CourtListener 10830002•Andrea M. v. Paul M. CA2/3
Texte intégral
Filed 3/30/26 Andrea M. v. Paul M. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ANDREA M., B346663
Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STFL12058)
v.
PAUL M.,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Josh Freeman Stinn, Judge. Affirmed in
part and reversed in part with directions.
Paul M., in pro. per.; and Sheri Tanaka for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Paul M. (Paul) appeals from a restraining order issued
under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code,
§ 6200 et seq.)1 at the request of his wife, Andrea M. (Andrea).
The restraining order required Paul to move out of the marital
residence, gave Andrea sole legal and physical custody of the
couple’s three teenage children, Rylan, Nicholas, and Sebastian,
and permitted Paul contact with the children only during visits
supervised by a professional monitor selected by Andrea and paid
for by Paul.
As we discuss, the domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) was overbroad in significant part. We therefore direct
the trial court on remand to strike Andrea’s and Paul’s adult son,
Rylan, from the order; issue a new custody and visitation order
that takes into account Nicholas’s and Sebastian’s wishes with
regard to contact with their father; omit from the order reference
to the family’s pets; permit Paul access to the minor children’s
medical and education records; and permit Paul to retrieve his
personal property from the family’s residence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Divorce proceedings and DVRO petition.
Andrea and Paul were married in 2005 and have three
children together: Rylan (born in December 2006), Nicholas
(born in May 2009), and Sebastian (born in January 2013).
Andrea is a marriage and family therapist who works for a
community mental health agency and has a private practice.
Paul is a soccer coach.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Family
Code.
2
Andrea filed a marital dissolution petition in
December 2024. Paul filed a response in January 2025, in which
he requested spousal support and sole legal and physical custody
of the children.
Andrea filed an application for a DVRO against Paul in
February 2025.2 Andrea stated that Paul had a history of
“escalating verbal, emotional, and physical abuse,” and he had
threatened Sebastian by telling him that his “ ‘time is coming’ ”
after Andrea filed for divorce. Andrea sought protection for
herself, the three children (then ages 18, 15, and 12 years), and
the family’s pets. She also sought exclusive possession of the
family home and sole legal and physical custody of the children
with no visitation for Paul.
The trial court granted a temporary restraining order on
February 3 and set a hearing for February 28. At the time the
temporary restraining order was granted, Andrea, Paul, and the
children were still living together.
II. DVRO hearing.
A. Andrea’s testimony.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing over portions of
three days in February, March, and April. Andrea testified that
Paul physically and verbally abused both her and the children.
With regard to herself, Andrea said that Paul grabbed her throat
during an argument 18 years earlier, when Rylan was a newborn.
When Andrea told Paul she was leaving the house, he locked her
car keys in the bathroom. Andrea said Paul never again touched
2 All subsequent dates are in 2025 unless otherwise
indicated.
3
her violently, but he “pin[ned]” her during arguments without
touching her. Andrea explained: “He just puts his hands like
this when we’re close and arguing so I can’t get away, but he
doesn’t touch me.” Andrea said Paul had “pinned” her
throughout their relationship, most recently during an argument
in June 2024.
With regard to physical abuse of the children, Andrea
testified to four incidents. The first incident occurred when
Rylan “was little.” Andrea said that Rylan texted her that Paul
had “grabbed [him] by the throat and the hair.” When Andrea
told Paul that was unacceptable, Paul responded that he had
“ ‘grabbed [Rylan] by the neckline to show him exactly what I
needed’ ” because “ ‘I can’t work with children that choose not to
listen to their parents.’ ” The second incident occurred “when we
lived at the house on Curtis.”3 Rylan asked Paul to turn his
music down, and Paul shoved Rylan and said he was going to
“knock Rylan’s fucking head off.” The third and fourth incidents
occurred in 2020. In May 2020, Nicholas tried to grab his phone
from Paul, and Paul “shoved Nicholas down on the ground.”
Nicholas hit his head and bloodied his nose. In July 2020, Paul
shoved Sebastian during an argument.
Andrea also testified that Paul verbally abused her on a
regular basis, telling her that she was “a piece of shit” and was
not a good mother or wife. In support, she introduced a copy of a
text from November 2024 in which Paul said he was “surprised,
3 Andrea did not specify when this incident occurred, but she
said in her DVRO request that the family had lived at their
current address on Barkley Lane for five years and three months.
Presumably, then, the shoving incident occurred sometime prior
to the end of 2019.
4
shocked, and disappointed” that Andrea had “not purchase[d] any
food or cook[ed] for this weekend/week as you had promised,” and
had left for the week without “providing any details (e.g., where
you would be staying, how long you would be leaving for, where
we/the boys could contact you if there was an emergency).” The
text continued: “Your actions are unfair, uncalled for,
unwarranted, and simply irresponsible as a parent. More than
that, you are failing/refusing to provide the boys with a basic
necessity for them to live and function (i.e., food). I had provided
you with options of going through either Instacart or DoorDash if
you were too busy to cook this week, which you simply ignored.
[¶] I also do not appreciate you leveraging and using the boys to
communicate . . . . For example, when I got home this evening,
Nico said that you told him to tell me that I needed to go to
Costco after I finished work to shop for food. These are
conversations that need to take place between us as adults (not
indirectly through the boys). It is our responsibility as parents to
ensure that we have clear communications with regards to our
children. It makes it somewhat challenging when you fail to
provide the details of what is happening in the family, and I learn
it through my children because you are unwilling to communicate
with me directly. This is an ongoing problem I have in our
marriage, and I do not think that the children should be used as
pawns in our disagreements. Unfortunately, your actions
continue to display your inability to provide proper guidance,
care, and support to our children.”
Subsequently, Paul texted Andrea: “Thank you for
confirming that you are refusing to pay any funds whatsoever for
food for our children after you left the family for an unspecified
period of time. As you already know, since you forced me to give
5
up other business opportunities I was pursuing due to your
unreliable and neglectful actions, I simply cannot cover your
portion for food. . . . Please understand I simply do not have the
time for your games nor do I have the money to pay for the
service charge given that there is now an overage on our joint
account because you are refusing to pay for a basic necessity (i.e.,
food) for your children.”
Andrea also played two recordings of interactions between
her, Paul, and the children that she said illustrated Paul’s verbal
abuse of the boys.4 In the first recording, Paul yelled at one of
the boys about comments he had made to Paul in public. Paul
said: “[I]f you don’t want to listen, . . . [t]hen you don’t get my
support. You don’t get anything [from] me, because I don’t want
a child that’s going to be disrespectful. . . . [Y]ou’re the one with
the fucking issues.” In the second recording, made in July 2023,
Paul and Nicholas argued, and Paul told Nicholas: “You’re on
your own for practices, and you’re on your own for [a soccer game
in] Phoenix . . . . I don’t need you on the team anymore. . . .
You’re a disappointment, you’re a disappointment as a fucking
son.”
Andrea testified that in November and December 2024, she
worked away from home for a period of time to earn extra money
and to try to de-escalate the tension in the house. The boys
stayed home with Paul, and Andrea saw them on the weekends.
Andrea didn’t worry that Paul would hurt the kids because she
“knew the kids would tell [her] if he did,” “like when Sebastian
4 The recordings are not part of the appellate record, but
transcripts of the recordings are attached to Andrea’s petition.
6
called me the very first night in December, crying that Paul had
taken away his Xbox for no reason.”
Andrea filed for divorce in December 2024. She said that
after she filed, she was concerned that Paul might harm her or
the children. She nonetheless sought joint legal and physical
custody with Paul because she was “trying to make it as easy as
possible and not rock the boat.” At that time, she continued to
live with Paul and to share a bed with him because “our house is
very tiny [and] there’s not another place to sleep” and she “didn’t
want to cause any waves.” She ultimately decided to seek a
DVRO because she “realized that [she] needed to stop the cycle”
of abuse and that it “was going to be the only way to protect us
because things got really toxic around the house, especially after
[she] filed” for divorce.
Andrea said the children had been “terrified” of Paul for
years, and she was scared of Paul when he yelled. She believed
that she and the children were in danger of being abused by Paul
if the court did not enter a restraining order. She hoped the court
would give her full custody of the kids and allow Paul to see the
kids only in public places because when Paul got angry and was
in a private place, “things go sideways.”
B. Nicholas’s testimony.
Nicholas, then age 15, testified about an incident a few
years earlier when he and his father argued and Paul took away
his phone. Paul pushed Nicholas when he went to get the phone
to plug it into a charger. Nicholas fell to the floor and developed
a bloody nose. Nicholas said he didn’t know why his nose began
bleeding—“I don’t know if my head hit something or maybe my
head hit the floor”—but when he got up, he had a bloody nose.
There were other incidents where Paul “rush[ed]” him into a
7
wall—“like, walking with a pace, like, fast towards us, kind of
like barricading us next to a wall,” so he “couldn’t move anywhere
else”—but “nothing physically ever really happens.” The last
such incident happened about a year earlier. Nicholas felt “a
little scared but kind of neutral” when Paul “rush[ed]” him.
Nicholas had seen his father similarly “rush[ ]” his younger
brother Sebastian.
Nicholas also testified that Paul had occasionally been
verbally abusive, “yelling, cursing, stuff like that.” He described
an incident in May 2024 when he and Paul had argued in the car,
and Paul called him a “retard” and made Nicholas walk the rest
of the way to school. The same day, Paul texted Nicholas that he
would not take Nicholas to soccer practice because he would “not
be disrespected by you or anyone within this household.” After
that incident, Paul refused to drive Nicholas to school or soccer
practice for four or five months. Instead, Andrea would drive
Nicholas or he would ride his bike or take an Uber. Another
time, Paul told Nicholas he was a “ ‘disappointment as a son.’ ”
That made Nicholas feel disappointed and sad. Nicholas was
sometimes “scared” of his father, but was not “terrified” of him.
Nicholas and his brothers sometimes stayed alone with
Paul when Andrea traveled for work, most recently in November
or December 2024. Nicholas wasn’t scared to be alone with his
dad.
Nicholas acknowledged writing the following message in an
undated birthday card to Paul: “ ‘Happy birthday, dad. I know
we argue and fight, but that doesn’t take away how much I love
you and care about you. You’re always there for me. And I can
trust you with anything. You’ve raised us so well, and I’ll always
8
thank you for that. So have a great birthday, and I love you.’ ”
Nicholas said he was sincere when he wrote that.
C. Paul’s testimony.
Paul denied that he ever grabbed Andrea by the throat or
locked the car keys in the bathroom when Rylan was a baby. He
denied ever barricading Andrea or any of his sons, shoving Rylan
or Sebastian, telling Rylan that he “suck[ed],” was “horrible,” was
“an embarrassment,” or “nobody wants you,” touching his
children in a way that caused them pain or injury, or grabbing
any of the children by the throat or the neck.
Regarding the incident in which Nicholas’s nose was
bloodied, Paul said he took Nicholas’s phone and Nicholas tried to
grab it back. When Paul let go of the phone, it hit Nicholas on
the nose and Nicholas fell to the ground. Paul never intended for
Nicholas to be struck in the nose.
Paul acknowledged that after Nicholas treated him
disrespectfully, he did not drive Nicholas to school or practice for
five months. He also acknowledged that in November 2023, he
told Nicholas that he was “ ‘a disappointment as a fucking son’ ”
and was “now on his own.” And, he acknowledged a recording
from July 2023 in which he said: “ ‘You don’t get my support.
You don’t get anything from me because I don’t want a child that
is going to be disrespectful.’ ”
Paul also acknowledged texting Sebastian that, “ ‘your time
is coming.’ ” He meant that when you do something wrong, life
will catch up to you. Sebastian had been disrespectful and had
talked back a lot, and Paul “was trying to articulate to him that
in life, you have to treat people with respect and dignity and the
way he was handling himself wasn’t the proper way.”
9
Paul testified that he and Andrea had different views on
how to raise and discipline children. He explained: “[B]ecause
Andrea was always out working, I was more of a disciplinary
individual. I had to teach my children . . . . It was about
accountability. It was about respect. It was about integrity.
I had to implement and showcase these values to them at a young
age and Andrea was more of . . . a friend. I’ll be here. If she was
around, great. If she wasn’t, I handled all those responsibilities
to ensure that my children when they went out in public, they
respected their neighbors and they respected another family, a
mother, a child. . . . It was more of me being, you know, I think
in today’s society, a mother and father. Being able to kind of
implement these important values that unfortunately a lot of
these children do not have.”
Paul said his relationship with his sons had always been
solid and loving until the restraining order was put in place. He
never rushed or pinned his kids.
D. Trial court’s findings and order.
On April 11, the trial court entered a DVRO protecting
Andrea, Rylan, Nicholas, and Sebastian from Paul. The order
directed Paul to move out of the family home; to stay 100 yards
away from the family home, Andrea’s workplace, the children’s
schools, and the family’s pets; not to contact Andrea except
through Talking Parents; and not to contact the children except
during monitored visits. The order further granted Andrea sole
legal and physical custody of the children, and permitted Paul
three-hour visits with the children on the first and third Sundays
of each month. Visits were to be in a public place and monitored
by a professional monitor chosen by Andrea and paid for by Paul.
Paul was specifically directed not to attend any of the children’s
10
sporting events, and he was denied access to the children’s
educational and medical records.
In connection with the DVRO, the court made the following
oral findings:
“The court found [Andrea’s] testimony to be credible
including her testimony of dad’s conduct[,] including testimony
about him . . . pinning and barricading both her and the children
at different times, his name calling and belittling of her, grabbing
Rylan by the throat and the hair, shoving Nicholas, intentionally
or recklessly causing him to fall which resulted in a bloody nose,
shoving Sebastian with threats to knock his fucking head off.[5]
“The court found Nicholas’s testimony to be credible.
Nicholas testified to the incident where dad pushed him where he
fell and it resulted in a bloody nose. Nicholas testified to various
incidents of dad rushing and blocking and barricading.
“The court does find dad created a culture within the home
of intimidation and control which formed the pattern of conduct.
“The court found Nicholas’s testimony about . . . dad calling
Nicholas a retard . . . credible as well.
“Under [section] 6203, of course, we know that abuse is
either intentional or reckless as the court alluded to. The
pushing of Nicholas causing him to fall and resulting in a bloody
nose, . . . if it wasn’t intentional, it certainly would have been
reckless.
“In terms of dad’s conduct with the rushing and the
barricading, the question is whether or not that creates a
5 Andrea’s testimony was that this incident involved Rylan.
Presumably, the court misspoke when it referred to Sebastian.
11
reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily injury. Given the
context and the history and the threats, I think it does.
“The court is also going to find that dad’s conduct toward
mom, the insults, the belittling, the rushing of the children,
barricading, did disturb her peace and destroy her emotional
calm.
“The court also points counsel to the case of Perez v.
[Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389], that stands for the
proposition that it does destroy someone’s mental peace and
emotional calm when children are being abused.
“Accordingly, the court is going to grant the request for the
restraining order. However, I am not going to make it for five
years. I am going to make it for three years. I do find good cause
given the nature of the abuse to include Rylan, Nicholas and
Sebastian. I understand that Rylan is 18 and will soon be going
to college but he is still a household member. [¶] . . . [¶]
“I’m going to include a no-contact provision, which means
[Paul is] going to be prohibited from contacting either [Andrea] or
the [children] directly or indirectly by any means including
telephone, mail, email or other electronic means. However, I am
going to make an exception . . . [for] dad [to] contact mom via
Talking Parents. [¶] All communications shall be child focused.
In other words, it’s only about what is going on with the kids . . . .
[W]e’re talking about the kinds of things that parents would need
to share information on like doctors’ visits, check-ups, major
milestones, things like that. Custody exchanges, visitation
times. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Paul] is going to be ordered to stay 100 yards away from
the home, [Andrea], her job or her workplace or her vehicle, the
. . . children [and] the children’s school[s].
12
“I am going to include an exception . . . that dad . . . is going
to be permitted to have monitored visitation and that will be the
exception to the stay-away order.
“I am going to sustain the prior order of the move out,
which is that mom is going to be granted exclusive access and use
of the marital home for the time being. . . .
“I’m including the animals . . . for protection as well. That
is . . . the family dog[s] Milo [and] . . . Rambo, and the three
chickens.[6] [¶] . . . [¶]
“The court is going to grant mom sole legal and sole
physical custody. Dad is going to be permitted to have
professionally supervised visitation. Mom is to choose a
monitor. . . . Dad is going to be responsible for covering
100 percent of the fees associated with the monitored visitation.
“I’m going to permit dad’s visitation on the first and third
Sunday of each month and it’s going to be for three hours by
mutual agreement. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . All visitations are to be in a
public location. And dad shall not attend any of the [children’s]
sporting events.”
III. Subsequent proceedings.
Paul filed a request for a statement of decision on April 14,
but no such statement was issued. Paul filed a notice of appeal of
the DRVO on May 23.
On May 27, Paul filed an ex parte request to modify the
DVRO. Paul asked that Rylan, who was then 18 years old, be
excluded from the order, and that Paul be allowed to attend
6 Although Andrea’s DVRO request sought protection for the
family’s pets, there was no testimony at the hearing suggesting
that Paul had injured or threatened to injure the pets.
13
Rylan’s high school graduation. The court denied the request,
finding that Paul had not made a showing of immediate
irreparable harm warranting emergency relief.
Paul filed a further request to change court order on
May 30, and on June 11, he filed a request for spousal support,
attorney fees, access to his personal belongings in the marital
home, and to be permitted contact with Rylan “once he has moved
from the marital residence . . . and moved on campus to the
University of Hawaii.” Among other things, Paul said in a
supporting declaration that he had been homeless since he was
forced to leave the marital home in February, had exhausted his
savings and run up credit card debt to pay his lawyers, and had
not been able to see his children for months because he could not
afford the professional monitor’s fees. Further, although the
court had not ordered him to do so, he had enrolled in and
completed an anger management class “with the hopes that this
will aid in reunification with my children.” He concluded: “I love
all three of my children and miss them dearly. I long to see their
faces, hug them, and hear how they are doing.”
On June 20, the court found that because Paul had filed an
appeal of the DVRO, the court “does not currently have
jurisdiction to change or end the restraining order.” The court
nonetheless amended the restraining order to eliminate custody
and visitation orders relating to Rylan, who had turned 18 years
old. Paul’s request to change or end the restraining order was
otherwise “stayed based on the pending appeal.”
14
DISCUSSION7
Paul contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
including the children and the family pets as protected parties;
failing to issue a statement of decision; granting Andrea relief
she had not requested; permitting Andrea to introduce evidence
that was not timely submitted, was hearsay, and was
unauthenticated; and barring Paul from retrieving his belongings
from the family’s home. Finally, Paul contends the trial court’s
cumulative errors denied him a fair hearing. We consider Paul’s
contentions below.
7 Andrea did not file a brief on appeal. “ ‘Although some
courts have treated the failure to file a respondent’s brief as in
effect a consent to a reversal, it has been said that the “better
rule . . . is to examine the record on the basis of appellant’s brief
and to reverse only if prejudicial error is found.” ’ (In re Bryce C.
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 232–233.) This approach gives full effect
to the presumption that the judgment or order appealed from is
correct and that, in order to prevail, the appellant has the burden
to not only overcome that presumption but also demonstrate
reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–
609.)” (Farnum v. Iris Biotechnologies Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
602, 608.) We follow that approach here, examining the record on
the basis of Paul’s brief and reversing only where we find
prejudicial error. (See In re Marriage of M.P. and M.C. (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1106, fn. 5 [“In view of the important
policies advanced by the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, and
the overriding need to protect Wife and the minor children from
abuse, we ‘examin[e] the record on the basis of appellant’s brief
and revers[e] only if prejudicial error is found’ ”]; Rooz v. Kimmel
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 573, 594, fn. 12 [adopting the “better
practice of examining the record on the basis of appellant’s brief
and reversing only if prejudicial error is found”].)
15
I. Paul has not complied with his duty to provide a
summary of all the significant facts.
“Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) of the California Rules of Court
imposes a duty on an appellant to ‘[p]rovide a summary of the
significant facts limited to matters in the record.’ The significant
facts are not simply the facts favoring the appellant. Rather, ‘An
appellant must fairly set forth all the significant facts, not just
those beneficial to the appellant.’ ” (Perry v. Kia Motors America,
Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1096.)
Paul’s appellate briefing does not comply with this rule.
Notably, Paul’s opening brief does not discuss Andrea’s testimony
that Paul “pinned” her throughout their relationship, shoved and
pinned the children, and was verbally abusive. Paul also fails to
acknowledge Nicholas’s testimony that he developed a bloody
nose as a result of Paul pushing him, that Paul “rush[ed]” him
and Sebastian into walls so they “couldn’t move anywhere else,”
and that Nicholas felt “a little scared” when Paul rushed or
pinned him. To the contrary, Paul insists that Nicholas “never
said Paul caused the [bloody nose]” and “admitted he was not
afraid of his father.”
The failure to provide a fair summary of the evidence
forfeits the claims on appeal. (See, e.g., Symons Emergency
Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 598;
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. AMZ Ins. Services, Inc. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 401, 415.) Nonetheless, because this appeal
concerns not just Andrea and Paul, but also their children, we
will address Paul’s contentions on the merits.
16
II. The conduct of the trial did not violate Paul’s due
process rights.
Paul contends that the trial court abused its discretion and
violated Paul’s right to due process in a variety of ways.
Specifically, Paul urges that the trial court failed to issue a
statement of decision; granted Andrea relief she had not
requested; permitted Andrea to introduce evidence that was not
timely submitted, was hearsay, and was unauthenticated; and
erroneously credited Andrea’s testimony. Paul’s contentions lack
merit, as we discuss.
A. Failure to issue a statement of decision.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 632, “[t]he court
shall issue a statement of decision . . . upon the request of any
party appearing.” If the trial “is concluded within one calendar
day or in less than eight hours over more than one day,” a
request for statement of decision “must be made prior to the
submission of the matter for decision”; otherwise, the request
must be made “within 10 days after the court announces a
tentative decision.” (Ibid.) The statement of decision “shall be in
writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree otherwise;
however, when the trial is concluded within one calendar day or
in less than 8 hours over more than one day, the statement of
decision may be made orally on the record in the presence of the
parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subd. (b).) A trial court’s error
in failing to issue a statement of decision is not reversible per se,
but is reviewed for harmless error. (F.P. v. Monier (2017)
3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.)
In the present case, Paul filed a request for a statement of
decision on April 14, three days after the trial court issued the
17
DVRO. The request therefore was timely if the trial was more
than eight hours, but untimely if the trial was less than eight
hours. Although the trial was held over portions of three days,
we cannot determine whether it exceeded eight hours because
neither the reporter’s transcript nor the minute orders contain
time stamps. Paul thus has not satisfied his appellate burden of
demonstrating error. (See Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
pp. 608–609 [“it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure
that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct
and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of
the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment”].)
In any event, the purpose of a statement of decision “is to
permit meaningful review by the appellate court.” (S.Y. v.
Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 324, 346.) Because the
court made oral findings setting forth its reasons for the DVRO,
the absence of a statement of decision does not hamper our
review. (In re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou (1991)
1 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1494, fn. 3.) Any error, thus, is harmless.
B. The trial court did not grant Andrea relief she
did not request.
Paul contends that the DVRO violated his right to due
process because it granted relief that Andrea had not requested
and of which he had no prior notice. Specifically, Paul contends
that Andrea’s request for a restraining order did not allege any
acts of physical violence and did not seek orders relating to the
children, the marital property, or the family’s pets.
The trial court record does not support Paul’s contention.
Andrea’s DVRO request asserted that Paul “physically abused
our sons (shoving to the ground and causing a bloody nose;
18
grabbing by the throat and hair) while in a shouting rage,”
“continuously threatens me and the children with verbal,
emotional, financial, and physical abuse in the home,” “has
grabbed the children by the hair, throat, and body while enraged
on multiple occasions,” pulled Sebastion’s hair, “snatched
[Nicholas’s] phone from his hand and knocked him to the ground,
giving Nicolas a bloody nose,” and “grabbed our son Rylan by the
throat in a rage.” Further, Andrea’s DVRO request specifically
sought a move-out order, protection for the couple’s three
children and the family’s pets, a grant of full legal and physical
custody to Andrea, and no visitation for Paul. The scope of the
hearing and order, therefore, did not exceed Andrea’s request.8
C. Evidentiary rulings.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. (640 Octavia LLC v. Walston (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
861, 868–869.) “ ‘In deciding whether the trial court’s order[ ]
excluding evidence . . . constituted an abuse of discretion, we
“view the entire record in the light most favorable to the court’s
ruling, and draw all reasonable inferences in support of it.
[Citation.] . . . . The trial court’s decision will be reversed only
‘for manifest abuse exceeding the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Paul makes a variety of claims of evidentiary error. None
has merit.
Admission of Andrea’s exhibit book. Paul contends that on
the first day of the hearing, over his counsel’s objection, the trial
8 At oral argument on appeal, Paul’s counsel noted that the
DVRO denied Paul access to the children’s educational and
medical records, which Andrea had not requested in her petition.
We address this issue below.
19
court allowed Andrea to provide “an entirely new ‘exhibit book’ ”
that contained exhibits Paul had no opportunity to review or
rebut. The record is to the contrary. The reporter’s transcript
demonstrates that when Andrea’s counsel handed the court and
the witness a copy of Andrea’s exhibit book on the first morning
of the hearing, the court inquired whether Andrea’s counsel had
also provided a copy of the exhibits to Paul’s counsel. Andrea’s
counsel responded that she had “sent [them] electronically to
Mr. Maier, and I just provided counsel, at counsel table, hard
cop[i]es as well.” Paul’s counsel did not object or suggest that he
had not timely been provided a copy of Andrea’s exhibits. Paul’s
suggestion that he was ambushed by the introduction of new
exhibits at trial thus lacks support in the record.
Exclusion of Paul’s rebuttal exhibits. Paul contends that
the trial court erred by excluding his rebuttal exhibits, including
a birthday card from Nicholas to Paul and photographs of meals
Paul prepared for the family. However, the minute orders Paul
cites in support reflect the admission of Paul’s exhibits, including
the birthday card, and the reporter’s transcript reflects that the
photographs were also admitted.9
Admission of Andrea’s notes. Paul contends that the trial
court erred by admitting Andrea’s notes, which he characterizes
as “classic hearsay.” In fact, Andrea’s notes were marked for
identification but were not admitted into evidence.
Admission of Andrea’s audio recordings. Paul contends
that the trial court violated Penal Code section 632 by admitting
9 Paul also contends that the trial court excluded his texts to
Sebastian’s soccer coaches, but no such text messages are
referenced in the appellate record.
20
into evidence two audio recordings that Andrea made without
Paul’s knowledge. Penal Code section 632 generally prohibits the
admission in a judicial proceeding of intentional electronic
recordings of confidential communications without the consent or
knowledge of all parties, but there are some statutory exceptions.
(Pen. Code, § 632, subds. (a) & (d).) One such exception is set
forth in Penal Code section 633.6, subdivision (b), which provides
that “a victim of domestic violence who is seeking a domestic
violence restraining order from a court, and who reasonably
believes that a confidential communication made to him or her by
the perpetrator may contain evidence germane to that
restraining order, may record that communication for the
exclusive purpose and use of providing that evidence to the
court.”
Paul suggests that the recordings should not have been
admitted because they did not demonstrate abuse. But under the
statute, the admissibility of the recordings turned not on their
contents, but on Andrea’s purpose in making them—i.e., whether
she “reasonably believe[d] that [the recording] may contain
evidence germane to [a] restraining order.” (Pen. Code, § 633.6,
subd. (b).) Below, Andrea testified that she made the recordings
because knew that she “at some point, might need to report
[Paul] for child abuse.” The trial court thus did not abuse its
discretion by crediting Andrea’s testimony and concluding that
the recordings were admissible under this section.
Admission of texts and emails. Paul asserts that the trial
court erred by admitting a “handful of text messages and emails”
that were never properly authenticated. Paul does not identify
the particular exhibits he believes should not have been
admitted, but he presumably is referring to Andrea’s Exhibits 1,
21
3, 6, and 15, which are texts and emails between the parties.
Paul’s counsel stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1, and did
not object to the admission of Exhibits 3, 6, and 15. Any objection
to the admission of these exhibits, therefore, was forfeited.
(People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 969 [objection to
evidence forfeited if not raised in trial court]; Wang v. Peletta
(2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 478, 483, fn. 1 [same].)
Disappearance of exhibits from court files. Paul asserts
that all of the exhibits “vanished” after trial, denying him the
opportunity to obtain meaningful appellate review. He does not
explain why he could not provide the court with his own copy of
the admitted exhibits or obtain a copy from his or Andrea’s
attorney. In any event, all or most of the admitted exhibits
appear to have been either attached to Andrea’s petition or read
into the oral record. We therefore perceive no prejudicial error.
D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
crediting Andrea’s testimony.
Paul contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
crediting Andrea’s testimony “despite her own admissions,
contradictions, and conduct that rendered her account
implausible.” Paul notes that Andrea admitted that Paul had
physically abused her just once, 19 years before the DVRO
hearing; although Andrea was a mandated reporter, she had
never reported any abuse of herself or the children; Andrea
continued sharing a bed with Paul until she served him with the
DVRO application; Andrea told Sebastion that she was “ ‘not
scared’ ” of Paul; and Andrea left the children in Paul’s care for
several weeks in November and December 2024. Paul also
contended that Andrea’s testimony was “riddled with
22
contradictions and factual impossibilities” that “destroyed her
credibility.”
In making this contention, Paul is asking this court to do
something—revisit the trial court’s credibility findings—that the
law forbids us to do. “[T]he trial court is best situated to exercise
discretion to grant or deny the DVRO request after evaluating
the credibility of the parties and weighing the evidence.” (X.K. v.
M.C. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1287, 1298; see also In re Miguel J.
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 635, 645 [“ ‘ “ ‘issues of fact and credibility
are the province of the trial court’ ” ’ ”].) Thus, appellate courts
“do ‘ “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (Ridley v. Rancho
Palma Grande Homeowners Assn. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 788,
800; see also People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 435
[“ ‘Our review “accept[s] the trial court’s credibility
determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if
supported by substantial evidence” ’ ”].) Instead, because we
“ ‘review a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have no
opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the
witnesses,’ ” we must “defer ‘to the trier of fact on such
determinations, and ha[ve] no power to judge the effect or value
of, or to weigh the evidence; to consider the credibility of
witnesses; or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or
deductions from the evidence.’ ” (Newman v. Casey (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 359, 378.) We therefore reject Paul’s suggestion
that the trial court erred in crediting Andrea’s version of events
and rejecting his.
23
III. The DVRO was overbroad with regard to the
children and the family’s pets.
Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by the manner in which it conducted the trial, we now
turn to the DVRO’s terms. As we discuss, the DVRO was
overbroad because it included Rylan as a protected party, made
custody and visitation orders as to Nicholas and Sebastian
without considering their wishes and best interests, and
protected the family’s pets. We therefore will reverse the DVRO
in part and remand the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.
A. Legal standards.
The DVPA permits a trial court to issue a DVRO “to
provide for a separation of the persons involved in . . . domestic
violence” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”
(§§ 6220, 6300.) Past abuse must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 106, 116; In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.)
“ ‘Domestic violence’ ” is “abuse perpetrated against” a
spouse or child of a party, among others. (§ 6211.) To “ ‘abuse’ ”
means (1) “[t]o intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to
cause bodily injury,” (2) to “[s]exual[ly] assault,” (3) “[t]o place a
person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury to that person or to another,” or (4) “[t]o engage in any
behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a).) Section 6320, in turn, permits
a court to enjoin a party from “molesting, attacking, striking,
stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly
24
impersonating . . . , falsely impersonating . . . , harassing,
telephoning, . . . destroying personal property, contacting, either
directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a
specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party.”
“ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ ” is “conduct that,
based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or
emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) Such
conduct includes “coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior
that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s
free will and personal liberty.” (Ibid.) Abuse “is not limited to
the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203,
subd. (b).)
A DVRO may be granted to “any person described in
Section 6211,” including a spouse or former spouse, and may
issue to protect both the petitioner and, “on a showing of good
cause, . . . other named family or household members.” (§§ 6301,
subd. (b), 6211, 6320, subd. (a).) In considering whether a DVRO
should issue, “[t]he length of time since the most recent act of
abuse is not, by itself, determinative.” (§ 6301, subd. (d).)
Instead, “[t]he court shall consider the totality of the
circumstances.” (Ibid.) Where appropriate, a court may also
issue a child custody or visitation order in a DVPA proceeding.
(§ 6223.)
We review the grant or denial of a request for a DVRO and
accompanying custody order for an abuse of discretion. (Navarro
v. Cervera (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 229, 238; In re Marriage of
F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 115–116.) “ ‘ “ ‘To the
extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s factual
findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of review.’ ” ’ ”
(Navarro, at p. 238.)
25
B. The DVRO was overbroad as to Rylan.
Paul suggests that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
include Rylan as a protected party because he was 18 years old
when the DVRO was issued. Not so. Section 6320 provides that
a court may, in its discretion, include “other named family or
household members” in a DVRO on a showing of good cause.
(§ 6320, subd. (a).) Nothing in section 6320 limits the family
members who may be subject to a protective order to minors
(ibid.), and courts routinely include adult family members in
DVROs (see, e.g., In re Marriage of Reichental (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 396, 405 [no abuse of discretion in including
husband’s girlfriend in DVRO]).10
Because the statute permits the inclusion of adults as
additional protected parties in DVROs, Rylan was not “beyond
the court’s jurisdiction,” as Paul urges. We nonetheless conclude
that the DVRO was overbroad with regard to Rylan. As noted
above, a family or household member may be included in a DVRO
“on a showing of good cause.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).) In determining
good cause to include family members as protected parties, the
court considers the totality of the circumstances (K.T. v. E.S.
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114, 1129; M.S. v. A.S. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1144), including whether the person to be
restrained “presently pose[s] a threat” to those family members
10 In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587 does
not suggest to the contrary. Jensen held that a trial court lacked
personal jurisdiction over an adult child who lived in Thailand,
and lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a custody order
concerning the child once he turned 18. Jensen did not consider
whether a trial court could include an adult party as a protected
party in a DVRO.
26
(J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 644). Generally, “ ‘ “good
cause as a standard ‘is relative and depends on all the
circumstances.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘[I]n determining the meaning of
“good cause” in a particular context, the courts utilize common
sense based upon the totality of the circumstances,’ which
‘include[s] the purpose of the underlying statutory scheme.’ ” ’ ”
(K.T. v. E.S., at p. 1130.) We review the trial court’s good cause
finding for substantial evidence. (M.S. v. A.S., at p. 1143–1144.)
Below, Andrea described two incidents of physical violence
involving Rylan—that when Rylan “was little,” he reported that
Paul had “grabbed [him] by the throat and the hair”; and when
the family “lived at the house on Curtis”—i.e., sometime prior to
late 2019—Paul shoved Rylan and said he was going to “knock
Rylan’s fucking head off.” The trial court did not explain why
these incidents, which occurred in the family home when Rylan
was a child, constituted good cause to issue an order of protection
even after Rylan reached adulthood, Paul was removed from the
home, and Rylan was moving out of state for college. We are
troubled, moreover, that Rylan was included as a protected party
without any evidence of his wishes, and that the DVRO
prevented Paul from any contact with Rylan by any means,
including telephone and email. It therefore prevented Paul from
seeing, calling, and emailing Rylan, and from receiving calls and
emails from Rylan. In short, the order completely severed the
relationship between Paul and Rylan.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the evidence
before the trial court did not support the inclusion of Rylan as a
protected party, and we therefore will order Rylan stricken from
the DVRO. Of course, should Rylan desire protection from his
father, he is free to seek a DVRO on his own behalf.
27
C. The DVRO was overbroad with regard to
Nicholas and Sebastian.
Paul contends that the DVRO was also overbroad with
regard to 15-year-old Nicholas and 12-year-old Sebastian. He
urges that the boys were “summarily added” as protected parties,
and that the trial court made custody and visitation findings
without considering the children’s wishes or best interests.
We do not agree that the trial court abused its discretion by
including Nicholas and Sebastian as protected parties.11 As
discussed above, there was evidence that Paul had shoved both
boys during separate incidents in 2020, within five years of the
DVRO proceeding, and that Nicholas had sustained a bloody nose
as a result. There also was evidence that Paul “rushed” or
“barricade[d]” Nicholas and Sebastian when he was “mad,”
preventing the boys from “mov[ing] anywhere else.” Nicholas
said these incidents were not “terrifying,” but “there are some
instances where I do get scared.” Nicholas said the most recent
“rushing” incident happened about a year before the DVRO
hearing. Nicholas also said Paul was sometimes verbally
abusive, explaining that there were a couple of times when
arguments “[went] a little south and [got] violent,” with Paul
11 Contrary to Paul’s assertion, J.H. v. G.H., supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 641–642 does not require a trial court to
make a specific finding of good cause before including children in
a DVRO. To the contrary, J.H. says that section 6340 “only
requires that a court consider the safety of the petitioner and the
children for whom orders under the statute are sought,” noting
that “[h]ad the Legislature meant to make orders contingent on a
specific finding or showing, it surely would have said so . . . .”
(Id. at p. 642, some italics added.)
28
“yelling, cursing, stuff like that.” This conduct, considered
together, constituted good cause to include Nicholas and
Sebastian as parties protected by the DVRO.
We reach a different conclusion with regard to the custody
and visitation order. A custody or visitation order issued in a
proceeding brought under the DVPA is subject to sections 3020 to
3204, which govern custody of minor children. (§ 6223.)
Section 3040 provides that custody should be granted “according
to the best interest of the child.” (§ 3040, subd. (a); Bianka M. v.
Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004, 1020.) Section 3020
further provides:
“(a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the
public policy of this state to ensure that the health, safety, and
welfare of children shall be the court’s primary concern in
determining the best interests of children when making any
orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of
children. The Legislature further finds and declares that
children have the right to be safe and free from abuse, and that
the perpetration of child abuse or domestic violence in a
household where a child resides is detrimental to the health,
safety, and welfare of the child.
“(b) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the
public policy of this state to ensure that children have frequent
and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have
separated or dissolved their marriage, or ended their
relationship, and to encourage parents to share the rights and
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy,
except when the contact would not be in the best interests of the
child, as provided in subdivisions (a) and (c) of this section and
Section 3011.
29
“(c) When the policies set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b)
of this section are in conflict, a court’s order regarding physical or
legal custody or visitation shall be made in a manner that
ensures the health, safety, and welfare of the child and the safety
of all family members.”
Upon a finding by a court that a party seeking custody of a
child has perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five
years against a parent, child, or child’s siblings, there is a
rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or
legal custody to the perpetrator is detrimental to the child’s best
interests. (§ 3044, subd. (a).)12 This presumption may be
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.; see also S.Y.
v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 334 [to rebut the
presumption, father who had perpetrated domestic violence “had
to show only that, by a preponderance of the evidence, joint or
sole custody to him would not be detrimental to [the child’s] best
interest”].)
Where there has been a finding of domestic violence, the
preference for frequent and continuing contact with both parents
“may not be used to rebut the presumption, in whole or in part.”
(§ 3044, subd. (b)(1).) However, “[t]he legal presumption is
not . . . ‘that a parent who has committed an act of domestic
violence should not be awarded sole or joint legal or physical
custody of a child.’ [That parent’s] burden [is] only to persuade
the court his custody would not be detrimental to [the child’s]
best interest.” (S.Y. v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
p. 334, italics omitted.) And, while a domestic violence finding in
12 Section 3044 was amended effective January 1, 2026. The
sole change made to section 3044 is not relevant to this appeal.
30
a family law case changes the burden of persuasion, it “does not
limit the evidence cognizable by the court,” “eliminate the best
interest requirement,” or “supplant other Family Code provisions
governing custody proceedings.” (Keith R. v. Superior Court
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1054–1055.) The statute also does
not establish a presumption for or against joint custody:
“[A]gain, the paramount factor is the child’s health, safety and
welfare. (§§ 3020, subd. (a), 3040, subd. (b).) And where the
section 3044 presumption has been rebutted, there is no
statutory bar against an award of joint or sole custody to a parent
who was the subject of the order.” (Id. at p. 1055.)
With regard to visitation, the court “shall grant reasonable
visitation rights to a parent when it is shown that the visitation
would be in the best interest of the child.” (§ 3100, subd. (a).) If a
protective order has been issued restraining a parent, “the court
shall consider whether the best interest of the child requires that
visitation by that parent be suspended, denied, or limited to
situations in which a third person, specified by the court, is
present.” (§ 3100, subd. (b)(1)(A).) In determining whether
visitation with the restrained party is in the best interest of the
child, “the court shall consider the nature of the acts that led to
the protective order, the period of time that has elapsed since
that order, and whether the restrained party has committed
further acts of abuse.” (§ 3100, subd. (b)(2).)
If a child is “of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to
form an intelligent preference as to custody or visitation,” the
court “shall consider, and give due weight to, the wishes of the
child in making an order granting or modifying custody or
visitation.” (§ 3042, subd. (a).) The court may allow a child to
address the court or, alternatively, “shall provide alternative
31
means of obtaining input from the child and other information
regarding the child’s preferences.” (§ 3042, subds. (c), (e).) In
making custody and visitation decisions, “California courts give
special weight to a child’s wishes, assuming the child can form an
intelligent preference.” (Guardianship of Saul H. (2022)
13 Cal.5th 827, 854; see also In re Aljamie D. (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432 [child’s wishes are not determinative,
but are relevant to best interests determination].)
Here, 15-year-old Nicholas and 12-year-old Sebastian
plainly were “of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to
form an intelligent preference as to custody or visitation.” The
trial court therefore should have “considered, and give[n] due
weight to, the[ir] wishes” in making a custody and visitation
order. (§ 3042, subd. (a).) It did not do so. Although Nicholas
testified at the hearing, he was not asked what his wishes were
with regard to custody or visitation, and Sebastian did not testify.
Nor were the children evaluated by a custody evaluator or
represented by counsel. The court therefore had no information
about the children’s wishes with regard to custody and visitation
to inform a best interests analysis. It nonetheless issued an
extraordinarily broad order that barred Paul from contacting the
boys by phone, email, or text, permitted him only infrequent
monitored visits with the boys in a public setting, and precluded
him from accessing any health or educational information about
his children. Further, as Paul’s counsel noted at oral argument,
although Andrea’s petition requested that Paul continue to have
access to records maintained by the children’s schools and their
medical, dental, mental health, and extracurricular activity
providers, the DVRO prevented him from any access to those
records.
32
On the present record, the DVRO was overbroad. While
the DVRO’s broad provisions might be appropriate in some
circumstances—for example, if the children told the court that
they feared having overnights with Paul, being alone with him, or
having phone or text contact—they were unwarranted on the
present record. Nor should the court have ordered Paul to pay for
a professional monitor without determining if he could afford to
do so. Finally, the trial court should not have prevented Paul’s
access to the children’s education and health records, or extended
the custody and visitation order as to Nicholas beyond his 18th
birthday.
For all of these reasons, we will reverse the custody and
visitation order and the portion of the DVRO precluding Paul’s
access to the children’s education and medical records. On
remand, we direct the trial court to conduct a new proceeding in
which it considers Nicholas’s and Sebastian’s wishes with regard
to future contact with Paul and, having done so, to enter a new
custody and visitation order that gives due weight to the
children’s wishes and terminates as to Nicholas on his 18th
birthday. The trial court is also directed to revise the DVRO as
appropriate to accommodate the custody/visitation order, and to
permit Paul to access the minor children’s education and medical
records.
D. The DVRO was overbroad with regard to the
family pets.
We also conclude that the DRVO was overbroad with
regard to the family’s pets. Section 6320, subdivision (b) provides
that on a showing of good cause, the court may give the protected
party exclusive possession and control of any animal, and may
order the restrained party “to stay away from the animal and
33
forbid the [restrained party] from taking, transferring,
encumbering, concealing, molesting, attacking, striking,
threatening, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.”
Here, as Paul notes, there was no evidence suggesting that Paul
ever injured, or threatened to injure, the family’s dogs and
chickens. Indeed, the only testimony regarding the pets
concerned who typically was responsible for feeding and bathing
them. The trial court therefore erred in ordering Paul to stay
away from the family’s pets.
E. Paul’s right to retrieve his personal property.
We conclude, finally, that the DVRO should have included
a provision permitting Paul to retrieve his personal property from
the family home. The trial court is directed to include such a
provision on remand.
34
DISPOSITION
The DVRO and accompanying custody and visitation orders
are reversed in part and the matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to (1) strike Rylan as a protected party,
(2) eliminate the portions of the DVRO that pertain to the
family’s pets, (3) permit Paul access to the minor children’s
education and medical records, (4) conduct a further hearing and
issue a new custody and visitation order consistent with the
views expressed in this opinion, and (5) permit Paul to retrieve
his personal property from the family home. In all other
respects, the DVRO and custody and visitation orders are
affirmed. All parties shall bear their own appellate costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
ADAMS, J.
35
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