CourtListener 10813782•People v. Ivory CA2/7
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Filed 3/23/26 P. v. Ivory CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B339706
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA045658)
v.
CLARENCE EUGENE IVORY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Julie A.
Harris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
In 2002 a jury found Clarence Eugene Ivory guilty of arson
and inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant. The trial court
found true allegations that Ivory had two prior serious felony
strike convictions (one of which was for a 1986 robbery) and had
served three prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced Ivory
to an aggregate prison term of 29 years to life.
In June 2024 the superior court resentenced Ivory under
Penal Code section 1172.75.1 The court struck the three one-year
prior prison term enhancements but declined to dismiss Ivory’s
1986 robbery strike conviction. Ivory contends the court abused
its discretion by refusing to dismiss the 1986 strike conviction.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Offenses and Original Sentencing
On July 3, 2000, after arguing with his former girlfriend at
her apartment, Ivory followed her into the bedroom and punched
her in the face. He then doused the bed with lighter fluid, which
he lit with matches setting the bedspread on fire. The girlfriend
and her 18-year-old son extinguished the fire. (People v. Ivory
(May 19, 2003, B157862) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2002 a jury convicted Ivory of arson of property (§ 451,
subd. (d)) and inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)). The trial court found two prior strike convictions
(including a 1986 robbery conviction) and three prior prison term
enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). The court sentenced
Ivory to 25 years to life on the arson count under the
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
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“Three Strikes” law, plus one year for the corporal injury count
and plus three one-year prior prison term enhancements, for a
total aggregate sentence of 29 years to life.
Ivory’s criminal history includes: a 1986 robbery conviction,
a 1991 robbery conviction, a 1991 grand theft auto conviction, a
1991 hit and run causing injury or death conviction, a
1995 involuntary manslaughter conviction, and repeated parole
violations. (People v. Ivory (May 19, 2003, B157862) [nonpub.
opn.].)
B. The Resentencing Proceeding
In 2022 the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.), retroactively invalidated all sentencing
enhancements under section 667.5, except those for sexually
violent offenses. (See People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 379-380 (Burgess).) The California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Ivory for sentencing
review under former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, and the
superior court appointed counsel for Ivory.
Ivory filed a resentencing memorandum requesting the
court dismiss the now-invalidated prison priors and the
1986 strike conviction, arguing that Ivory is not a public safety
risk under section 1172.75 due to the remoteness of the strike
conviction, his rehabilitation efforts, his age (61 at the time of
resentencing), and his developmental disability. The People filed
a response, submitting on the dismissal of the three one-year
prison priors but objecting to any further reduction because of
Ivory’s lengthy criminal history, indications that he is a danger to
public safety, his limited insight into the factors behind his
criminality, and his “not well controlled” mental illness.
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At the resentencing hearing, the court struck the
three prison prior enhancements but declined to dismiss the
1986 robbery strike conviction. The court stated that it was “not
going to focus its ruling based upon his prior conduct because
that is already baked into the cake of the original sentence and
the Court of Appeal[] most recently has asked the court to focus
forward upon his behavior in state prison.” The court found that,
although Ivory had made some progress, his behavior had not
been exemplary, he had violations that could be of a dangerous
nature, and he reported hearing voices telling him things and
was acting upon those voices. The court noted that mental illness
is not a reason to keep Ivory incarcerated, but found he was a
danger to the public:
“When he sacrifices [his] agency to the voices, it’s a
danger to the public. Because even if it’s his own
internal desire not to do something bad or dangerous,
apparently if these voices tell him to do things, he
may do them. And until that can be resolved, the
court sees him as a danger to the public based upon
his conduct in prison as well as the violence of the
underlying act.”
The court resentenced Ivory to 25 years to life plus one year for
the corporal injury count. Ivory timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Ivory Has Not Forfeited His Claim
As a threshold matter, the People argue that Ivory forfeited
his claim that the resentencing court should have dismissed his
1986 strike conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). Their reasoning is that he did
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not specifically identify Romero or section 1385, subdivision (a),
as the basis for requesting dismissal of the prior. Ivory argues
that he specifically requested that the resentencing court dismiss
both the three one-year prison priors and the 1986 strike
conviction.
When a party fails to raise an issue or object at sentencing,
the party may forfeit the claim and not raise it for the first time
on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.) However,
“‘[a]s a general matter, no useful purpose is served by declining to
consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under
alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one
that was properly preserved by a timely motion that called upon
the trial court to consider the same facts and to apply a legal
standard similar to that which would also determine the claim
raised on appeal.’” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436,
quoting People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117.)
Although Ivory never expressly stated Romero or
section 1385 as the basis, he asked the court to dismiss his
1986 prior conviction and provided information about his
rehabilitation, education, and other mitigating circumstances.
The People objected to dismissing the 1986 strike conviction and
argued in their response that Ivory’s record in prison showed that
he was a danger to the public. The court specifically considered
and rejected dismissing the 1986 strike conviction to reduce the
sentence further. Ivory is not raising a new argument; rather, he
simply contests the decision that the resentencing court made.
Ivory did not forfeit his right to argue on appeal that the
resentencing court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss
his 1986 prior conviction.
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B. The Resentencing Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Declining To Dismiss the 1986 Strike Conviction
1. Applicable legal standards
Under Romero, a trial court may dismiss a prior serious or
violent felony conviction in the furtherance of justice pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (a). (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 504.) In deciding whether to dismiss a prior strike, the court
must consider “whether, in light of the nature and circumstances
of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though
he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161.)
We review the resentencing court’s decision for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) “[A]
trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.” (Ibid.) A court abuses its discretion when it is unaware of its
discretion, considers impermissible factors, or where the
sentencing norms established by the Three Strikes law produce
an “‘“arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd” result’” under the
specific facts of a particular case. (Id. at p. 378, quoting People v.
Gillispie (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 429, 434.)
2. The resentencing court’s decision was not irrational or
arbitrary
Ivory argues that the resentencing court should have
dismissed his 1986 strike conviction because it is nearly 40 years
old and he has demonstrated rehabilitation through educational
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programs, improved mental health, and having the lowest
possible security classification score for an inmate serving an
indeterminate sentence. We acknowledge these are significant
considerations. But they do not lead us to the conclusion that the
resentencing court abused its discretion.
First, as to remoteness: while the 1986 conviction is
undeniably old, remoteness alone does not require a court to
strike a prior conviction. (People v. Humphrey (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [holding that the overriding concern is
not the age of the prior conviction but whether the defendant has
led a “‘legally blameless life’”’].) Here, Ivory has not led a legally
blameless life since the 1986 strike conviction. To the contrary,
he committed a second robbery in 1991, grand theft auto in 1991,
hit and run causing injury or death in 1991, and involuntary
manslaughter in 1995—all before the arson and domestic
violence offenses in this case. This is the type of patterned
criminality that tends to undermine the mitigating argument of
remoteness. (See People v. Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108,
1124-1125 [holding that the mitigating factor of remoteness was
undermined by continuing criminal conduct].)
Second, while Ivory has made commendable efforts at
rehabilitation—earning educational certificates, participating in
self-improvement programs, and having the lowest possible
security score for an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence—
the resentencing court also considered the People’s countervailing
evidence. Ivory has incurred 14 rule violations during his
incarceration. Furthermore, at a 2020 parole suitability hearing,
Ivory reported hearing voices that told him to light the fire that
led to his current sentence, and the hearing panel expressed
concern about his uncontrolled mental illness and limited insight
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into his criminal behavior. The resentencing court was entitled
to weigh this evidence in assessing Ivory’s current dangerousness
and prospects for the future.
Third, the nature and circumstances of Ivory’s present
felonies—arson and domestic violence—are violent and
dangerous. These are not crimes that suggest Ivory falls outside
the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.
Considering Ivory’s extensive and violent criminal history
spanning from 1986 to 2000, the nature of his current offenses,
his disciplinary record in prison, and the concerns about his
mental health and insight, we cannot say the resentencing court’s
refusal to strike the 1986 strike conviction was so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. The
resentencing court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GIZA, J.*
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J. STONE, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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