CourtListener 10795182•People v. Fayed CA2/7
Texte intégral
Filed 2/17/26 P. v. Fayed CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B345178
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA346352)
v.
JAMES MICHAEL FAYED,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Dismissed.
James Michael Fayed, in pro. per.; Richard B. Lennon,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
James Michael Fayed appeals from the superior court’s
order granting his petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacating his
restitution fine under Penal Code section 1465.9, subdivision (d),1
and correcting the abstract of judgment. We appointed counsel to
represent Fayed on appeal. After reviewing the record counsel
for Fayed filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record and the contentions in
Fayed’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any either.
We dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court in People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147
(Fayed) summarized the facts of this case. “Shortly after
initiating divorce proceedings in October 2007, defendant
arranged for Pamela Fayed’s murder by paying the couple’s
employee, Jose ‘Joey’ Moya, $25,000 to kill her. Moya, in turn,
enlisted Gabriel Jay Marquez, the boyfriend of his niece, and
Steven Simmons, Marquez’s nephew. On July 28, 2008, Pamela
was stabbed to death in a Century City parking garage, moments
after she had left a meeting with defendant and their respective
attorneys. At the time of her murder, defendant and Pamela
were under federal investigation for allegedly laundering money
for Ponzi schemes through their e-currency business.” (Id., at
p. 155, fn. omitted.)
“On or about September 15, 2008, a complaint charged
defendant with the first degree murder of Pamela. [Citation.] It
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
alleged the special circumstance allegations of murder for
financial gain [citation] and murder by means of lying in wait
[citation]. Count 2 also charged defendant with one count of
conspiracy. . . . [¶] After deliberating for two days, the jury
found defendant guilty of first degree murder and one count of
conspiracy to commit murder. It also found true the special
circumstance allegations of murder for financial gain and murder
by means of lying in wait. After penalty phase deliberations, the
jury fixed the penalty at death.” (Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 158.) The trial court ordered Fayed, among other things, to
pay a $10,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $40 court
operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a court facilities
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). The Supreme Court affirmed
Fayed’s convictions. (Fayed, at p. 154.)
On December 24, 2024 Fayed, representing himself, filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawfulness of
the restitution fine. Fayed claimed the restitution fine was
unlawful because the court made it “outside of petitioner’s
presence and a ‘waiver’ was never submitted by petitioner
consenting to absence.” In the alternative, Fayed argued the
restitution fine was invalid under section 1465.9, subdivision (d),
which, after the January 1, 2025 effective date of Assembly Bill
No. 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1), states: “Upon the expiration
of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine
pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection
fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a
judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
On March 17, 2025 the superior court denied Fayed’s
request to vacate the restitution fine because he was not present
when the trial court imposed it. The court, however, agreed with
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Fayed’s alternative argument. The court ruled Fayed’s “sentence
includes an unpaid restitution fine imposed pursuant
to . . . section 1202.4. Ten years have elapsed since its
imposition. Pursuant to . . . section 1465.9[, subdivision] (d), the
unpaid balance is unenforceable and uncollectible. Accordingly,
the portion of the judgment imposing such fines is vacated, while
the remaining portion of the judgment remains in full force and
effect. A new abstract of judgment is to be issued and forwarded
to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.”
Fayed filed a notice of appeal from the superior court’s March 17,
2025 order.
DISCUSSION
As stated, we appointed counsel to represent Fayed in this
appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel did not identify any
arguable issues and indicated this court should review whether
the sentencing court had “jurisdiction to vacate the fine because
that act had already been done by the statute itself without
requiring any court action.” On December 11, 2025 counsel
advised Fayed that he was filing a brief stating he was unable to
find any arguable issues and that Fayed could submit a letter
brief stating any contentions he wanted the court to consider.
Counsel also sent Fayed a copy of the opening brief and the
record on appeal.
On December 22, 2025 we received a four-page
supplemental brief from Fayed, which attached 47 pages of
exhibits, consisting of miscellaneous court filings and rulings in
various state and federal court actions. Fayed, however, does not
explain why the superior court erred in granting his petition.
4
Instead, he asks us to review these federal and state
“filings/briefs/petitions/reply-briefs . . . of related cases” and to
consolidate them for “judicial efficiency and economy.”
We do not, however, have jurisdiction to hear Fayed’s
appeal. The order denying his habeas petition in part is not
appealable. (See Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 836; In re
Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; Jackson v. Superior Court
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1064.) Orders denying petitions for
habeas corpus “are not appealable,” and appeals from such orders
“must be dismissed.” (People v. Goff (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 1039,
1042.)
The order granting his habeas petition in part is also not
appealable; only the People can appeal from that order, and they
did not. Section 1506 states: “An appeal may be taken to the
court of appeal by the people from a final order of a superior court
made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a
defendant or otherwise granting all or any part of the relief
sought.” (See People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 986
[“[t]he Legislature has provided that the People may appeal from
the granting of habeas corpus relief . . . but has not provided that
remedy for a defendant”]; see also People v. Bilbrey (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 764, 772 [“[s]ection 1506 specifically authorizes
and governs the People’s appeal from a superior court’s order
upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus”].)
Nor is Fayed aggrieved by the order he appeals from: The
superior court gave him the relief he sought. Therefore, he lacks
standing to appeal. (See Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 482, 487; In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492,
499; Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947; People v.
Superior Court (Plascencia) (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 409, 420.)
5
And to the extent Fayed seeks in this appeal to consolidate and
have us review his two California cases and four pending federal
court actions, we lack jurisdiction to do that as well. This appeal
is only from the superior court’s March 17, 2025 order. (See
In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75 [“‘“Our jurisdiction on
appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the
judgment or order appealed from.”’”]; Faunce v. Cate (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“We have no jurisdiction over an order
not mentioned in the notice of appeal”].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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