CourtListener 10796992•People v. Herrera CA5
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Filed 2/20/26 P. v. Herrera CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087295
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 19CR-05080,
v. CRL001123)
GUADALUPE LOPEZ HERRERA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Carol K.
Ash, Judge.
Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
John W. Powell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant and defendant Guadalupe Lopez Herrera appeals following his 2023
conviction for crimes committed in 2019. He claims, in relevant part, entitlement to
relief from the judgment based on the erroneous excusal of a potential juror, in violation
of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (e).1 As explained herein, we
conclude the trial court erred when it overruled defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s
use of a peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective Hispanic juror who reported
negative experiences with law enforcement and the criminal justice system, where the
prosecutor did not overcome the presumptive invalidity of the challenge by clear and
convincing evidence. (§ 231.7, subd. (e).) Reversal for this error is compelled under the
statute. (Id., subd. (j).) Therefore, we vacate defendant’s judgment and remand for a
new trial.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2019, defendant fired shots into the rental house where his ex-
partner and their children were living, broke inside, beat his ex-partner in the head with a
gun, and then fled.2 Several days later, law enforcement located defendant, but he
evaded capture after shooting at two deputies and stealing a truck at gunpoint. The next
day, law enforcement spotted the stolen truck and began pursuit. After the truck’s tire
was flattened with a spike strip, defendant stopped, dropped a gun and magazine out of
the window, and drove off again. Officers thereafter succeeded in forcing the truck to
stop and defendant was taken into custody.
In August 2023, defendant was convicted by jury of the attempted murder of his
ex-partner, two counts of attempted murder of a peace officer, two counts of assault on a
peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm and one count of assault with a semiautomatic
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 Given our conclusion that the trial court committed error during jury selection,
necessitating reversal and remand for a new trial, we only briefly summarize the facts underlying
defendant’s convictions.
2.
firearm, carjacking, first degree burglary, willful infliction of corporal injury on the
mother of his children, shooting at an inhabited dwelling, and stalking. (Pen. Code,
§§ 664/187, subd. (a) [counts 1, 2, 7]; 245, subds. (b), (d)(2) [counts 3, 4, 8]; 215,
subd. (a) [count 5]; 459 [count 6]; 273.5, subd. (a) [count 9]; 246 [count 11]; 646.9,
subd. (b) [count 12].)3 The jury also found true the firearm enhancement allegations.
(Pen. Code, §§ 12022.53, subds. (b) [counts 5, 8], (c) [counts 1, 2, 7], 12022.5, subd. (a)
[counts 3, 6, 9].)
In December 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of
seven years to life for the attempted murders of two peace officers and a consecutive term
seven years for the attempted murder of his ex-partner, with three additional 20-year
terms for use of a firearm; and to a consecutive term of one year eight months for
carjacking, for an aggregate term of 82 years eight months to life.4 Sentences on the
remaining counts were imposed and stayed under Penal Code section 654.
On appeal, defendant advances two claims for relief. First, he claims the trial
court erred in overruling his statutory objection to the excusal of a prospective Hispanic
juror (Juror No. 7910) who reported negative experiences with law enforcement and the
criminal justice system, and the excusal of the juror also violated his constitutional rights.
Second, he claims that although the trial court instructed the jury on voluntary
intoxication, the court failed to instruct sua sponte that evidence of defendant’s
3 Three misdemeanor counts for violating a protective order were dismissed prior to the
commencement of evidence; one felony count for making criminal threats was dismissed after
the People rested; and the jury acquitted defendant of assault with a deadly weapon and the lesser
included offense of simple assault based on a separate incident. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.6, subd. (a)
[counts 14–16], 422 [count 10], 245, subd. (a)(1)/240 [count 13], 1118.1.)
4 The trial court struck the 10-year firearm enhancement attached to count 5, carjacking,
given the overall length of defendant’s sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1385.) Additionally, the court
indicated its intent to impose a concurrent middle term of three years on count 12, stalking (Pen.
Code, § 646.9), but the court did not separately pronounce the sentence as to count 12.
3.
intoxication was relevant to whether he knew two of the attempted murder victims were
peace officers, in violation of his rights under state and federal law.
The People dispute any errors occurred.
As discussed herein, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a
Hispanic male juror who reported he and his wife each had a negative experience with
law enforcement and, relatedly, he had a negative experience with the criminal justice
system. These reasons were presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (e),
and required the prosecutor to “show by clear and convincing evidence that an
objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective
juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or
religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons
articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case[.]”
(Ibid., italics added.) Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court addressed the presumptive
invalidity of the peremptory challenge under section 231.7, subdivision (e), and the trial
court instead appeared to evaluate defendant’s objection under the rubric of
Batson/Wheeler, finding the prosecutor did not act with discriminatory intent.5 However,
express terms of the ruling notwithstanding, even if we were to assume the court
evaluated the objection based on the totality of the circumstances under section 231.7,
subdivision (d), rather than under Batson/Wheeler, intentional discrimination is not the
correct standard and the court did not first require the prosecutor to overcome the
presumptive invalidity of the challenge under the more demanding standard set forth in
section 231.7, subdivision (e). (People v. Guzman (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 464, 475
(Guzman); People v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534, 540 (Jimenez).)
5 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258
(Wheeler).
4.
We may not impute to the trial court findings it did not make (§ 231.7, subd. (j)),
but in this case, the record is devoid of any evidence that the prospective juror’s negative
experiences with law enforcement and the criminal justice system bore on his inability to
be fair and impartial (id., subd. (e)). Under these circumstances, the prosecutor did not
overcome the presumptive invalidity of the peremptory challenge, the trial court erred in
overruling defendant’s objection, and section 231.7 compels reversal of the judgment and
remand for a new trial. Given this disposition, defendant’s claims of separate
constitutional error and of instructional error are moot, and we do not reach them.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
“‘Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race. [Citations.] Doing
so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right
to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.’” (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1184, 1210–1211, quoting People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612.) The United
States Supreme Court has recognized “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that race
discrimination be eliminated from all official acts and proceedings of the State is most
compelling in the judicial system.” (Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 415.) This is
so because “[i]t is not only litigants who are harmed when the right to trial by impartial
jury is abridged. Taints of discriminatory bias in jury selection—actual or perceived—
erode confidence in the adjudicative process, undermining the public’s trust in courts.”
(People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1154 (Gutierrez), citing Miller-El v. Dretke
(2005) 545 U.S. 231, 238 & Powers v. Ohio, supra, at p. 412.)
Constitutional Batson/Wheeler claims are subject to “a three-step framework.
‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citation.] Second,
5.
once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to
explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral
justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is
tendered, the trial court must then decide … whether the opponent of the strike has
proved purposeful racial discrimination.”’” (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 124
quoting Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 (Johnson).) “‘[T]he ultimate
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the
opponent of the strike’” (Nadey, supra, at p. 124, quoting Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514
U.S. 765, 768), and the moving party “must prove ‘it was more likely than not’ that a
challenge was motivated by discrimination” (Nadey, supra, at p. 124, quoting Johnson,
supra, at p. 170 & citing People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 766).
“Under the Batson/Wheeler test, the ultimate question for the trial court in ruling
on an objection to a peremptory challenge is whether the party exercising the objection
engaged in ‘purposeful discrimination.’” (Guzman, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 475,
italics added, quoting Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168.) “‘Recognizing the limitations
of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019–
2020 Reg. Sess.) … to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new
procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.’
(People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, fn. omitted (Jaime).) The Legislature
intended that the new law ‘be broadly construed to further the purpose of eliminating the
use of group stereotypes and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious
bias, in the exercise of peremptory challenges.’” (People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
768, 791–792 (Ortiz), quoting Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1, subd. (c); accord, Guzman, supra,
at p. 471.)
“Section 231.7 prohibits the use of ‘a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender
identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived
6.
membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.’ (§ 231.7, subd. (a).) If a
party or the trial court objects to the use of a peremptory challenge, ‘the party exercising
the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been
exercised.’ (Id., subd. (c).)” (People v. Barnes (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 560, 577–578
(Barnes).)
If the reason for the exercise of the peremptory challenge is not presumptively
invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (e) or subdivision (g), discussed next,
subdivision (d) provides that the reason is to be “evaluated ‘in light of the totality of the
circumstances’ to determine if ‘there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively
reasonable person,’ who is aware that unconscious bias and purposeful discrimination
have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in California, would view
membership or perceived membership in any of the protected groups as a factor in the
use of the peremptory challenge.” (Barnes, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 578, quoting
§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1), (2)(A).) “The court need not find purposeful discrimination to
sustain the objection.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).)
Subdivisions (e) and (g) of section 231.7 set forth specific reasons that are
presumptively invalid. “‘Each subdivision sets out a distinct process by which a court
determines whether a presumptively invalid reason can be absolved of that presumption.
(Id., subds. (e), (f), (g)(2).)’” (Barnes, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 578, quoting Ortiz,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 793.) At issue in this case, “[e]xpressing a distrust of or
having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system” and
“[h]aving a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted
of a crime” are presumptively invalid reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge
under subdivision (e) of section 231.7. To overcome the presumptive invalidity of a
peremptory challenge under subdivision (e), the prosecutor is required to “show by clear
and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale
as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual
7.
orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of
those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be
fair and impartial in the case[.]” (Ibid., italics added.) Within the meaning of
subdivision (e), “‘clear and convincing’ refers to the degree of certainty the factfinder
must have in determining whether the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory
challenge are unrelated to the prospective juror’s cognizable group membership, bearing
in mind conscious and unconscious bias. To determine that a presumption of invalidity
has been overcome, the factfinder shall determine that it is highly probable that the
reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or
unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s ability to be
fair and impartial in the case.” (Id., subd. (f).)
The trial court’s denial of an objection under section 231.7 is reviewed “de novo,
with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The
appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a
prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the record.
The reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and
shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain either the
party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly
situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged
juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis argument in
the trial court. Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously
denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the
case remanded for a new trial.” (Id., subd. (j).)
II. Proceedings in Trial Court
Juror No. 7910 was in the initial group of 18 prospective jurors selected for voir
dire. He lived in Livingston and was employed as a warehouse lead, his wife worked at a
clinic, and he had three children and no prior jury service.
8.
The prosecutor asked Juror No. 7910 if he had any reservations about voting guilty
if the evidence established guilt in his view. After he stated he did not, the prosecutor
noted his questionnaire indicated he had a case in the criminal justice system and he did
not answer the question asking whether he thought he was treated fairly. He responded
he thought he was innocent, and the case was dismissed pretrial based on lack of
evidence. He did not think the process was fair because he was not the one who
committed the crime he was charged with. Asked who was at fault, he stated officers
with the Livingston Police Department and explained they saw that he did not do it but
because he was there and did not run, he was the one charged. The prosecutor asked if
there was anything about that experience that would be on his mind when he listened to
officers testify in this case. He responded no. The prosecutor stated it would be his job
to determine witness credibility and asked if anything about his negative experience with
the police would impact how he viewed the evidence. He responded he would “look at
the evidence and go from there.” The prosecutor then asked if, prior to hearing
testimony, he had any opinion on the credibility of the police. He answered, “Well, I
think everybody should be credible or not credible even though … if you’re not a police
officer, if you’re a civilian, it should be the same.” The prosecutor asked if he tended to
disbelieve police officers because he had a bad experience and he answered no.
The prosecutor then asked Juror No. 7910 if he thought the police sometimes
abused their power and he said yes. Asked for specifics, he stated his wife was pulled
over for her tinted car windows as an excuse and after she showed officers her license,
they gave it back and told her to have a nice day. He also stated they asked another
officer about that and were told the windows were legal, but could be used as an excuse.
The prosecutor asked if he felt his wife was treated unfairly and he said yes. When the
prosecutor asked if that would affect how he listened in this case, he said, “I mean not
everybody’s the same.”
9.
Subsequently, the prosecutor questioned Juror No. 7910 about whether he held a
supervisory position at work. He confirmed that he did and that the position involved
reviewing subordinate employees. The prosecutor asked if that might affect how he
listened to the evidence and deliberated with other jurors. He said he did not think so.
After three jurors were excused for cause, the prosecutor passed three times while
the defense exercised peremptory challenges to excuse three potential jurors. The
prosecutor then exercised her first peremptory challenge to excuse Juror No. 7910 and
defense counsel requested to make an objection outside the presence of the jury.
Defense counsel expressly objected under section 231.7 and stated she believed
the peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis that Juror No. 7910 was Hispanic.
The trial court made the record that defendant appeared to be Hispanic based on his name
and use of a Spanish interpreter, and that Juror No. 7910 also appeared to be Hispanic.
In response to the trial court’s inquiry concerning her reasons, the prosecutor
stated, “On the questionnaire the juror answered that he previously had a court case and
the follow up question was whether—if I could find that questionnaire. It had to do with
his impression of how he was treated, and he did not answer the question. He left it
blank. [¶] Then when questioned about that in court, he explained that he felt that he
was treated unfairly in that process. He thought that he was treated unfairly both by the
police and during the Court process. [¶] The case was ultimately dismissed. And even
though the district attorney dismissed the case, he felt that it was unfair that he had been
charged. And so I think that—he stated a concern at least about the fairness of the
criminal justice system. It was a highly personal experience.
“It’s also concerning to me that he did not include that information in the written
questionnaire, that he had to be questioned about it specifically. And his comments about
law enforcement were not generally that he has a problem with law enforcement, but that
he specifically feels that he’s been mistreated and that his wife has been mistreated. And
I have concerns about whether he could follow the instruction to judge the credibility of
10.
law enforcement witnesses the same as any other witness, as well as a concern about
whether he thinks that the Court process is just.”
In response, defense counsel argued that racial profiling or a distrust in the system,
being prosecuted even though innocent, and a general distrust of law enforcement were
presumptively invalid reasons to exercise a peremptory challenge under subdivision (e)
of section 231.7. The prosecutor replied, “I don’t recall any conversation or any
statements made about racial profiling. I understand the prong for expressing distrust of
law enforcement, but I don’t believe that the juror expressed a belief that law
enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced
in a discriminatory manner that was not established by any of the questions that he
answered.”
The trial court stated, “I don’t know if it would have to have been directly
established. He did say he felt his wife had been unfairly pulled over because of tinted
windows. Maybe that was my own interpretation of his response. Let me take a
moment. I do have an analysis I need to look at. I usually have it in my trial folder. I
can’t find it right now. [¶] So I’ll take a short break and consider it and come back.”
After a recess, the court overruled defendant’s objection on the following grounds: “So
the Court did determine that a prima facie case had been met based upon the facts set
forth by the defense. And then [the prosecutor] did offer her reasons. And part of the
things the Court considered as past preemptory challenges by the party, side by side
comparison of jurors, remaining jurors not struck, the challenged parties,
misrepresentations of the record when defending the strikes. This is the first preemptory
challenge that [the prosecutor] has offered in this case.
“And the issue before the Court is whether there’s a facial validity for the
justification unless the discriminatory intent is inherent. Given that this is the first
challenge that she’s exercised and that [Juror No. 7910] did say he had been treated
unfairly and felt his wife had been treated unfairly, I can’t find her intent would be
11.
inherently discriminatory at this point since this is the first challenge that she’s exercised,
so I … deem that the reason is neutral.
“I think just at this point given the history that there’s a very limited history of any
improper challenges, or any challenges at all basically. And he did say he had been
treated unfairly in the past. And I realize the factors that [defense counsel] put forth, but
I just think at this point I don’t have enough of a history or circumstances to find that
[the] prosecutor was acting with a discriminatory intent in exercising her challenge, so
I’m going to deny the objection. I’ll go ahead and excuse that juror.”
III. Analysis
Section 231.7 had been in effect for more than one and one-half years when the
jury was selected in this case (id., subd. (i)), and there is no dispute that the exercise of a
peremptory challenge to excuse a potential juror who expressed “a distrust of or [had] a
negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system” or who had “a
close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime”
is presumptively invalid (id., subd. (e)(1), (3)). Despite defense counsel’s express
objection on this ground, however, neither the prosecutor nor the court addressed the
requirement that the prosecutor “show by clear and convincing evidence that an
objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective
juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or
religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons
articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case[.]”
(Id., subd. (e), italics added.) The trial court’s express findings that defendant made a
prima facie showing; the prosecutor provided a facially valid, neutral reason for the
exercise of the challenge; and the court was unable to find inherently discriminatory
intent indicate the court addressed defendant’s objection under the Batson/Wheeler
framework. (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1158–1159.) In any event, the court did
not view the objection through the lens of subdivision (e) of section 231.7, as required.
12.
Despite this record, the People rely on the decision in Gonzalez for the proposition
that the prosecutor overcame the presumptive invalidity of her peremptory challenge by
clear and convincing evidence (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1, 17–18
(Gonzalez)), and, therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s objection
under the totality of the circumstances test in subdivision (d) of section 231.7 (Gonzalez,
supra, at pp. 19–20). The facts in Gonzalez are readily distinguishable from the facts
here, however.
In Gonzalez, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s claim the trial court erred
when it overruled his objection to the excusal of Juror No. 1589. (Gonzalez, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 5.) In that case, Juror No. 1589, a Black man, had a cousin who was
shot and killed in a gang-related shooting, although his cousin was not a gang member.
(Id. at pp. 9–10.) Juror No. 1589 was satisfied that the perpetrator was caught, convicted
and imprisoned. (Id. at p. 10.) However, he was not satisfied with law enforcement’s
handling of the crime. (Ibid.) He reported his cousin was left on the ground for two
hours before they came and checked on him, which frustrated the family, and, in his
view, law enforcement improperly delayed investigating, tried to blame the family, and
treated the family like they were gang members because of the neighborhood they lived
in. (Ibid.) When the trial court asked if the experience would affect the prospective juror
in that case, he was unsure, although he agreed he would try his best to listen to the
evidence and be fair and impartial to both sides. (Ibid.)
Juror No. 1589 also reported a negative experience with law enforcement that
occurred when he was 12 or 13 years old. (Gonzalez, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 10.)
He was playing basketball with friends when a patrol car pulled up. (Ibid.) Officers
made the children put their hands on the hot hood and then beat their hands with a
flashlight when they moved their hands. (Ibid.) He expressly reported the experience
made him “‘kind of … bitter.’” (Ibid.) He again responded he did not know when asked
13.
if he would hold that experience against officers who testified in the case, but he
confirmed he would be able to follow the jury instruction on assessing credibility. (Ibid.)
After unsuccessfully attempting to have Juror No. 1589 excused for cause, the
prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse him. (Gonzalez, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 11.) During argument, the prosecutor explained, in part, that the
prospective juror twice responded that he was not sure he could be fair to law
enforcement based on his experience. (Id. at p. 12.) The trial court found the prosecutor
met the clear and convincing evidence standard under section 231.7, subdivision (e), and
overruled the defense objection. (Gonzalez, supra, at p. 12.)
On review, the appellate court found no error. (Gonzalez, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 5.) The court explained, “Juror No. 1589’s views appeared to be the direct result of
how law enforcement had treated him personally, both in connection with his cousin’s
murder and when officers stopped him as a child. There was thus reason to believe Juror
No. 1589’s views arising from his past experiences were related to his race.” (Id. at
p. 17.) However, “‘[a]n objectively reasonable person would view the prosecutor’s
challenge of Juror Number [1589] due to [his] feelings on law enforcement as related to
[his] ability to be fair based on [his] repeated acknowledgement that [he] would have
difficulty setting aside [his] bias and being fair.’ (Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 544.) While a prospective juror’s negative experience with law enforcement may be
inextricably related to that juror’s race, the focus of section 231.7 is on race as a factor in
the use of the peremptory challenge. In view of his multiple uncertain and noncommittal
responses regarding impartiality, the trial court properly found it highly probable the
prosecutor’s challenge was unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and was instead
specific to Juror No. 1589 and bore on his ability to be fair and impartial. In other words,
the clear and convincing standard was satisfied.” (Id. at pp. 17–18; see Jimenez, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 544 [presumption of invalidity overcome where juror who expressed
14.
belief of racial bias in law enforcement repeatedly acknowledged it would be difficult to
set aside her bias against law enforcement and fairly consider their testimony].)
This case involves a prospective juror who reported he and his wife each had a
negative experience with law enforcement, and, based on his innocence, he did not feel
the criminal justice system was fair even though the case against him was dismissed. In
contrast with Gonzalez, however, Juror No. 7910 did not express that he was embittered
by his experiences and, critically, he did not express any uncertainly over whether he
could be fair to law enforcement. To the contrary, he stated repeatedly he could be fair.
The People point out because Juror No. 7910 believed he and his wife had been
mistreated by law enforcement, the prosecutor was concerned about his ability to follow
the court’s instruction on assessing witness credibility. They state there was evidence
here that bore on Juror No. 7910’s ability to be fair and impartial and argue, “The
prosecutor’s stated reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge against Prospective
Juror No. 7910 involved the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.
The reasons articulated by the prosecutor were unrelated to conscious or unconscious
bias. The stated reasons were specific to Prospective Juror No. 7910 and were highly
relevant to his ability to be fair and impartial in the case. Thus, as in Gonzalez, the
prosecutor’s stated reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge were sufficient to
rebut any presumption of invalidity under section 231.7, subdivision (e)(1) of the Code of
Civil Procedure.”
We have explained why Gonzalez is inapt, and the statute prohibits this court from
imputing “any findings … that the trial court did not expressly state on the record.”
(§ 231.7, subd. (j).) Thus, we are limited to considering “only reasons actually given
under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given
to explain either the party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to
challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as
the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis
15.
argument in the trial court.” (Ibid.)6 Here, neither the prosecutor nor the trial court
addressed how the reasons articulated by the prosecutor bore on Juror No. 7910’s ability
6 We note a split of authority in the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Six,
concerning the extent to which the trial court is required to make an express ruling. In
Uriostegui, the majority reversed the judgment and remanded the matter where the trial court
failed to make the specific findings required to overcome presumptively invalid reasons for
exercising a peremptory challenge under subdivision (g) of section 231.7. (People v. Uriostegui
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 271, 281 (maj. opn.).) One justice dissented (id. at pp. 282–284 (dis.
opn. of Gilbert, P. J.)), and subsequently, in SanMiguel, the majority affirmed the judgment
where the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror on the presumptively
invalid basis of inattention and the trial court confirmed the behavior, but the prosecutor failed to
explain why the behavior mattered to the case, in accordance with section 231.7, subdivision (g).
(People v. SanMiguel (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 880, 890–891 (maj. opn.), review granted Dec. 18,
2024, S287786 (SanMiguel).) The majority opined the potential juror’s “lack of attention alone
was a sufficient reason for his dismissal” (id. at p. 891), and overcame the presumption of
invalidity under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2) (SanMiguel, supra, at p. 891, review granted).
One justice dissented on that point, explaining, “Because the prosecutor failed to explain why
[the juror’s] behavior mattered in this case, I must treat as conclusive the presumption that he
was excused for invalid, discriminatory reasons.” (Id. at p. 895 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cody, J.),
review granted.) Subsequently, the majority in Garcia expressed disapproval of Uriostegui.
(People v. Garcia (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1165, review granted Dec. 30, 2025, S293973.)
In a concurring opinion, Justice Cody distinguished Uriostegui on the ground that it involved
presumptively invalid peremptory challenges that were not rebutted while the demeanor-based
challenge in Garcia was rebutted in compliance with the statute. (Garcia, supra, at pp. 1167–
1169 (conc. opn. of Cody, J.), review granted.) Additionally, the concurring opinion disagreed
with the characterization of Uriostegui as requiring “‘verbatim’ recitation of the statute” (Garcia,
supra, at p. 1168 (conc. opn. of Cody, J.), review granted). The concurring opinion stated that
instead, Uriostegui “recognizes that trial courts must make certain findings to overcome a
presumption of invalidity. [Citation.] Those findings need not take a particular form. But they
must exist, and appellate courts cannot impute them. [Citation.] A trial court’s general
awareness of the statute and implicit bias is insufficient.” (Garcia, supra, at p. 1169 (conc. opn.
of Cody, J.), review granted.)
To date, no other published decision has followed the view articulated in SanMiguel and
Garcia that an express finding is not required under subdivision (e) or subdivision (g)(2) of
section 231.7, notwithstanding the statutory language setting forth the requirements for
overcoming a presumptively invalid basis for exercising a peremptory challenge and prohibiting
imputing findings to the trial court on review. (Garcia, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1165 (maj.
opn.), review granted; SanMiguel, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 890–891 ( maj. opn.), review
granted.) In this case, the People do not advance that argument, but in any event, there is no
evidence in the record that Juror No. 7910 was unable to be fair and impartial, or to follow the
jury instruction on assessing the credibility of witnesses, due to his and his wife’s experiences
with law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Moreover, neither the prosecutor nor the
16.
to be fair and impartial in this case. The People’s reasoning is circular in that they cite to
the presumptively invalid basis for the challenge as evidence of the juror’s inability to be
fair and impartial, and they fail to point to anything additional that would support a
showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Juror No. 7910 could not be fair and
impartial. The Court of Appeal in Jaime rejected this reasoning, explaining, “Allowing a
party to use the presumptively invalid reasons to overcome the presumption would render
section 231.7, subdivision (e) meaningless.” (People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
941, 947 (Jaime).)
With respect to the prosecutor’s assertion that Juror No. 7910 failed to answer a
question on the jury questionnaire and she was also concerned whether he could follow
the jury instruction on assessing witness credibility, either concern could arguably present
an independent basis to exercise a peremptory challenge, depending on how the
prosecution explains the basis for the challenge. (See Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 799 [“the prosecutor’s actual reasons for the peremptory challenge are what matters”].)
In this case, however, the one question Juror No. 7910 left blank related to how he felt he
was treated by the criminal justice system and the prosecutor’s concern whether he would
follow the jury instruction on assessing witness credibility also directly related to his
report that he and his wife were treated unfairly by law enforcement. Neither stated
concern was supported by any evidence that Juror No. 7910 was confused or acted
deceptively, or that he expressed any hesitation in evaluating the testimony of law
enforcement officers fairly or following jury instructions. (See Jimenez, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 544 [juror repeatedly acknowledged she would have difficult time
“setting aside her bias against law enforcement officers to fairly consider their testimony,
despite her initial statements she could be fair” and “because of her views on law
enforcement and race, she would have a difficult time fairly evaluating the testimony of
trial court even purported to address the clear and convincing evidence standard for overcoming
a presumptively invalid basis for excusing the juror under subdivision (e) of section 231.7.
17.
law enforcement witnesses and might have an ‘implicit bias’ against the officers without
realizing” it]; Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 805 [juror’s “unclear answers, failure to
answer, confusion, reluctance, and evasiveness did not allow [the prosecutor] to
determine his views and impartiality, and it was not for lack of her trying,” which was
sufficient to overcome the presumptive invalidity of the reasons under § 231.7,
subd. (g)(2)].)
In sum, the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror
No. 7910 based on his negative experience with law enforcement and the criminal justice
system was presumptively invalid. (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(1), (3).) The prosecutor did not
attempt to make a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, “that an objectively
reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race,
ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious
affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons
articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.”
(Id., subd. (e), italics added.) Nor did the trial court purport to find that the prosecutor
made the requisite showing under section 231.7, subdivision (e). We cannot impute to
the trial court findings it did not make, and it is clear from the record that neither the
prosecutor nor the court was focused on subdivision (e) or section 231.7. The record
indicates the trial court considered defendant’s objection through the lens of
Batson/Wheeler, but even if we were to assume the court was focused on the totality of
the circumstances under subdivision (d) of the statute and simply misspoke, this was error
where the presumptive invalidity of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was not
overcome in accordance with subdivision (e). Therefore, the trial court erred in
overruling the defense objection and, in this circumstance, the statute compels reversal.
(§ 231.7, subd. (j); Barnes, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 583; Jaime, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 947.)
18.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and this matter is remanded for a new trial.
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
HARRELL, J.
19.
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