People v. Santos CA2/1

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Filed 2/19/26 P. v. Santos CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337974

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA099490)
v.

CARLOS SANTOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Affirmed.
Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Carlos Santos appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered after the trial court denied his motion to
suppress evidence. Santos pleaded nolo contendere to one count
of possession of a controlled substance with a firearm and one
count of unlawful possession of ammunition. A police officer
found the firearm, ammunition, and narcotics during a traffic
stop and the ensuing search of a vehicle in which Santos was a
passenger. The trial court sentenced Santos to the low term of
imprisonment on each count to run concurrently.
On appeal, Santos argues the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the contraband because police officers
unduly prolonged the traffic stop. Santos concedes the police
lawfully stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation. He claims,
however, that the officers should have either issued a citation to
the driver or terminated the traffic stop after a records check
revealed that the vehicle had not been reported as stolen.
Instead, the officers ordered the driver, Santos, and another
passenger out of the vehicle, and one of the officers elicited an
admission from the driver that a methamphetamine pipe was in
the vehicle. Having thus secured probable cause to search the
vehicle and its contents for narcotics, the officer later retrieved a
satchel from the floorboard of the front passenger seat where
Santos had been sitting. In that satchel, the officer found the
firearm, ammunition, and narcotics.
Additionally, Santos asks us to review the in camera
proceedings the trial court conducted on his Pitchess1 motion in
which he sought disclosure of the personnel records of the officers
who conducted the traffic stop.

1 (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.)

2
We decline Santos’s request to examine the in camera
Pitchess proceedings because he fails to demonstrate such a
review falls within the limited scope of our review of the
judgment entered upon his pleas of nolo contendere.
We also reject Santos’s claim the police unduly prolonged
the traffic stop. Although one of the officers conducted a records
check revealing the vehicle had not been reported as stolen and
may have been a rental car, the driver’s inability to produce
documentation showing she was in lawful possession of the car
justified the officer’s decision to continue to detain the vehicle’s
occupants to investigate further. Further, one of the officers
observed Santos and the driver make furtive movements after the
traffic stop had been initiated; specifically, the driver appeared to
hand a bag to the rear passenger and Santos seemed to reach for
the satchel. Based on these observations, the officers could
implement measures for their safety. These measures were
ordering the occupants out of the car, conducting patdown
searches, and searching the passenger compartment for weapons.
The driver admitted that drug paraphernalia was in the car
while the officers were completing these safety measures.
Based on these facts, we conclude the traffic stop was not
unduly prolonged and the trial court thus did not err in denying
Santos’s motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.

2 We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from admissions in the parties’ filings. (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)

3
1. The information
The People filed an information charging Santos with one
count of possession of a controlled substance with a firearm, in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.1,
subdivision (a) (count 1), and one count of unlawful possession of
ammunition, in violation of Penal Code3 section 30305,
subdivision (a)(1) (count 2).

2. Procedural history of, and the traffic stop giving rise
to, Santos’s motion to suppress evidence
Santos filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to
section 1538.5. On January 9, 2024, the trial court held a
hearing at which Officer Oscar Villanueva testified. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion. We
summarize the traffic stop below.4 In Discussion, part B, post, we
describe in greater detail certain aspects of the traffic stop
pertinent to this appeal.
At 1:38 a.m. on June 7, 2023, Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) Officers Villanueva and Jordan Mitchell
were on patrol near a motel in Panorama City. Officer
Villanueva testified that upon observing a vehicle make an
unsafe lane change, he initiated a traffic stop by activating the
patrol car’s lights and sirens. The vehicle traveled approximately
a block and a half before it stopped. Officer Villanueva testified

94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2 (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs) [employing this approach].)
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4 We rely in part on body camera footage from the traffic
stop that was an exhibit in the trial court.

4
that before the vehicle came to a full stop, the officer (1) believed
he saw the driver “making furtive movements,” that is, he
believed he saw the driver hand a bag to the rear passenger, and
(2) observed that “the front passenger,” i.e., Santos, “was making
furtive movements toward his torso area.” Officer Villanueva
testified he had “a clear vision of the interior” of the vehicle by
virtue of the “three high intensity lights” on the patrol car.
Officer Villanueva approached the driver’s side of the
vehicle and asked the driver for her license, which the driver
provided to the officer. In response to Officer Villanueva’s
request for the car’s registration and proof of insurance, the
driver asserted the vehicle was a rental car that “doesn’t come
with nothing [sic].”
Officer Villanueva returned to the patrol car to use the
car’s computer to determine whether the driver had any
outstanding warrants and attain registration information for the
vehicle. The computer system indicated the vehicle was
registered to “My Car Enterprises.” Officer Villanueva testified
the vehicle had not been reported as stolen and that the identity
of the registered owner led him to believe it was a “rental car.”5

5 In his reply brief, Santos claims that Officer Villanueva’s
“check of the license . . . confirmed there were no outstanding
warrants on the driver’s license . . . .” The excerpts from Officer
Villanueva’s testimony that Santos cites do not support that
proposition. Further, although the excerpt from the body camera
footage Santos cites depicts Officer Villanueva conducting a
records check using the computer in his patrol vehicle, we are
unable to determine from that footage whether the records check
revealed any outstanding warrants for the driver.
Notwithstanding Santos’s failure to support this assertion, we

5
Officer Villanueva then ordered the occupants to exit the
vehicle. Before Santos stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Mitchell
ordered Santos to leave his bag in the car. Officer Villanueva’s
testimony supports the inference that at some point before
Santos exited the vehicle, the officer observed Santos “reaching or
touching or fidgeting with [a] satchel when it was on his
chest . . . .” Upon being asked why he decided to order the
occupants to exit the vehicle, Officer Villanueva testified: “At
that moment, based on the totality of all the circumstances — the
fact that it came out of a motel, the fact of prior it was stopped
[sic] they were making furtive movements inside the vehicle and
now that we have a vehicle that’s a rental car but there is no
proof that she rented it, for my officer safety concerns, I elected
all the occupants to step out and be detained along the sidewalk
so I can have a clear visual of their hands and reduce the risk of
them grabbing anything or arming themselves any with [sic]
weapons inside the car.”
After the three individuals left the vehicle, Officer
Villanueva approached the driver and instructed her to move
several feet away from the other occupants. Officer Villanueva
asked the driver if the officers were “going to find any narcotics in
the car . . . .” The driver stated that she had a “piece” or “pookie”
in the vehicle, which the parties agree is a methamphetamine
pipe. Officer Villanueva asked the driver if any firearms were in
the vehicle, and the driver replied, “That I know of, there is
nothing in the car except for my piece. It should be just a
pookie.” The video shows that this conversation between Officer

assume solely for the purposes of this appeal that Officer
Villanueva found no outstanding warrants for the driver.

6
Villanueva and the driver ended less than 10 and a half minutes
after the traffic stop began.
Officer Villanueva thereafter instructed Officer Mitchell to
conduct a patdown search of the individual who had been in the
rear passenger seat of the vehicle, and Officer Villanueva
conducted a patdown search of Santos. Officer Villanueva then
directed Officer Mitchell to patdown the driver as well.
Officer Villanueva approached the vehicle from the
passenger side and searched the green satchel that was on the
floorboard. Based on his training and experience, the officer
testified many individuals in the area he patrols “carry guns in
satchels,” and “[a] common reason why people carry guns in
satchels is they are able to discard the satchel when running
from the police.”6 Inside the satchel, Officer Villanueva found a
loaded handgun, live ammunition, narcotics, baggies, and a
scale.7 The firearm was not registered to Santos. Officer
Villanueva also found a methamphetamine pipe in the driver’s

6 Officer Villanueva further testified, “It is actually safer
for [a person armed with a gun] to discard [the weapon via a
satchel] because prior to that they would remove a firearm from
their person, which sometimes would result in some kind of
deadly force situation.”
7 Although Santos acknowledges in his factual summary
that, “[i]n searching the green satchel, [Officer Villanueva]
recovered a 43 Glock 9-millimeter pistol, live ammunition,
narcotics, baggies and a scale,” Santos claims an excerpt from the
video footage “shows that there were no narcotics, baggies or a
scale in the bag.” Because of the angle and lighting conditions of
the video, however, we are unable to discern the precise contents
of the satchel from the excerpt of the footage he cites.

7
side door panel, and a black handbag on the backseat that
contained heroin.
Although the police arrested Santos, the officers let the
driver and other passenger leave in the vehicle.
In denying Santos’s motion to suppress, the trial court
found the officers had not prolonged the traffic stop because
Officer Villanueva “indicated that he ran the car and didn’t have
any resolution as to whether the driver was in the rightful
possession of the car.” The court also indicated that Officer
Villanueva was permitted to order the occupants out of the car
for “officer safety” because the court found credible the officer’s
testimony that he saw “furtive movements” in the vehicle, and
there were “two officers and three individuals in the car.”
According to the court, once the driver “admitted that there was a
meth pipe, . . . the law allowed [Officer Villanueva] to search”
“the vehicle including containers in it” for narcotics.

3. Procedural history of Santos’s Pitchess motion
After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, Santos
filed a Pitchess motion for discovery of information in Officer
Villanueva’s and Officer Mitchell’s personnel files. Specifically,
Santos sought discovery of evidence that could impeach the
officers’ character for truthfulness or veracity, acts of past
misconduct, and acts demonstrating racial or ethnic prejudice
and improper tactics.
The trial court granted the Pitchess motion as to both
officers. The court conducted an in camera hearing with the
LAPD’s custodian of records on April 3, 2024. The sealed
transcript for the April 3, 2024 hearing reveals that although the
custodian asserted there existed no responsive documents as to
Officer Mitchell, the court announced its intention to order the

8
custodian to disclose to the defense some, but not all, of the
records concerning Officer Villanueva that the custodian had
produced at the in camera hearing.
On appeal, neither side clarifies whether the LAPD’s
custodian of records in fact produced any documents to Santos in
accordance with the trial court’s oral remarks at the in camera
hearing. Instead, Santos and the Attorney General claim that at
the April 3, 2024 hearing, the court decided not to disclose any
documents to the defense.

4. Santos’s pleas of nolo contendere, the trial court’s
sentence, and Santos’s notice of appeal
On April 11, 2024, Santos pleaded nolo contendere to
counts 1 and 2. The minute order for the April 11, 2024 hearing
shows the trial court sentenced Santos to the low term of
16 months in prison on count 2, to be served concurrently with
the sentence for count 1, and the low term of two years in prison
for count 1, which term the court stayed pursuant to section 654.
The minute order also indicates the court ordered that Santos be
released from custody “for time served.” (Capitalization omitted.)
On May 9, 2024, Santos filed a form notice of appeal.
Santos checked a box on the notice indicating his appeal is “based
on the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under . . .
section 1538.5.” Santos did not check any boxes on the form that
would have indicated he had asked the trial court to issue a
certificate of probable cause for the appeal.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Generally, an “investigative detention” must be supported
by “reasonable suspicion.” (See People v. Flores (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 617, 626–628 (Antonino Flores).) “[A] reasonable

9
suspicion justifying a detention is ‘simply . . . “a particularized
and objective basis” for suspecting the person stopped of criminal
activity.’ [Citation.] So long as the facts known to the officer
reasonably cause him or her to suspect the person he or she
intends to detain might be or has been involved in criminal
activity, the detention is lawful.” (Id. at p. 628.) “ ‘Although an
officer’s reliance on a mere “ ‘hunch’ ” is insufficient to justify a
[detention] [citation], the likelihood of criminal activity need not
rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence
standard [citation].’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Similarly, if an officer is aware of facts giving rise to
reasonable suspicion that an occupant of a vehicle is “dangerous
and may gain immediate control of a weapon,” then the “officer
may . . . search the passenger compartment of the vehicle, limited
to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden . . . .”
(See People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463 (Dolly); see also
People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 752, fn. 10 (Evans)
[indicating the “reasonable suspicion” standard governs this type
of search].) “The rule applies even where a defendant is outside
his car and nominally under the control of law enforcement
officers.” (See People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052
(Bush).)
On the other hand, probable cause is typically required
before an officer may conduct a more extensive search of a
lawfully stopped vehicle. (See Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at
p. 753.) If the police have “probable cause to believe [the] . . .
vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband,”
then officers may search “ ‘every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search.’ [Citations.]”

10
(See ibid.) “Probable cause to search . . . exists when the ‘known
facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of
reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
A traffic stop “only ripens into an unlawful detention if it
deviates too far from the proper legal justification, which is to
‘address the traffic violation that warranted the stop’ — . . . the
‘mission’ of the stop — and ‘attend to related safety concerns.’
[Citation.] Aside from directly addressing the traffic violation,
the ‘officer’s mission’ also ‘includes “ordinary inquiries incident to
[the traffic] stop . . .” [citation] . . . . [such as] checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration
and proof of insurance.’ [Citation.]” (See People v. Esparza
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1094 (Esparza).) In determining
whether a traffic stop has been unduly prolonged in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, a court must bear in mind that
“[i]nvestigations conducted by officers not directly related to the
initial purpose of the stop ‘do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries
do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’ [Citation.]”
(See ibid.)
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress
evidence, “ ‘we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express
or implied, where supported by substantial evidence[,]’ [citation]”
meaning “ ‘the [trial] court is vested with the power to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony,
weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences . . . .’ [Citation.]”
(See Antonino Flores, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 626.) We
independently review whether the facts found by the trial court

11
give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation. (See ibid.) We
determine whether a search or seizure was reasonable “under an
objective standard, based on the facts and circumstances known
to the officer but without regard to the officer’s subjective state of
mind.” (See ibid.)
“[R]egardless of the applicable standard of review,” “[t]he
appellant bears th[e] burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision . . . .” (See
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777; see also People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [same].) To overcome the
presumption of correctness, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record. (See People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“ ‘If no[ legal argument with citation of
authorities] is furnished on a particular point, the court may
treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ”]; People v.
Flint (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 983, 1006, fn. 17 [noting that an
appellate court may “ ‘decline to consider any factual assertion
unsupported by record citation at the point where it is
asserted[,]’ ” and that “ ‘[a]n appellate court “will not develop the
appellants’ arguments for them” ’ ”].)

DISCUSSION
Santos raises two questions on appeal: (1) Did the trial
court err in denying his motion to suppress evidence under
section 1538.5?; and (2) Did the court err in its examination of
officer personnel files at the in camera Pitchess hearing? We lack
jurisdiction to review the trial court’s Pitchess rulings.
(Discussion, part A, post.) As to the first issue, we conclude

12
Santos has not shown the trial court erred in denying his
suppression motion. (Discussion, part B, post.)

A. Santos Fails To Show the Trial Court’s Rulings on
His Pitchess Motion Are Within the Scope of Our
Appellate Review
“ ‘ “It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that
a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so
by statute.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Section 1237 authorizes an appeal
by a defendant from a final judgment of conviction except as
provided in section 1237.5. (See § 1237, subd. (a).) As relevant
here, section 1237.5 provides limited review from a judgment
that is the product of a plea: “No appeal shall be taken by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere . . . except where both of the following are met:
[¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written
statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing
reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going
to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has
executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal
with the clerk of the court.” (§ 1237.5.) The limitations in
section 1237.5 are jurisdictional. (See People v. Hernandez (1992)
6 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1361.)
If the defendant does not file in the trial court a written
request for a certificate of probable cause or the trial court denies
the defendant’s request for issuance of such a certificate, then
“the appeal will be limited to issues that do not require a
certificate of probable cause.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.304(b)(3).) A defendant does not need a certificate of
probable cause for an appeal based on or from: “(A) The denial of

13
a motion to suppress evidence under . . . section 1538.5; [¶]
(B) The sentence or other matters occurring after the plea . . .
that do not affect the validity of the plea[;] . . . or [¶] (C) An
appealable order for which, by law, no certificate of probable
cause is required.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2).)
Santos bears the burden of showing we have jurisdiction to
review the trial court’s rulings on his Pitchess motion. (See
People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 588 [noting that an
appellant bears the “burden of establishing reversible error,”
italics added]; Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. County
of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 721–722 [indicating that an
appellant’s “burden of demonstrating reversible error” includes
the obligation to show that the reviewing court may exercise
appellate jurisdiction].) As explained below, Santos has not
discharged that burden.
Santos does not claim to have sought or attained a
certificate of probable cause from the trial court, and there is no
certificate of probable cause in the two clerks’ transcripts in the
appellate record. Additionally, a certificate of probable cause
is not among the materials Santos successfully moved to augment
the appellate record to include. Indeed, as we noted in our
Factual and Procedural Background, part 4, ante, Santos did not
check any boxes on his notice of appeal that would have indicated
he had requested a certificate of probable cause from the trial
court.
Santos asserts, “The [Pitchess] motion was related to the
suppression motion [Santos] filed in the case which went to the
heart of the search and the items recovered.” Accompanying this
assertion is nothing more than a passing citation, with no
supporting analysis, to People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 and

14
People v. Collins (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137 (Collins). (Citing
Hobbs, at pp. 955–956; Collins, at pp. 149–151.) (See Hodjat v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1,
10 [“[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal
authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.”].)
Admittedly, a trial court’s rulings on a Pitchess motion may
be reviewed on appeal from a judgment entered on a plea of nolo
contendere if the motion was “intertwined with” a motion to
suppress evidence under section 1538.5.8 Santos’s Pitchess
motion does not appear to satisfy this standard. As we noted in
our Factual and Procedural Background, part 3, ante, Santos
filed that motion after the trial court had already denied his
suppression motion.
It is telling that Santos’s counsel represented in the
declaration he filed in support of the Pitchess motion that the
personnel records Santos was requesting were “necessary in
order to properly prepare the case for trial . . . .” (Italics added.)
Defense counsel further asserted, “[T]he body worn video
evidence directly contradicts the allegation that any drugs were
found in the satchel, thereby undermining all statements from
[Officers Villanueva and Mitchell].” Defense counsel also
represented in the motion Santos’s “defense may be that the

8 (See Collins, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141, 150–151;
see, e.g., id. at pp. 141, 149–151 & fn. 9 [holding that an order
denying the defendant’s Pitchess motion, which denial order was
issued over a year before the trial court denied the defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search, was
reviewable on appeal from a plea of nolo contendere because the
defendant had sought prison officials’ personnel records for the
purpose of challenging the search’s legality].)

15
[o]fficers misrepresented facts related to the arrest of . . . Santos
and that such misrepresentation undermines their credibility.”
The Pitchess motion thus seems to have been aimed solely at
preparing a defense for trial.
For these reasons, we decline Santos’s request to “examine
the sealed transcript and materials reviewed by the trial court at
the in camera hearing” to determine whether the court abused its
discretion in ruling on his Pitchess motion.

B. Santos Fails To Demonstrate the Trial Court Erred
In Denying His Motion To Suppress
Santos acknowledges Officer Villanueva “had reasonable
suspicion to pull the vehicle over” “[b]ased on the traffic violation”
the officer had observed. Santos argues instead that Officer
Villanueva prolonged that detention to obtain probable cause to
search the vehicle. Specifically, he contends Officer Villanueva
“prolonged the detention . . . when he beckoned the driver to step
apart from, and out of earshot of, the other two occupants,” and
asked the driver questions “purposely and solely focused on
pursuing a criminal investigation unrelated to the traffic
violation.” According to Santos, before Officer Villanueva had
this discussion with the driver, the officer’s concerns regarding
“whether the driver was in rightful possession of the vehicle” had
already been “resolved . . . .” From this premise, Santos
advocates Officer Villanueva should simply have “issue[d the
driver] a citation or let [the driver, Santos, and the other
passenger] go.” We disagree.
Santos elaborates, “The officer’s ‘concerns’ . . . about the
vehicle were dispelled as soon as he . . . confirmed that there
were no outstanding warrants on the driver’s license and, just as

16
the driver had explained to the officer, the vehicle was a rental
and it was not reported as a stolen vehicle.”
Although Officer Villanueva testified he believed the
vehicle was a rental car, Santos overlooks the officer’s testimony
that the driver had failed to provide him with any proof that she
had rented it. (See Factual & Procedural Background, part 2,
ante.) In determining whether to continue his detention of the
vehicle’s occupants for further questioning, Officer Villanueva
was “ ‘permit[ted] . . . to make “commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.” ’ [Citation.]” (See People v.
Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.) Specifically, the officer
reasonably could have inferred that a rental car company would
ordinarily provide a customer with documentation relating to the
rental. The officer was thus aware of “specific articulable facts”
that “ ‘provide some objective manifestation that the [occupants
of the vehicle] may be involved in criminal activity[,]’ ” i.e.,
reasonable suspicion warranting further detention to ascertain
whether the occupants lawfully possessed the vehicle. (See
Antonino Flores, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 627 [defining
reasonable suspicion].)
Prior to inquiring further regarding whether the driver and
two passengers were in lawful possession of the vehicle (e.g.,
asking the driver for additional details concerning the rental
transaction), the officers were permitted to employ certain safety
measures. First, “[o]nce a vehicle has been detained in a valid
traffic stop, police officers may order the driver and passengers
out of the car pending completion of the stop without violating
the Fourth Amendment.” (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530,
564.) “[I]t is well settled that” an officer may undertake this

17
precaution in the absence of any “individualized suspicion
whatsoever . . . .” (See ibid.)9
The circumstances known to Officer Villanueva also
justified his decision to conduct patdown searches of the vehicle’s
occupants. An officer may conduct such a search if he or she
“harbors reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he [or she] is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous[.]’ ” (See Esparza, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091.) Officer Villanueva’s testimony
indicates that before the occupants exited the vehicle, he
observed the driver and Santos make certain furtive movements,
that is, the officer saw Santos reach for a satchel on his chest,
and the officer believed he saw the driver hand a bag to the rear
passenger. (See Factual & Procedural Background, part 2, ante.)
Officer Villanueva also testified he learned from his training and
experience that many individuals in his patrol area carry guns in
satchels to readily dispose of weapons if pursued by police. (See
Factual & Procedural Background, part 2, ante.) Officer
Villanueva thus had reasonable suspicion the occupants of a
vehicle he could not confirm the driver had rented were armed
and dangerous.
Because Officer Villanueva was aware of facts giving rise to
reasonable suspicion the vehicle’s occupants were armed and
dangerous, the officers were also permitted to search the

9 Santos argues, “[E]ven if the officer was permitted to pull
everyone out of the car for ‘officer safety’ the officer did not do so
initially.” Santos does not contend, however, that Officer
Villanueva unduly prolonged the traffic stop by failing to order
the occupants out of the vehicle when he first made contact with
the driver.

18
passenger compartment of the vehicle for weapons. (See fn. 11,
post [noting Santos claims Officer Villanueva expressed his
intention to search the vehicle prior to the driver’s admission that
contraband was in the car]; Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 463;
Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 752, fn. 10; Bush, supra,
88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.)
The trial court did not err in rejecting Santos’s claim the
detention was constitutionally infirm. The officers could lawfully
continue to detain the driver and two passengers to investigate
the lawfulness of their possession of the vehicle and ensure they
did not have access to weapons during that inquiry. Officer
Villanueva asked the driver whether narcotics were in the vehicle
after she, Santos, and the other passenger exited the vehicle but
before the two officers conducted patdown searches of the three
occupants. (See Factual & Procedural Background, part 2,
ante.)10 The video shows that approximately 45 seconds elapsed
between (1) the moment Officer Villanueva ordered the driver to
walk away from the other two passengers so he could ask her
questions and (2) the conclusion of his conversation with the
driver in which she had admitted a “piece” or “pookie” was in the
car.11 Santos does not argue, let alone establish, that the officers

10 In his reply brief, Santos intimates the officers had
already searched him “by the time [Officer Villanueva] pulled the
driver aside to question her . . . .” The excerpt from the video
Santos cites in support of this apparent proposition, however,
does not show the officers searched him before Officer Villanueva
asked the driver whether contraband was in the vehicle.
11 Santos complains that when Officer Villanueva asked
the driver whether narcotics were in the vehicle, “the officer . . .
implied that a search of the vehicle was going to be conducted
shortly irrespective of anything the driver might say.” Insofar as

19
should have conducted patdown searches of the occupants,
searched the passenger compartment for weapons, and finished
their inquiry as to the occupants’ lawful possession of the vehicle
within 45 seconds. Santos thus fails to demonstrate that Officer
Villanueva’s questioning of the driver violated the Fourth
Amendment by “ ‘measurably extend[ing] the duration of the
stop.’ [Citation.]” (See Esparza, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1094.)
Santos seems to argue the Fourth Amendment did not
permit the officers to extend the duration of the traffic stop to
undertake officer safety measures as to the rear passenger
because she had “prosthetic legs and one hand . . . .” We
acknowledge the rear passenger had these physical
characteristics. Still, Officer Villanueva believed he saw the
driver pass a bag to the rear passenger after the officers had
initiated the traffic stop but before the vehicle came to a halt.
Additionally, the video shows the rear passenger was able to
walk and stand for some time after being ordered out of the
vehicle. Accordingly, the facts known to Officer Villanueva gave

Santos is arguing Officer Villanueva improperly procured the
driver’s admission of contraband by falsely representing the law
permitted him to search the vehicle, we reject that contention.
As we explained earlier, the information known to Officer
Villanueva at that point gave rise to reasonable suspicion
justifying a search of the passenger compartment for weapons.
Additionally, because Santos does not contest the trial
court’s finding that the driver’s admission of contraband afforded
the officer probable cause to search the “containers within the
vehicle,” we need not decide whether reasonable suspicion alone
would have been sufficient to authorize Officer Villanueva to
open the green satchel.

20
rise to reasonable suspicion that the rear passenger presented a
danger to the officers, notwithstanding her physical
characteristics.
Santos argues the case before us is analogous to People v.
Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926 (Ayon). In that case, the
appellate court concluded the trial court erred in denying a
motion to suppress narcotics and drug paraphernalia seized
during a traffic stop. (See id. at pp. 929, 944.) Police officers had
initiated the stop after they observed the defendant-driver
prematurely enter a bike lane and belatedly activate his traffic
signal in the course of making a right turn. (See id. at p. 930.)12
Within the first 3 minutes and 32 seconds of the stop, the officers
obtained the defendant’s license and registration information,
and learned from a “records check” that the defendant’s “license
was valid[ and] there were no ‘wants’ for him”; there was “no
evidence that anything transmitted by the dispatcher would have
justified further investigation.” (See Ayon, at pp. 931–932, 938–

12 Unlike in the case before us, the traffic infractions in
Ayon arguably did not motivate the officers to initiate the traffic
stop. Instead, the defense argued the officers stopped the vehicle
to further a preexisting narcotics investigation. (See Ayon, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 942.) The appellate court acknowledged, “As
a general matter, pretextual traffic stops do not violate the
Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.) Two justices, however, concluded
the preexisting drug investigation was relevant to “whether [the]
warrantless search or stop [was] objectively reasonable” in that
case. (See id. at pp. 929, 943–944.) In her concurring opinion,
Justice Danner disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the
preexisting narcotics investigation was relevant because an
officer’s subjective intent “ ‘plays no role in the Fourth
Amendment inquiry.’ ” (See id. at pp. 944–945 (conc. opn. of
Danner, J.).)

21
939.) Several minutes later, the defendant declined the officer’s
request for consent to search the vehicle, and the officer
handcuffed and detained the defendant. (See id. at pp. 930–932.)
More than 18 minutes after the traffic stop began, a narcotics
canine alerted to the presence of narcotics in the defendant’s
vehicle. (See id. at pp. 933, 938–939.)
The appellate court observed, “Nothing in the record
show[ed the officers in Ayon] doing anything to address the traffic
infractions” after the records check was completed. (See Ayon,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 938–940.) Rather, the evidence
showed “[a]fter [one of the officers received] the radio response to
the records check, [the officer] stood next to [another officer] for
the next 12 minutes, at which point [the officer who received the
radio response] got into his car and began writing on a yellow
index card.” (See id. at p. 938.) The Ayon court “conclude[d] the
police failed to diligently pursue an investigation of the traffic
infraction and instead unlawfully prolonged the stop” “until the
narcotics dog arrived” and alerted to the drugs in the vehicle.
(See id. at pp. 943–944.)
Whereas there was no evidence the records check
conducted in Ayon revealed any legal issues with the defendant’s
driver’s license or registration (see Ayon, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
at p. 938), the records check here did not establish the driver
lawfully possessed the vehicle. Officer Villanueva could question
the vehicle’s occupants further. Additionally, the officers could
constitutionally take certain safety measures during that
investigation, including ordering the occupants out of the vehicle,
conducting patdown searches, and searching the passenger
compartment for weapons. Officer Villanueva elicited the
driver’s admission that contraband was in the vehicle during a

22
45-second conversation that occurred before the investigation and
related officer safety measures could have been completed.
Accordingly, Ayon is inapposite.
Lastly, we observe Santos repeatedly questions whether
Officer Villanueva believed the car may have been stolen or that
the vehicle’s occupants were armed and dangerous. For instance,
Santos asserts, “[A]part from [Officer Villanueva’s] initial contact
with the driver[,] . . . the officer never discussed or pursued the
traffic violation or the vehicle registration again throughout the
entire course of the detention.” He also claims Officer Villanueva
“would never have allowed” the driver to depart in the vehicle “if
she was not in valid possession of it, or if it was stolen.” Santos
further asserts, “[I]t is clear from the video that the officer
did not have safety concerns with respect to the driver because he
never placed her in handcuffs before pulling her aside and
questioning her.”
These arguments are unavailing because, as a general rule,
“the subjective intent of officers is irrelevant in Fourth
Amendment analysis.” (See Esparza, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1094.) The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry is whether
“the lawful bounds that justif[ied] the stop [we]re observed” by
the officers. (See ibid.) For the reasons explained above, we
conclude the officers had lawful justification to continue their
detention of Santos and the other occupants of the vehicle.
In sum, Santos fails to demonstrate the officers unlawfully
prolonged the traffic stop to attain probable cause to search the
vehicle. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying
Santos’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during that
search.

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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