Turner v. Walmart CA2/5

CourtListener 10801168Calctapp26 févr. 2026

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Filed 2/26/26 Turner v. Walmart CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ALISA TURNER, B337896

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22AVCV00396)

WALMART, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Reversed.
BD&J, Jennifer R. Bagosy, and Olivier A. Taillieu for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sims, Lawrence & Broghammer, J. Fred Trudeau, and
John T. Hill for Defendant and Respondent.
Alisa Turner (Turner) sued Walmart, Inc. (Walmart) after
she fell at one of its stores and claimed to have injured her neck.
Walmart requested she undergo an independent medical
examination during discovery, but before the exam was
conducted, Turner underwent elective surgery to her cervical
spine. Walmart then moved for terminating sanctions on
spoliation grounds, and the trial court granted the motion. We
are asked to determine whether the trial court’s decision to
dismiss Turner’s case for undergoing surgery before the
scheduled medical exam was a proper exercise of its discretion.

I. BACKGROUND
In May 2022, Turner sued Walmart for premises liability.
In her form complaint, she alleged she slipped and fell at a
Walmart Supercenter in Lancaster two months earlier as a result
of the dangerous condition of the sales floor.

A. Walmart’s First Motion for Terminating Sanctions
Walmart answered the complaint by generally denying the
allegations and asserting various affirmative defenses.
Concurrent with its answer, Walmart served Turner with written
discovery requests.1
Turner did not respond to the discovery requests and
Walmart moved to compel responses. Turner did not file a

1
Among other things, Walmart sought the identity of all
heath care providers who treated Turner since her fall and for 10
years prior. Walmart also requested all documents relating or
referring to any medical examination and/or treatment Turner
received as a result of any injuries she sustained because of the
fall.

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written opposition to any of the motions to compel. The trial
court granted the motions and directed Turner to serve verified
responses within 10 days; in addition, the court, pursuant to the
discovery statutes, imposed sanctions of $250 on Turner and her
counsel.
Turner did not comply with the trial court’s discovery order
and Walmart then moved for terminating sanctions. Within days
of that motion, however, Turner served her belated discovery
responses and Walmart withdrew its motion. In her discovery
responses, Turner advised that as a result of her slip and fall she
suffered from the following injuries: “Head pain, neck pain, left
shoulder [pain], left elbow [pain], left thigh pain, left knee pain,
lower back pain, entire body numbness[,] and headaches.”
After Turner served her discovery responses, the parties
stipulated to vacate and reset the trial date and advised the trial
court as follows: “It is anticipated that plaintiff will likely be
seeking additional medical treatment related to the incident. As
a result, the plaintiff may need to undergo an Independent
Medical Examination. This is undetermined until plaintiff is
deposed.”
On May 16, 2023, Walmart deposed Turner. At her
deposition, Turner testified she would be going forward with a
recommended neck surgery “soon” to address her complaints of
sharp pains in her neck. When asked what she meant by “soon,”
Turner testified she “assume[d]” the surgery would take place
“[w]ithin . . . 30-45 days.”

B. Walmart’s Second Motion for Terminating Sanctions
Some five weeks after her deposition (and her testimony
that she would be undergoing neck surgery soon), Walmart

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served Turner with a demand for an independent physical
examination on June 26, 2023. The demand proposed an
examination on August 4, 2023, by a specialist in orthopedic
spine surgery.
Turner did not respond to the independent physical
examination demand. On the afternoon of July 31, 2023, four
days before the noticed examination, Walmart emailed Turner’s
counsel to confirm that the examination was going forward. That
evening, Turner’s counsel advised that the examination would
need to be rescheduled without further elaboration.
The following day, Walmart objected to rescheduling the
examination at such a late date with no explanation and advised
that it would file a motion to compel seeking fees and costs if
Turner did not appear at the noticed examination. Turner’s
counsel responded and explained his client could not attend the
examination because she was having surgery on “August 3rd,
[t]he day before the IME.” The following day, Turner’s counsel
provided additional details: the surgery would be an “anterior
cervical decompression and fusion from C3-C5” and would be
performed on an out-patient basis. Turner’s attorney also offered
to make Turner available for an examination at a later date.
Two months later, on October 3, 2023, Walmart moved for
terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary or issue
sanctions. Walmart argued terminating sanctions were
warranted because of Turner’s history of discovery abuse and her
recent “nonemergent” decision to “alter[ ] and/or destroy[ ] the
condition of her neck forever.” Walmart’s motion was not
supported by any expert medical testimony (e.g., a declaration by
an orthopedic surgeon, neurologist, or neurosurgeon). The only

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supporting declaration was from Walmart’s counsel, and the only
attachments thereto were litigation-related documents.
Turner opposed the motion for sanctions. She argued in
the main that there was no spoilation of evidence because she
had a constitutionally protected right to receive reasonable
medical treatment for chronic pain arising out of her fall at
Walmart’s store. Turner’s opposition was supported by two
attorney declarations with litigation-related attachments.
The trial court held a hearing on Walmart’s request for
sanctions in January 2024. After taking the matter under
submission, the court later issued an order granting Walmart’s
motion for terminating sanctions and dismissing the action with
prejudice. The court found Walmart made a prima facie case that
Turner “destroyed evidence” that had a substantial probability to
establish an element of its defense. Specifically, the court found
Turner’s surgery “prevented [Walmart] from being able to
investigate [Turner’s] claims” and “any evidence related to
[Turner’s] neck which could provide a defense has been
altered . . . . permanently.” In addition, the court found Turner
did not present “any evidence that the surgery was necessary” or
that the “procedure could not have waited for two days in order to
conduct the physical examination.”

II. DISCUSSION
We hold granting terminating sanctions was an abuse of
the trial court’s discretion. Walmart did not submit any evidence
that it had no means—other than the independent medical
examination that did not go forward—to understand the
condition of Turner’s neck and any injury prior to her surgery.
Instead, Walmart premised its motion solely on attorney

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argument about the purported effects of Turner’s surgery on its
defense. That is too little to justify the outright dismissal of
Turner’s case. We shall therefore reverse and remand the cause
for further proceedings.
The Legislature has authorized sanctions for “misuse” of
the discovery process; such misuse includes “[f]ailing to respond
or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.” (Code Civ.
Proc.,2 § 2023.010, subd. (d).)
As our highest court has recognized, “[d]estroying evidence
in response to a discovery request after litigation has commenced
would surely be a misuse of discovery,” as such conduct “can
destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an
erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause of
action” and “increase[s] the costs of litigation as parties attempt
to reconstruct the destroyed evidence or to develop other
evidence, which may be less accessible, less persuasive, or both.”
(Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th
1, 8, 12; accord, Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Superior
Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1139 [“One serious form of
discovery abuse is the spoliation of evidence, which is defined as
the destruction or alteration of relevant evidence or the failure to
preserve evidence for another party’s use in pending or future
litigation”].) “[A] party moving for discovery sanctions based on
the spoliation of evidence must make an initial prima facie
showing that the responding party in fact destroyed evidence that
had a substantial probability of damaging the moving party’s

2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

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ability to establish an essential element of his claim or defense.”
(Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.)
Courts may impose a “broad range” of penalties for misuse
of the discovery process, including monetary sanctions, issue
sanctions, evidentiary sanctions, and “terminating sanctions.”
(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 12; see also § 2023.030,
subds. (a)–(d).) Terminating sanctions include “dismissing the
action” or any part thereof. (§ 2023.030, subd. (d)(3); Cedars-
Sinai, supra, at 12.) “The discovery statutes evince an
incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with
monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of
termination. ‘Discovery sanctions “should be appropriate to the
dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to
protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied
discovery.”’ [Citation.]” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.)
Before imposing sanctions for discovery abuse, the trial
court “should consider both the conduct being sanctioned and its
effect on the party seeking discovery and, in choosing a sanction,
should ‘“attempt [ ] to tailor the sanction to the harm caused by
the withheld discovery.”’ [Citation.]” (Doppes, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at 992; accord, Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77
Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246 [in addressing a motion for terminating
sanctions, the trial court should review the totality of the
circumstances, including “conduct of the party to determine if the
actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and
the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the
discovery”].)
“‘A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be
made lightly.’” (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 992, fn.

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omitted; accord, Leavitt v. County of Madera (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 1502, 1524 [terminating sanctions are “severe and
are to be used sparingly”].) “‘But where a violation is willful,
preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less
severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the
discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the
ultimate sanction.’ [Citation.]” (Doppes, supra, at 992, fn.
omitted [terminating sanctions warranted where defendant lied
during a hearing, violated four discovery orders, failed to be
forthcoming in a deposition regarding the production of
documents, and obstructed the production of documents]; see also
Atlas v. Davidyan (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1096 [the
question is not whether the trial court should have imposed a
lesser sanction; the question is whether the court erred in
imposing the sanction it chose].)
Our review of a trial court’s sanctions decision is for abuse
of discretion (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New
York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604), and we hold there
was an abuse here because there was no proper evidentiary
predicate for imposing the ultimate sanction. Walmart did not
present the trial court with any evidence that Turner’s surgery
had a detrimental effect on its ability to establish an essential
element of its defense—only unsupported attorney assertions.
Walmart, for instance, did not establish there were no pre-
surgical images or physician assessments on which it and its
medical experts could reasonably rely to determine the nature
and scope of Turner’s condition before undergoing surgery. Nor
did Walmart present any evidence, either in the form of medical
records or expert opinion, of how the surgery would otherwise
preclude it from contesting damages (and perhaps causation) in a

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summary judgment proceeding or trial. Walmart also did not
explain why it waited weeks to schedule the proposed
independent examination after learning during Turner’s
deposition that she intended to undergo surgery within the next
30-45 days. Dismissing Turner’s lawsuit under these
circumstances was error. (See, e.g., Victor Valley, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at 1159 [“Except for in cases of extreme misconduct
and when other viable options are unavailable, a trial court
abuses its discretion when a sanctions order deprives a party ‘of
any right to defend the action upon its merits’ and was ‘designed
not to accomplish the purposes of discovery but designed to
punish’ the party for not fully complying with its discovery
obligations”]; New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 1403, 1433-1434 [reversing terminating sanctions
imposed for destroying video recordings even after reviewing the
recordings and receiving a notice to produce them]; see also
Lopez, supra, at 604 [“Although in extreme cases a court has the
authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure
[citations], a terminating sanction should generally not be
imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives
and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly
shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective”].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is reversed and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Turner is awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.
We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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