Botach v. DiVeroli CA2/5

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Filed 2/13/26 Botach v. DiVeroli CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JONATHAN BOTACH, B342512

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV16593)

ATERET DIVEROLI, in her
individual capacity and as CO-
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF YOAV BOTACH,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan Botach, self-represented litigant, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Gold & Berkus, Justin B. Gold, and Omer A. Khan, for
Defendants and Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jonathan Botach appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of defendant Ateret DiVeroli on his claims
against her individually and in her capacity as co-executor of the
estate of plaintiff’s brother Yoav1 Botach (the estate). We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

This action arises from over a decade of disputes between
plaintiff and Yoav. Plaintiff contends he spent years pursuing
payment for debts Yoav owed to him and his siblings. Plaintiff
filed several lawsuits to enforce Yoav’s promises and Yoav
negotiated settlements with him to end each litigation, but Yoav
never paid his debt. After Yoav’s death, plaintiff tried to collect
from his estate.

1 Because many of the persons involved in the dispute are
family members who share the same last names, we will refer to
them by their first names. Ateret is Yoav’s daughter.

2
A. Plaintiff’s Agreements with Yoav2

1. 2010 agreement

In 2008, Yoav’s nephew Assaf3 filed lawsuits against Yoav
in Israel. On May 2, 2010, Yoav agreed to pay plaintiff, who was
licensed as a lawyer in Israel, 10 percent of all the money that
plaintiff saved Yoav by representing him in the lawsuits (2010
agreement). According to plaintiff, the last lawsuit was resolved
when the last judgment became final on appeal, on November 17,
2019, at which time plaintiff became entitled to $3.4 million, or
10 percent of $34 million.4 Yoav never paid plaintiff.

2. 2012 settlement agreement

On October 21, 2012, plaintiff and Yoav entered into a
settlement agreement in which Yoav agreed to pay plaintiff $2.6
million to settle plaintiff’s claims against him (2012 settlement
agreement). According to plaintiff, the 2012 settlement
agreement settled only claims for “his work in Los Angeles (not

2 The facts concerning the agreements involved in this action
are taken from the operative first amended complaint.

3 Assaf is the son of David, Yoav and plaintiff’s brother who
died in 1999.

4 As discussed later, defendants presented evidence that the
Israeli court approved a settlement agreement between Yoav and
Assaf in that final lawsuit on September 24, 2017, ending the
litigation as to Yoav though the litigation continued against
others through appeal.

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his work in Israel, which was not yet completed) . . . .” The
written agreement attached to the complaint, however, stated
that in exchange for $2.6 million in “property only,” plaintiff
would “DROP ALL COMPLAINTS BOTACH FAMILY,
FOREVER PERTAINING TO THIS MATTER).” Yoav breached
the settlement agreement by failing to make payment.

3. 2015 settlement agreement

On March 31, 2015, plaintiff and Yoav entered into a
written settlement agreement in which Yoav agreed to pay
plaintiff “$1.5 million . . . on or before September 30, 2015,” in
exchange for plaintiff’s agreement to “dismiss[ ] with prejudice
. . . all existing lawsuits against all defendants filed in the state
of California in which Yoav . . . was a party” (2015 settlement
agreement).5 Yoav also “promised to give [plaintiff’s daughter
Abigail a] $50,000 wedding gift . . . [t]hen, sometime in 2016 Yoav
orally promised to add $10,000 to Abigail’s gift . . .” (2016 oral

5 Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the 2015 settlement
agreement pertained only to his “personal claims (not the
family’s claims, which were settled 2 days prior, and not [the
2010 agreement] for work that was still ongoing[.])” We do not
consider plaintiff’s reference to his ability to settle “family claims”
as he is not a licensed attorney in California and is unable to
represent the claims of other individuals in court. (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 6125 [“No person shall practice law in California unless
the person is an active licensee of the State Bar”].) “Since the
passage of the State Bar Act in 1927, persons may represent their
own interests in legal proceedings, but may not represent the
interests of another unless they are active members of the State
Bar.” (Hansen v. Hansen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 618, 621, citing
Drake v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830.)

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promise). But Yoav had “repeatedly broken every one of his
promises . . . .”

4. 2019 settlement agreement

On May 5, 2019, plaintiff and Yoav entered into a
settlement agreement in which Yoav “promis[ed] to pay [plaintiff]
a sum of $1,250,000 by . . . check number 1401, dated: 5/3/19.”
In exchange, plaintiff “promise[d] to consider this payment of
$1,250,000 as a full and complete payment of all past debts owed
by [Yoav] to [plaintiff]” (2019 settlement agreement).6 Plaintiff
also “promise[d] never to sue Yoav in the future for any past or
present debts, nor for any kind of claims or demands, not by him,
nor by his children Adams Botach, Abigail Botach, or Lior
Botach, nor by any other of his future descendants or issues.” On
May 3, 2019, pursuant to the terms of the 2019 settlement
agreement, Yoav wrote plaintiff a check for $1.25 million (2019
check). Yoav instructed plaintiff “to deposit the check in Israel,
so that [p]laintiff (and then Yoav) [would not] have to pay 40%

6 Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the 2019 settlement
agreement to his complaint, but defendants submitted a copy of
the agreement in support of their motion for summary judgment,
on July 24, 2024, 15 days after they had filed their motion,
statement of undisputed facts, and supporting evidence. Plaintiff
did not seek a continuance of the hearing on the summary
judgment motion or raise an evidentiary objection to the 2019
settlement agreement. He nonetheless now contends that
defendants’ late production of the 2019 settlement agreement
should have voided defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
He does not, however, raise a cogent argument as to why the late
production voids summary judgment. We therefore reject
plaintiff’s contention.

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tax . . . .” Plaintiff alleged that in July 2019, Ateret cancelled the
check by telling her daughter Avigail to put a stop payment on
the check.
After the 2019 check was cancelled, Ateret and her siblings
told “family, associates, and the general public—that [p]laintiff
[was] to blame for [the] cancellation . . . because he did not
deposit the check in a bank account in Los Angeles, and instead
tried to deposit it in Israel. They further claim[ed] that they
would have paid [p]laintiff, had he not sued them.”

B. Plaintiff’s Lawsuits Against Yoav

1. 2011 lawsuit

On October 12, 2011, plaintiff filed a lawsuit (2011 lawsuit)
seeking a declaratory judgment against Yoav that the Botach
“family is entitled to finally regain our share in the properties—
equity and all revenues derived—which Yoav had bought with
the money that David sent him during the [1970s] . . . .” On
December 12, 2012, plaintiff dismissed the lawsuit.

2. 2014 lawsuit

On April 25, 2014, plaintiff filed a lawsuit (2014 lawsuit)
against Yoav for breaching the 2012 settlement agreement. On
April 1, 2015, plaintiff dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

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3. 2015 lawsuit

On September 18, 2015, plaintiff filed a lawsuit (2015
lawsuit) seeking to vacate the dismissal of the 2014 lawsuit due
to fraud during the settlement negotiations. He also alleged that
Yoav breached the 2015 settlement agreement, including the
$50,000 promise to plaintiff’s daughter. On July 27, 2016, the
trial court granted Yoav’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the
action with prejudice.

4. 2016 lawsuit

On August 8, 2016, plaintiff filed a lawsuit (2016 lawsuit)
against Yoav alleging breach of the 2012 and 2015 settlement
agreements. On January 12, 2017, the trial court in that lawsuit
ruled that claims based on the 2012 settlement agreement were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. For claims based on the
2015 settlement agreement, the court abated the action because
the 2015 lawsuit, which alleged a breach of the 2015 settlement
agreement, was then on appeal. On April 4, 2018, after the
appeal was dismissed, the court entered a judgment of dismissal
against plaintiff.

5. 2021 probate proceedings

On February 4, 2021, plaintiff filed a creditor’s claim
against the estate for $6,115,000 (2021 probate proceedings). For
facts supporting the claim, he wrote: “[On May 2, 2010,] [Yoav]
promised [plaintiff] 10% of moneys saved in litigation [amount
claimed] 3,515,000” and “[on October 21, 2012,] [Yoav] promised

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to pay [plaintiff] for his legal services [amount claimed]
2,600,000[.] Attached [are] some of the documents relating to
those promises.” Plaintiff did not identify the 2015 settlement
agreement or the 2019 settlement agreement in his creditor’s
claim.7 The estate did not respond to the claim.

6. 2021 lawsuit

On July 12, 2021, plaintiff filed a lawsuit (2021 lawsuit)
against Ateret as representative of the estate. He alleged that
the estate had rejected his family’s separate creditor’s claim to
return the family wealth. On December 1, 2021, plaintiff filed a
first amended complaint in that lawsuit, in which he alleged
“‘Yoav has repeatedly breached his many promises to return our
family’s wealth’” and “all of the moneys, antiques, houses, bank
accounts, foreign investments, commercial properties and
everything else that is deemed today as part of Yoav’s estate, in
fact belong to our family and not to Yoav’s estate.’” On March 11,
2022, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the first amended
complaint in the 2021 lawsuit, without leave to amend.

7 Plaintiff attached a copy of the 2012 settlement agreement.
In addition, plaintiff attached a copy of the 2015 settlement
agreement and the 2019 check as documents relating to the 2010
agreement and the 2012 settlement agreement. He did not,
however, attach a copy of the 2019 settlement agreement to his
creditor’s claim.

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. First Amended Complaint

On July 11, 2023, plaintiff filed the operative first amended
complaint against defendants8 alleging causes of action for:
(1) breach of contract (alleging breaches of the 2010 agreement,
the 2012 settlement agreement, the 2015 settlement agreement,
the 2016 oral promise, and the 2019 settlement agreement);
(2) “intentional intervention” in contractual relationship
(intentional interference claim); (3) declaratory relief;
(4) defamation; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and (6) punitive damages.

B. Summary Judgment Motion

On July 9, 2024, defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, in which they argued, among other things, that
plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.9

8 As noted, defendants are Ateret, as an individual, and
Ateret as co-executor of the estate.

9 The trial court took judicial notice of 17 documents, 15 of
which were court records in plaintiff’s prior lawsuits against
Yoav and the estate: Jonathan Botach v. Barkochba Botach, et
al., L.A. Super. Ct. No. BC471397; Jonathan Botach v. Yoav
Botach, et al., L.A. Super. Ct. No. BC543788; Jonathan Botach v.
Yoav Botach, L.A. Super. Ct. No. BC595051; Jonathan Botach v.
Yoav Botach, L.A. Super. Ct. No. BC629796; and Jonathan
Botach v. Ateret DiVeroli, L.A. Super. Ct. No. 21STCV25493. One
was the plaintiff’s creditor’s claim filed in Estate of Yoav Botach,

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Specifically, they contended that plaintiff’s claims that Yoav
breached the 2012, 2015, and 2019 settlement agreements were
previously litigated over the course of the 2014, 2015, 2016, and
2021 lawsuits.
Defendants also argued that plaintiff’s claims against the
estate were barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 366.210,
which requires an action against a decedent’s estate be filed
within one year after the date of death. Defendants
acknowledged that the statute of limitations is tolled while a
creditor’s claim for the same alleged debt is pending (Prob. Code,
§ 9352) but supported their limitations defense with the following
undisputed facts: Yoav died on May 23, 2020; and on February 4,
2021, plaintiff filed a creditor’s claim against the estate for
$6,115,000 for promises made in the 2010 agreement and 2012
settlement agreement.11
On the intentional interference claim, defendants
submitted evidence that Ateret never instructed her daughter
Avigail to stop payment on the 2019 check. They offered the
declaration of Ateret stating, “I did not cancel the check or order
my daughter to cancel the check. And I did not instruct Yoav’s
bank in Los Angeles not to respond to [plaintiff’s] bank in Israel
about payment.”

L.A. Super. Ct. No. 20STPB04880. One was a copy of a search of
the California State Bar Attorney website showing that plaintiff
is not licensed to practice law in California.

10 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.

11 The trial court took judicial notice of plaintiff’s creditor’s
claim.

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On the intentional infliction claim, defendants argued that
plaintiff could not satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous
conduct because he was alleging a mere breach of contract, which
is not a recognized basis for this tort claim. Defendants offered
the undisputed facts that “[p]laintiff’s purported emotional
distress is due to Yoav’s breaches of contracts, which “‘forced
[plaintiff] to live a poor and miserable life’” and “[Ateret’s] alleged
breach of promise to pay the 2019 [c]heck on behalf of Yoav’s
Estate ‘caused [plaintiff] immeasurable plain and suffering.’”
Finally, on the defamation claim against Ateret personally,
defendants argued that plaintiff could not meet the elements of
publication, falsity, or defamatory nature. As to Ateret’s alleged
statement that plaintiff was “to blame for cancellation of the
check, because he did not deposit the check in a bank account in
Los Angeles, and instead tried to deposit it in Israel,” defendants
noted that plaintiff had not identified a specific conversation or a
third party who heard the allegedly defamatory statement.
Further, defendants set forth the following undisputed facts:
“Plaintiff took the 2019 [c]heck to deposit it in Yoav’s bank in Los
Angeles. The banker at Yoav’s bank told [p]laintiff that if
[p]laintiff deposited the 2019 [c]heck there, [p]laintiff ‘would have
a huge amount of tax.’ [¶] . . . [¶] Yoav’s [c]ertified [p]ublic
[a]ccountant . . . also confirmed that [p]laintiff would be
responsible for a heavy tax if he deposited the 2019 [c]heck at
Yoav’s bank in Los Angeles.” They also noted it was undisputed
that plaintiff took the check to Israel and “Yoav’s bank in Los
Angeles did not transfer the funds under the 2019 [c]heck to
Israel upon the Israeli bank’s request.” Thus, according to
defendants, plaintiff could not demonstrate, as a matter of law,
that Ateret’s alleged statement was false.

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Next, defendants argued that plaintiff could not
demonstrate that Ateret’s alleged statement that defendants
“would have paid [p]laintiff, had he not sued them” was
defamatory. Defendants argued that this alleged statement
related only to Ateret’s state of mind, was predictive in nature,
and did not reflect on the character of plaintiff. Therefore, the
statement was not defamatory as a matter of law.

C. Opposition to Motion

On September 11, 2024, plaintiff filed his opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. As relevant here, he argued that
the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to his claims for breach
of the 2010 agreement or the 2019 settlement agreement, which
he claimed had never been litigated. In support of his opposition,
plaintiff submitted a declaration in which he stated that, “[i]n the
[2021] probate proceedings that [sic] I did not sue anything that
is owed to me, I tried, and failed, to demand payment to my
family, not to me.” He also submitted a tentative ruling of the
probate court sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended
complaint in the 2021 lawsuit, without leave to amend. That
tentative ruling, which was not adopted in the final judgment,
stated that the court was sustaining the demurrer based on the
jurisdictional defect of standing and the pleading defect of lack of
certainty.
In support of his intentional interference claim, plaintiff
submitted his own declaration, stating, “[Ateret] ordered her
daughter A[v]igail Di[V]eroli, whom she sent from FL to live in
Yoav’s house in LA, to cancel the $1.25m check that Yoav gave
me in 2019.”

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Plaintiff maintained that there were disputed issues of fact,
requiring “evidence and testimony” as to whether Ateret’s
conduct—alleged to include defamation, as well as contractual
interference and willful refusal to pay—constituted intentional
infliction of emotional distress. He noted that defendants did not
deny that Ateret made the allegedly defamatory statements.

D. Ruling on Motion

On September 23, 2024, the trial court granted defendants’
summary judgment motion. The court found that the breach of
contract claim, the intentional interference claim, and the
declaratory relief claim were barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
The trial court agreed that Ateret was entitled to summary
judgment on the defamation claim because there were no
disputed facts and plaintiff had not shown that the statements
were false or defamatory. Specifically, plaintiff admitted he did
not deposit the 2019 check in a bank in Los Angeles because he
was told he would incur a significant tax burden if he did so. The
other allegedly defamatory statements regarding whether
“plaintiff is to blame” or defendant “would have paid [p]laintiff,
had he not sued them” could not be defamatory because they
were not statements of fact and they did not constitute a
“‘publication that exposes the plaintiff to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or
avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation.’”
In addition, the trial court concluded Ateret was entitled to
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of

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emotional distress because plaintiff could not prove extreme and
outrageous conduct by repeating his contract claims and deficient
defamation claims.
Finally, as to the claim for punitive damages, the trial court
explained that a request for punitive damages was not an
independent cause of action; it was a remedy. Because the court
granted defendants summary judgment, the court ruled plaintiff
was not entitled to punitive damages.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no
triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (. . . § 437c, subd. (c).)
We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the
evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except
that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted
inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]”
(Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) “We
exercise our independent judgment as to the legal effect of the
undisputed facts [citation] and must affirm on any ground
supported by the record.” (Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles
(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 140.)
“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is
no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . . . There is a triable issue of
material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a

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reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850, fns. omitted.) “The court may not weigh the
plaintiff’s evidence or inference against the defendants’ as though
it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 856.)

B. Legal Principles

1. Claims Against a Decedent

Under section 366.2, subdivision (a), a cause of action
against a decedent that existed at the time of death, “whether
accrued or not accrued,” must be initiated no later than one year
after death. (§ 366.2, subd. (a); Prob. Code, § 9000 (a)(1); see
Bradley v. Breen (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 798, 800.) “An action
may not be commenced against a decedent’s personal
representative on a cause of action against the decedent unless a
claim is first filed . . . and the claim is rejected in whole or in
part.” (Prob. Code, § 9351.) “[T]he filing of a claim tolls the
underlying statute of limitations until the creditor’s claim has
been rejected, and after rejection, ‘“the creditor has three months
within which to bring an action, regardless of the time otherwise
remaining on the statute of limitations.” [Citations.]’ ([Anderson
v. Anderson (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 135,] 140.)” (Estate of
Holdaway (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1049, 1056; § 366.2, subd. (b)(2);
Prob. Code, §§ 9352, subd. (a), 9353.)

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2. Res Judicata

Res judicata, now known in California as claim preclusion,
requires: (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on
the merits; (2) the present action is on the same cause of action as
the prior proceeding, or the issue could have been litigated in the
prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present action or
parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.
(Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82 (Zevnik).)
Generally, a dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of a
final judgment on the merits, barring the entire cause of action.
(Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 793.)
This includes a voluntary dismissal with prejudice following a
settlement. (Estate of Redfield (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1526,
1533; Rest.2d of Judgments, § 19, comment b, subd. (a)(1).)

C. Analysis

1. Breach of Contract

As noted, plaintiff alleged in the operative complaint that
defendants breached the following agreements: the 2010
agreement; the 2012 settlement agreement; the 2015 settlement
agreement; the 2016 oral promise; and the 2019 settlement
agreement.
It was undisputed that prior to his filing of the operative
complaint, plaintiff sued Yoav at least twice for breach of the
2012 settlement agreement and the 2015 settlement agreement.
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed with prejudice the 2014 lawsuit,
which alleged a breach of the 2012 settlement agreement; and the

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court dismissed the 2015 lawsuit, which alleged a breach of the
2015 settlement agreement, after granting Yoav’s anti-SLAPP
motion. Plaintiff raises no challenge to the trial court’s ruling
that his breach of contract claims premised on the 2012
settlement agreement and the 2015 settlement agreement are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (Zevnik, supra, 159
Cal.App.4th at p. 82.)
We thus next consider whether defendants were entitled to
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that defendants breached
the 2010 agreement. Here, defendants met their initial burden to
demonstrate that they were entitled to a judgment in their favor
because their obligations under the 2010 agreement—which they
claim accrued in September 2017 when the last lawsuit between
Yoav and Assaf ended in a settlement agreement—were released
by the 2019 settlement agreement, the terms of which stated that
plaintiff would consider the $1.25 million “a full and complete
payment of all past debts owed by [Yoav] to [plaintiff]” and
“promise[d] never to sue Yoav in the future for any past or
present debts . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 1541; Skrbina v. Fleming Cos.
(1996) 45 Cal. App.4th 1353, 1366; compare Village Northridge
Homeowners Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2010) 50
Cal.4th 913, 930 [noting that the law favors settlements and a
settlement agreement is considered presumptively valid].)
According to plaintiff, the 2019 settlement agreement did
not discharge defendants’ obligations under the 2010 agreement
because Yoav’s obligations under the 2010 agreement did not
accrue until November 14, 2019 (after the parties entered into
the 2019 settlement agreement), when final judgment was
entered in Israel regarding the last remaining party to Assaf’s
final lawsuit against Yoav. We disagree.

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Defendants met their initial burden to show that Yoav’s
obligation under the 2010 agreement accrued no later than
September 24, 2017, when the Israeli court approved a
settlement agreement between Yoav and Assaf in that final
lawsuit. Defendants offered the declaration of Elad Greiner,
Yoav’s attorney in the final litigation, to attest to this fact.
Plaintiff offered his own declaration attesting to Greiner’s bias,
but did not meet his burden to demonstrate a material dispute as
to the fact. The only copy of the 2010 agreement that is part of
the record on appeal is written in Hebrew,12 and plaintiff does
not direct the court to any terms that rebut defendants’ proof
regarding the obligation’s accrual. Nor does he submit Israeli
court documents to prove the litigation matters covered by the
agreement or when they were resolved. We conclude defendants
have met their burden to show that Yoav’s debt under the 2010
agreement constituted a “past debt owed” to plaintiff on the date
the 2019 settlement agreement was signed and was released by
that settlement. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on the claim for breach of the 2010 agreement.
The claim for breach of the 2019 settlement agreement is
barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 366.2,
subdivision (a). Defendants met their burden of showing that
plaintiff failed to bring the claim against the estate within one-
year of Yoav’s death. (§ 366.2, subd. (a).) Plaintiff failed to create
a genuine issue of material fact regarding tolling of the statute of
limitations because plaintiff agreed that he did not identify the
2019 settlement agreement in his creditor’s claim. It being
undisputed that there is no basis for tolling under Probate Code

12 Neither party provided a certified English translation to
aid in our review.

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section 9352, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
the claim for breach of the 2019 settlement agreement.
Plaintiff also alleged Yoav breached an oral promise made
in 2016 to give plaintiff’s daughter an additional $10,000 as a
wedding gift “as compensation for his repeated failures to keep
his promise.” In the trial court, defendants contended this was
an unenforceable promise because it lacked consideration.
Plaintiff did not address defendants’ argument regarding the
2016 oral promise but conceded that Yoav’s $50,000 gift to
Abigail was given out of gratitude for what she had done in
encouraging plaintiff to settle with Yoav. An enforceable contract
requires consideration. (Passante v. McWilliam (1997) 53 Cal.
App.4th 1240, 1247.) Past consideration cannot support a
contract. (Ibid.) Consideration must be bargained for and given
in exchange for the promise, not extended for past services
rendered. (Ibid.) Defendants have met their burden to show that
the 2016 oral promise is not an enforceable contract.

2. Intentional Interference Claim

The elements of intentional interference with contractual
relations are: (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a
third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) the
defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or
disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or
disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting
damage. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19
Cal.4th 26, 55.) The tort of intentional interference with
contractual relations requires a valid contract between the
plaintiff and a third party. (Ibid.) Because the estate stands in

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the shoes of Yoav, and Yoav was the contracting party, there can
be no claim for intentional interference in contractual relations
against the estate.
Most of the allegations in plaintiff’s intentional interference
claim refer to conduct by Yoav’s son Bar Kochba, who is not a
defendant in the operative first amended complaint. The only
allegation that pertained to Ateret individually was that “the
2019 check was cancelled by [d]efendant Ateret Di[V]eroli, who
told her daughter Avigail to put a stop payment on the check.”
(Underscoring omitted.) As we note above, Ateret submitted a
declaration denying that she told her daughter to stop payment
on the 2019 check. According to plaintiff, defendants should have
submitted evidence (a declaration or deposition testimony) from
Ateret’s daughter Avigail, who could have provided the strongest
proof that there was no interference with the check. Plaintiff
relies on the principle that “summary judgment may be denied in
the discretion of the court if the only proof of a material fact
offered in support of the summary judgment is an affidavit or
declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to
that fact . . . .” (§ 437c, subd. (e).) But this “rule” is discretionary,
and it is not improper to grant summary judgment to the
defendants on these facts where plaintiff has offered no evidence
that Ateret interfered in his contractual relationship except his
accusation.
Ateret is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s
intentional interference claim.

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3. Declaratory Relief

Defendants have met their burden to show they are
entitled to summary judgment on the third cause of action
against the estate, which sought a declaration that Yoav owed a
debt to the family. In support of this claim, plaintiff alleged Yoav
agreed on March 29, 2015, to “return to the family ALL the
money that David transferred to him” in the 1970s and requested
a declaration that Yoav’s commitment was valid and binding,
that the family in Israel was entitled to all of Yoav’s property in
Israel, “including real estate, and moneys in bank accounts” to
“compensate the family for at least some of the millions that
[Yoav] owed.”
This claim is barred by the statute of limitations set forth
in section 366.2, subdivision (a). Defendants met their burden to
show that plaintiff failed to bring the claim against the estate
within one year of Yoav’s death. (§ 366.2, subd. (a).) Plaintiff
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding tolling
of the statute of limitations because plaintiff agreed that
“[p]laintiff’s [c]reditor’s [c]laim identified [only] two agreements
as the basis for his claim: (1) the 2010 [a]greement in the
amount of $3,515,000, and (2) under the 2012 [settlement
a]greement in the amount of $2,600,000, for a total amount of
$6,115,000.” He did not identify the March 29, 2015, promise to
return the family’s money. It being undisputed that there is no
basis for tolling under Probate Code section 9352, defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on the declaratory relief claim on
the basis of the statute of limitations.

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4. Defamation

“Defamation is ‘a false and unprivileged publication that
exposes the plaintiff “to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or
which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation.” (Civ. Code, § 45.)’
[Citations.]” (Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 1027, 1047–1048.) The elements of this cause of
action are: “‘(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory,
(d) unprivileged, and (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that
causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683,
720.)
Ateret met her burden to show that she was entitled to
summary judgment because plaintiff cannot meet the element of
falsity.13 “In all cases of alleged defamation, whether libel or
slander, the truth of the offensive statements or communication
is a complete defense against civil liability, regardless of bad
faith or malicious purpose. [Citations.] . . . [T]he defendant need
not justify the literal truth of every word of the allegedly
defamatory matter. It is sufficient if the defendant proves true
the substance of the charge, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in
the details, ‘so long as the imputation is substantially true so as
to justify the “gist or sting” of the remark.’ [Citations.]” (Smith
v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 646–647, fn. omitted.)
As to Ateret’s alleged statement that the 2019 check was
cancelled because plaintiff did not deposit it in Los Angeles,
plaintiff admitted that he did not deposit the 2019 check in a
bank in Los Angeles, explaining that he was told he would incur

13 The defamation cause of action was alleged only against
Ateret.

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a significant tax burden if he did. The distinction that plaintiff
draws—that Yoav told him to take the 2019 check to Israel to
avoid the tax—is an additional detail about the motive behind his
conduct, but it does not make the statement false. The other
statements—that plaintiff was to “blame” for the cancellation of
the check, and Ateret would have paid plaintiff if he had not sued
the estate—are not facts that can be adjudged for falsity. (Jensen
v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 958, 970 [a
statement of opinion cannot be false]; Cansino v. Bank of America
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469 [statements or predictions
about future events are opinions].) Plaintiff has failed to show
that there is a disputed issue of material fact with respect to
falsity.
Ateret is therefore entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiff’s defamation cause of action.

5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prove the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, plaintiff must prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional
distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional
distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Hughes v. Pair
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050, internal quotations omitted.)
Outrageous conduct is defined as conduct that is “so ‘“‘extreme as
to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community.’”’” (Id. at pp. 1050–1051.)

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Here, plaintiff alleged that defendants’ extreme and
outrageous conduct comprised of “[d]efendants’ defamation
against [p]laintiff, [and] their constant intervention in each of the
agreements that [p]laintiff has had with Yoav . . . .” As we
explain above, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
the defamation claim and thus plaintiff could not demonstrate, as
a matter of law, that defendants engaged in the alleged
outrageous conduct. Further, breaches of contract are not
considered extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law.
(Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 558 (Erlich).) Because
“the law generally does not distinguish between good and bad
motives for breaching a contract” (Applied Equipment Corp. v.
Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 516), merely
breaching a contract does not support a tort action. To become
tortious, the breach must also violate a duty arising from
principles of tort law that is independent of the contract. (Id. at
p. 515; Erlich, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 552.)
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.

6. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are a remedy, not a cause of action.
(Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163–164.)
Because we grant summary judgment in favor of defendants on
all claims, punitive damages are not available to plaintiff.

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V. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs
on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KUMAR, J.*

* Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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