People v. Utsey CA3

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Filed 2/20/26 P. v. Utsey CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100535

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE019386)

v.

ELIJAH UTSEY et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Defendants Elijah Utsey and Joshua Emmanuel Berry were found guilty of first
degree murder with the enhancement of using a firearm causing death. Defendants make
several arguments on appeal: (1) Berry challenges the admission of Utsey’s police
interrogation on confrontation grounds; (2) both defendants assert several claims of

1
instructional error; and (3) both defendants challenge the trial court declining to strike
their firearm enhancements under Penal Code1 section 1385. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants were charged with murder with the enhancement they personally
discharged a firearm causing death. It was also alleged that Utsey had a prior felony
strike conviction.
At trial, evidence showed Terrence Hanes was discovered dead on July 4, 2022,
from multiple gunshot wounds. Officers recovered five .40-caliber casings and twelve
9‑millimeter casings at the scene; there was no firearm near Hanes’s body.
Law enforcement officers downloaded the contents of Hanes’s phone and found
multiple social media messages between Hanes and Utsey. The content of the messages
overall indicated a “big brother, little brother type of relationship,” but the two would
also “squabble frequently.” Utsey and Hanes had a “heated argument” on July 1, 2022,
and that afternoon Utsey posted a picture of him in a mask with the words “I’ll leave your
body slumped”; there was a screenshot of this post on Hanes’s phone. Later that day,
Hanes sent Utsey a message insulting Utsey’s family, saying: “ ‘Bitch, cut it out. Yo
whole family broke and bummy . . . . Look at how all y’all ended up . . . . Let’s be real,
three living off of government assistance, one living in a trailer park, and the other one
dead. Make it make sense, bro.’ ”
The search of Hanes’s phone also showed a connection between Utsey and Berry.
As a result, officers investigated Berry’s social media accounts and found he owned a red
car consistent with a car seen in Hanes’s neighborhood around the time of Hanes’s
murder.

1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

2
After more investigation, it was discovered Berry’s red car incurred a toll on the
Carquinez Bridge at 8:44 p.m. on July 1, 2022. The video surveillance in Hanes’s
neighborhood showed a matching red car enter Hanes’s neighborhood in Sacramento at
9:53 p.m. July 1, 2022, leave, and then come back at 10:13 p.m. These videos then show
two people leave the car at 10:20 p.m., gunshots at 10:25 p.m., and then two people run
away from the direction of Hanes’s house before the car leaves the area.
Law enforcement officers recovered cell phone location data for Utsey’s and
Berry’s phones. Defendants’ phones’ location data match that of the red car throughout
the evening of July 1, 2022, starting in Oakland, going over the Carquinez Bridge at the
same time Berry’s car incurred the toll, and to Hanes’s house in Sacramento. The
precision of Utsey’s phone’s data showed the phone leaving the area of the parked red car
and moving toward Hanes’s house between 10:20 and 10:28 p.m. And Berry’s phone
placed a call at 10:17 p.m. from outside of Hanes’s house. After the car left the scene,
both phones traveled to an area where Utsey’s sister lives.
The jury found both defendants guilty of first degree murder and found true the
personal use of a firearm allegation.
At sentencing, the trial court found true beyond a reasonable doubt Utsey had been
previously convicted of a strike offense for residential burglary. The court then denied
Utsey’s request to strike that strike and denied both defendants’ requests under
section 1385 to strike the firearm enhancements. The trial court then sentenced Berry to
25 years to life for the murder and a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement, for a total term of 50 years to life. The trial court sentenced Utsey to the
same term except the murder sentence was doubled for his prior strike, for a total term of
75 years to life.
Defendants appeal.

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DISCUSSION
I
The Admission Of Utsey’s Interrogation
Did Not Violate Berry’s Confrontation Rights
Berry first challenges the trial court admitting a video of law enforcement officers
interrogating Utsey after his arrest. Citing Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123
and People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, Berry argues he was deprived of his
constitutional right to cross-examine Utsey when Utsey’s “testimonial statement to the
police was played for the jury” and Utsey did not testify at trial. (Capitalization and
boldface omitted.) The People contend there was no error because “none of Utsey’s
statements constituted a confession, much less one that was facially incriminating to
Berry.” We agree with the People.
A
Additional Background
After Utsey’s arrest, law enforcement officers interviewed him. Video of this
interview was played for the jury during the testimony of one of the interviewing officers,
who was the prosecution’s final witness. During the interrogation, officers presented
Utsey with messages of him arguing with Hanes online, the phone data showing him at
Hanes’s house when Hanes was killed, and a recording of the gunshots.
The interviewing officers also asserted several times Utsey knew someone else
was involved, this person “drives a red car, that [Utsey was] also in that night,” and
stated: “[W]e’re gonna be talkin’ to him right afterwards. And I don’t want you, who
was so close to [Hanes], to be silent on somethin’ like this, when your buddy, who was
there, might throw you under the bus.” The officers also showed Utsey pictures of Berry,
including one with his red car, and asked if he knew him or recognized the car. Utsey
originally said he did not recognize Berry but then said, “[Berry] look[s] familiar. I

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probably seen him around before,” and “[t]hat’s probably where I seen him before – on
Instagram.” These pictures were shown to the jury.
Utsey maintained throughout the interview he did not know what happened the
night of July 1, 2022, he “probably could have been in Sacramento” that night but
“[m]ost likely” was visiting his sister, he was not involved with Hanes’s death, and
towards the end of the interview stated: “I’m innocent – I’m innocent . . . – that doesn’t
mean nothin[g] to y’all.”
The video, and the provided transcript, had several redacted sections. Prior to
trial, the parties discussed admitting Utsey’s interview. Berry’s counsel objected to any
references to Berry, arguing the jury could infer a connection between the two defendants
and violate Berry’s confrontation rights because Berry’s counsel would not have the
opportunity to cross‑examine Utsey. The parties and the trial court went through the
video and transcript to eliminate any references to Berry. They also eliminated
references to Utsey having been in prison before and possessing a gun. But the court
permitted the officers’ references to a second suspect and the officers showing Utsey
pictures of Berry, as described in the paragraph above.
B
Legal Standards
“The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when
the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that
incriminates a codefendant. ‘ “Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a
‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the
other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that
defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is
given.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1176.) The rule applies
only to a “facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant” that

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“ ‘expressly implicat[ed]’ the defendant as his[, her, or their] accomplice.”
(Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 207-208.)
C
Utsey’s Statements Did Not Trigger The Aranda/Bruton Rule
Berry’s arguments focus on the insufficiency of the redactions, asserting the trial
court’s redactions “failed to consider the entire context of the interview” because
“[w]ithout any reference to any other evidence, it would have been obvious to the jury
that all of these references were to . . . Berry. Simply removing . . . Berry’s name, as the
trial court believed, was not enough to sanitize the interrogation.” But this argument
ignores the threshold question of whether Utsey made statements incriminating Berry at
all. We conclude he did not.
Utsey routinely and consistently denied any involvement with Hanes’s killing,
including being at Hanes’s house on July 1, 2022, and explicitly asserted his innocence.
Utsey also said Berry only looked familiar, possibly from Instagram, without any
indication they had a relationship that could involve jointly killing Hanes. There are
therefore no incriminating statements triggering the Aranda/Bruton rule.
The statements that Berry alleges were incriminating are attributable to the
officers, not Utsey. This includes the “repeated references to the fact that . . . Utsey was
not alone . . . when he traveled from Oakland to Sacramento” and “the detective showing
. . . Utsey a picture of . . . Berry.” None of this can be attributed to Utsey, and Berry
provides no legal support establishing law enforcement questions during an interrogation
implicate the Aranda/Bruton rule, which is applied only to a codefendant’s statements.
In his reply, Berry contends Utsey made “adoptive admissions” of the officers’
statements, including by not denying the possibility he was in Sacramento the day of the
murder. Even if Utsey denied killing Hanes, Berry argues this statement incriminates
Berry. We disagree and conclude these statements are not sufficient because “[t]he class
of inferentially incriminating statements under Bruton is limited to ‘obvious[]’ ones,

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‘inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the
very first item introduced at trial.’ ” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 867.)
That is not the case with Utsey’s repeated denials of killing Hanes, even if he implied a
possibility of being in Sacramento the day of the murder. Thus, we conclude there was
no error because Utsey’s statements were not confessions incriminating Berry. (See
People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 875 [finding Aranda/Bruton did not apply
because a codefendant’s statement “was not a confession, much less one that facially
incriminated [the] defendant”].)
II
Defendants Do Not Establish Any Reversible Jury Instruction Error
Defendants make several challenges to the jury’s instructions. We reject each
challenge in turn.
A
Jury Instruction Legal Standards
Trial courts have a duty to sua sponte instruct “ ‘on those general principles of law
that are closely and openly connected with the facts before the court and necessary for the
jury’s understanding of the case.’ ” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 143.) On
appeal, we review “ ‘the wording of a jury instruction de novo’ ” and “determine[]
whether ‘the instructions are complete and correctly state the law.’ ” (People v. Bell
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 435.) We examine the entire charge of the court to
determine whether the instructions are adequate (People v. Pena (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d
462, 475) and whether it is reasonably likely that the instructions as a whole caused the
jury to misapply the law (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36).
Failure to object to a jury instruction affecting the substantial rights of the
defendant does not result in a forfeiture of the right to appellate review of the instruction.
(§ 1259; People v. Cabral (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 748, 750.) “The doctrine of invited
error[, however,] applies to estop a party from asserting an error when ‘his[, her, or their]

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own conduct induces the commission of error.’ ” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545,
549, fn. 3, italics omitted.) But in the absence of a clear and deliberate tactical purpose
by counsel in suggesting or acceding to an erroneous instruction, courts and
commentators shun a finding of invited error that excuses a trial judge from rendering full
and correct instructions on material questions of law. (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th
1, 28; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 438; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d
303, 319.) That is, “only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting,
resisting, or acceding to an instruction [will it] nullify the trial court’s obligation to
instruct in the cause.” (Graham, at p. 319.)
B
Additional Background
After the close of evidence, the parties and the trial court discussed jury
instructions, including CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225. The court stated: “I almost always
let the lawyers decide this issue. [CALCRIM Nos. ]224 and 225 on circumstantial
evidence, the [c]ourt can give either, but I can only give one. Some lawyers like the way
[CALCRIM No. ]224 reads better. And more specifically, defense attorneys sometimes
have options. If you guys care, we can give [CALCRIM No. ]224 or we can give
[CALCRIM No. ]225.” Utsey’s attorney stated: “I’ve gotten some judges to give a
hybrid in this courthouse. You’ve denied that request before. So based on the facts of
this case, I would choose [CALCRIM No. ]225 over [CALCRIM No. ]224.” The court
asked Berry’s counsel, who said, “That’s fine,” so the court gave CALCRIM No. 225 and
not CALCRIM No. 224.
The CALCRIM No. 225 instruction given explained the prosecution must prove a
defendant’s mental state and provided: “[Intent] may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. [¶] Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact
necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the
[prosecution] ha[s] proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable

8
doubt.” The instruction further stated if there are two or more reasonable conclusions of
intent that could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, “you must conclude that the
intent and/or mental state was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However,
when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions
and reject any that are unreasonable.” CALCRIM No. 224 applies this same instruction
broadly whenever circumstantial evidence is used to prove any “fact necessary to find the
defendant guilty,” not just mental state.
During jury instruction discussions, the trial court also asked if “anybody
th[ought] [CALCRIM Nos. ]334 or 335 should be given?” These instructions detail how
a jury must handle incriminating statements by an accomplice. (See CALCRIM
Nos. 334, 335.) All attorneys said no, and the court did not give either instruction.
The trial court did instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 359, stating a defendant
cannot be convicted based solely on out-of-court statements and can only rely on these
statements if there is other evidence a crime was committed. The instruction further
stated: “This requirement of other evidence does not apply to proving the identity of the
person who committed the crime . . . . If other evidence shows that the charged crime . . .
was committed, the identity of the person who committed it . . . may be proved by the
defendant’s statements alone. [¶] You may not convict the defendant unless the
[prosecution] ha[s] proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In addition to the CALCRIM Nos. 225 and 359 instructions, the trial court
provided other instructions discussing the burden of proof. The court gave the standard
CALCRIM No. 220 explaining the presumption of innocence and that this “presumption
requires that the [prosecution] prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
court continued, “Whenever I tell you the [prosecution] must prove something, I mean
[it] must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless I specifically tell you otherwise.”
The court also gave the CALCRIM No. 223 instruction explaining direct and
circumstantial evidence and that the jury “must decide whether a fact in issue has been

9
proved based on all the evidence.” CALCRIM No. 355 stated a defendant does not need
to testify and instead may “rely on the state of the evidence and argue that the
[prosecution] ha[s] failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.” CALCRIM
Nos. 520, 521, and 640 also mentioned the need to establish first degree murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. And CALCRIM No. 3149 stated the prosecution had to prove the
firearm allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, CALCRIM No. 200 was given,
which told the jury, among other things, to “[p]ay careful attention to all of these
instructions and consider them together.”
C
There Was No Reversible Error By Not Giving CALCRIM No. 224
Berry asserts the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury
with CALCRIM No. 224. Berry argues there were two reasonable inferences from the
circumstantial evidence, therefore “[t]he court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
that it must accept the reasonable inference that points toward innocence.” The People
argue forfeiture, the instruction does not apply, and any error was harmless. We agree
with the People’s final contention.
Initially, we conclude this issue was not forfeited because there was no evidence
that requesting CALCRIM No. 225 over CALCRIM No. 224 had a deliberate tactical
purpose. Instead, it appears Utsey’s attorney wanted to give a hybrid of both instructions,
but the trial court had a history of allowing only one and the court did not discourage this
understanding. We will therefore discuss the issue on the merits.
The difference between the CALCRIM No. 224 instruction not given and the
given CALCRIM No. 225 instruction is that CALCRIM No. 224 states the jury must
believe a reasonable inference of innocence from circumstantial evidence on all facts, not
just intent. “ ‘CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 provide essentially the same information on
how the jury should consider circumstantial evidence, but CALCRIM No. 224 is more
inclusive. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] CALCRIM No. 224 ‘is the proper instruction to give

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unless the only element of the offense that rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial
evidence is that of specific intent or mental state.’ ” (People v. Contreras (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 587, 592.) Courts have said an instruction on the principles contained in
CALCRIM No. 224 “ ‘must be given sua sponte when the prosecution substantially relies
on circumstantial evidence to prove guilt.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826,
885 [analyzing the comparable instruction CALJIC No. 2.01].) But our Supreme Court
has also indicated CALCRIM No. 224 “should not be given where the evidence relied on
is either direct or, if circumstantial, is not equally consistent with a reasonable conclusion
of innocence.” (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167 [analyzing the
comparable instruction CALJIC No. 2.01], abrogated on another ground in People v.
Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.)
The People argue, “[U]nder Heishman, the trial court had no duty to instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 224” because “[o]nly one reasonable conclusion can be drawn
from this evidence, that is, Berry drove Utsey to Sacramento and, together with Utsey,
shot Hanes multiple times as he lay on his couch.” We do not need to address whether
Heishman relieved trial courts of their duty to instruct with CALCRIM No. 224 under
circumstances presented by this case because we conclude any error was harmless.
The harmless error analysis here requires us to examine whether there is a
reasonable probability a properly instructed jury would have returned a verdict more
favorable to defendants had the trial court used CALCRIM No. 224. (People v. Rogers,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 886-887.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “[A] ‘probability’ in this context does not mean
more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract
possibility.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422, italics omitted.)
“ ‘In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things,
whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the
evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no

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reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956, italics omitted.)
Identity was the main issue in the case, and whether Berry and Utsey were the two
figures leaving the car and shooting Hanes. The CALCRIM No. 225 instruction applied
only to inferences of intent from circumstantial evidence, unlike CALCRIM No. 224
which would have applied to every fact, including identity. We therefore must analyze
specifically the strength of the identity evidence and whether there was a reasonable
probability the jury could have found a reasonable inference Berry was not one of the
shooters.2
We conclude any error here was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of
Berry’s identity as one of the killers. Berry’s phone went from Oakland to Hanes’s house
the day of the killing and was at Hanes’s house at the time of the gunshots. Berry’s car
matched the description of the suspects’ red car, in color and other physical features, and
the toll confirmed Berry’s car was in the same location of the suspects’ car at the same
time. Videos showed the occupants of the car get out and walk towards the house right
before gunshots are heard, and the car left the neighborhood after the shots. Berry’s
phone also made a call outside of Hanes’s house before the shooting. And there was no
evidence any person other than Utsey and Berry possessed their phones or possessed
Berry’s car on July 1, 2022. Based on this evidence there is no reasonable probability the
jury would have returned a different result had the trial court given the more inclusive
CALCRIM No. 224 instruction.

2 Utsey joined Berry’s argument on this issue. But he does not present any
individualized argument and we will therefore only analyze the evidence from the
perspective of Berry. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335,
363 [“Appellate counsel for the party purporting to join some or all of the claims raised
by another [is] obligated to thoughtfully assess whether such joinder is proper as to the
specific claims and, if necessary, to provide particularized argument in support of his or
her [or their] client’s ability to seek relief on that ground”].)

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Berry’s argument does not present an inference of innocence the jury was
reasonably likely to adopt. Berry contends there were two reasonable inferences from the
evidence: (1) The prosecutor’s inference Berry and Utsey drove to Sacramento and
killed Hanes and (2) “that . . . Berry, who had no known connection to, or conflict with,
. . . Hanes, simply loaned his car to . . . Utsey. Both inferences are reasonable.” But
Berry’s inference does not acknowledge, much less incorporate and explain, the presence
of his phone or the call made from outside Hanes’s house, making Berry’s proposed
inference clearly unreasonable when compared to the evidence overwhelmingly
supporting the inference he was a participant in Hanes’s murder.
We therefore conclude any error in not instructing on CALCRIM No. 224 was
harmless.
D
There Was No Error By Not Giving CALCRIM No. 334
Berry next argues the trial court prejudicially erred in not instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 334. Berry asserts, “[T]he trial court failed to instruct the jury that it
must find that . . . Utsey’s accomplice statement was corroborated.” The People argue
forfeiture, no error, and no prejudice. We again first conclude there was no forfeiture
given the lack of evidence it was a tactical decision by defense counsel not to request
CALCRIM No. 334 when the trial court asked whether either attorney wanted it
included. (People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 319 [“only if counsel expresses a
deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction [will it]
nullify the trial court’s obligation to instruct in the cause”].) But addressing the merits,
we do conclude there was no error here.
CALCRIM No. 334 instructs the jury: “You may use (a statement/[or] testimony)
of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant to convict the defendant only if”
it is corroborated with evidence independent of the statement and this evidence tends to
connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.

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As discussed, Utsey made no incriminating statement to make this instruction
relevant. The plain language of the instruction applies only to a statement tending to
incriminate the defendant. (Cf. People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 218 [explaining
the instruction was proper in that case because “the accomplice-defendant’s testimony
should be viewed with distrust to the extent that it tends to incriminate his[, her, or their]
codefendant”].) As previously discussed with the Aranda/Bruton rule, Utsey’s
statements were only denials. Berry does not establish Utsey’s denials incriminate him.
We therefore conclude there was no error in not giving CALCRIM No. 334.
E
There Was No Error With The Language Of CALCRIM No. 359
Utsey next argues the trial court’s given CALCRIM No. 359 instruction was
prejudicially erroneous. Utsey asserts the CALCRIM No. 359 instruction told the jury it
could find identity based on a defendant’s statements alone but “these ‘statements alone’
were insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . Utsey committed the crime,
telling jurors they could rely on those statements alone to infer identity undercut the
state’s burden of proof.” Utsey argues this requires “per se reversal” and even if it is not
per se reversible, it was prejudicial error because it went to the single contested issue of
identity. The People argue forfeiture, no error, and no prejudice. We conclude there was
no error.
CALCRIM No. 359 is based on the corpus delicti rule. “ ‘In every criminal trial,
the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the
fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.’ ”
(People v. Ramirez Ruiz (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 809, 829.) “The corpus delicti rule
requires some evidence that a crime occurred, independent of the defendant’s own
statements.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 721.) “The independent proof
[of the corpus delicti] may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1171.) “In every case, once the necessary

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quantum of independent evidence is present, the defendant’s extrajudicial statements may
then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues.” (Ibid.)
However, the “identity of the defendant as the perpetrator is not part of the corpus delicti;
identity may be established by the defendant’s words alone.” (People v. Valencia (2008)
43 Cal.4th 268, 297.)
There was previously a split on whether CALCRIM No. 359 was erroneous. The
court in People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1427-1428, concluded “that
CALCRIM No. 359 is deficient to the extent it lends itself to an interpretation that
criminal defendants could be convicted on the basis of extrajudicial statements alone that
they committed a crime.” Whereas the court in People v. Rosales (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1258-1259, “disagree[d] with Rivas and f[ound] no instructional
error.” But, as explained in the CALCRIM No. 359 bench notes, “[t]he instruction has
been modified in light of the discussion in Rivas.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury
Instns. (2018 ed.) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 359, p. 126.)
The former version of CALCRIM No. 359 analyzed in Rivas and Rosales stated in
relation to identity: “ ‘The identity of the person who committed the crime [and the
degree of the crime] may be proved by the defendant’s statement[s] alone.’ ” (People v.
Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428, fn. 5, quoting former CALCRIM No. 359.)
The updated CALCRIM No. 359 instruction given here more clearly and thoroughly
explained the relevant law. It explained that the “requirement of other evidence does not
apply to proving the identity of the person who committed the crime.” It further
reiterated that only if other evidence proved the commission of the crime may the jury
assess whether the defendant’s statements proved identity: “If other evidence shows that
the charged crime . . . was committed, the identity of the person who committed it . . .
may be proved by the defendant’s statements alone.” This correctly states the corpus
delicti rule. (People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 721 [“The corpus delicti rule
requires some evidence that a crime occurred, independent of the defendant’s own

15
statements”].) And the court has a mandatory duty to instruct on the corpus delicti rule
“[w]henever an accused’s extrajudicial statements form part of the prosecution’s
evidence.” (People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) We therefore conclude
there was no error in the language of the CALCRIM No. 359 instruction given here.
F
There Was No Burden Of Proof Instructional Error
Utsey also asserts the CALCRIM No. 359 instruction allowed the jury to convict
him on proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt because his statements were not
sufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, Utsey contends the
CALCRIM No. 225 instruction given violated his constitutional rights because it
instructed the jurors proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied only to circumstantial
evidence. Utsey explains the CALCRIM No. 225 instruction correctly advised
circumstantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but the instruction did not include
direct evidence. From this he asserts: “[I]t is both obvious, and logical, that by explicitly
limiting this principle to circumstantial evidence, the instruction logically told the jurors
that this principle did not apply to direct evidence. Put another way, if this cautionary
principle applied both to direct and circumstantial evidence, the instruction would not
have referenced only circumstantial evidence.” Berry joins this argument. The People
contend forfeiture, no error, and no prejudice. We conclude there was no error here.
Defendants’ narrow arguments on CALCRIM Nos. 359 and 225 ignore the totality
of the instructions given referencing the burden of proof. There were six instructions
other than CALCRIM Nos. 359 and 225 that told the jury it had to find a certain fact true
beyond a reasonable doubt. This includes the standard burden instruction CALCRIM
No. 220 explaining the presumption of innocence and that this “presumption requires that
the [prosecution] prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court
continued, “Whenever I tell you the [prosecution] must prove something, I mean [it] must
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless I specifically tell you otherwise.” CALCRIM

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Nos. 355, 520, 521, 640, and 3149 affirmed specific facts must be found true beyond a
reasonable doubt. The CALCRIM No. 223 instruction also instructed on circumstantial
and direct evidence, concluding: “You must decide whether a fact in issue has been
proved based on all the evidence.” (Italics added.) There were no instructions stating
there was a lower burden of proof applicable on any fact, and the jury was instructed to
consider all instructions together.
This is why the case defendants rely upon, People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220,
is inapplicable. There, our Supreme Court found reversible error where the trial court did
not give the standard reasonable doubt instruction, now CALCRIM No. 220. (Vann, at
pp. 222-223, 225.) The trial court there did give the CALCRIM No. 225 equivalent, but
our Supreme Court found this insufficient by itself because the instruction “might with
equal logic have been interpreted by the jurors as importing the need of a lesser degree of
proof where the evidence is direct and thus of a higher quality.” (Vann, at pp. 226-227.)
Unlike Vann, the trial court here gave the standard reasonable doubt instruction,
along with several others establishing beyond a reasonable doubt as the appropriate
standard without any implication direct evidence is susceptible to a lower burden. Had
the jury been confused on whether CALCRIM No. 225 was implicitly stating direct
evidence could be applied with a lower than beyond reasonable doubt standard, or that
CALCRIM No. 359 permitted finding identity under a lesser standard, there is no
reasonable chance it held this mistaken belief when considering the totality of the
instructions as it was told to do. (See People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 826
[finding the standard burden of proof instruction, “coupled with the directive to ‘consider
the instructions as a whole and each in light of the others,’ fully apprised the jury that the
reasonable doubt standard applied to both forms of proof”].) We consequently conclude
it was not reasonably likely the jury misapplied these instructions on the whole to convict
with a lower burden.

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III
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Under Section 1385
The defendants finally assert the trial court abused its discretion when declining to
strike their firearm enhancements under section 1385. We conclude there was no abuse
of discretion.
A
Additional Background
For its analysis under section 1385, the trial court first assumed the mitigating
circumstances the defendants asserted under section 1385 applied. The trial court then
noted aggravating factors listed in the probation report: “Obviously, this is a crime that
involved death. This is a crime that involved great harm. It was vicious. It was callous.
The defendants, obviously, were armed, although that’s part of the potential
enhancement; so I don’t consider it for that purpose. The manner in which the crime was
carried out definitely indicated planning.” The court then summarized the facts of the
killing concluding: “[D]efendants walk[ed] into that back room and execut[ed] . . .
Hanes. [¶] . . . So it would appear that this was a very cold, cold, calculated murder that
was carried out. [¶] So these are [sic] violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society.” Berry was also on probation and Utsey was on parole at the time of the crime.
Thus, the court found, “[T]here are a lot of aggravating circumstances in this case.”
The trial court then balanced the factors: “So I do balance that against all the
mitigating circumstances in this case, and I am giving them the mitigating circumstances,
for both defendants in here, great weight when I consider this. . . . I find the aggravating
circumstances do outweigh the mitigating circumstances in this case, and argue against or
point the [c]ourt against striking the firearm enhancement. [¶] . . . [E]ven if a reviewing
court looked at this and thinks that the [c]ourt is incorrect on this analysis, I would say
that even then I would not strike these firearm enhancements because I do think that it
would endanger -- to dismiss these enhancements would endanger public safety, as

18
indicated in [section] 1385[, subdivision ](c)(2), and that the likelihood of dismissal
would very well result in physical injury or danger to others. I think a maximum
sentence in this case is appropriate.” Thus, the court concluded: “[W]hen I balance all
that out, I’m going to decline to strike the enhancement -- the firearm enhancement in this
case.”
B
Legal Standards
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) states in relevant part: “[T]he court shall dismiss
an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” “In exercising its discretion
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances” listed in the
statute “are present.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Presence of any of “these [mitigating]
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, “section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s mandate
to give ‘great weight’ to enumerated mitigating circumstances requires a sentencing court
to ‘engage[] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated mitigating
factors.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1034-1035, citing with approval
People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087.) “Stated simply, if the court does not
conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances
strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine
whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a danger to public
safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight
of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1036.)

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C
The Trial Court’s Public Danger Analysis
Did Not Result In An Abuse Of Discretion
Utsey argues the trial court abused its discretion by focusing exclusively on his
current dangerousness for the public endangerment analysis, instead of when he could be
released if the enhancement was stricken, which is still 50 years in the future and subject
to Board of Parole Hearings approval. Berry joins in the argument.
Defendants’ argument ignores the entirety of the section 1385, subdivision (c)
analysis. The public dangerousness analysis is a release valve on section 1385’s great
weight analysis in subdivision (c)(2). Section 1385 requires courts to weigh greatly
mitigating factors “unless” dismissal would ultimately endanger public safety. (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).) But the statute does not mandate the public safety analysis in every
instance, only as a means to circumvent the great weight analysis. A necessary corollary
is that courts can do the furtherance of justice analysis greatly weighing the mitigating
factors irrespective of the public safety analysis.
This is why Utsey’s primary reliance on People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215 is misplaced. The appellate court there found an abuse of discretion
where the trial court’s public danger analysis concluded the defendant “ ‘presently’ ”
represented a danger. (Id. at pp. 224, 230-231.) The appellate court found this analysis
erroneous because the plain language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not support
a “singular focus on whether the defendant currently poses a danger.” (Gonzalez, at
p. 228.) Instead, “the trial court must look to when a defendant would be released” and
determine if that defendant could still pose a danger to society in the future. (Id. at
p. 229.)
However, the issue in Gonzalez was not the great weight analysis. The trial
court’s analysis made no mention of the mitigating factors and their weight. (People v.
Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 223-224.) Instead, the trial court’s section 1385

20
analysis sought to answer one question: Did the trial court “consider [the defendant] to
be a danger to society?” (Gonzalez, at p. 223.) The appellate court’s opinion therefore
focuses exclusively on the public endangerment analysis. (See id. at p. 224 [summarizing
the issues].) Thus, the appropriateness of the public danger analysis was critical to
whether the trial court abused its discretion under section 1385.
Conversely, the trial court here assumed the mitigating factors were present and
stated: “I am giving them the mitigating circumstances, for both defendants in here, great
weight when I consider this.” The court still declined to exercise its discretion because it
found several serious aggravating factors outweighed the great weight of the mitigating
factors. Defendants do not challenge this analysis, so we consequently do not analyze its
sufficiency. The trial court did also find dismissal of the enhancements would endanger
public safety. But even were we to agree with defendants that this analysis was deficient,
this would not require reversal because the trial court already performed the overarching
great weight analysis. Thus, defendants’ focus on the public endangerment analysis does
not undermine the trial court’s decision not to strike the firearm enhancements. We
therefore affirm the trial court declining to strike defendants’ firearm enhancements.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

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