People v. McCaleb CA1/1

CourtListener 10795656Calctapp18 févr. 2026

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Filed 2/18/26 P. v. McCaleb CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171788
v.
JAMES EDWARD MCCALEB, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05-00020386-9)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant James Edward McCaleb, who is now 72 years old, was
committed to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) nearly 50 years ago
after being found not guilty by reason of insanity of robbery and assault. In
this appeal, he challenges an October 2024 order recommitting him to DSH
for two years. We agree with him that the record fails to establish that he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights to a jury trial and therefore
reverse.1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In 1977, McCaleb was found not guilty by reason of insanity of one
count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and two counts of assault with a deadly

1 In light of this conclusion, we need not address McCaleb’s alternative

claim that he was incorrectly advised about his right to a jury trial.
weapon (id., § 245, subd. (a)), and committed to DSH.2 McCaleb, who has
schizophrenia, was briefly released into the Conditional Release Program
(CONREP) on several occasions in the early 1990’s. The conditional releases
were unsuccessful, however, and his commitment to DSH has been extended
numerous times in the ensuing decades.
In June 2024, six months before McCaleb’s commitment was set to
expire, the People filed a petition under section 1026.5 to extend his
commitment for another two years. That September, the trial court accepted
McCaleb’s waiver of his right to a jury trial on the recommitment. After a
bench trial the following month, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt
that McCaleb posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a
result of a mental disorder. It thus granted the People’s petition and
extended McCaleb’s commitment for two years, through December 22, 2026.
II.
DISCUSSION
McCaleb claims he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
a jury trial. We agree that the record does not affirmatively show he validly
waived this right, requiring automatic reversal.
A. Additional Facts
Before the bench trial on the petition to extend McCaleb’s commitment,
two hearings took place at which his right to a jury trial was discussed.
McCaleb appeared at these hearings remotely, over Zoom.
At the first hearing, on September 18, 2024, McCaleb initially agreed
with the trial court that he understood “that we’ll be proceeding with a court
trial in this case.” The court then advised him about what rights he would
have if a jury trial occurred. It explained to McCaleb that he could

2 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

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participate in selecting 12 jurors, the prosecution would bear the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he posed a substantial risk of physical
harm to others, and the jurors would hear the evidence and need to agree
unanimously that the prosecution met its burden.
The trial court continued, “[N]ow instead[,] you’re asking for just me to
hear the evidence, not the 12 jurors. Do you understand that?” McCaleb
responded, “Okay.” He then indicated he understood when the court stated
that it would be “the only one deciding whether the People have met their
burden of proof.” But when the court asked McCaleb if he had enough time to
discuss with his attorney the differences between a bench trial and a jury
trial, the following colloquy ensued:
“[MCCALEB]: [My attorney] called me on the telephone, and
that’s the information I got that I would be on
this screen. And I think next month, I go to a
jury—pick out the ones that—

“THE COURT: Well, what we’re doing today is not picking out
a jury. Is that understood to you, that you’re
waiving that right?

“[MCCALEB]: Oh, I’m not waiving it.

“THE COURT: You’re not—

“[MCCALEB]: I wasn’t waiving it.

“THE COURT: You won’t waive the jury trial—

“[MCCALEB]: I never said I would waive it.

“THE COURT: Okay. So I want to make sure we’re on the
same page: Not waiving the trial but waiving
the right to have a jury hear the trial. Is that
what you’re doing today?

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“[MCCALEB]: Well, I guess. I can do it that way too, so—

“THE COURT: Well, I want to make sure that this is
something—

“[MCCALEB]: I wasn’t told I would do a regular trial. They
said a jury trial, that I would pick out
12 people.

“THE COURT: Is that what you’re asking for, a jury trial?

“[MCCALEB]: Yes.”
At the end of this exchange, the trial court told McCaleb, “I can’t take
the jury trial waiver today. I think that there needs to be more conversation.
And if after that ‘more conversation’ you come to the same conclusion you had
previously [reached about wanting a jury trial], we can just put it back on.”
The court set another hearing for the following week to address “if indeed
[McCaleb] is, again, wishing to waive jury.”
The second hearing was held on September 25, 2024. Appearing to
assume that McCaleb did not want a jury trial, the trial court announced that
the hearing’s purpose was “to discuss Mr. McCaleb waiving his right to a jury
trial but having this case as a court trial.” The court asked McCaleb, “Is that
what you understand is happening today?” McCaleb responded, “Yes. I have
something to say about that when I get a chance . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I don’t know
what was happening, but I want to say something before you start the trial so
I can have an input.” The court interrupted to clarify that trial was not
happening that day, explaining, “Today I’m just confirming that you don’t
want a jury and that you want it to be heard just in front of me.” McCaleb
replied, “And that’s what I’m saying. I want to be sure to go on CONREP.”
The trial court then asked McCaleb if he was saying he “want[ed] the
two-year extension so that [he could] go to CONREP,” and McCaleb replied,

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“Yes.” After McCaleb’s counsel indicated she could file a petition asking for
McCaleb to be conditionally released, the court surmised that McCaleb might
want to “waive trial entirely,” and it allowed McCaleb and his counsel to
discuss the matter further in private.3
When the matter was recalled after McCaleb’s discussion with counsel,
the trial court stated, “Mr. McCaleb may wish to vacate his trial. But for
now, I’m going to make sure that if we do have a trial, it is just a court trial
because that does appear to be what he wants.” The discussion continued as
follows:
“[THE COURT]: Mr. McCaleb, do you understand that if there
were a jury trial, you would have the right to
select random members from the community to
hear evidence in this case?

“[MCCALEB]: Okay.

“THE COURT: And you would have the ability to participate in
the process of selecting random members from
the community to hear evidence in your case if
this were a jury trial. Do you understand that?

“[MCCALEB]: Yes, I do.

“THE COURT: And in the end, if we had a jury trial, 12 people
would be selected to hear your case. Do you
understand that?

“[MCCALEB]: Yes, ma’am.

“THE COURT: And the People have a burden of proof in this
case beyond a reasonable doubt [to prove] that

3 The same day as the hearing, McCaleb filed a petition for release into

CONREP under section 1026.2. On December 27, 2024, after this appeal was
initiated, the trial court granted the petition. The record does not reveal
McCaleb’s current custodial status.

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you represent a substantial risk of physical
harm to others, and those 12 jurors would have
to hear the evidence and all agree that the
People met their burden. [¶] Do you understand
that that would be your right in a jury trial?

“[MCCALEB]: All right. I agree.

“THE COURT: And instead, if we do proceed with a trial,
you’re asking for just me, the Court, to hear all
of the evidence. Do you understand that?

“[MCCALEB]: Yes, Your Honor.

“THE COURT: And I’m the only one deciding whether the
People have met their burden of proof. Do you
understand that?

“[MCCALEB]: What?

“THE COURT: If we have the trial, I’m the only one hearing
evidence in deciding your case. Do you
understand that?

“[MCCALEB]: Yes, ma’am. Okay.”

The trial court then asked whether McCaleb had sufficient time to
“discuss the issue of jury trial versus court trial” with his counsel. McCaleb
responded, “Yes.” The court also asked whether he had “any questions about
a jury trial,” at which point McCaleb said, “Well, the jury trial, I don’t know
people out there. I don’t know what they did or nothing.” The court
interrupted him, stating, “You don’t have any questions, though, about your
waiver of a right to have a jury hear this case, do you?” McCaleb responded,
“No.”
The trial court then solicited the agreement of McCaleb’s counsel and
the prosecutor to proceed with a bench trial. The court said it was “satisfied

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that [McCaleb] ha[d] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
rights to a jury trial.” Though admitting the “process was a little bit more
confusing than usual,” the court stated it “underst[ood] that Mr. [Mc]Caleb’s
confusion really [came] from his feelings on whether he want[ed] a trial at
all.” The court concluded by reiterating that it was “satisfied that [McCaleb]
d[idn’t] want a jury trial.”
B. Analysis
“Where a criminal defendant has been found to have been insane at the
time the offense was committed, ‘unless it appears to the [trial] court that the
sanity of the defendant has been recovered fully,’ the court may order the
defendant committed to [DSH] or any other appropriate facility for care and
treatment. (§ 1026, subd. (a).)” (People v. K.P. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 331,
338.) The commitment order must specify “the maximum term of
commitment,” which is defined as “the longest term of imprisonment which
could have been imposed for the offense . . . of which the person was
convicted.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).)
A person committed to DSH who completes the maximum term of
commitment must be released unless, prior to the expiration of that term, the
prosecution files a petition seeking to extend the commitment by two years
“and demonstrates that the person, ‘by reason of a mental disease, defect, or
disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.’ ”
(People v. Superior Court (Frezier) (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 652, 661–662;
§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1)–(2).) Upon the filing of such a petition, the person is
entitled to a jury trial, unless that right is “waived by both the person and
the prosecuting attorney.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(4).)
To proceed with a bench trial instead of a jury trial in a recommitment
proceeding, the trial court “must obtain a personal waiver of that right from

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the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant
lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case
defense counsel controls the waiver decision.” (People v. Tran (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163.) Here, neither party contends that McCaleb lacked
the capacity to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury, so the
only question before us is whether he personally waived it.
We uphold a jury-trial waiver only “ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows
that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’
[Citation.] We do not start with a presumption of validity that may only be
rebutted by signs of a defendant’s confusion or unwillingness in entering a
waiver. Instead, a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only
when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent.”
(People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991.) The denial of a defendant’s
right to a jury trial in a recommitment proceeding, including through the
“acceptance of an invalid jury trial waiver[,] . . . is not susceptible to ordinary
harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal.” (People v.
Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169.)
While we acknowledge that some portions of the record suggest
McCaleb wanted to waive his right to a jury trial, others suggest he did not.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
record affirmatively establishes that he knowingly waived his right to a jury
trial. Accordingly, we must reverse.
We begin by observing that near the end of the September 18 hearing,
McCaleb indicated in plain terms that he did not want to waive his right to a
jury trial. The trial court then indicated that further discussion was
necessary and scheduled another hearing. Yet at that follow-up hearing on

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September 25, the court assumed, for reasons the record does not make clear,
that McCaleb did want to waive the right.
This assumption affected the nature of the subsequent exchange
between the trial court and McCaleb, which as a whole suggests that the two
did not have a meeting of the minds. (See People v. Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 995 [an “utterance of bewilderment might [weigh] in favor of our finding
[a] waiver to not be knowledgeable”].) Some of the confusion might have
resulted because the court surmised that McCaleb wanted to avoid any trial,
as his primary goal seems to have been his release into CONREP. We credit
the court for trying to sort these issues out with McCaleb, and we do not
minimize the challenges trial courts face in trying to explain legal principles
to people who have a documented history of mental illness. Still, when the
court went from explaining McCaleb’s jury-trial right to explaining how a
bench trial would be different, it stated that “if we do proceed with a trial,
you’re asking for just me, the Court, to hear all of the evidence.” (Italics
added.) While someone with legal training would likely have understood that
“a trial” meant a bench trial, McCaleb could have thought the court meant it
would hear the evidence in any trial—jury or non-jury. Thus, his agreement
that he understood the court’s statement does not affirmatively establish that
he was knowingly waiving his right to a jury.
Furthermore, at no time did the trial court attempt to clarify the
confusion with any direct question asking McCaleb for his choice between a
bench or jury trial. Even the Attorney General concedes that McCaleb’s
“waiver of a jury trial must be pieced together from his statements along the
way.” Although we disagree with McCaleb that “it was a foregone conclusion
[by the court] that [he] was choosing a bench trial and [the court] conveyed
that he had no other option,” we cannot be certain on this record that the

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court and McCaleb were ever, in the court’s words, “on the same page”
regarding his desire to waive his right to a jury trial. And because we cannot
be confident that McCaleb actually waived the right, we do not ascribe much
significance to his final indication that he did not have any questions about
waiving the right.
In sum, under the totality of the circumstances, the record does not
affirmatively demonstrate that McCaleb knowingly and voluntarily waived
his right to a jury. As a result, the order extending his commitment to DSH
cannot stand.
III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s October 7, 2024 recommitment order is reversed. The
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

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_________________________
Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

People v. McCaleb A171788

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