Martens v. Alessi CA2/1

CourtListener 10812461Calctapp20 mars 2026

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Filed 3/20/26 Martens v. Alessi CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

REBECCA MARTENS, B348581

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. 23SMCV01136,
v. 23SMCV05054)

DAVID M. ALESSI, M.D., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Affirmed.
Rebecca Martens, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Schmid & Voiles, Denise H. Greer, Rodney G. Tomlinson
and Adam R. James, for Defendants and Respondents.
____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff and appellant Rebecca Martens sued defendants
and respondents David M. Alessi, M.D. (Dr. Alessi) and David M.
Alessi, M.D., P.C. (collectively, respondents) for medical
malpractice and medical battery. Martens appeals from the
judgment entered by the trial court after it had granted
respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
Although Martens is representing herself in this appeal,
well-settled rules of appellate procedure require her to support
her appellate claims with cogent argument and citations to the
record and legal authority. Because she has not discharged that
obligation, we affirm the judgment.

A. Procedural Background2
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.
On March 15, 2023, Martens, who at that time was
represented by counsel, filed a complaint against Dr. Alessi and
his professional corporation (i.e., defendant and respondent
David M. Alessi, M.D., P.C.) for medical malpractice in trial court
case No. 23SMCV01136. On October 26, 2023, Martens, through

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . .” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
2 We derive our Procedural Background in part from
undisputed aspects of the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment and respondents’ assertions that Martens does not
contest in her reply brief. (See Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 [employing this approach].)

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counsel, filed a complaint against respondents for medical battery
in trial court case No. 23SMCV05054. In August 2024, the trial
court consolidated the two cases for all purposes. At bottom,
Martens alleged that she suffered injuries from cosmetic surgery
and medical treatment provided by respondents, and they
subjected her to certain surgeries and treatment without her
consent.
Respondents moved for summary judgment. After
respondents filed a reply to Martens’s opposition to their motion,
Martens filed a separate statement of disputed material facts,
exhibits, and a declaration, and lodged a USB drive with various
photographs and videos in support of her opposition.
Respondents filed evidentiary objections and an objection and
request to strike Martens’s separate statement and exhibits.
Martens subsequently filed several additional documents,
including a response to respondents’ objections.
On July 24, 2025, the trial court heard and granted
respondents’ summary judgment motion.3
As for the medical malpractice claim, the trial court found
that respondents satisfied their initial burden of showing
Martens would be unable to establish they breached the standard
of care or that any such breach caused or contributed to
Martens’s claimed injuries. Specifically, respondents submitted a
declaration from J. Brian Boyd, M.D., an experienced plastic
surgeon. Dr. Boyd attested he had analyzed Martens’s medical
records, and he opined, inter alia: (1) respondents “complied with
the standard of care in the treatment of . . . Martens which

3 The next four paragraphs summarize pertinent aspects of
the order granting summary judgment.

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included the pre-operative workup, performance of . . . surgery,
and post-operative care, including the injection of the steroids”;
and (2) “to a reasonable degree of medical probability,” that
“Martens’[s] alleged injuries are not due to any act or omission on
behalf of” respondents. The court ruled respondents thus “shifted
the burden of production to [Martens] to raise triable issues of
material fact” vis-à-vis the medical malpractice claim.
The trial court found Martens failed to satisfy that burden.
The court explained that Martens’s separate statement and
evidentiary submissions were untimely and Martens had “not
demonstrated good cause for the Court to excuse the delay.”4
According to the court, even if it “were to overlook the
untimeliness of [Martens’s] filings,” the letter from a plastic
surgeon that Martens offered to controvert respondents’ expert
declaration was inadmissible. “[Respondents] point[ed] out[ ] the
letter is both unauthenticated and unsigned.” The court also
found the correspondence contains various “indicia of
unreliability,” to wit, “numerous typos and misspellings,
including of [Martens’s] own name, and the bottom of the letter
indicates, ‘Dictated but not verified, subject to
dictation/transcription variance.’ ”
As for the medical battery claim, the trial court ruled
respondents met their initial burden of showing Martens could
not establish they performed procedures beyond those for which

4 In her reply brief, Martens asserts, without any
supporting citation to the record, that she “became self-
represented following the withdrawal of trial counsel shortly
before the dispositive proceedings.” Nevertheless, she seems to
acknowledge that “self-representation [does not]
excuse[ non]compliance with procedural rules.”

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she had consented, thereby “shift[ing] the burden of production to
[Martens] to raise triable issues of material fact.” In particular,
respondents offered evidence Martens had consented to certain
surgical procedures (i.e., “a cervico-facial rhytidectomy . . . and a
minor tip rhino revision”); Dr. Alessi’s administration of steroid
injections to address Martens’s complaints of scarring did not
require signed informed consent; notwithstanding Martens’s
apparent allegation to the contrary, Dr. Alessi did not perform a
brow lift on her; and the consent form Martens signed
“encompassed treatment for conditions that may arise during the
course of care and treatment, including ‘operations and
procedures different from, or in addition to, the procedure
described’ that ‘are considered necessary and advisable.’ ”
The trial court found Martens failed to create a triable
issue of material fact as to her medical battery claim. First, the
court reiterated its conclusion that Martens’s “evidentiary and
separate statement submissions are untimely.” Second, the court
concluded Martens’s untimely evidentiary submissions did not
support the theory of liability she had pleaded in her complaint
for medical battery. Whereas Martens pleaded that respondents
had, without her consent, “ ‘performed surgery on [her] neck,
face, eye brow, and scalp’ ” and given her “ ‘unnecessary and
prolonged injections of steroids,’ ” the evidence Martens offered
concerned only whether she consented to a “hematoma drainage
procedure . . . .” Lastly, the court ruled, “[E]ven if [Martens’s]
withdrawal of consent in the middle of the post-operative
drainage procedure were properly at issue in this case, which it is
not based upon [the] allegations in the complaint, the video
evidence [Martens offers] does not demonstrate that the doctor
continued with the procedure without [Martens’s] consent . . . .”

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Several hours after the trial court granted respondents’
summary judgment motion, Martens filed a notice of appeal
seeking review of a “[j]udgment after an order granting a
summary judgment motion,” which judgment she claimed had
been entered on July 24, 2025. On August 18, 2025, the trial
court filed a judgment in favor of respondents in accordance with
its order granting their summary judgment motion.5

B. Standards of Review and Rules of Appellate
Procedure
Summary judgment motions are governed by a three-step
procedure. (See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres
Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist.).) “ ‘ “ ‘First, [a court] identif[ies] the issues
raised by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the
motion must respond; secondly, [the court] determine[s] whether
the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate
the opponent’s claims and justify a judgment in movant’s favor;
when a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a
judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the
opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material
factual issue.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (See ibid.)
“We review an order granting or denying summary
judgment or summary adjudication independently.” (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.) “Only
admissible evidence is . . . [considered] in deciding whether there

5 We exercise our discretion to treat Martens’s notice of
appeal as having been filed immediately after entry of judgment.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).) All undesignated rule
references are to the California Rules of Court.

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is a triable issue.” (See Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761.) “We review the trial court’s rulings on
evidentiary objections for an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 762.)
We also review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s “refus[al] to
consider papers [in opposition to summary judgment] served and
filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good
cause for late submission.” (See id. at p. 765.)
“ ‘ “Even when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited
to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in
[the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.] Issues not raised in
an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.’ ”
[Citation.] To succeed[,] . . . [an appellant] must first establish
error. . . . “ ‘[T]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is
that an appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct.’
[Citation.]” . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To ‘rebut[ ] the
presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision,’
the appellant must ‘ “ ‘ “supply[ ] the reviewing court with some
cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record.” ’ [Citation.] [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Cruz v. Tapestry,
Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 953–954 (Cruz).) Consequently,
“ ‘ “[d]e novo review does not[, for instance,] obligate us to cull the
record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to
uncover the requisite triable issues. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (See
Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 492.)
The rules of appellate procedure apply to Martens even
though she is a self-represented party. (Scholes v. Lambirth
Trucking Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.) Accordingly,
Martens “ ‘ “is entitled to the same, but no greater[,]

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consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]” ’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)

C. Martens Fails To Show the Trial Court Erred In
Granting Summary Judgment
In her opening brief, Martens identifies three appellate
issues: “1. Whether the trial court erred in granting Summary
Judgment where disputed material facts existed. [¶] 2. Whether
the court improperly weighed evidence or failed to construe
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
([Martens]). [¶] 3. Whether [respondents] failed to meet [their]
initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c.”
Instead of analyzing any of these questions in her opening
brief, Martens purports to “incorporate[ ] by reference all filings
identified in the Designation of Record, including oppositions,
declarations, exhibits, and objections . . . .” Martens does not cite
any particular filing she claims supports her challenge to the
order granting summary judgment. She also asserts, without
elaboration or citation to the record, that “no sitting court Judge
should be allowed to be bias [sic] and take funds from an
insurance company.”
“ ‘[I]t is well settled that the Court of Appeal does not
permit incorporation by reference of documents filed in the trial
court. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (York v. City of Los Angeles
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1188–1189, fn. 4.) We thus
disregard Martens’s vague and oblique reference to unspecified
documents filed in the trial court. Because her opening brief
contains no cogent argument challenging the trial court’s order
granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment, Martens

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fails to rebut the presumption of correctness accorded to that
decision. (See Cruz, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 953–954.)6
In her reply brief, Martens seems to argue that we have an
“obligation to independently review the summary judgment
ruling de novo . . . to determine whether triable issues of material
fact exist” regardless of whether her appellate briefing is
deficient. She cites a page from Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 for the following proposition: “Even where
briefing is imperfect, courts routinely reach the merits where the
record permits review and the issues are purely legal.” (Citing
Aguilar, at p. 860.) In the excerpt Martens cites, however, the
Supreme Court did not hold that an appellate court must assume
the role of an advocate when an appellant files a defective brief
challenging entry of summary judgment. (See ibid. [merely
holding that “[a]n order granting summary judgment . . . is
reviewed independently”].) We decline Martens’s invitation to
take on that role. (See part B, ante [noting that an appellant
must overcome the presumption of correctness even on de novo
review]; see also Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County
Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“ ‘We are not

6 Respondents ask us to strike Martens’s opening brief for
failure to comply with rules 8.204(a)(1)(B) and 8.204(a)(1)(C),
which require each appellate brief to “support each point by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority” and “[s]upport
any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (See
rules 8.204(a)(1)(B)–(C).) We deny respondents’ request as
procedurally improper because they failed to raise it in a separate
motion. (See rule 8.204(e)(2)(B) [providing that a party may
move to strike an appellate brief that does not comply with
rule 8.204].)

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required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains
support for [a party’s] contentions.’ [Citation.] We do not serve
as ‘backup appellate counsel[.]’ ”].)7
In sum, because Martens does not show the trial court
erred in granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment, we
affirm the ensuing judgment.8

DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Defendants and respondents
David M. Alessi, M.D. and David M. Alessi, M.D., P.C. are
awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J. M. KIM, J.

7 At oral argument, Martens raised multiple contentions
she did not include in her appellate briefing. We decline to
address these belatedly raised arguments. (BFGC Architects
Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 848, 854 [“We will not consider an issue not
mentioned in the briefs and raised for the first time at oral
argument.”].)
8 Although respondents observe in their summary of the
procedural history of this case that the trial court denied
Martens’s motions for reconsideration and for a new trial,
respectively, Martens does not mention those rulings in her
briefing, let alone claim they are properly before us.

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