People v. Pirozzi CA2/6

CourtListener 10811239Calctapp19 mars 2026

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Filed 3/19/26 P. v. Pirozzi CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B343599
(Super. Ct. No. 21CR04504)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

ADAM MICHAEL PIROZZI,

Defendant and Appellant.

Adam Michael Pirozzi appeals a restitution order following
no contest pleas to two counts of embezzlement (Pen. Code1,
§ 506; counts 1 & 4). He also admitted an aggravated white-
collar crime enhancement because he caused a loss in excess of
$500,000. (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(1).) Pirozzi was placed on
probation with conditions. After a restitution hearing the trial
court ordered him to pay restitution.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
Pirozzi contends the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding restitution to persons and an entity who were not direct
victims and by not allowing him to call an attorney as a witness.
He also contends the restitution awards are not supported by
substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pirozzi was a real estate broker who had access to various
client financial accounts. He owned AMPCore, Inc., a property
management company that conducted business as Santa Barbara
Property Management. He received “money belonging to over 30
rental property owners in the form of rent payments and security
deposits from tenants.” The money was held in a client trust
account so he could “make regular payments to the property
owners based on their portion of the trust’s income.” Pirozzi was
“entrusted” with and had control of these accounts acting as a
trustee or broker.
In December 2019, Pirozzi “was entrusted with $150,000”
from an agent of a property owner to be used for repairs on that
owner’s rental property. Pirozzi transferred the money from the
trust account to his own personal account. When the agent
subsequently inquired why the funds were not in the rental
property trust repair account, Pirozzi said it was an accounting
error. Pirozzi later made a false report to police that B.T., a
former employee, stole his identity, forged documents, and took
funds from the trust account.
In December 2020, Pirozzi transferred $512,896.77 from
the client trust account to his own account. When a business
partner questioned the transfer, Pirozzi lied and said the money
was “ ‘frozen due to a cyber-attack.’ ” In February 2021, the
agent of the property owner who had deposited $150,000 with

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Pirozzi canceled the property management agreement. He
requested repayment of the money he had given to Pirozzi to hold
in trust for rental property repairs. Pirozzi refused this request
and falsely claimed that B.T. had stolen the funds from the trust
account.
In January 2024, a district attorney investigator
determined that there were approximately 35 victims from whom
Pirozzi had embezzled funds. The People filed a seven-count
criminal complaint alleging Pirozzi committed embezzlement in
2019 (§ 506; count 1), theft from an elder or dependent adult
(§ 368, subd. (d)(1); count 2), preparing false documentary
evidence (§ 134; count 3), embezzlement in 2020 and 2021 (§ 506;
count 4), money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)(1); counts 5 & 6),
and embezzlement from Central Holding Group, LLC (§ 506;
count 7). The People also alleged a special allegation that Pirozzi
committed an aggravated white-collar crime causing a loss of
more than $500,000 (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(2)).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Pirozzi pleaded no contest to
counts 1 and 4 for embezzlement (§ 506). These counts did not
specifically identify any victims. Pirozzi also admitted the special
allegation that he caused a loss in excess of $500,000. (§ 186.11,
subd. (a)(1).) Pirozzi’s signed plea form indicates that the
remaining counts would be dismissed with a Harvey2 waiver.
Pirozzi confirmed signing the plea form and accompanying
addendum.
The plea form and addendum acknowledged that Pirozzi
“[understood] that the sentencing judge may consider facts
underlying dismissed counts to determine restitution” and

2 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 754.

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“consider the entire factual background of the case, including any
dismissed or stricken charges or allegations or cases, and any
charges the District Attorney agrees not to file, when . . . ordering
restitution to victims (even victims of dismissed counts, or counts
not filed per agreement).” As a factual basis for his pleas, Pirozzi
admitted that he “was a licensed real estate broker,” “operated a
property management company . . . which did business as Santa
Barbara Property Management,” and “received money from
clients which was supposed to [be] held in trust for the clients.”
The factual basis further stated that Pirozzi fraudulently
transferred funds entrusted to him of $150,000 (count 1) and
$512,896.77 (count 4) to his own account for his own benefit.
The probation presentence report indicated the People
would seek victim restitution of $72,149.50 for Dennis Hoey,
$178,901 for Santa Barbara Property Management, and $468,125
for Anthony McMahon. Consistent with the plea agreement, the
People dismissed the remaining five counts, and the trial court
placed Pirozzi on five years of probation with conditions including
that he pay restitution to his victims. The trial court found that
the prosecutor made a “prima facie showing” for the claimed
restitution. Pirozzi did not challenge the court’s finding that a
prima facie showing had been made. Determination of the
amount of restitution was set for a later hearing.
The People later filed a brief requesting restitution with an
itemized list reflecting the embezzled funds and corresponding
victims. At the restitution hearing, the People presented the
victim statements of loss caused by Pirozzi’s conduct and
supplied supporting documentation. Pirozzi objected to some of
the restitution amounts sought by the People and did not object
to others. The trial court overruled the objections and found the

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victims had presented sufficient evidence to support the amounts
claimed. The court ordered restitution of $72,149.15 to Dennis
Hoey, $178,901 to Santa Barbara Property Management, and
$468,125 to Anthony McMahon.
DISCUSSION
Restitution as a condition of probation
“It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of
California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of
criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure
restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the
losses they suffer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).)
“Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in
every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in
which a crime victim suffers a loss.” (Id., subd. (b)(13)(B).) And
“in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a
result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the
defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount
established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed
by the victim or victims or any other showing to the
court. . . . The court shall order full restitution.” (§ 1202.4, subd.
(f).)
“In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to
impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public
safety pursuant to [section 1203.1].” (People v. Carbajal (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120 (Carbajal).) “Restitution has long been
considered a valid condition of probation.” (Id. at p. 1121.)
“California courts have long interpreted the trial courts’
discretion to encompass the ordering of restitution as a condition
of probation even when the loss was not necessarily caused by the
criminal conduct underlying the conviction. Under certain

5
circumstances, restitution has been found proper where the loss
was caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction.”
(Ibid.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[S]entencing judges are given virtually unlimited
discretion as to the kind of information they can consider and the
source from whence it comes . . . because a hearing to establish
the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other
phases of a criminal prosecution.’ [Citation].” ’ ” (People v. Hove
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275.) “The court ‘ “may use any
rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is
reasonably calculated to make the victim whole.” ’ . . . It may
make a restitution order based on ‘truncated evidence’ such as
declarations or probation reports, business records, and checks.”
(People v. Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 872, 898-899.)
“The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is
preponderance of the evidence . . . . [Citation.] We review a
victim restitution award for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]
‘[W]here the specific issue is whether the court’s factual findings
support restitution, we review those findings for substantial
evidence.’ ” (People v. Trout-Lacy (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 369,
373.) And once the prosecutor establishes a prima facie showing
of loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that
the amount is other than that claimed by the victim. (People v.
Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26 (Millard).)
Restitution for Dennis Hoey
Pirozzi contends the trial court erred by awarding
restitution to Hoey in the amount of $72,149.15. He claims Hoey
was not a direct victim of his criminal conduct and that

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substantial evidence does not support the restitution award. We
are not persuaded.
“The court must order direct victim restitution in ‘every
case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of
the defendant’s conduct.’ ” (People v. Maheshwari (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 1406, 1409 (Maheshwari), quoting § 1202.4, subd.
(f).) As our Supreme Court reaffirmed in People v. Martinez
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1101 (Martinez), courts have broad
discretion to impose probationary conditions “ ‘to foster
rehabilitation and to protect public safety.’ ” This includes the
power to order restitution “ ‘even when the loss was not
necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the
conviction,’ ” including in cases where “ ‘the loss was caused by
related conduct not resulting in a conviction [citation], by conduct
underlying dismissed and uncharged counts [citation], and by
conduct resulting in an acquittal [citation].’ ” (Ibid.)
At the restitution hearing, Hoey testified he and Pirozzi
were partners in a business called Hidden Oaks Ranch, a
property consisting of a golf course and clubhouse. The Mix
family deposited money with the partnership for the purpose of
hosting a wedding at the property. The Mix family later learned
that “all of [Pirozzi’s] business operations were terminated”
because of pending litigation involving the partnership. Thus,
the wedding could not take place at Hidden Oaks Ranch.
The Mix family asked for return of their deposit but Pirozzi
“refused to give it” back. Instead, he stole the money from the
partnership and kept it for himself. The Mix family subsequently
filed a lawsuit against the partnership. Because he was a
partner, Hoey was liable for repayment of the deposit. Hoey
settled the lawsuit with the Mix family for $19,000 and incurred

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attorney’s fees in litigation defense. Hoey testified he suffered a
direct loss caused by Pirozzi’s conduct. He sought restitution of
the settlement and attorney fees. His total loss was $72,149.15,
and the People included a sworn statement from Hoey itemizing
the attorney’s fees and settlement payment.
We conclude it was proper for the trial court to award
restitution to Hoey as a condition of Pirozzi’s probation. Without
Pirozzi embezzling the deposit, Hoey would not have been sued
by the Mix family for return of the deposit, paid the settlement,
and incurred attorney’s fees. Thus, Hoey’s loss of $72,149.15 was
“ ‘proper, necessary, and a logical result of appellant’s criminal
conduct.’ ” (Maheshwari, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1409-
1410.) Substantial evidence also supports the restitution order
and Pirozzi failed to rebut the prima facie finding. (Millard,
supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)
People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, upon which Pirozzi
relies, is inapposite. Our Supreme court in Birkett held that
insurance companies that had reimbursed owners of stolen
vehicles were not “ ‘direct victim[s]’ ” entitled to restitution. (Id.
at p. 229.) Here, Hoey and Pirozzi were in a partnership and
Hoey suffered economic loss because of Pirozzi’s criminal conduct.
Thus, Hoey is a “direct victim of a crime” entitled to criminal
restitution. (§ 1202.4, subds. (f), (k)(2).)
Nor does People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
1076 assist Pirozzi. There, the defendant unlawfully withdrew
money from a bank account belonging to another person. The
bank covered the loss to that customer, thereby suffering an
economic loss, and became a direct victim of the crime entitled to
restitution. (Id. at p. 1083.) That is what happened here. When
Pirozzi took the money deposited with the partnership, Hoey

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became responsible for paying back that money and became a
direct victim of Pirozzi’s conduct. Hoey suffered an economic loss
directly resulting from Pirozzi’s criminal conduct.
Pirozzi also contends he was not convicted of stealing
money from the partnership and therefore restitution should be
denied. But “restitution has been found proper where the loss
was caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction.”
(Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) Here, Pirozzi pleaded no
contest to counts 1 and 4 for embezzling property from others and
he expressly agreed in his plea agreement that the trial court
could “consider the entire factual background of the case,”
including “victims of dismissed counts, or counts not filed per
agreement.” Because restitution “ ‘may serve the salutary
purpose of making a criminal understand that he has harmed not
merely society in the abstract but also individual human beings,
and that he has a responsibility to make them whole’ ” (People v.
Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1097), it was not an abuse of
discretion to award criminal restitution to Hoey. Because Pirozzi
was placed on probation, the court had broad discretion to
fashion a restitution order. (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp.
1101-1102.)
Restitution for Santa Barbara Property Management
Pirozzi claims the trial court erred by awarding restitution
of $178,901 to Santa Barbara Property Management. He
contends the company is not a direct crime victim and substantial
evidence does not support the award. We disagree.
Steven Downarowicz was the prior owner of Santa Barbara
Property Management. He had sold the company to Pirozzi but
later “agreed to take the company back” after Pirozzi “began
embezzling money from the clients.” Downarowicz took over the

9
liabilities and the prosecutor contended Pirozzi embezzled
$178,901. Downarowicz “compiled a list of all the missing funds,
which he provided to the District Attorney” to support the loss
the company had suffered. The loss was documented by exhibits
showing a total loss to the company caused by Pirozzi’s
embezzlement of $178,901. The trial court said there was “no
opposing evidence to shed doubt on its authenticity.”
We conclude that Pirozzi failed to rebut the prima facie
finding and that substantial evidence supports the restitution
award because the company incurred liabilities resulting from
Pirozzi embezzling money from the client trust accounts. And
contrary to Pirozzi’s contentions, specifying the names of the
clients’ accounts from whom Pirozzi stole does not negate the
company’s economic loss resulting from having to repay the
embezzled funds based on a preponderance of the evidence.
(People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542.) There was
no abuse of discretion in awarding restitution to Santa Barbara
Property Management.
Restitution for Anthony McMahon
Pirozzi contends the trial court erred by awarding
restitution to McMahon in the amount of $468,125. He claims
there was insufficient evidence or documentation to support this
restitution award. We again disagree.
Pirozzi embezzled money from financial accounts
associated with properties owned by McMahon, including the
Montecito Gardens Property and the Valerio Property. The
People presented a statement of loss showing “total restitution
due of $468,125.” The amount of loss was broken down into six
categories: 1) money due for Montecito Gardens Property of
$157,235; 2) money due on the Valerio Property of $96,515;

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3) security deposits due for Montecito Gardens of $34,340; 4)
security deposits due for Valerio of $13,035; 5) a missing
$150,000 deposit; and 6) attorney fees of $17,000. We again
conclude that Pirozzi failed to rebut the prima facie finding and
that the People made a sufficient “showing to the court” to
support restitution. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).)
Pirozzi presented a letter from attorney Berg who
represented the victims showing that Pirozzi made payments to
McMahon. Thus, he contends the claim should be reduced. But
the letter Pirozzi cites was dated 2021. The claim of loss
prepared by attorney Berg, and relied on by the prosecution, was
dated 2024. The People contended Pirozzi had not made a
sufficient showing about what those earlier 2021 payments were
for. The trial court agreed and found Pirozzi had not met his
burden of proof. The issue was not whether Pirozzi made
payments to McMahon in the past; it was whether Pirozzi’s
alleged payments were to reimburse McMahon for the six
categories of loss mentioned in his 2024 statement of loss.
The trial court found that it was “not convinced” that
Pirozzi was entitled to any credits. Weighing the evidence,
resolving evidentiary disputes, and deciding credibility are
exclusively decided by the trial court. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) Here, the court found the letter Pirozzi
relied on was ambiguous and did not support his claims for a
credit. Based on the record, Pirozzi has not shown an abuse of
discretion.
No due process violation
Pirozzi contends he was denied due process because he was
deprived of the “right to present his own evidence.” At the
restitution hearing, attorney Berg was present. Berg represented

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McMahon in civil litigation against Pirozzi. Pirozzi implies that
the court erred by not allowing him to call Berg as a witness or to
cross-examine him. We are not persuaded.
At the hearing, Pirozzi’s counsel noted that Berg was
present in the courtroom and stated, “I wonder if he might be
examined briefly on this subject” of payments Pirozzi made to
McMahon. The prosecutor stated Pirozzi “does not have the right
to cross-examine witnesses.” The trial court responded, “That’s
correct. It’s discretionary with the court. . . . I know why he’s
here. I presume he’s monitoring his client’s interests.”
A trial court’s decision to admit or deny evidence is
typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People Vieira
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292.) To support a claim that the trial
court improperly excluded witness testimony, the appellant must
make an offer of proof in the trial court showing what the
proposed testimony would be. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25
Cal.4th 543, 580.) “In general, a judgment may not be reversed
for the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless ‘the substance,
purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known
to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any
other means.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).)
“This rule is necessary because, among other things, the
reviewing court must know the substance of the excluded
evidence in order to assess prejudice.” (Ibid.) Counsel here
suggested the general subject matter of Berg’s proposed
testimony but did not offer what the substance of the testimony
would be. Accordingly, neither abuse of discretion nor prejudice
has been shown.

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DISPOSITION
The order granting restitution is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

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Jean M. Dandona, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Keith & Highland Law and Andrea Keith, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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