People v. Becher CA4/3

CourtListener 10795189Calctapp17 févr. 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 2/17/26 P. v. Becher CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064377

v. (Super. Ct. No. 16WF2885)

JASON BECHER, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila F. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed.
Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Eric A. Swenson and Tyler L. Krentz,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Jason Becher of first degree murder
and found true the special circumstance of lying-in-wait. (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15).)1 In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found
prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(1)) and prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) allegations to be true. The court
sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the
murder conviction and a five-year term for the prior serious felony conviction.
In an unpublished opinion, we conditionally reversed the
judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to hold a
new Pitchess hearing regarding one officer’s records.2 (People v. Becher (May
1, 2023, G060372) [nonpub. opn.] (Becher).) We directed the court to
personally review the records or obtain a list of their contents and confirm
the conclusion of the custodian of records. (Ibid.) We also directed the court to
reinstate the judgment if there was no discoverable evidence or defendant
was not prejudiced from the denial of discovery. (Ibid.)
On remand, the trial court held another Pitchess hearing and
independently reviewed the entirety of the officer’s internal affairs
investigation file and personnel file. The court then ordered disclosure of
identifying information for one witness and later determined there was no
prejudice to defendant for not receiving the information prior to trial.
On appeal, defendant argues the custodian of records at the
Pitchess hearing held on remand was not neutral and may not have provided
all relevant documents. He therefore requests we reverse the matter for a

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.

2
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

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new Pitchess hearing with a different custodian of records. He alternatively
requests we review the Pitchess hearing to determine if the trial court
properly questioned the custodian or abused its discretion by denying any
additional discovery.
For the reasons infra, we need not remand for another Pitchess
hearing. The custodian of records was not an improper custodian, and our
review of the in-camera hearing reveals no abuse of discretion by the trial
court. The judgment is accordingly affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
THE UNDERLYING INCIDENT
We incorporate by reference our statement of facts from our
unpublished opinion in the prior appeal. (Becher, supra, G060372.) In short,
defendant murdered the victim with whom he had a relationship. (Ibid.)
II.
THE FIRST PITCHESS HEARING
“Before trial, defendant moved to discover the personnel records
of Detective Steve Wickser. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531.) Defendant
sought records from the police department personnel files concerning, among
other things, “lack of credibility,” “falsifying police reports,” “prior acts
involving moral turpitude,” and information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland
(1963) 373 U.S. 83. The court found good cause to review Wickser’s files
(People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109) and conducted an in-camera
review ([Evid. Code,] § 1045, subd. (b)) but found no discoverable items (see
People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226-1232 (Mooc)).” (Becher, supra,
G060372.)

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In a prior appeal, we reviewed the sealed transcript of the in-
camera hearing. (Becher, supra, G060372.) “The court placed the custodian of
records for the Huntington Beach Police Department under oath in the
presence of counsel for the City of Huntington Beach. The custodian stated he
had one file from Wickser’s internal affairs investigation file. The court asked
if anything was removed from that file, and the custodian said he was not
aware of anything being removed. The custodian also generally described
what is included in an officer’s personnel file and the internal affairs
investigation file. The custodian then provided the records falling within the
parameters of the request. The court examined the files with the custodian on
the record and identified the documents it reviewed. The court found no
discoverable documents. Although the court reviewed the documents from the
internal affairs investigation file, it did not question the custodian about
what records were present in Wickser’s personnel file or what records had
been reviewed to reach the conclusion that no documents in the personnel file
were responsive.” (Ibid.)
We conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for the
trial court to conduct a new Pitchess hearing where it had to personally
review the records or obtain a list of their contents and confirm the
conclusion of the custodian of records. (Becher, supra, G060372.) If the court
found there was discoverable evidence, we noted it then had to determine if
defendant was prejudiced from the denial of discovery. (Ibid.) If the court
found no discoverable evidence or that defendant was not prejudiced from the
denial of discovery, the judgment would be reinstated. (Ibid.)

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III.
THE PITCHESS HEARING ON REMAND
In September 2023, the trial court held a further Pitchess hearing
on remand.3 Counsel for the City of Huntington Beach and Sergeant Daniel
Quidort, the custodian of records for the Huntington Beach Police
Department, were present. The court placed Quidort under oath and
questioned how the Huntington Beach Police Department investigates and
maintains records of complaints made against a police officer. Quidort
explained how the department investigates a complaint and retains records.
Quidort next stated he had a file from Wickser’s internal affairs
investigation. The court asked if Quidort had removed anything from the file,
and he said he had not. The court also asked if anything generally had been
removed from the file, and Quidort said he was not aware of anything being
removed. The court then reviewed the entirety of the file and described every
document.
After reviewing the internal affairs investigation file, the court
turned to Wickser’s personnel file. The court asked if Quidort had removed
anything from the file, and he said he had not. The court also asked if
anything generally had been removed from the file, and Quidort said he was
not aware of anything being removed. The court proceeded to review the
entirety of the personnel file and described every document.
The court ordered disclosure of identifying information for a
witness. It otherwise found no discoverable items.

3
Judge Sheila Hanson handled the proceedings on remand and
was not involved in the original Pitchess hearing. Judge Hanson also presided
over the underlying jury trial.

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IV.
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO THE CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
The day after the Pitchess hearing, defendant objected to the
court’s reliance on Quidort as the custodian of records. Defendant argued
Quidort was not neutral and instead had “an obvious and unavoidable
entanglement in the prosecution of the . . . case.” Among other things,
defendant noted Quidort testified in the underlying trial and was the
prosecution’s investigating officer.
In January 2024, the court held a hearing to rule on defendant’s
objection. Defendant’s counsel again emphasized Quidort was an
investigating officer in the case. She also noted the Huntington Beach Police
Department had paid to unlock the victim’s phone, which was “unusual and
new.” She speculated this was because the police “felt personally invested in
the prosecution of [defendant] because of . . . [their] prior failures” to arrest
him for domestic violence in the months before he murdered the victim.
After hearing argument from both parties, the court overruled
defendant’s objection and found Quidort was an appropriate custodian of
records. First, the court emphasized Quidort was placed under oath. Second,
the court believed he was credible in his answers to the court’s questions. The
court found it significant that Quidort’s responses were consistent with those
of a different custodian in earlier proceedings. Both Quidort and the prior
custodian provided the same answer when asked about allegations of
misconduct or any prior misconduct involving Wickser. Third, the court noted
it “went into detail with . . . Quidort to ensure . . . [the court] knew precisely
how any such complaint, whether generated from a citizen outside of the
department or inside, would be documented, retained, and investigated.”
Fourth, the court spent “nearly six hours to review every single page in”

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Wickser’s personnel file, “including every personnel evaluation of . . . Wickser
for the entire time period of which he was a police officer with the City of
Huntington Beach.” The court accordingly concluded: “[T]here were no other
discoverable responsive documents within the personnel file itself, nor was
there any indication that there was ever any additional information that
would have been in existence at any time during Wickser’s life, even beyond
that five-year period or any period.”
V.
THE HEARING REGARDING PREJUDICE
In June 2024, the court held a hearing to determine whether
defendant was prejudiced from the denial of discoverable evidence prior to
trial. At the outset, the court reiterated that Quidort was an appropriate
custodian of records because “it is the province of the chief of police of
Huntington Beach Police Department to make assignments of their officers in
the manner in which they choose, and the fact that . . . Quidort had now been
transferred to that role was not something that [the court] could change.”
The court next noted it had ordered disclosure of identifying
information for a witness who claimed to have seen “an accident in a parking
lot, and the individual [Wickser] didn’t leave a note.” But the court concluded
there was no prejudice to defendant for not receiving the witness’ identifying
information prior to trial.
First, the court explained defendant already had relevant
information before trial. Defendant previously received the witness’s name
with a different surname and a different address, but defendant had the
same phone number for the witness. The substance of what the witness said
was also documented in a police report, which was provided to defendant
before trial.

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Second, the court held none of the information would be
admissible at trial. Because Wickser never testified at trial, evidence
regarding moral turpitude would not have been relevant to his credibility as
a witness. Although defendant suggested the evidence might show Wickser
somehow failed to do his job, the court held an allegation of misdemeanor hit-
and-run had little to no probative value as to whether Wickser appropriately
collected evidence. Even assuming the allegation had any probative value,
the court indicated it would have been inadmissible under Evidence Code
section 352. Having found no prejudice to defendant, the court reinstated the
judgment.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the matter should be remanded for a new
Pitchess hearing where a different custodian of records produces Wickser’s
files. He insists Quidort was an improper custodian because he shared
investigative duties with Wickser in the underlying case and testified against
defendant at trial. He adds that defense counsel had insinuated Quidort and
Wickser were negligent in their investigation of the case. According to
defendant, “It would have been only human nature for . . . [Quidort] to have
some degree of emotional investment in the affirmance of . . . [defendant’s]
conviction.” In the alternative, defendant requests this court review the
Pitchess hearing conducted on remand to determine if the trial court
sufficiently questioned Quidort and identified all discoverable materials.
We disagree with defendant’s contentions. Quidort was not an
inappropriate custodian of records, and our independent review of the in-
camera hearing reveals no abuse of discretion.

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I.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant seeking discovery from a peace officer’s personnel
records must file a motion and “identify the proceeding, the party seeking
disclosure, the peace officer, the governmental agency having custody of the
records, and the time and place where the motion for disclosure will be
heard.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) The motion must describe the
information sought and include affidavits showing good cause for the
discovery. (Ibid.)
If the trial court finds there is good cause, “the custodian of
records should bring to court all documents ‘potentially relevant’ to the
defendant’s motion.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) The court must
administer an oath to the custodian in order “to establish the accuracy and
veracity of the custodians’ representations regarding the completeness of the
record submitted for the court’s review.” (People v. White (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340.) “The integrity of the custodian’s testimony in this
regard is also necessary to ensure that ‘the locus of decisionmaking’ at the
hearing ‘is to be the trial court, not the prosecution or the custodian of
records.’” (Ibid.) “The custodian should be prepared to state in chambers and
for the record what other documents (or category of documents) not presented
to the court were included in the complete personnel record, and why those
were deemed irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive . . . .” (Mooc, at p. 1229.)
The court examines the information in chambers in the presence
of “‘the person authorized [to possess the records] and such other persons [the
custodian of records] is willing to have present.’” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 1226.) The court also must “make a record of what documents it
examined.” (Id. at p. 1229.) Subject to certain exceptions, the court must

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“disclose to the defendant ‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending litigation.’” (Id. at p. 1226.)
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a Pitchess motion,
and its ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. (Alford v.
Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039.)
II.
QUIDORT AS CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
Here, the trial court did precisely what the law requires and
what we directed on remand. The court placed Quidort under oath and
questioned him about how the Huntington Beach Police Department
investigates and maintains records of complaints against police officers. The
court also questioned whether Quidort or anyone had removed anything from
Wickser’s internal affairs investigation or personnel files. After confirming
nothing had been removed from the files, the court personally reviewed every
document at the in-camera hearing.
Defendant’s concern that Quidort was not neutral overlooks the
procedural safeguards built into the Pitchess process. The core safeguard of
the Pitchess process is independent judicial review. The trial court—not the
custodian of records—bears responsibility for determining what materials are
relevant and discoverable. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) The custodian
of records is responsible for producing the officer’s records. (Id. at pp. 1228–
1229.) Defendant cites no law, and we are aware of none, requiring the
custodian to be uninvolved in the underlying investigation or trial.
Our Supreme Court has acknowledged “an unscrupulous
custodian could always remove evidence that reflected unfavorably on a peace
officer.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229, fn. 4.) Given this risk, a
“defendant would thus not be much better protected by a strict rule requiring

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production of an officer’s entire personnel file in every case.” (Ibid.) The court
emphasized city attorneys are “officers of the court” and “defendants are
protected by the fact that a representative of the custodian of records is
placed under oath before responding to a trial court’s questions during the in
camera inspection of records.” (Ibid.) The court further noted a defendant
“who learns that relevant documents were improperly withheld may move for
a new trial pursuant to . . . section 1181, subdivision 8, or seek relief by filing
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court later explained: “In every case, accepting the
custodian’s representations concerning what is in a personnel file will be, at
bottom, a credibility determination for the trial court, regardless of whether
the custodian produces what purports to be the entire file in court, produces
only what purport to be the potentially responsive documents, or produces
what purport to be the potentially responsive documents and specifies on the
record what nonresponsive documents were omitted.” (People v. Fuiava
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 647–648.)
As noted ante, the trial court placed Quidort under oath and later
stated he was credible, noting his responses were consistent with those of a
different custodian in earlier proceedings. We have no basis to second-guess
that determination.
Defendant’s reliance on other authorities is misplaced. Code of
Civil Procedure section 170.1 addresses grounds for disqualification of a
judge, and California Rules of Court, Standards of Judicial Administration,
rule 10.20 addresses a court’s duty to prevent bias and ensure the judicial
system is impartial. The latter authorities say nothing about the role of a
custodian in a Pitchess proceeding. Section 1424 addresses conflicts of
interest warranting disqualification of a prosecutor, not a custodian charged

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with locating and producing an officer’s records. Sections 13510.8 and
11102.2 pertain to suspension of a peace officer’s certification and a program
maintained by the California Department of Justice to process fingerprint-
based criminal record background clearances on individuals designated by
agencies as custodians of records. The latter statutes do not impose any
requirement that a Pitchess custodian be uninvolved in the underlying
investigation or trial.
Finally, we have reviewed the sealed reporter’s transcript of the
in-camera hearing, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
discovery of information beyond identifying information for one witness. The
documents examined by the court are also adequately identified, and nothing
in the record suggests Quidort failed to provide potentially discoverable
material.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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