People v. Davis CA2/7

CourtListener 10795183Calctapp17 févr. 2026

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Filed 2/17/26 P. v. Davis CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B340189

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LACBA503382)
v.

DEXTER CONTEZ DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Emily Cole, Judge. Vacated with directions.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Dexter Contez Davis pleaded no contest to possessing or
carrying a weapon while confined in a penal institution, in
violation of Penal Code section 4502, subdivision (a),1 and the
trial court placed Davis on probation under various terms and
conditions. Finding Davis was indigent, the trial court waived
certain statutorily mandated fines and assessments and did not
require Davis to pay them as a condition of probation.
The court subsequently found Davis violated the terms and
conditions of his probation and revoked his probation. At the
probation violation sentencing hearing the court (a different
judge) sentenced Davis to three years in county jail and ordered
him to pay a restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a court
operations assessment of $40 (§ 1465.8), and a court facilities
assessment of $30 (Gov. Code, § 70373).
Davis argues that the probation violation sentencing court
did not have authority to impose the fine and assessments, that
the People forfeited their “ability to defend the belated
imposition” of these fines and fees under People v. Dueñas (2019)
30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), disapproved in People v. Kopp
(2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23, fn. 17 (Kopp), and that it would have
been futile for him to argue at the probation violation sentencing
hearing he did not have the ability to pay the $370. We conclude
Davis is entitled to challenge the restitution fine and the
assessments under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kopp.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2024 Davis pleaded no contest to possessing or
carrying a weapon while confined in a penal institution, and the
trial court placed him on probation for two years on terms and
conditions that included serving 365 days in county jail and
obeying all laws. Based on a representation by Davis’s trial
counsel, the court found Davis was indigent and waived
unspecified “fines and fees.” The People did not object to the
court’s finding Davis was indigent or to the court’s decision not to
impose the fines and fees.
Two months later the trial court, after finding Davis had
violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked his
probation. In July 2024 the court denied Davis’s request to
reinstate probation and sentenced him to three years in county
jail. The court also ordered Davis to pay a $300 restitution fine, a
$30 court facilities assessment, and a $40 court operations
assessment. Though counsel for Davis did not argue Davis was
indigent or object to the imposition of the restitution fine and the
assessments, she stated: “I would like to note that for the
probation case,[2] all fines and fees were previously waived.” The
court stated, “Correct. They [were] waived. This is now a
resentencing. And based on the sentence and the other case, the
court is going to impose the fines and fees.” Davis timely
appealed.
While Davis’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
decided Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1 and held a defendant may
challenge the imposition of a punitive fine under the Excessive

2 “Probation case” referred to this case. The People had filed
new charges against Davis in another case.

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Fines Clauses of the United States and California Constitutions
and the imposition of what the Supreme Court called “ancillary
costs” (like the court facilities and court operations assessments)
under the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and
California Constitutions. (Id. at pp. 23-24.) We gave the parties
an opportunity to submit supplemental briefs on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kopp. Davis submitted a supplemental brief;
the People did not.

DISCUSSION

Davis argues in his supplemental letter brief that, “because
ancillary costs were at the [first] hearing discretionary, and
because they remain discretionary under Kopp,” the People are
prohibited “from now defending the belated imposition of these
assessments when the People failed to object to the court’s waiver
of these costs at the [first sentencing] hearing.” He also argues
that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kopp, he should
have an opportunity to challenge the restitution fine as
constitutionally excessive and “‘to present any relevant evidence
or argument’” on his ability to pay the assessments. We agree
Davis should have an opportunity to challenge the restitution
fine and the assessments under Kopp.

A. Applicable Law

1. The Minimum Restitution Fine
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b) states: “In every case where
a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate
and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and

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extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons
on the record.” (See Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 13 [restitution
fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1), “is required in ‘every
case where a person is convicted of a crime’ unless the court ‘finds
compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states
those reasons on the record’”]; People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
963, 967 [same]; People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415,
423 [same].) Section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1), states that the
minimum restitution fine is $300 for each felony conviction and
that the maximum fine is $10,000. Section 1202.4,
subdivision (c), allows the court not to impose the restitution fine
for compelling and extraordinary reasons, but states the
defendant’s inability to pay is not a compelling and extraordinary
reason not to impose the minimum fine. Thus, the defendant’s
“inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and
extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to
pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the
restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine.” (See Kopp, at
p. 30; People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 356; see also
People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1033 [“Under
section 1202.4, subdivision (c), the trial court may not consider a
defendant’s ability to pay when imposing the minimum
restitution fine of $300, but the court may consider the
defendant’s ability to pay if the court imposes a restitution fine
above the minimum.”].)
Section 1202.4, subdivision (l), provides that, where the
court grants the defendant probation, “the court shall make the
payment of restitution fines and orders imposed pursuant to this
section a condition of probation.” Defendants who are not
granted probation are also subject to the mandatory imposition of

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a restitution fine. “‘“The difference is that the restitution
fine must also be made a condition of probation for any defendant
admitted to probation. The mandatory orders for restitution are
made part of the conditions of probation because ‘[f]ailure to do so
would lead to successful probationers avoiding the mandatory
nature of subdivision (b).’” (People v. Holman (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1457; see People v. Arata (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 195, 201 [“If probation is granted, payment of
the restitution fine must be made a condition of that
probation.”].)
In Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 we held that,
“although . . . section 1202.4 bars consideration of a defendant’s
ability to pay unless the judge is considering increasing the fee
over the statutory minimum, the execution of any restitution fine
imposed under this statute must be stayed unless and until the
trial court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that the
defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution fine.” (Id.
at p. 1164.) In Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 23, the Supreme Court
disapproved our reasoning in Dueñas that due process required
an ability-to-pay hearing before the trial court may impose a
punitive fine. The Supreme Court held: “Although fines may
properly be imposed as punishment for crime,” the “excessive
fines analysis” under the United States and California
Constitutions, “which considers ability to pay, is the proper
vehicle to challenge punitive fines.”3 (Kopp, at pp. 23 & fn. 17.)

3 The Supreme Court stated: “Contrary to Dueñas’s
suggestion, we do not find a due process requirement to hold an
ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine.”
(Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23 & fn. 17.)

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2. Ancillary Costs
Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), states: “To assist in
funding court operations, an assessment of forty dollars ($40)
shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . .”
Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1), states: “To
ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, an
assessment shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal
offense . . . . The assessment shall be imposed in the amount of
thirty dollars ($30) for each misdemeanor or felony . . . .” “Both
costs are mandatory.” (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 15; see
People v. Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 401, 405.)
In Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 we held due process
“requires the trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and
ascertain a defendant’s present ability to pay before it imposes
court facilities and court operations assessments
under . . . section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373.”
(Id. at p. 1164.) In Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1 the Supreme Court
clarified that “equal protection principles require a court, upon
request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing
a court operations assessment under . . . section 1465.8,
subdivision (a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under
Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1).” (Kopp, at
p. 9.)

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B. Davis Is Entitled To Challenge the Restitution Fine
and the Assessments Under Kopp

1. The Minimum Restitution Fine
Davis argued in his opening brief (1) that the probation
violation sentencing court lacked the authority to impose the
restitution fine and (2) that, because the fine was “discretionary,”
the People’s “failure to object to the initial waiver” of the fine
“results in forfeiture of any argument that the
belated . . . imposition . . . is valid.” In his supplemental letter
brief, however, Davis abandons his second argument, stating his
contention the restitution fine “was discretionary” is “no longer
viable” under “the Kopp Court’s analysis of Dueñas,”4 and
appears to abandon his first argument.
Instead, Davis argues that, in light of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Kopp a defendant may challenge “‘the imposition of
any fine as constitutionally excessive,’” he should have the
opportunity to make such a challenge. The People did not file a
supplemental brief responding to Davis’s new argument, but in
their respondent’s brief, the People argue that Davis “did not
offer any evidence to support [his] inability to pay” at the
probation violation sentencing hearing and that he “made no
complaint with the manner in which the court determined [he]
had the ability to pay” at the that hearing.
It is true that, when the probation violation sentencing
court imposed the restitution fine, Davis did not argue he did not
have the ability to pay and that he did not present any evidence

4 We accept Davis’s concession and do not reach this issue.

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he was indigent, which essentially forfeited his challenge.5 (See
People v. Evers (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“Once case law
exists holding that a hearing on ability to pay is constitutionally
required when requested, a defendant who does not object or ask
for a hearing forfeits the claim of error.”]; see also People v.
Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490 [“a defendant must in
the first instance contest in the trial court his or her ability to
pay the fines, fees and assessments to be imposed and at a
hearing present evidence of his or her inability to pay the
amounts contemplated by the trial court”], disapproved on
another ground in Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23, fn. 17.)
However, we excuse Davis’s failure to object. Though our
(pre-Kopp) decision in Dueñas should have alerted counsel for
Davis to argue at the probation violation sentencing hearing the
federal or state constitution required the court to hold an
ability-to-pay hearing, counsel could not reasonably have
anticipated that the proper vehicle to request such a hearing was
the Excessive Fines Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause.
(See People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 8 [“[w]e have excused a
failure to object where to require defense counsel to raise an
objection would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to
anticipate unforeseen changes in the law” (internal quotation
marks omitted)]; People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113,
127 [“Courts generally decline to apply the forfeiture rule to a
right derived from recent, unanticipated changes to the law.”].)
Davis should have an opportunity to present the relevant
arguments and evidence under Kopp. (See Kopp, at p. 23

5 Davis concedes his trial counsel “did not raise an ability to
pay objection to the court’s imposition of the fines at the
revocation hearing.”

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[remanding the matter to give the defendant “the opportunity to
assert the legal analyses applicable” to challenging the
restitution fine].)6
2. Ancillary Costs
Davis argues (in his opening brief) a court granting
probation “must impose” the ancillary costs under section 1465.8,
subdivision (a)(1), and Government Code section 70373,
subdivision (a)(1), “at the time of the original sentencing,” and
may not impose the assessments later (such as at sentencing on a
probation violation). Davis, however, does not cite any relevant
authority in support of this proposition.7 Thus, Davis has
forfeited the argument. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363-364 [“If a party’s briefs do not
provide legal argument and citation to authority on each point

6 Because we remand the matter for Davis to make the
appropriate challenge to his restitution fine, we do not reach
Davis’s argument it would have been futile for him to object when
the probation violation sentencing court imposed the restitution
fine.

7 The cases Davis cites did not discuss ancillary costs
imposed under section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), or Government
Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1). People v. Preston, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th 415 concerned the restitution fine under
section 1202.4, subdivision (b), the probation revocation fine
under section 1202.44, and the parole revocation fine under
section 1202.45 (see Preston, at p. 423), and People v. Arata,
supra, 118 Cal.4th 195 and People v. Chambers (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 819 concerned the restitution fine under
section 1202.4, subdivision (b) (see Arata, at p. 202; Chambers, at
p. 822).

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raised, ‘“the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without
consideration.”’”].)
Citing People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, Davis also
argues in his opening brief that, by failing to object when the trial
court waived or failed to impose the ancillary costs (which,
according to Davis, “are not mandatory under the reasoning of
Dueñas”), the People “forfeited any argument” the probation
violation sentencing court “could permissibly impose” those costs.
In his supplemental letter brief Davis restates this argument and
adds that, “under Kopp,” the costs “remain discretionary.”
In People v. Tillman, supra, 22 Cal.4th 300 the trial court
failed to impose the mandatory restitution fine under
section 1202.4, subdivision (b). (Tillman, at p. 302.) The court in
Tillman amended the judgment to add the restitution fine, but
the Supreme Court reversed, holding “the People’s failure to
object” to the trial court’s failure “to state on the record its
reasons for not imposing the restitution fines” waived their
argument on appeal the defendant’s sentence should be modified
to add the fine to the defendant’s sentence.8 (Id. at pp. 301-303.)
It is unclear why Davis relies on Tillman. First, the
procedural posture of this case is different from that in Tillman.

8 As the court in People v. Rodriguez (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th
372 explained: “It . . . appears that Tillman stands for the
proposition that when a trial court determines that compelling
and extraordinary reasons exist for not imposing a section 1202.4
fine but fails to comply with the statutory requirement of the
making of the necessary finding with a recorded statement of
reasons, it is a correctable error which the People must call to the
trial court’s attention in a timely manner.” (Rodriguez, at
p. 377.)

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In Tillman the People sought to have the restitution fine imposed
(for the first time) on appeal, and the Supreme Court held “the
waiver doctrine bars the People from obtaining the relief they
seek on appeal.” (People v. Tillman, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 302.)
Here, the probation violation sentencing court imposed the
ancillary costs, and the People are not seeking to modify the
judgment on appeal. In fact, Davis is the one asking us to vacate
the costs. Second, even assuming the People waived their ability
to defend imposing the assessments (a question we do not decide),
Davis has not shown a connection between the People’s waiver
and the probation violation sentencing court’s authority to
impose the costs. There is nothing in the statutory language of
section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), or Government Code
section 70373, subdivision (a)(1), that prohibits a court
sentencing a defendant who has violated probation from imposing
these assessments. And Davis has not cited authority supporting
his position.
Finally, Davis argues that, if we disagree with his
argument under Tillman, he is entitled to present argument and
evidence in the trial court on his “inability to pay these
assessments.” We agree with Davis’s alternative position and,
consistent with Kopp (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 30), direct the
trial court to allow him to make an appropriate equal protection
challenge, allow him to argue he is entitled to a hearing on his
ability to pay ancillary costs, and permit him to present evidence
and argument on his ability to pay the assessments. As with the
restitution fine, we excuse Davis’s failure to object to the
imposition of the ancillary costs on the ground he lacked the
ability to pay them. (See People v. Perez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 8;
see, e.g., Kopp, at p. 30 [remanding the matter to allow the

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parties “to present and contest any relevant evidence or
argument” on the defendant’s ability to pay the ancillary costs].)

DISPOSITION

The restitution fine and ancillary costs are vacated. The
probation violation sentencing court is directed to give Davis an
opportunity to challenge the restitution fine and the ancillary
costs under People v. Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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