CourtListener 10796325•In re Amanda A. CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 2/19/26 In re Amanda A. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re AMANDA A., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D086990
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. NJ15973)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ARMANDO T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alejandro Morales, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
David J. Smith, Acting County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief
Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is the third appeal filed by Armando T. (Father) in this
dependency action involving 11-year-old Amanda A. He contends no
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding at the contested 18-
month permanency hearing that returning Amanda to Mother’s physical
custody would not “create a substantial risk of detriment” to Amanda’s
“safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 366.22(a)(1).) Resolving this appeal by memorandum opinion (People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851–854), we conclude substantial
evidence supports the court’s no detriment finding. We thus affirm its
September 25, 2025 order.
I.
A.
In November 2023, the San Diego County Health and Human Services
Agency filed a petition under section 300(d). The petition alleged
(1) Amanda’s stepfather had sexually abused her and (2) Mother had failed to
protect her. We affirmed the juvenile court’s dispositional order keeping
Amanda in out-of-home care, rather than placing her with Father in Ohio.
(In re Amanda A. (Sept. 20, 2024, D084041) [nonpub. opn.].)
At the 12-month contested review hearing, the juvenile court found it
was not in Amanda’s best interest, and would be detrimental to her
emotional well-being, if placed with Father in Ohio. Like the juvenile court,
we commended Father’s efforts to develop a relationship with Amanda, but
found substantial evidence supported the court’s order. (In re Amanda A.
(Nov. 24, 2025, D086049) [nonpub. opn.].)
B.
In recommending Amanda be returned to Mother, the Agency noted
Mother has made “significant behavioral changes” since the 12-month review
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hearing. These included: (1) stopping all business dealings with the
stepfather, her former business partner; (2) having third parties supervise
visits between the stepfather and their son and using only the “[T]alking
[P]arents application” to schedule those visits and arrange exchanges;
(3) confronting the stepfather’s family about his sexual abuse of Amanda;
(4) participating (i) in dozens of child sexual abuse therapy classes, where she
completed a written safety plan and wrote a letter of apology to Amanda, and
(ii) in court-ordered conjoint therapy with Amanda, which helped her identify
her past “mistakes” and make “necessary changes” to become more protective
of Amanda; (5) rearranging the furniture in her home and buying Amanda
new bedroom furniture, so the home would feel and look different for Amanda
when back in her care; and (6) enrolling Amanda in boxing and self-defense
classes, with the expectation Amanda would “feel more comfortable in her
body and have the confidence in herself to fight back.”
At the contested 18-month permanency hearing, the juvenile court
found there would not be a substantial risk of detriment to return Amanda to
Mother. According to the court: (1) the conjoint therapy it ordered for Mother
and Amanda was a “huge step” forward in their relationship, as it allowed
them to openly discuss their feelings and emotions and “clear the air”;
(2) Mother “has demonstrated and is willing to ensure and account for
Amanda’s well-being and safety and how [Amanda] feels emotionally”;
(3) Amanda’s 60-day trial visit with Mother (and stepbrother) was “going
well,” with no concerns reported; and (4) Amanda was a “bright girl” who has
“demonstrated to everybody” that she knows how to protect herself, including
calling 911 if she came in contact with the stepfather. The court thus
returned Amanda to Mother’s physical custody and ordered family
maintenance services to Mother and enhancement services to Father.
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II.
A.
Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile
court’s no detriment finding. We disagree.
During the reunification phase of dependency, the juvenile court
typically holds a hearing at six-month intervals to evaluate the adequacy of
the services offered to, and the progress of, the parent. (Michael G. v.
Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 625.) At the 18-month hearing, “the
court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their parent
. . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return
of the child to their parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to
the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
(§ 366.22(a)(1).) The Agency has the burden of establishing detriment.
(See ibid.) “In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider the
extent to which the parent participated in reunification services” and “the
efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating the conditions
that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400.)
We review the juvenile court’s no detriment finding for substantial
evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s order
and drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its
favor. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) If two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the evidence, we cannot substitute
our decision for the trier of fact’s. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
319.) Instead, we must affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence,
even if it could support a contrary finding. (Id. at p. 318.)
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We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Amanda could be safely returned to Mother’s physical custody. The
court found that after the 12-month review hearing, Mother, “to her credit,”
took the necessary “steps” to become more protective of Amanda, alleviating
the concern that led to the dependency. The record supports this finding:
Mother began communicating with the stepfather only through the Talking
Parents application; she stopped supervising visits between him and their
son; she arranged for third parties to pick up and drop off their son based on
a visitation schedule she created; she no longer had any business dealings
with the stepfather; and she recognized the stepfather needed to be “held
accountable for his actions.” Mother thus gained insight into how her prior
relationship with the stepfather had negatively impacted Amanda’s
emotional and mental well-being, as Mother herself recognized when she told
the Agency: “‘I know that I made a mistake and I am responsible for my
actions, my job is now to take care of my kids and that they are safe.’”
The record also shows Amanda reported (1) being “happy” back home
with Mother and her stepbrother and “excited” about “learning how to protect
herself”; and (2) having no anxiety in Mother’s care, once she settled into a
routine. Amanda also no longer worried about the stepfather, stating she
would call 911 if she saw him and that Mother would protect her. Amanda’s
therapist also reported that Amanda was “excited and happy” to return to
Mother’s care. And the Agency reported the 60-day trial visit was going well
with no concerns reported.
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that returning Amanda to Mother’s physical custody would not
“create a substantial risk of detriment” to Amanda’s “safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being.” (§ 366.22(a)(1).)
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B.
Father argues “it was detrimental to place” Amanda with Mother
because Mother (1) still has a relationship with the stepfather and (2) would
fail to protect Amanda again. We are not persuaded.
Father’s contention is simply a request for us to reweigh the evidence
and make new findings, despite the substantial evidence discussed earlier
that supports the juvenile court’s no detriment finding. This we cannot do.
(See In re Stephanie M., 7 Cal.4th at p. 318; In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal.App.4th at
p. 947.)
Father’s contention that Mother will fail to protect Amanda in the
future from the stepfather is also speculative. “Speculation” however “is not
evidence.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 864.)
“Neither does it even support an inference implying as much.” (Id. at p. 865.)
More importantly, the juvenile court addressed the safety issue at the
permanency hearing, finding Mother has come “a long ways” since the 12-
month review hearing by becoming more protective of Amanda’s physical and
emotional well-being. This included her using only the Talking Parents
application to exchange information with the stepfather and making
arrangements with various third parties to pick up and drop off their son to
avoid any direct or indirect contact between her and the stepfather or
between the stepfather and Amanda.
C.
Father alternatively contends it was in Amanda’s “best interest” to be
placed with him in Ohio. But at the 18-month permanency hearing, that is
not the standard used by the juvenile court. Instead, “[s]ection 366.22,
subdivision (a), . . . contains a statutory presumption the child will be
returned to parental custody unless the court finds the child’s return would
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create ‘a substantial risk of detriment’” to the child’s well-being. (Bridget A.
v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 311, italics added.)
In any event, substantial evidence supports the finding it was not in
Amanda’s “best interest” to be placed with Father in Ohio. Amanda was
adamant she did not want a relationship with Father and did not want to live
in Ohio, including when she addressed the juvenile court at the contested 18-
month hearing. Amanda reported having suicidal ideation in 2024, in part
due to “stress[]” “when [Father] pressure[d] her to connect.” The Agency
recommended against placement with Father, noting he and Amanda needed
to work on their relationship and Amanda had no family or “support system”
in Ohio. Even so, we continue to commend Father’s efforts to address his
relationship with Amanda and encourage him to take full advantage of the
enhancement services the juvenile court ordered for him.
III.
We affirm the juvenile court’s September 25, 2025 order.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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