People v. Salinas CA2/8

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Filed 2/18/26 P. v. Salinas CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B341570

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA128998
v.

GILBERTO SALINAS, et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
instructions.
Jennifer Peabody and Keilana Truong, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Raul Garay.
Jonathan Demson and Eric R. Larson, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Gilberto
Salinas.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Raul Garay and Gilberto
Salinas pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and one
count of attempted murder. Both petitioned the court for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The court denied each
man’s petition. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petitions
as to the attempted murder charges. We reverse and remand for
the trial court to hold another evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) to determine whether Garay and
Salinas would be guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt
under current law. Code citations are to the Penal Code.
I
We begin with the pertinent factual and procedural
background.
Garay and Salinas both told police they were members of
the Hangout Boys gang. The Hangout Boys and Playboys are
rivals.
Enrique Cardozo is a member of the Playboys criminal
gang. His sister’s boyfriend, Javier Garcia, is also a member of
the Playboys gang. His friend Rodolfo Alarcon is also a member.
Garay, Salinas, Cardozo, Alarcon, and Garcia all attended a
large baptismal party one evening. While dancing, a woman
made a hand sign that represented the Hangout Boys. Shortly
after, Alarcon got into a fistfight with a member of the Hangout
Boys group toward the back of the party. When a crowd went
toward the fight, it broke up.
Garay had the following text message conversation with a
contact labeled “LT” in his cell phone:

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“GARAY: This shit is popping my boy.
“GARAY: Are you coming?
“LT: Give me the address.
“GARAY: 640 West Hoover [additional directions]
“GARAY: Bring the toy, we might need it my boy.
“GARAY: I think we have some peanuts.
“GARAY: Make that some dead bunnies.
“GARAY: Hey, where are you at? We need that.
“LT: I’m on my way, I got you vatos.”
A gang expert testified that “toy” meant gun. “Peanuts” was
a derogatory term for members of the Playboy gang. “Dead
bunnies” likewise referred to Playboys and suggested a need to
eliminate rivals. While the address was not the exact location of
the party, it was close, and the directions provided led to the
party. This exchange began before the first fight.
A Hangout Boys member by the moniker True brought the
gun. Salinas took the gun because it was his “actions to take at
the party.”
Cardozo and Garcia decided to leave after the first
fight. The rest of their party was still gathering their things when
the two headed to the exit.
When Cardozo and Garcia reached the gate, a second fight
broke out. Cardozo was fighting with someone, but then saw
Salinas with a gun. He then tried to get the gun from Salinas.
While he struggled for the gun, Garay stabbed Cardozo twice in
the back with a knife. Cardozo dropped the gun and tried to run
away but collapsed not long after. He then heard gunshots.
After Salinas lost control of the gun, he shouted, “Smoke
’em!”

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True picked up the gun and began shooting. The bullets
killed Alarcon and injured four other individuals, including Garcia
and Cardozo’s sister.
Police received reports of gunshots and began driving
toward the address of the party. Officer William Niemeyer saw
Garay walking by himself away from the address talking on his
cell phone. As Niemeyer opened his car door, Garay threw
something he was holding in a bush and began to run. Officers
caught Garay and retrieved a phone from the bush. The phone
showed the text conversation reflected above.
After police arrested Salinas, they put him in a cell with an
undercover agent pursuant to Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S.
292. The police recorded the conversation Salinas had with the
agent. Salinas told the agent that at their request a fellow gang
member, True, brought a gun to the party. Salinas said True had
given the gun to him because it was Salinas’s “action.” But after
Salinas lost control of the gun, True had used it.
An information charged Garay and Salinas with murder
and four counts of attempted murder, with firearm and gang
enhancements. Pursuant to a plea bargain, each pleaded no
contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of
attempted murder.
Garay and Salinas each filed a petition for resentencing.
The prosecutor stipulated Garay had made a prima facie showing
of eligibility for relief, and the court found Salinas had as well.
The trial court therefore set an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). Neither side submitted new
evidence. The parties and the court relied on the transcript from
the preliminary hearing.

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After hearing argument, the court stated, “Mr. Garay and
Mr. Salinas – and I find it beyond a reasonable doubt – would be
convicted of the crimes for which they pled to. [¶] And I think
that is significant because they pled to manslaughters. It was a
fight and a mele[e], and I do believe one count of attempted
murder as to the actual victims.” After summarizing the
evidence, the court again stated, “I find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Garay and Mr. Salinas would have been convicted for the
crimes that they pled to prior to trial without a trial. And they
would have been convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting the
murders and the attempted murders that occurred on that
evening.” The minute order from the hearing reflected: “The
Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
liable, based on aiding and abetting, for the crimes which he pled
to.”
Garay and Salinas appeal the denials of their petitions.
II
Both Garay and Salinas argue the trial court erred in
denying their petitions for resentencing on their manslaughter
charges because it found they could still be found guilty of
manslaughter, not murder. We agree and reverse for the trial
court to hold another evidentiary hearing to consider the issue.
Garay alone also argues substantial evidence did not support the
trial court’s finding that he could be convicted of attempted
murder under current law. We disagree and affirm this part of
the trial court’s ruling.
A
In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which altered the rules

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of murder liability to ensure culpability more closely matched
punishment. (People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 472.)
To provide retroactive relief, Senate Bill 1437 also
established a resentencing process, now codified in section
1172.6. This statute permits individuals convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter under a theory made invalid
by the current law to petition the sentencing court to vacate the
conviction and seek resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(1).) Petitioners can seek such relief whether their convictions
are the result of a trial or acceptance of a plea offer in lieu of a
trial. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2).)
If petitioners make a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief, the trial court holds an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court sits as the
trier of fact and determines whether the petitioner could be found
guilty of murder or attempted murder under current law. (§
1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) We review the court’s finding for substantial
evidence, making all inferences in favor of the judgment. (People
v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 442.)
B
We turn first to the argument that the trial court applied
the wrong standard in denying the petitions for resentencing on
Garay’s and Salinas’s manslaughter convictions.
Three times the court stated Garay and Salinas could be
convicted of the crime to which they pleaded. In one instance, the
court noted it was “significant” the crime they had pleaded to was
manslaughter. However, that is not the question the court must
answer. The evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), requires the court to determine whether the

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petitioner could be convicted of murder or attempted murder
under current law – not manslaughter. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The court made one statement that Garay and Salinas
would have been convicted of aiding and abetting the murders and
attempted murders. And the court’s analysis of the evidence
seems to comport with a determination of whether the evidence
supports a finding of murder or attempted murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. While this final statement appears to answer
the correct question, we cannot ignore that it is one of the four
statements addressed to this point. On this record, we cannot
confidently find the trial court meant to find the two men could be
found guilty of murder and not manslaughter under current
law. We therefore remand for the court to hold an evidentiary
hearing and answer the required question under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) with regard to Garay’s and Salina’s
manslaughter convictions.
C
Garay incorrectly argues substantial evidence did not
support the trial court’s finding that he could be convicted of
attempted murder under current law.
To be guilty of aiding and abetting attempted murder, a
person must provide aid or encouragement with knowledge of the
direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the intent of facilitating
the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing.
(People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 624.) Direct evidence of
intent to kill is rare. Normally, we must infer the intent to kill
from the statements and actions of the aider in light of the
circumstances of the crime. (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th
591, 602.) Relevant considerations include presence at the scene
and failure to prevent the crime, companionship, conduct before

7
and after the offense, and flight. (People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 576, 599.)
Here, Garay texted a fellow gang member to ask him to
bring a gun to the event. He also indicated a desire to make
“some dead bunnies.” Garay remained at the event and
participated in the gang fight. When rival gang member Cardozo
tried to take the gun from Salinas, Garay stabbed Cardozo twice
in the back with a knife, allowing his gang to regain possession of
the gun. Thus, not only did Garay fail to prevent the crime, he
took steps to ensure his gang could commit the intended murders.
After the shooting, when police approached Garay, he
attempted to run away and threw away the phone with the
incriminating text messages. While this conduct alone cannot
show intent, it can provide corroborative evidence of a guilty
mind.
Considered together, Garay’s actions are sufficient to show
he intended to aid his fellow gang members in killing rival gang
members during the gang fight.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Garay’s and Salinas’s
petition for resentencing on their respective attempted murder
convictions. We reverse and remand for the trial court to apply
the correct standard for an evidentiary hearing under subdivision
(d)(3) of section 1172.6 with regard to Garay’s and Salinas’s
manslaughter convictions.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J. SCHERB, J.

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