Rinche v. Necib CA1/3

CourtListener 10816059Calctapp26 mars 2026

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Filed 3/26/26 Rinche v. Necib CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MARIO ANTONIO RINCHE,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Appellant, A174028

v. (Contra Costa County
KHALID NECIB, Super. Ct. No. N25-0329)
Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Respondent.

Mario Antonio Rinche appeals from the trial court’s issuance of a six-
month civil harassment restraining order (CHRO) against him. He contends
the CHRO was entered due to various procedural and evidentiary errors.
We conclude that because the CHRO expired on December 10, 2025, the
court did not renew the order, and there is no information that respondent
Khalid Necib has sought any further restraining orders against Rinche, the
appeal will be dismissed as moot.1

1 On December 15, 2025, Rinche filed a motion to augment the record

with various documents related to other court proceedings. This court
previously construed the motion as a request for judicial notice and deferred
ruling as to Exhibits A–C. We now deny Rinche’s request as to those exhibits
because the records are not required for our disposition of this matter.
MEMORANDUM OPINION2
This dispute appears to stem from conflict between Rinche, a third
individual, Frederick Eaton, who Rinche describes as his “ex-romantic
partner,” and Necib, who Rinche describes as Eaton’s “new partner.”
Background
In early 2025, Rinche filed a request for a CHRO against Necib. The
court denied this request on March 12, 2025. Rinche sought reconsideration
of the order, which was subsequently denied by the court on May 19, 2025.
Rinche filed another request for a CHRO in late May, 2025. Necib then
filed a cross-petition for a restraining order against Rinche. The court
granted Necib’s temporary restraining order (TRO) against Rinche as to
Necib and his daughter, but denied the request as to Rinche’s contact with
government agencies. The court also denied Rinche’s request for a TRO.
On June 10, 2025, the court again denied Rinche’s request for a CHRO
and granted Necib a six-month CHRO “with the same terms of the temporary
order.” The court denied Rinche’s request to stay enforcement of the CHRO
pending this appeal. Rinche subsequently appealed.
This court requested the parties provide supplemental briefing on the
question of mootness because the CHRO expired on December 10, 2025—five
days prior to Rinche filing his opening appellate brief. In response, Rinche
filed a supplemental brief alleging the appeal is not moot. Specifically,
Rinche asserted (1) meaningful relief is available because the restraining
order—although expired—carried “continuing stigma,” (2) short term civil

2 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion, reciting only those

facts necessary to resolve the issue raised. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1;
People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)

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harassment orders are capable of repetition yet evade review, and (3) public
interest and due process considerations support review.
Analysis
Rinche makes several claims on appeal regarding the CHRO, including
that it was based on altered and/or fraudulent evidence, the court excluded
his video evidence and declarations, the court erroneously classified Rinche’s
service of demand letters as harassment, Rinche did not consent to a
commissioner presiding over the matter, and the court improperly mixed
filings from different cases. He also claims Necib submitted a false
“deceased” notice to the court. However, based on the record before this
court, the CHRO appears to have expired in December 2025 and was not
renewed. And Rinche’s brief concedes the CHRO expired on December 10,
2025.
This court “may examine a suggestion of mootness on its own motion.”
(City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 479.) “[A]
case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot
provide the parties with effective relief.” (Lincoln Place Tenants Association
v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.) “ ‘It is well settled
that an appellate court will decide only actual controversies and that a live
appeal may be rendered moot by events occurring after the notice of appeal
was filed. We will not render opinions on moot questions or abstract
propositions, or declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter at
issue on appeal.’ ” (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 866.) As such, “ ‘ “[i]f relief granted by the trial
court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be
heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.” ’ ” (Harris v. Stampolis

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(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495, quoting City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079.)
Three general exceptions may apply to the rules regarding mootness:
“ ‘ “(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely
to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy
between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for
the court’s determination.” ’ ” (Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th
at p. 495.)
Here, the six-month CHRO was issued on June 10, 2025. By its terms,
it expired on December 10, 2025. The same controversy appears unlikely to
recur between the parties because nothing in the record indicates Necib
attempted to renew the CHRO. Likewise, the record does not indicate this
dispute involves an issue of public interest, and there are no material
questions that remain for the court’s determination as to the CHRO since it
expired. Nor has Rinche identified any authority supporting his position that
avoiding “continuing stigma” is a valid basis for considering a moot appeal.
At oral argument, Rinche maintained the CHRO would continue to impose
concrete harm, such as in connection with his professional licenses or travel,
but he failed to provide any substantive argument in his briefs or evidence to
support these claims. Accordingly, we cannot provide Rinche any effective
relief, and we dismiss the appeal as moot.3 In doing so, we expressly do not
opine on whether the CHRO was properly issued.

3 Rinche also requests other relief inappropriate for disposition here.

First, he requests this court “[r]einstate the February 21 2025 TRO.”
However, Rinche failed to provide a complete copy of this order. Presumably,
the TRO expired as of the date of the hearing—March 4, 2025—and again no
effective relief is possible. Second, he requests this court remand Department
57 for representing that Commissioner Yamamoto is a judicial officer and
recommend a criminal referral against Necib. But apart from requesting
4
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot. In the interests of justice, the parties
are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

such relief as “requested disposition,” Rinche does not provide any
meaningful analysis of the legal basis supporting such requests. (Benach v.
County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“When an appellant
fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”].)

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PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P. J.

FUJISAKI, J.

A174028 / Rinche v. Necib

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