People v. Pearson CA1/1

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Filed 2/25/26 P. v. Pearson CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173844
v.
ADAM LEROY PEARSON, (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. No. 24CR06020)
Defendant and Appellant.

After pleading no contest to witness intimidation and admitting a prior
strike, defendant Adam Leroy Pearson appeals on the ground the trial court
improperly denied his request for pretrial mental health diversion under
Penal Code1 section 1001.36 by applying the wrong standard in determining
that Pearson did not satisfy the statute’s public safety requirement. (See §
1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) We agree. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the
judgment and remand to the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, in
November 2024, police officers responded to a 911 call reporting an assault.
The caller said that he and his coworker were on the sidewalk when a man

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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they did not know, but who was later identified as Pearson, approached them
and slapped the coworker. Then, after observing the caller on the phone,
Pearson approached the caller and repeatedly punched him in the face,
pushed him to the ground, and placed him in a chokehold. The coworker
pushed Pearson off the caller. Pearson later claimed that the two men
attacked him.
An amended information charged Pearson with committing witness
intimidation by force or threat of force against the caller (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1);
count one); assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury against the
caller (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count two); and misdemeanor battery against the
coworker (§ 242; count three). The amended information alleged that
Pearson had a prior strike (§§ 667, 1170.12) and a prior serious felony
conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and that Pearson committed the offenses
while released from custody on his own recognizance in another case
(§ 12022.1).
In February 2025, Pearson filed a motion for mental health diversion
pursuant to section 1001.36. He argued that at the time of the November
2024 incident, he “was suffering an emotional crisis . . . directly related to his
Bipolar Disorder.” He supported his motion with a mental health evaluation
report prepared by Carmen Harris, a licensed clinical social worker.2 Based

2 Pearson’s motion for mental health diversion and Harris’s report are

part of a confidential clerk’s transcript, so we limit our discussion of the
information in those documents to that addressed in the parties’ appellate
briefs, which were filed without redactions or a sealing request. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.47(c)(2) [to maintain confidentiality, a party may file a
motion to file a document under seal]; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th
529, 617, fn. 38, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, and superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 356.)

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on her interview with Pearson and review of the police report and prior
psychological evaluations of Pearson, Harris agreed with Pearson’s previous
diagnoses of Bipolar Disorder, Amphetamine-Stimulant Use Disorder, and
Alcohol Use Disorder. She concluded that Pearson satisfied the eligibility
and suitability requirements for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36, subds.
(b)–(c).) Regarding the fourth suitability requirement—i.e., that the
defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if
treated in the community (id., subd. (c)(4))—Harris noted that Pearson’s
mood had “stabilized in jail,” he agreed to attend therapy, and he was
“compliant with his medication that maintains stability in his mood.”
In opposition, the prosecution submitted two exhibits. The first exhibit
consisted of three police reports that named Pearson as the suspect for
various crimes. The second exhibit was a list of Pearson’s prior convictions,
which included convictions for felony battery in 2015 and arson of property in
2022. (§§ 243, subd. (d), 451, subd. (d).)
At the hearing on Pearson’s motion, the prosecution argued that
Pearson was not amenable to diversion because he was likely to commit a
super strike, specifically murder, based on the facts of his current offenses
and his history of committing violent crimes.
In denying Pearson’s motion for diversion, the trial court accepted that
Pearson was eligible for diversion and concluded that “[t]he only issue this
Court feels is relevant . . . is the Court’s consideration on whether or not he
poses a reasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The court said it was
“aware of the current state of the law” and “understands that some of the
analysis involves whether or not [Pearson] would commit a super strike. But
the Court can also consider other crimes that are not listed in that section
that would otherwise compromise public safety.” The court noted that

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Pearson had at least one prior strike and that his current offenses and one of
his previous offenses involved an “unprovoked” attack. The court further
found that Pearson’s current offenses “[were] a failure on mental health
diversion,” because he was on mental health diversion at the time of the
November 2024 incident. Ultimately, the court concluded that Pearson
would be a danger to the community if he was treated in the community.
Pearson subsequently pleaded no contest to witness intimidation and
admitted a prior strike. The trial court sentenced Pearson to a prison term of
four years.
II. DISCUSSION
Pearson contends remand is required for the trial court to reconsider
his motion for mental health diversion because the court abused its discretion
by finding him unsuitable for diversion. We agree.
A. Mental Health Diversion Statute
Under section 1001.36, a trial court may grant a defendant pretrial
mental health diversion if the defendant has a qualifying mental health
disorder. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626–627.) Section 1001.36
gives courts discretion to grant pretrial diversion “if the defendant satisfies
the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b)”
and the court finds “that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under
the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).)
Under section 1001.36, subdivision (b), a defendant is eligible for
pretrial diversion if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed with a qualifying
mental disorder; and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense.
For any defendant who satisfies the above eligibility requirements, the
court must then find the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if all the

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following criteria are met: “(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health
expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing,
contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental
health treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant agrees to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . . [¶] (4) The defendant will not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
Section 1170.18, in turn, defines “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety’ ” as “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new
violent felony within the meaning of” section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).
(§ 1170.18, subd. (c); People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149.)
Thus, a trial court must determine whether “the defendant is likely to
commit an offense . . . known colloquially as a ‘ “super strike.” ’ ” (People v.
Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 851, fn. 11.) Qualifying super strikes
include murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault
with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass
destruction, and any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); Whitmill, at pp. 1150–1151.)
Mental health diversion is discretionary, not mandatory, even if all the
requirements are met. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); People v. Gerson (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080.) But this “ ‘residual’ ” discretion must be exercised
consistently with the principles and purpose of the law, which includes a
strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because
of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the
community. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892–
893; § 1001.35.)

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We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health
diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1147; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448–449.) “A court
abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by
applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express
or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.”
(Moine, at p. 449.)
B. Analysis
Pearson contends the trial court applied the wrong standard in denying
his motion for mental health diversion by relying on his general risk of
violence rather than his specific risk of committing a super strike offense.
The People do not dispute that the trial court applied the wrong standard but
assert the error was harmless.
We conclude that the trial court’s comments at the hearing on
Pearson’s motion for mental health diversion indicate that it applied the
wrong legal standard in denying diversion. In particular, the court stated
that “some” of the analysis regarding whether Pearson posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “involves whether or not he
would commit a super strike” but that the court could “also consider other
crimes that are not listed in that section that would otherwise compromise
public safety.” These comments, coupled with the fact the court did not
expressly find a likelihood that Pearson would commit a super strike, suggest
the court was expanding the meaning of “public safety” in section 1001.36
beyond the likelihood that Pearson “will commit a limited subset of violent
felonies.” (People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.) This was
improper. (See Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp.

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896–897 [trial courts cannot create an “alternative meaning of ‘public safety’
inconsistent” with § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)].)
The People nonetheless argue that reversal is not required here
because the error was not prejudicial under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818 (Watson). Under the Watson test, an error is harmless unless it is
“reasonably probable” the outcome would have been different in the absence
of the error. (Id. at p. 836.) The Watson standard is appropriate in
circumstances where the trial court understood the nature of its discretion
but, for example, relied on an improper factor in exercising that discretion or
failed to state its reasoning. (People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420,
426.) It does not apply where the court was unaware of “the extent of [its]
lawful authority in [a] particular context” (In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701,
716), because “determining what choice the trial court is likely to make in
[the] first instance is far more speculative” (McDaniels, at p. 426).
We do not find the Watson standard of prejudice applicable here.
Because the record suggests the trial court did not understand that its
discretion in deciding Pearson’s motion was constrained by section 1001.36’s
narrow definition of “public safety,” we cannot be confident that the court was
aware of the scope of its discretion under section 1001.36.3 “ ‘Defendants are
entitled to . . . decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of
the . . . court.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391
(Gutierrez).) “ ‘A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers [cannot] exercise that “informed discretion.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The

3 People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, relied on by the People,

is distinguishable because the trial court in that case exercised its discretion
to determine whether the defendant was likely to commit a super strike if
treated in the community pursuant to mental health diversion. (Id. at p.
214.)

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appropriate remedy in such circumstances is to remand “unless the record
‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Watson standard is thus inapplicable. (See People v. Doron (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1, 9–10 [concluding remand was required under Gutierrez where
trial court did not apply correct standard in denying defendant’s motion for
mental health diversion]; People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 774
[Gutierrez standard applied where trial court was unaware that its discretion
to select a prison sentence was constrained by a presumption against the
upper term].)
This is not a case where the record clearly indicates that the trial court
would have made the same decision had it applied the correct standard in
determining whether Pearson posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4). Although the court discussed
Pearson’s criminal history and noted the violent nature of some of his
offenses, it did so after stating that only “some of the analysis” concerns
whether Pearson would commit a super strike and that it could consider
“other crimes that are not listed in that section.” One inference from these
comments and the lack of an express finding of the likelihood that Pearson
would commit a super strike is that the court found no such likelihood. (See
Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895 [trial court
acknowledged correct standard in evaluating § 1001.36’s fourth suitability
factor but “made no finding of . . . a likelihood” that defendant would commit
a super strike, “impliedly acknowledging there was none”].) Thus, the record
does not clearly indicate that the court would have determined that Pearson
would be likely to commit a super strike if granted diversion and treated in

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the community. Reversal is accordingly necessary for the court to reconsider
its application of section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4).
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the order denying
Pearson’s motion for mental health diversion is reversed. The matter is
remanded for the trial court with directions to reconsider Pearson’s motion in
accordance with section 1001.36. If the court does not grant diversion, then
the court shall reinstate the judgment.

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.

_________________________
SMILEY, J.

People v. Pearson / A173844

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