In re N.R. CA2/7

CourtListener 10807372Calctapp11 mars 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 3/11/26 In re N.R. CA2/7
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re N.R., a Person Coming B337391
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________ (Los Angeles County Super.
A.M., Ct. No. 22CCJP01162)

Respondent,

v.

R.R.,

Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Dismissed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, and Giselle Marie Achecar for Appellant.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Respondent.

__________________________
R.R. (Father) appeals from a restraining order under
section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code1 after the
juvenile court authorized A.M. (Mother) to serve the temporary
restraining order by mail in lieu of personally serving Father. He
contends there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s
conclusion that Father was evading service such that an
alternative means of service was permissible under Family Code
section 6340, subdivision (a)(2)(A). Because R.R. did not appeal
from an appealable order, we lack jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Original Proceedings in Dependency Court
In February 2022 the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral
regarding N.R. after her birth. The Department filed a petition
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). During the initial
hearing, the court detained N.R. from Father and released her to
Mother’s care.
At the August 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
Father appeared remotely. The court sustained the petition as
amended by interlineation, finding the parents had a history of
domestic violence, including while Mother was pregnant with
N.R.; Father failed to protect N.R. from Mother’s substance
abuse; Mother had a history of mental and emotional problems;
Father had a periodic history of substance abuse; and Father had
a history of mental and emotional problems, including a

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise noted.

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diagnosis of bipolar disorder. The court ordered Father to attend
a batterer’s intervention program and both parents to attend
counseling and a drug and alcohol program with testing, among
other programs.
Father subsequently appeared at three hearings in
November 2022, February 2023, and August 2023.

B. Mother’s Request for a Restraining Order and Attempts at
Service
In early December 2023 Mother requested a restraining
order to protect herself and N.R., alleging that Father had
recently punched, kicked, spit on, and dragged her by the hair,
leaving lacerations and bruises that required medical attention.
Mother indicated she had provided notice of the ex parte request
for a restraining order to Father’s counsel. At the hearing
several days later, Father’s counsel stated she had not been able
to reach Father that morning and generally objected to the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) because she had
not “been able to discuss the situation” with Father. The court
issued a TRO and set a hearing date on the permanent
restraining order for December 19. The court ordered Mother to
serve the TRO on Father.
That same month a process server from CalServe made
three unsuccessful attempts to serve Father with the TRO at his
housing at a shelter on 8th Street in San Pedro. The server noted
that Father was a day laborer with no set schedule and Father
never called the phone number the server left for him.
Father did not appear at the December 19 hearing. Mother
requested more time to serve him. Father’s counsel did not object
to the reissuance of the TRO and the court continued the hearing

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until January 2024. In January, Mother again requested to
continue the hearing to serve Father, and the court reissued the
TRO and continued the hearing until later that month.
Also in January 2024, the Department filed a section 342
petition based on the additional domestic violence incident in
November 2023 in the presence of N.R. At the initial hearing on
that petition, Father was again absent, and his counsel stated he
was unable to get in contact with Father and requested a
continuance so he could be present. Over Father’s counsel’s
objection, the court reissued the TRO and continued the hearing.
The Department’s February 2024 report indicated that
Father advised the Department on February 13, 2024 that he
was still living at the shelter on 8th Street in San Pedro. The
Department interviewed him at that location.
In February 2024 the court sustained the section 342
petition and ordered reunification services for both parents.
Father appeared at the hearing remotely. His counsel confirmed
Father was living at the shelter. Mother’s attorney requested
that Father’s counsel accept service of the TRO on Father’s
behalf. She stated, “Like the court said, we’ve been unable to
serve [Father] at this time. The shelter he’s purportedly staying
in cannot confirm or deny that he stays there.” In response,
Father’s counsel stated, “I would just ask that [t]he father be
served personally. I cannot accept service.” The court ordered
personal service but stated Mother could request alternative
service means if Father appeared to be evading Mother’s
attempts to serve him. The court continued the hearing until
March 2024.
At Mother’s request, the court again continued the hearing
in March and April to allow Mother more time for service. In

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April 2024 CalServe tried twice to serve Father at the shelter.
The notes from the first attempt state, “Will not provide any
information, stated only way is to leave a call back #, will have
[Father] call if he is currently at the address.” The notes from
the second attempt state, “no returned call, return unserved.”
At the continued hearing later in April 2024 Mother’s
attorney again asked the court to authorize service on Father’s
attorney or to require Father to appear so he could be served in
court. Mother’s attorney represented there had been
approximately six unsuccessful attempts at personal service. The
court directed Mother to submit an offer of proof that Father was
evading service and continued the hearing until May.

C. Mother’s Motion for Alternative Service and the Court’s
Order Permitting Service by Mail
In May 2024 Mother moved for permission to serve Father
with the restraining order by mail. She argued Father had
appeared remotely at the February 2024 hearing—when the TRO
was continued—and was aware of the proceedings. Despite his
awareness, subsequent attempts to personally serve him were
unsuccessful and there was reason to believe that Father was
evading service. The motion attached a report from CalServe,
which stated, “After due search, careful inquiry and diligent
attempts at the [shelter on 8th Street in San Pedro], we have
been unable to effect service of said process. . . . Interim housing
. . . will not provide any information [and] stated [the] only way is
to leave a call back#. . . . [Interim housing] will have [Father] call
if he is currently at the address. . . . No returned call, return
unserved.” (Capitalization omitted.) Mother contended, “Father
is unquestionably aware that Mother is attempting to serve him,

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but he has frustrated those efforts by failing to appear in court
and contact CalServe. This constitutes evasion of service
sufficient that the Court may permit alternative methods of
service. Given that Father’s address is known, service by first-
class mail is reasonably calculated to provide notice to him of the
proceedings.”
At the continued hearing the same month Father again
failed to appear. His counsel opposed the motion, arguing there
was no evidence Father was intentionally avoiding service. He
suggested Father might be in an inpatient program without
access to his phone, might not understand that personal service
was required, and might not even be aware that the TRO
remained active. Mother’s counsel reiterated that Father had
been informed of the TRO in February. She emphasized that
Father failed to appear for any court dates afterwards, that he
had made no effort to appear or respond to the process server,
and that his shelter refused to confirm his presence.
On May 6, 2024, the court granted the motion, authorizing
service by first-class mail and by serving Father’s attorney. It
found that Father had been aware of the restraining order since
February, multiple service attempts had failed, his program
would not cooperate with service, and Father’s attorney was in a
position to inform him of the restraining order hearing.
Father appealed. His notice of appeal lists his address as
the shelter on 8th Street.
On June 6, 2024, at the restraining order hearing, the court
found the TRO had been properly served on Father, based on the
proof of service by certified mail to Father at the 8th Street

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address as well as to Father’s counsel.2 The court granted a
three-year restraining order. Father did not appeal from the
restraining order.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Father’s Contention on Appeal
“Under section 213.5, and as pertinent here, a juvenile
court has the authority to issue a restraining order lasting up to
three years that protects . . . ‘any parent . . . of the [dependent]
child’ from harassment by a parent. (§ 213.5, subds. (a) & (d); see
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(a).)” (In re Lilianna C. (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 638, 643-644.) While the court may issue a TRO
without notice or a hearing, and the TRO can then remain in
effect for up to 25 days (§ 213.5, subd. (c)(1)), permanent
restraining orders are issued only “upon notice and a hearing”
(id., subd. (d)(1)). An application for a restraining order must be
made “in the manner provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil
Procedure or, if related to domestic violence, in the manner
provided by Section 6300 of the Family Code.” (Id., subd. (a).)
Because the order here relates to domestic violence, the
Family Code governs. Family Code section 6340 specifies, “If at
the time of a hearing with respect to an order issued pursuant to
this part based on an ex parte temporary restraining order, the
court determines that, after diligent effort, the petitioner has
been unable to accomplish personal service, and that there is
reason to believe that the restrained party is evading service, the

2 We augment the record on our own motion to include the
proof of certified mail to both Father and his counsel that were
submitted with the request to issue the restraining order.

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court may permit an alternative method of service designed to
give reasonable notice of the action to the respondent.” (Fam.
Code, § 6340, subd. (a)(2)(A).) Alternative methods of service
include “[s]ervice by first-class mail sent to the respondent at the
most current address for the respondent that is available to the
court or delivering a copy of the pleadings and orders at the
respondent’s home or place of employment.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(2)(A)(ii).)
Father does not argue that Mother failed to make a
“diligent effort” to personally serve him. (Fam. Code, § 6340,
subd. (a)(2)(A).) CalServe attempted service at Father’s known
residence at least five times between December 2023 and April
2024. (See Yu v. Pozniak-Rice (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1145
[“To be sure, six attempts at personal service shows
persistence.”]; Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 877, 881
[reasonable diligence established where plaintiff hired two
private investigators “to locate and serve” the defendant and they
made “numerous” attempts (i.e., four attempts over three days) to
effectuate service]; Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742,
750 [“ ‘Two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a
proper place ordinarily qualifies as “ ‘reasonable diligence.’ ” ’ ”].)
Father also does not challenge that the alternative method
of service authorized by the court—service by mail on Father at
his shelter on 8th Street, as well as mail service on his counsel—
was “designed to give reasonable notice of the action to the
respondent.” (Fam. Code, § 6340, subd. (a)(2)(A).) Further,
Father does not suggest he did not receive the TRO or notice of
the restraining order hearing. (Cf. Yu v. Pozniak-Rice, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1141 [restrained party asserted in motion

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to vacate restraining order that he never received actual notice as
a result of alternative means of service ordered].)
Father’s sole basis for challenging the order granting
Mother’s request to serve him by alternative means is that there
was no “reason to believe that the restrained party [was] evading
service” of the TRO. (Fam. Code, § 6340, subd. (a)(2)(A).) He
argues “it was not reasonable to infer from Father’s conduct, his
lack of cooperation, or the circumstances” that he was evading
service.

B. We Lack Jurisdiction To Hear Father’s Appeal
Father’s notice of appeal states he challenges “[a]ll findings
and orders made by the Court against Father” on May 6, 2024,
the date the court authorized service by mail of the re-issued
TRO.3 Father did not appeal from the permanent restraining
order issued one month later, on June 6, 2024. We requested and
received from the parties supplemental briefing on whether the
May 6, 2024 order authorizing service by mail is appealable. We
conclude it is not.
The order granting Mother permission to serve Father by
alternative means under Family Code section 6340, subdivision
(a)(2)(A), did not render Father “aggrieved” for purposes of
appeal. (See In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 692

3 Father’s opening brief states his appeal is from the order
granting a “temporary restraining order.” However, any appeal
from the TRO granted in December 2023 and then re-issued
multiple times, including on May 6, 2024, is moot because that
order was superseded by the permanent restraining order issued
on June 6, 2024. (See In re L.W. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 44, 47,
fn. 2.)

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[“ ‘Generally, a parent who is aggrieved by an order after
judgment in a juvenile dependency proceeding may take an
appeal from that order. [Citation.] “To be aggrieved, a party
must have a legally cognizable immediate and substantial
interest which is injuriously affected by the court’s decision. A
nominal interest or remote consequence of the ruling does not
satisfy this requirement.” ’ ”].) Father was not aggrieved until
the court subsequently issued the restraining order based on its
determination that Mother had properly served Father by
alternative means. While Father acknowledges that generally
“[t]he issuance of the restraining order, rather than the
procedural order regarding service, is the point at which [the
restrained party’s] substantive rights are affected, potentially
making them an ‘aggrieved’ party with standing to appeal,” he
nonetheless argues that we may hear the appeal because his due
process rights to notice of the proceedings were affected by the
juvenile court’s ruling that he could be served by alternative
means. Although Father had a due process right to proper notice
before the restraining order issued (see In re Marriage of D.S. &
A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935; Fam. Code, § 6340,
subd. (a)(1) [court may issue restraining order only after notice is
given]), no harm flowed from any possible due process violation
until the court actually issued the restraining order. To
challenge a ruling permitting notice by alternative means under
Family Code section 6340, subdivision (a)(2)(A), a party must
appeal from the restraining order.4 Father did not do so.

4 We need not determine whether a party could properly file
a writ petition challenging the order permitting service by
alternative means, if a restraining order has not yet issued.

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DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

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