CourtListener 10806794•In re Nathan A. CA2/7
Texte intégral
Filed 3/10/26 In re Nathan A. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re Nathan A. et al., Persons B344556
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05659C-D)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ZULEIKA A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Dismissed.
James W. Tritt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
In January 2025 the juvenile court sustained counts in a
petition by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b),1 alleging Zuleika A. and Francisco R.,
the parents of Nathan A. and his sister Zuleika Jr., had a history
of ongoing domestic violence in the presence of their children,
including incidents where Zuleika hit Francisco in the face. The
court also sustained a count under section 300, subdivision (b),
alleging Zuleika had a history of, and was currently, abusing
alcohol and marijuana.
At disposition the court declared Nathan and Zuleika Jr.,
who at the time were 10 years old and three years old,
respectively, dependent children of the juvenile court, removed
them from Zuleika, and placed them with Francisco with a home-
of-father order. The court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts to prevent removal and that Zuleika, though
she had recently started an outpatient drug treatment program,
needed “to spend a little more time addressing her substance
abuse issues before it’s safe to place the children with her.” The
court stated: “I think if we can resolve the substance abuse
issues, we’ll be in a better position to resolve the domestic
violence issues as well, which will then make the home a safer
1 Undesignated statutory references are to this code.
2
place for the children to be. So, for now, I am removing the
children from the mother.”
Zuleika appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders, challenging only the court’s
removal order at disposition. Zuleika argues substantial
evidence did not support the court’s findings that the Department
made reasonable efforts to prevent removal and that releasing
the children to Francisco would not be detrimental to them.
But in August 2025 the juvenile court terminated the
home-of-father order, entered a home-of-parents order, and gave
the Department discretion to allow Zuleika to move into the
family home. The court found Zuleika and Franscisco were
complying with their case plans and ordered them “to continue
successfully in their court-ordered programs.”2
The Department argues we should dismiss the appeal as
moot because, now that the juvenile court has returned Nathan
and Zuleika Jr. to Zuleika, we cannot provide her any effective
relief. The Department argues that, because the juvenile court
has entered a home-of-parents order and returned the children to
Zuleika, “as requested in her appeal,” she “has received the
precise relief she sought as to the children’s removal,” and “there
is no further relief this Court can provide.”
“‘A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’ [Citation.] A case becomes
moot when events “‘render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it
2 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of
this order. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
3
should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.’” [Citation.] For relief to be “effective,” two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.’”
(In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1051; see In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “‘This rule applies in the dependency
context. [Citation.] A reviewing court must “‘decide on a case-by-
case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency
matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect
the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.’”’” (S.R., at p. 1042; see
D.P., at p. 276.) “‘While appellate courts rarely consider
postjudgment evidence or evidence developed after the ruling
challenged on appeal, such evidence is admissible for the limited
purpose of determining whether the subsequent development has
rendered an appeal partially or entirely moot.’” (In re Damian L.
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369.)
“‘[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or
practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case
is not moot, and merits review is required. When a parent has
not made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has
discretion to decide the merits nevertheless.”’ (In re S.R., supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 1052; see In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)
Zuleika’s only argument is that the juvenile court should
not have removed Nathan and Zuleika Jr. from her at disposition.
The court, however, has now returned both children to her. Thus,
because the juvenile court has done the very thing Zuleika asks
us to do, reversing the order removing the children from her will
have no “‘practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or
legal status.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) Therefore,
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we cannot grant her any effective relief, and her appeal is moot.
(See In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623 [dependency
“‘“appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent,
the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate
court to grant the appellant effective relief”’”]; In re E.T. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [“An appeal may become moot where
subsequent events, including orders by the juvenile court, render
it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief.”].)
Zuleika contends that the Department’s “argument that the
court determined [her] proposed safety plan was insufficient is
unsupported by the record” and that, because she had complied
with her case plan by the time of the combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, “the issue of whether [the Department] made
reasonable efforts to prevent removal remains ripe.” This
appears to be an argument substantial evidence did not support
the juvenile court’s disposition order removing the children from
Zuleika; it is not an argument the appeal from that order is not
moot. The court’s order placing Nathan and Zuleika Jr. back
with both of their parents moots any issue regarding the prior
removal order.
Zuleika argues we should exercise our discretion to hear
her moot appeal because it presents “important questions
affecting the public interest that are capable of repetition.” She
identifies that issue as: “[A]ny parent whose children have been
removed where the department failed to make reasonable efforts
to avoid removal will be susceptible to bypass in any future action
pursuant to” section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3). (See In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282 [a reviewing court may exercise
discretion to hear a moot appeal where the case presents an issue
of broad public interest].)
5
Zuleika’s reference to the bypass provision of section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(3), does not warrant exercising our discretion to
hear her moot appeal. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), states
the juvenile court has discretion not to provide a parent with
reunification services where the court finds that the “child or a
sibling of the child has been previously adjudicated a dependent
pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of physical
or sexual abuse, that following that adjudication the child had
been removed from the custody of the child’s parent or guardian
pursuant to Section 361, that the child has been returned to the
custody of the parent or guardian from whom the child had been
taken originally, and that the child is being removed pursuant to
Section 361, due to additional physical or sexual abuse.” (See
In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1151; In re D.F. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 538, 544.)3 “If section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3)
applies, the court may not order reunification services unless it
finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the
best interest of the child.” (S.V. v. Superior Court (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 671, 676.)
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), however, does not apply to
Zuleika because Nathan and Zuleika Jr. were not adjudicated
dependent children of the juvenile court “as a result of physical or
3 “[S]ection 361.5, subdivision (a), provides that reunification
services are mandatory unless a bypass provision applies;
section 361.5, subdivision (b), lists the bypass provisions and
provides that reunification services are discretionary if any of
them [applies]; but section 361.5, subdivision (c), provides that
denial of reunification services is mandatory, not discretionary,
with respect to nearly all of the bypass provisions, unless the
court makes certain countervailing factual findings.” (In re A.E.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141.)
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sexual abuse.” The juvenile court sustained counts under
section 300 based on domestic violence between Zuleika and
Fransico and drug and alcohol abuse by Zuleika that rendered
her incapable of caring for and supervising the children. There
was no allegation or finding of physical or sexual abuse. And the
possibility a future court would interpret the domestic violence
findings as physical or sexual abuse is entirely speculative. (See
In re Miguel J. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 635, 648-649 [whether
domestic violence findings under section 300, subdivisions (a)
and (b), “might be misinterpreted in a hypothetical future case”
to “bypass reunification services for [the parent] under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3),” was “purely speculative”].)
Such a possibility is “too speculative for purposes of avoiding
mootness.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 280.)
The Department’s request for judicial notice is granted. The
appeal is dismissed as moot. (See In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58-59 [“An appellate court will dismiss an
appeal when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the
court to grant effective relief.”].)
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.
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