CourtListener 10814328•O'Leary v. Jones CA4/1
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Filed 3/24/26 O’Leary v. Jones CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JENNIFER O’LEARY, D086906
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2404688)
WALTER JONES III et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Eric A. Keen, Judge. Motion to dismiss denied. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Reeves & Weiss, Jeffrey H. Reeves, Daniel L. Weiss and Lindley G.
Round, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rod Pacheco and Irasema Rocha, for Defendant and Respondent Walter
Jones III.
Thomas N. Jacobson for Defendants and Respondents Kevin Wolf and
Rami Tahhan.
This appeal arises out of a commercial lease dispute. The lessor was
Michael Scheinker, who has been succeeded in the litigation by appellant
Jennifer O’Leary.1 The lessee was Green America, Inc., which is not a party
to this matter. Rather, the defendants include various individuals associated
with Green America: Walter Jones III, who signed the lease agreement on
behalf of the company and executed a personal guarantee; Kevin Wolf, Green
America’s chief operating officer and chief financial officer; and Rami
Tahhan, Green America’s secretary.
Along with Green America, these three individuals participated in a
year-and-a-half-long arbitration, culminating in an award in favor of
Scheinker. At no point during the arbitration did anyone object to the
arbitral forum. But when Scheinker sought to confirm the award, the
superior court found that Jones, Tahhan, and Wolf (collectively, the
defendants) were not bound to arbitrate under the arbitration agreement
and were not parties to the court action. Based on these findings, the court
dismissed Scheinker’s petition on “personal jurisdiction” grounds. Scheinker
filed but later dismissed his appeal in that matter, apparently deciding to
remedy the issues identified by the first court by filing a second petition to
confirm in a separate action.
It is Scheinker’s second petition that gives rise to this appeal. The
court concluded that the new petition to confirm the arbitration award was
precluded by the final judgment dismissing Scheinker’s first petition. The
court nonetheless went on to reach the merits, concluding that it would deny
the petition on “due process” or equitable grounds even if it had not found
Scheinker’s petition precluded by the earlier action.
1 For brevity, we refer to Scheinker as the party in the trial court, and
O’Leary as appellant on this appeal.
2
In the unique circumstances of this case, we find that applying issue
or claim preclusion would frustrate rather than further the public policies
underlying those equitable doctrines. Thus, we find that the first court’s
order does not preclude Scheinker’s second petition. With respect to the
merits of the petition, judicial review of the arbitration is limited by statute.
Because defendants do not contend that they timely filed petitions to vacate
or correct the arbitration award, the only question presented in this action is
whether to dismiss on the ground that the defendants were not bound by the
arbitration award and were not parties to the arbitration. There is no
substantial evidence in the record that defendants were not parties to the
arbitration. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to enter
an order confirming the arbitration award.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Lease Agreement and Jones’s Guarantee
In 2017, Scheinker leased a property in Riverside County (the
Property) to Green America, which intended to open a marijuana dispensary.
Jones, along with several other individuals not parties to this matter, signed
the lease on behalf of Green America. Jones also signed a guarantee clause
in the lease that provides:
“In consideration of the execution of this Agreement by
and between Landlord and Tenant and for valuable
consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
the undersigned (‘Guarantor’) does hereby: (i) guarantee
unconditionally to Landlord and Landlord’s agents
successors and assigns, the prompt payment of Rent or
other sums that become due pursuant to this Agreement,
including any and all court costs and attorney fees included
in enforcing the Agreement; (ii) consent to any changes,
modifications or alterations of any term in this Agreement
agreed to by Landlord and Tenant; and (iii) waive any right
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to require Landlord and/or Landlord’s agents to proceed
against Tenant for any default occurring under this
Agreement before seeking to enforce this Guarantee.”
The lease contained an arbitration provision stating:
“ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES: (1) Tenant and Landlord
agree that any dispute or claim in law or equity arising
between them out of this agreement or any resulting
transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall
be decided by neutral, binding arbitration . . . . [T]he
arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with Part III,
Title 9 of the California code of Civil Procedure. Judgment
upon the award of the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction. The parties shall have the right
to discovery in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1283.05.”
B. Litigation and Arbitration of Property-Related Disputes
In 2020, Green America sued Scheinker, alleging causes of action
related to the lease.2 Scheinker demanded arbitration in accordance with the
lease; the court ordered the parties to arbitration and stayed the court action.
Preparations began for a JAMS arbitration before a retired superior court
judge.
Scheinker filed a counterdemand for arbitration against Green
America, Jones, Wolf, and Tahhan. He alleged that: (1) Green America,
Jones, Wolf, and Tahhan had converted tools and equipment he had stored on
the Property; (2) Green America materially breached the lease by making
unpermitted modifications to the Property for which Jones was personally
liable as guarantor; (3) under the terms of the lease and the guarantee
clause, Scheinker was entitled to indemnity from Green America and Jones
2 Pursuant to O’Leary’s request filed on September 24, 2025, we take
judicial notice of the complaint filed by Green America.
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in the event Scheinker was subject to an enforcement action due to municipal
code violations; and (4) Scheinker was also entitled to implied or equitable
indemnity from Green America, Jones, Wolf, and Tahhan in connection with
any enforcement action.
According to the arbitrator’s status report, Jones, Wolf, and Tahhan
were each served with Scheinker’s counterdemand in March of 2022, but
“none of the Counter-respondents had filed Responses to the Counter-claim
within fourteen (14) days of service pursuant to JAMS Comprehensive
Arbitration Rule 9 (d).” In accordance with the JAMS rules, their failure to
file a response was treated as a denial of the allegations of Scheinker’s
counterclaims, as defaults are not permitted.
This report also reflects that “Rod A. Pacheco, Esq. and Molly J.
Magnuson, Esq. appeared [at the conference] on behalf of Counter-
respondents, Dr. Walter Jones III, Rami Tahhan and Kevin Wolf,” while
“Lawrence C. Ecoff, Esq. appeared on behalf of Claimant,” Green America.
“Counsel for Counter-respondents (Ms. Magnuson) informed the Arbitrator
that a mediation had been scheduled . . . on May 18, 2022, pursuant to the
mediation provision in” the lease, and the arbitrator “instructed all parties
to participate in the mediation, in good faith, in an effort to settle the case
without further arbitration proceedings.” This status report does not reflect
that Jones, Wolf, or Tahhan objected to being named as parties in the
arbitration or to participating in the mediation.
At the next status conference on May 20, 2022, “Rod A. Pacheco, Esq.
and Eric Fromme, Esq. appeared on behalf of Counter-respondents, Dr.
Walter Jones III, Rami Tahhan and Kevin Wolf,” while Ecoff again appeared
on behalf of Green America. The arbitrator noted that “Counter-respondents
had not yet complied with the document exchange,” and “[a]fter discussing
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this matter at length, . . . instructed all counsel to comply with JAMS
Comprehensive Arbitration Rule 17 (a) document exchange by June 3, 2022.”
The order again does not reflect any objection by Jones, Wolf, or Tahhan to
being named as parties in the arbitration or being required to comply with
JAMS discovery.
By September, Wolf and Tahhan had still not produced documents in
accordance with the arbitrator’s instructions and, while the arbitrator
“acknowledged that Counter-Respondents, Kevin Wolf and Rami Tahhan,
had just retained new counsel (Mr. Edmondson),” he “again expressed his
frustration with the delays caused by Messrs. Wolf and Tahhan changing
attorneys.” The arbitrator instructed Wolf and Tahhan’s new counsel “to
compile all documents responsive to JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rule
17 (a) and to provide them to all other counsel immediately - preferably by”
the next day. He instructed Scheinker’s counsel to meet and confer with Wolf
and Tahhan’s counsel “to set a compliance date . . . if the documents” were
not produced immediately. The arbitrator also granted Scheinker leave to
file a motion to compel documents and for sanctions and set forth a briefing
schedule if documents were not produced.
When Wolf and Tahhan failed to provide any documents, Scheinker
filed a motion for sanctions against Green America, Wolf, Tahhan and their
attorneys of record. Green America, Wolf, and Tahhan filed an opposition.
The arbitrator denied Scheinker’s motion without prejudice, but directed
“Wolf and Tahhan to produce various documents to Scheinker by October 31,
2022.”
It seems Wolf and Tahhan still did not produce any documents, and, on
February 3, 2023, the arbitrator granted Scheinker’s motion for terminating
sanctions against Green America, Wolf, and Tahhan, dismissing Green
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America’s claims against Scheinker. The arbitrator subsequently entered
partial final judgment on Green America’s claims and awarded $315,836.94
in fees and costs to Scheinker.
On March 27, 2023, the arbitrator granted another “Motion for
Issue/Evidentiary/Monetary Sanctions” against Green America, Wolf, and
Tahhan. At the hearing on that motion, “Kevin Abbott, Esq. appeared on the
call and indicated that he may be retained by Counter-Respondents, Kevin
Wolf and Rami Tahhan.” “Wolf also joined the call,” but Tahhan did not.
The arbitrator granted Scheinker’s motion and, as sanction for their failure to
comply with necessary document exchange, essentially found that Scheinker
had established his conversion claim against Green America, Wolf, and
Tahhan. He found, among other things: “Green America, Wolf and Tahhan
substantially interfered with Scheinker’s personal property by failing to
safeguard it, and intentionally destroying, disposing of, or refusing to return
the personal property after Scheinker demanded its return,” and that “Green
America, Wolf and Tahhan’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing
Scheinker’s harm.”
On May 22, 2023, Thomas Jacobson made an appearance on behalf of
Tahhan and Wolf, submitting a letter to the arbitrator. He argued the issue
of sanctions should be “reopen[ed],” stating: “My clients should not be denied
the right of being able to defend themselves from the cross claim. It is a
serious allegation to suggest that my clients stole personal property
belonging to Mr. Scheinker and then be maneuvered through motions and
the emotions of the moment to a position of not being able to even mount a
defense. [¶] My clients have already sat through hours of depositions and
responded to extensive discovery. Notwithstanding, I offered to [Scheinker’s
counsel] that my clients would sit for a further deposition and I would
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address each specific discovery issue [Scheinker] believes has not been fully
addressed. My clients have agreed with me to be cooperative in the discovery
matter.” Jacobson did not deny that Wolf and Tahhan were parties to the
arbitration or that they had discovery obligations. Instead, he asserted that
it was “in the best interest of due process and a resolution on the merits that
we allow all of the parties to be heard on the merits, and reach the point
where we can do such by resolving any outstanding discovery issues.”
At some point in the following months, Scheinker filed a motion for
summary adjudication. Jones filed an opposition to this motion asserting
arguments concerning his own liability. In that opposition, Jones did not
argue that he had not agreed to arbitration.
Wolf and Tahhan also filed an opposition to Scheinker’s motion,
asserting there was no evidence to support Scheinker’s conversion claim
against them. They also argued (1) they were not personally responsible for
maintaining the records Scheinker had sought in support of his conversion
claim, and (2) they had no personal duty to protect Scheinker’s personal
property. They did not argue they were not liable because they had not been
joined in the arbitration or that they had not agreed to arbitrate this claim.
After the arbitrator issued a tentative ruling in favor of Scheinker,
Wolf and Tahhan filed an “Opposition to Proposed Judgment” in which they
reiterated that they should not be held liable because they were merely
“shareholders.” They also argued that the court should not award punitive
damages against them for nonpayment of arbitration fees because Scheinker
had paid the fees, nor for their discovery malfeasance because they had
already been sanctioned. Again, they never objected on grounds they had not
agreed to arbitrate or indicate they had at any point been confused as to their
status as parties.
8
After a hearing, at which Jones, Wolf, and Tahhan appeared through
their respective counsel, the arbitrator entered judgment in Scheinker’s
favor. The arbitrator found that Jones was the guarantor on the lease and
was thus “jointly and severally liable for all amounts owed by Green America
to Scheinker under” the lease. The arbitrator awarded: (1) “attorney fees &
costs against Green America (and Jones as guarantor of the Lease) related
to the defense of the Demand for Arbitration in the amount of $315,836.94”;
(2) “damages against Green America (and Jones as guarantor of the Lease)
for breach of contract and unauthorized alterations to the subject property in
the amount of $531,565.41”; (3) “damages against Green America, Wolf[] and
Tahhan, for conversion of personal property in the amount of $114,936.79”;
(4) “punitive damages against Green America, Wolf[] and Tahhan, in
connection with the conversion of personal property in the amount of
$342,068.72”; and (5) “additional fees & costs against Green America (and
Jones as guarantor of the Lease) related to the prosecution of Scheinker’s
Counter-claims in the amount of $135,672.90.” That order, issued on
December 18, 2023, disposed of all claims in the arbitration except for Jones’s
separate claims against third parties.
C. Scheinker’s First Petition to Confirm the Arbitration Award
Scheinker filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award as against
Green America, Jones, Wolf, and Tahhan. The superior court sua sponte
raised the issue of personal jurisdiction. After a hearing, the court confirmed
the award against Green America, which did not oppose the petition, but
“denied” the petition “as against” the individual defendants.
The court identified “an issue of personal jurisdiction over Wolf,
Tahhan and Jones,” who “were named as counter-respondents in Scheinker’s
counter-demand in arbitration, but never named parties in this action.”
9
The order cites Code of Civil Procedure3 section 1293, which provides that
“[t]he making of an agreement in this State providing for arbitration to be
had within this State shall be deemed a consent of the parties thereto to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State to enforce such agreement by the
making of any orders provided for in this title and by entering of judgment on
an award under the agreement.” The court concluded that “Scheinker failed
to produce any evidence that Wolf, Tahhan or Jones ever agreed to arbitrate
any claims,” noting that Wolf and Tahhan were not signatories to the lease,
Jones did not sign the lease in a personal capacity, and the guarantee clause
did not “incorporate the arbitration provision included in the Lease.”
According to the court, it was irrelevant that defendants had been
named in both the arbitration and the petition to confirm arbitration award
because they had not been joined in the original court action when the matter
was ordered to arbitration, and “personal jurisdiction over non-parties is
established under [section] 1293.” The court also rejected Scheinker’s
argument that the court had personal jurisdiction over defendants “based on
their contacts with the forum state pursuant to [section] 410.10,” because
that provision “governs personal jurisdiction over parties named in an
action,” and because “Wolf, Tahhan and Jones were never named parties to
this action.” Similarly, the court rejected the argument that defendants had
made a general appearance stating, “The argument relating to ‘general
appearance’ is misplaced as this concept only applies to named defendants.”
Later, in a postjudgment order denying Jones’s motion for attorney
fees, the court characterized its ruling on the petition to confirm as follows:
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
10
“The Court granted Scheinker’s petition to confirm the
arbitration award against Green America only, and denied
the petition as to Wolf, Tahhan and Jones, finding that the
Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Notably, the
Court declined to rule on Jones’ request to vacate the
arbitration award. Accordingly, the Court finds that there
was no prevailing party as between Jones and Scheinker in
the postarbitration proceedings.”
“[T]he Court acted sua sponte in determining that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over Jones and declined to rule on
Jones’ request to vacate the award. Thus, the Court did not
rule on whether the arbitration award is enforceable
against Jones, and neither Jones nor Scheinker are
prevailing parties in the postarbitration proceeding.”
Although Scheinker filed an appeal in that matter, he voluntarily
dismissed it.
D. Scheinker’s Second Petition to Confirm the Arbitration Award
Scheinker initiated a new case by filing a second petition to confirm the
arbitration award on August 20, 2024. The matter was heard by a different
judge, but he nonetheless denied the second petition. First, the court thought
it appropriate to apply “issue preclusion and . . . res judicata,”4 “finding that
4 As the Supreme Court has explained: “We have frequently used ‘res
judicata’ as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue
preclusion, which have been described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an
overarching doctrine. [Citations.] Claim preclusion, the ‘ ” ’primary
aspect’ ” ’ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should have been,
advanced in a previous suit involving the same parties. [Citation.] Issue
preclusion, the ‘ ” ’secondary aspect’ ” ’ historically called collateral estoppel,
describes the bar on relitigating issues that were argued and decided in the
first suit.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823–824
(DKN).) The case law sometimes has described res judicata as “synonymous
with claim preclusion, while reserving the term ‘collateral estoppel’ for issue
preclusion. [Citations.] On occasion, however, the term ‘res judicata’ has
been used more broadly, even in a case involving only issue preclusion, or
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the issue before [the first judge was] virtually identical to the issue before
this Court regarding whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Wolf,
Tahhan, and Jones.” In the alternative, the court determined:
“I would also deny the petition because Mr. Wolf, Mr.
Tahhan and Mr. Jones were never joined in the arbitration.
My understanding from reading the brief was that
somehow they participated, but I think that’s a little bit
of difference of opinion as to what happened.
“I don’t have the transcript from the arbitration, but after
hearing from Mr. Jacobson [counsel for Wolf and Tahhan]
and Mr. Pacheco [counsel for Jones], it appears that neither
one of the defendants participated in the arbitration.
I thought maybe they had testified as witnesses at least,
but it doesn’t sound like that even happened.”
“I think it would violate equity if the Court were to grant a
petition to enforce an arbitration award against defendants
that never participated in the arbitration, never were
joined, and then never agreed to participate and then were
not bound by the original contract or agreement where
parties agreed to settle disputes by way of arbitration.”
DISCUSSION
Because it influences our ultimate conclusions, we begin by addressing
defendants’ contention that they were not parties to the arbitration at all.5
collateral estoppel.” (Id. at p. 824.) To avoid confusion, it is preferable to
“use the terms ‘claim preclusion’ to describe the primary aspect of the res
judicata doctrine and ‘issue preclusion’ to encompass the notion of collateral
estoppel.” (Ibid.) Although the difference between the doctrines is not
especially relevant to our analysis here, we follow the Court’s guidance and
use the terms claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
5 Jones asks this court to dismiss the appeal because O’Leary withdrew
her motion to substitute as plaintiff in the trial court, ostensibly to frustrate
Jones’s efforts to seek attorney fees. It appears there are ongoing
proceedings in the trial court with respect to Jones’s motion to substitute
O’Leary. Jones, who himself has apparently taken inconsistent positions
12
The record reflects that defendants: (1) were named as parties in Scheinker’s
counterdemand for arbitration; (2) were served with the counterdemand;
(3) were represented in the arbitration by their own attorneys; (4) personally
appeared at many proceedings, where they were each identified as “counter-
respondents”; and (5) submitted substantive briefing. There is no evidence
in the record that any defendant objected to being subject to arbitration until
after the award was final. Accordingly, we find that Jones, Wolf, and Tahhan
were parties to the arbitration.
Next, we determine that the first court’s judgment does not preclude
the second petition to compel arbitration because applying claim or issue
preclusion would undermine the public policies behind those doctrines.
We think applying preclusive effect would erode confidence in the judiciary,
as O’Leary’s litigation choices seem to have been shaped by the first court’s
erroneous statements. It would also undermine public policy in favor of
respecting final arbitration awards by unwinding over a year of arbitral
proceedings in which all of the parties participated. Further, preclusion
would not advance the parties’ interest in finality, as dismissing the second
petition to confirm would not preclude O’Leary from continuing to litigate her
substantive claims.
Finally, we turn to the trial court’s alternative holding, that it “would
violate equity” to confirm the arbitration award because defendants were not
parties to the arbitration. The defendants do not dispute O’Leary’s
contention that they failed to timely request vacatur of the arbitration award.
Accordingly, the court was required to confirm the petition unless defendants
with respect to whether O’Leary should be substituted in as plaintiff in the
trial court, has not pointed to any conduct that would support this drastic
remedy.
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were “not bound by the arbitration award and . . . not a party to the
arbitration.” (§ 1287.2, italics added.) As already noted, defendants were
parties to the arbitration. That ends the analysis with respect to the limited
judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision authorized by statute. We
accordingly remand with instructions to confirm the award.
A. Whether Defendants Were Parties to the Arbitration
A “party to the arbitration” includes one “[w]ho is made a party to such
arbitration by order of the neutral arbitrator . . . upon the application of
any other party to the arbitration, or upon the neutral arbitrator’s own
determination.” (§ 1280, subd. (h)(3).)6 Although a party cannot be forced
to arbitrate by an arbitrator’s order alone, “one who voluntarily joins an
arbitration becomes a party to it.” (Lovret v. Seyfarth (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d
841, 859 (Lovret).) An express agreement is not required. “[C]onsent to
arbitration . . . will be inferred from a party’s conduct of litigating an issue up
to the point of submitting it for decision in the arbitral forum, at least if the
party does so without objection.” (Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 376, 388 (Douglass).) Thus, “a party who questions the validity
of the arbitration agreement may not proceed with arbitration and preserve
the issue for later consideration by the court after being unsuccessful in the
arbitration.” (Bayscene Resident Negotiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park
6 O’Leary does not argue that defendants were bound to arbitrate by the
arbitration agreement. We therefore do not address that issue.
14
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 119, 129 (Bayscene), citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 29–31 (Moncharsh).)7
As indicated by our recitation of the factual history, the record before
this court demonstrates that all three defendants voluntarily participated in
the arbitration and failed to raise any objection, either before the arbitrator
or by seeking judicial intervention. With respect to Wolf and Tahhan, they
first appeared as parties, represented by counsel, on May 6, 2022, and the
arbitrator noted they had been served with Scheinker’s counterdemand.
They thereafter appeared as parties, represented by counsel, on May 20,
2022; August 3, 2022; September 15, 2022; and December 12, 2023. They
also appeared unrepresented on September 2, 2022, and an attorney who said
he expected to be retained by Wolf and Tahhan appeared at a hearing on
March 27, 2023. There is no indication they raised any concern about being
part of the arbitration at any point over the year and a half they continued to
7 Courts have variously framed this issue as one of waiver, forfeiture,
estoppel, or an implied-in-fact arbitration agreement. (See Moncharsh,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 31 [“Failure to raise the claim [of illegality of a contract
or arbitration agreement] before the arbitrator . . . waives the claim for any
future judicial review”]; Douglass, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 387 [“parties
may enter into an implied in fact agreement to arbitrate through their
conduct”]; Lovret, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 862 [wife of signatory to
arbitration agreement was “estopped from claiming that she was not a party
to the arbitration”].) We do not find it necessary to exhaustively analyze
these labels or the underlying concepts for our present purposes, as the
parties do not raise arguments regarding any potential distinctions.
Wolf and Tahhan briefly argue that Quach v. California Commerce
Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, is relevant to the standard of review here.
That case observed that “the party opposing enforcement of a contractual
agreement must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the waiving
party knew of the contractual right and intentionally relinquished or
abandoned it.” (Id. at p. 584.) Because no party is alleged to have waived
a contractual right, Quach does not govern our review.
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appear before the arbitrator. Nor is there any suggestion they objected to
being characterized as “counter-respondents” in every report and order issued
by the arbitrator.
Notably, Wolf and Tahhan filed both a joint opposition to Scheinker’s
motion for summary adjudication and an “Opposition to Proposed Judgment.”
Although their failure to participate in discovery was the key issue affecting
their liability, neither filing argued that they had not agreed to participate in
the proceedings, or that they had been confused about their role at any point.
While Wolf and Tahhan seek to present a different version of events
in their appellate briefing, they do not cite any evidence to support such a
revisionist narrative. “We are not required to search the record to ascertain
whether it contains support for [unsupported] contentions.” (Mansell v.
Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545; see Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [parties must “[s]upport any reference to a matter
in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where
the matter appears”].)
Wolf and Tahhan do cite a declaration from Jamie Wrage of Stream
Kim Hicks Wrage & Alfaro, PC, an attorney who represented Green America
in the arbitration. Wrage asserts her firm “was retained by Green America,
Inc. in early 2022 to represent it in an arbitration with Michael Scheinker,”
and says the firm “substituted out soon after the cross complaint [against
Wolf and Tahhan] was sent to JAMS.” Wrage was no longer representing
Green America by the time Wolf and Tahhan first appeared in the
arbitration, on May 6, 2022. Wrage’s knowledge of events before Wolf and
Tahhan were even named parties to the arbitration is not relevant to
whether they consented to be parties through their participation.
16
Wolf and Tahhan cite Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 16 v.
Merritt (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 530, for the proposition “that naming a person
in a Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award is not the proper vehicle to
attempt to enforce the arbitration award against the person if the person was
not properly before the arbitrator.” In Merritt, an individual alleged to be the
alter ego of a corporation successfully opposed a petition to confirm on the
grounds he was not “a party to the arbitration” against the corporation and
did not have “notice that an award against him personally was being sought.”
(Id. at p. 539.) Although he received some correspondence from the
arbitrator, there was “nothing to indicate that the notices were sent to [him]
other than as a person authorized to accept service or notice on behalf of the
corporation,” or to “show that [he] had any notice or reason to appear and
defend personally.” (Ibid.) In addition, the arbitration award was entered
solely against the corporation. (Id. at p. 533.) Here, the record establishes
that Wolf and Tahhan were named as parties in arbitral filings, actually
appeared and participated in the proceedings as named parties, and were
named in the final award. Merritt does not support their position.
At oral argument, counsel for Wolf and Tahhan argued they only
participated in the arbitration as “officers and directors” of Green America
and not as parties. This belated contention is inconsistent with evidence that
they were named in their individual capacity in the counterdemand, were
identified as “[c]ounter-respondents” in all of the arbitrator’s reports and
orders, and made substantive arguments concerning their individual liability.
Counsel also raised the concern that requiring a party to object to
arbitration places an unfair burden on individuals who did not expressly
agree to arbitrate their dispute. As a legal matter, numerous courts have
found that the failure to object is an important factor in assessing whether a
17
party has consented to arbitration through participation. (See Moncharsh,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 31 [a party must raise the argument that an arbitration
agreement is illegal “prior to participating in the arbitration process”];
Douglass, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 387–388 [collecting cases].) And, as a
factual matter, we see no evidence Wolf and Tahhan were prevented from or
hindered in stating an objection. Given the extent and duration of their
participation, we see no unfairness in considering their undisputed failure
to object.
For his part, Jones failed to argue in his briefing that he did not
participate in the arbitration, instead claiming that issue preclusion bars
O’Leary “from claiming that [he] agreed to participate in the arbitration.”8
At oral argument, counsel for Jones suggested he was prevented from filing
a “substantive motion” or “substantive briefing,” apparently alluding to a
ruling by the arbitrator that he could not be heard with respect to the
evidentiary sanctions against Green America, Wolf, and Tahhan. The record
is nonetheless clear that Jones voluntarily participated in the arbitral
proceedings and submitted other substantive filings, including an opposition
to Scheinker’s motion for summary disposition, and his own claims against
third parties.
In sum, the evidence in the record indicates that the defendants
meaningfully participated in the arbitration on their own behalf, often
represented by counsel, over an extended period of time without objection.
Defendants point to no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, we conclude
that defendants were parties to the arbitration.
8 As we shall explain in the following section, we do not find issue
preclusion applies in the circumstances of this case.
18
B. Preclusive Effect of the First Court’s Judgment
Generally, final judgments, even if they are erroneous, have a
preclusive effect and may conclusively resolve specific issues or entire claims
that were or could have been litigated between the parties. (See e.g., DKN,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 814–815.) But even where the technical elements of
issue or claim preclusion are otherwise satisfied, courts should decline to
apply these equitable doctrines where doing so would be inconsistent with
their core purposes. (See, e.g., People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 256
(Barragan) [“Whether res judicata applies in a given context is not simply a
matter of satisfying the doctrine’s technical requirements”]; Lucido v.
Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342–343 (Lucido) [“Even assuming all
the threshold requirements are satisfied, however, our analysis is not at an
end. We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine
before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular
setting”].) The public policies underlying claim preclusion include ensuring
finality and preventing vexatious litigation. (See Panos v. Great Western
Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637.) “The public policies underlying [issue
preclusion] are preserving the integrity of the judicial system, promoting
judicial economy, preventing inconsistent judgments, and protecting litigants
from vexatious litigation.” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
462, 475 (F.E.V.).) In our view, applying preclusion here would be
inconsistent with—if not undermine—several core policies behind these
doctrines.9
Defendants argue that preclusion would advance the parties’ and the
courts’ interest in finality by preventing O’Leary from relitigating the
9 We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on
this issue, which was not addressed by the trial court.
19
enforceability of the award. However, giving preclusive effect to the first
court’s order would not end the dispute. As observed by the superior court,
barring O’Leary from confirming the award would not prevent her from
pursuing her underlying claims in court.
In fact, applying preclusion would potentially worsen the parties’
current quagmire because, “[f]or purposes of res judicata, even an
unconfirmed arbitral award is the equivalent [of] a final judgment.” (Bucur
v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 186.) As explained in the next section,
defendants have not filed a petition to vacate the award and now appear to
be time-barred from doing so. Applying preclusive effect to the first court’s
judgment would thus leave the parties, and future courts, to contend with a
zombie arbitration judgment as well as a difficult-to-understand
jurisdictional ruling, substantially increasing the risk of inconsistent
judgments.
In addition, in the ordinary case, preclusion serves to ensure finality of
a matter that has been litigated to a final judgment. (Cf. People v. DeLouize
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223, 1232 [“The concept of finality ‘rests upon the sound
policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair
adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and
subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination’ ”].) Here,
giving preclusive effect to the first court’s order has the effect of unwinding
a lengthy arbitration proceeding in which, we have found, the defendants
voluntarily participated. To the extent the purpose of preclusion is to protect
a final merits judgment, that purpose would be inverted by applying the
doctrine here. (See Ahdout v. Hekmatjah (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 21, 33
[noting the “strong public policy in favor of . . . according finality to
arbitration awards”].)
20
Moreover, applying preclusion is inconsistent with public policy
because the court’s orders appear to have encouraged O’Leary to dismiss the
appeal of the first order, thus ensuring it became a final judgment potentially
entitled to preclusive effect. The first court’s order seems to rest on the
premise that defendants could not be made parties to the court action by
means of a petition to confirm the award. This is incorrect. After a petition
to compel arbitration has been initiated (see § 1281.2), “the court in which
such petition was filed retains jurisdiction to determine any subsequent
petition involving the same agreement to arbitrate and the same controversy,
and any such subsequent petition shall be filed in the same proceeding.”
(§ 1292.6.) A petition to confirm must “name as respondents all parties to the
arbitration and may name as respondents any other persons bound by the
arbitration award.” (§ 1285.) These statutes thus contemplate that parties
may be added to a judicial action through a petition to confirm and not only
through prearbitration pleadings.
The court’s order further suggests that, because they were not parties
to the court action before the arbitration was commenced, the exclusive basis
for exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants was section 1293. This
is also incorrect. Section 1293 merely provides that a party who has
contractually agreed to arbitration in California has also thereby consented
to personal jurisdiction in the courts of California. (§ 1293.) It does not
provide the exclusive grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. (See
Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444
[“California’s long-arm statute authorizes California courts to exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of California,” citing Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10].)
21
On their own, these conclusions were likely to lead to confusion,
conflating unrelated issues of personal jurisdiction and party joinder.
Compounding that uncertainty, the court’s postjudgment order states that
“the Court did not rule on whether the arbitration award is enforceable
against Jones.” Together, the court’s orders suggested that there was a
jurisdictional defect due to the procedural posture in the first action because
defendants were not originally parties. It is therefore not surprising that
O’Leary believed filing a second action could “cure[] the perceived
jurisdictional defect,” as she argues in her briefing. For this reason, we
believe giving preclusive effect to the first judgment would risk eroding public
confidence in the judicial system. (See F.E.V., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at
p. 476 [declining to give preclusive effect to a judgment where doing so would
not promote “[p]ublic confidence in the wisdom and integrity of judicial
decisions”].)
Finally, while O’Leary could have challenged the first court’s order
by pursuing her appeal, her mistake in dismissing that appeal is
understandable in light of the court’s rulings. As it seems to have been an
effort to streamline the litigation, we do not find the duplicative litigation to
be vexatious. (See Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351 [“The essence of
vexatiousness . . . is not mere repetition. Rather, it is harassment through
baseless or unjustified litigation.”].)
Defendants argue that this case is distinguishable from other cases in
which courts have declined to apply preclusion on public policy grounds,
including F.E.V. and Barragan. We agree that these cases are not factually
or procedurally similar, but we are neither surprised nor troubled by this.
It is, and should be, rare that a case will meet the technical criteria for claim
or issue preclusion, but applying those doctrines would nonetheless not serve
22
the public policy interests behind them. We would thus expect the
circumstances of those cases to be unique, as are the circumstances here.
In sum, we conclude that applying preclusion to the rather odd
circumstances presented by this case would undermine interests of finality,
judicial economy, and public confidence in the judicial system, which are core
policies the preclusion doctrines are intended to advance. Accordingly, we
find it would be inappropriate to apply the doctrines of claim and issue
preclusion.
C. Scope of Judicial Review of the Award
O’Leary argues that the trial court did not have the authority to rely
on general considerations of equity or due process to deny the petition to
confirm. She contends that, because defendants have not shown they timely
requested vacatur of the award, the court was required to either confirm the
award or dismiss the petition on the grounds that defendants were not
parties to the arbitration and were not bound by the award.
Until it has been either confirmed or vacated by a court, an arbitration
award “has the same force and effect as a contract in writing between the
parties to the arbitration.” (§ 1287.6.) A party may seek to vacate an award
either by filing a petition to vacate or requesting vacatur in response to a
petition to confirm the award. (§ 1288.2.) Such petition must be filed and
served “not later than 100 days after the date of the service of a signed copy
of the award on the petitioner.” (§ 1288.) In the event a request to vacate is
made in response to the petition to confirm, the response must be timely
under the 100-day deadline and it also must be filed within 10 days after
service of the petition to confirm. (Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key (2023)
14 Cal.5th 932, 946 (Key); § 1288.2; § 1290.6.) “Failure to file a timely
23
response prevents a party from vacating an award . . . .” (United Firefighters
of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1576, 1581.)
Wolf and Tahhan dispute this interpretation of the law, arguing that
the 100-day time limit only applies to stand-alone petitions to vacate. On
this point, the statute is specific: “A response requesting that an award be
vacated or that an award be corrected shall be served and filed not later
than 100 days after the date of service of a signed copy of the award . . . .”
(§ 1288.2.) Wolf and Tahhan also suggest that this reading conflicts with
section 1286, which provides, “If a petition or response under this chapter is
duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made, whether
rendered in this state or another state, unless in accordance with this chapter
it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or
dismisses the proceeding.” We see nothing in this provision that conflicts
with the time limits set out in section 1288.2, especially as it references “duly
served and filed” responses.
Wolf and Tahhan further suggest this interpretation is unfair, as “a
Petitioner need only to wait 100 days and file a Petition to which the other
party could not even appear and defend.” We are bound by the recent ruling
of the Supreme Court: “Under the plain terms of sections 1288 and 1288.2,
[a party] ha[s] 100 days from the service of the final award to request that
the arbitration award be vacated—whether . . . via a standalone petition to
vacate or via a response to [a] petition to confirm the award.” (Key, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 946.) As indicated by this language, a party need not wait for a
petition to confirm and is free to file his own petition to vacate. Wolf and
Tahhan’s concerns about unfairness are thus ill-founded.
For his part, Jones contends that Bayscene “recognizes the authority of
trial courts to deny confirmation of arbitration awards where due process has
24
been violated—particularly under circumstances in which respondents did
not consent to arbitration.” Bayscene does not discuss whether the parties
opposing the petition to confirm timely requested vacatur, only stating that
the trial court “dismissed” the petition. (Bayscene, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th
at p. 124.) “ ‘ “[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.” ’ ”
(B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11.) In any event,
Bayscene addressed circumstances in which a city passed an unconstitutional
ordinance compelling arbitration of an ongoing case and the city attorney
threatened respondents with criminal prosecution if they did not submit to
arbitration. (Bayscene, at pp. 122–126, 135.) In addition, the respondents
“objected to the arbitration proceedings repeatedly, continually raising the
constitutional challenge both before and during proceedings.” (Id. at 129.)
The circumstances of this case bear no resemblance to those in Bayscene.
In short, defendants were required to file timely petitions or requests
to vacate the award in order to obtain such relief. They do not contend that
they did so. Jones barely addresses this issue except to say, “[O’Leary’s]
claim that [defendants’] ‘time to cry foul’ has long passed due to their alleged
failure to petition to vacate the award is entirely misplaced.” Wolf and
Tahhan similarly do not claim that they timely asserted a request to vacate.
Accordingly, defendants have forfeited such arguments. (See, e.g., Asaro v.
Maniscalco (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 717, 728, fn. 4 (Asaro).)10 As a result,
10 While the first court’s order indicates that the defendants requested
to vacate the award, it does not note whether the requests were timely made,
under the deadlines discussed above. Defendants do not argue that a timely
request in the first matter would preserve their ability to seek vacatur in this
second matter, thus forfeiting any such argument. (See Asaro, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 728, fn. 4.)
25
we cannot consider defendants’ various arguments regarding the fairness of
the arbitral proceedings.
Rather, our review is limited to determining whether dismissal is
appropriate because defendants “[were] not bound by the arbitration award
and [were] not a party to the arbitration.” (§ 1287.2.) As we have already
concluded, defendants were parties to the arbitration. Accordingly, there are
no grounds to deny the petition to confirm the award.11
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to
the trial court to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment in favor
of O’Leary, who is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, J.
RUBIN, J.
11 The parties filed requests for judicial notice on September 24, 2025,
October 24, 2025, and November 13, 2025. As noted above (ante, at fn. 2),
we take judicial notice of the complaint filed by Green America. Otherwise,
these requests include information that is either already part of the record or
beyond the scope of our limited review. They are thus denied as unnecessary.
26
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