Conservatorship of H.M. CA2/1

CourtListener 10793876Calctapp13 févr. 2026

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Filed 2/13/26 Conservatorship of H.M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re CONSERVATORSHIP OF B347882
H.M.
(Los Angeles County
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF Super. Ct. No. 24NWMH00667)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

H.M.,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert S. Harrison, Judge. Reversed.
Rudy Kraft for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quiñonez,
Assistant County Counsel and William C. Sias, Principal Deputy
County Counsel for Petitioner and Respondent.
____________________________
Following a court trial, the court found appellant H.M.
gravely disabled under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf &
Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act). The court appointed the
Los Angeles County Public Guardian as H.M.’s conservator. On
appeal, H.M. argues the trial court erred in failing to advise him
of his right to a jury trial and failing to obtain a personal waiver
of that right. Here, the only discussion of a jury trial before the
court occurred between H.M. and his attorney while H.M was
being assisted by an Arabic language interpreter when, in fact,
H.M. needed an Armenian language interpreter. When the court
trial later resumed, now with the assistance of an Armenian
interpreter, at no time did the court advise H.M. of his right to a
jury trial or obtain a waiver of that right. The record thus does
not support that H.M. knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to a jury trial. We thus cannot conclude the failure to advise
H.M. of his jury trial right in a language he understood was
harmless. We reverse the conservatorship order.

BACKGROUND
In November 2024, County Counsel filed a petition for
appointment of a conservator over H.M. In support of the
petition, a physician declared H.M. suffers from schizophrenia
and was disorganized and delusional.
On January 8, 2025, H.M. was present in court with his
attorney and an Arabic language interpreter. H.M.’s counsel
asked him, “[W]ould you agree to be on a conservatorship?” and
H.M. responded, “I don’t want to.” His attorney then stated:
“You can have either a court trial with a judge or a jury trial. Do
you know what type of trial you would like?” H.M. responded,
“Judge.” The court then stated: “[T]he court will waive the jury
trial and we will set this matter for a court trial at your request.”

2
At a subsequent hearing on April 16, 2025, the Arabic
language interpreter explained to the court that H.M. needed an
Armenian language interpreter. The interpreter said H.M.
understood “a little bit of Arabic,” but was “more comfortable”
communicating “in Armenian.” When the court said, “It’s not
really Arabic he’s speaking,” the interpreter responded, “Exactly.”
Counsel for the Public Guardian told the court H.M.
“understands Arabic but speaks it very little” and requested an
Armenian interpreter for H.M. Counsel for the Public Guardian
explained Armenian was H.M.’s “primary language.” The court
continued the trial so that an Armenian interpreter could assist
H.M. The court never obtained a waiver of jury from H.M. when
he was being assisted by an Armenian interpreter.
The bench trial commenced on June 18, 2025 with an
Armenian language interpreter. After trial, the court appointed
the Los Angeles County Office of the Public Guardian conservator
over H.M.

DISCUSSION
H.M. argues we must reverse the conservatorship order
because the trial court failed to advise H.M. of his right to a jury
trial and the error was not harmless. “We review any statutory
claims de novo.” (Conservatorship of B.K. (Jan. 28, 2026,
B343506) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2026 Cal.App.LEXIS 40, at
p. *7].)1

1 Because we reverse based on the failure to obtain a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial right, we do not
consider H.M.’s other arguments. These arguments are the
record lacks substantial evidence he was gravely disabled and the

3
The LPS Act authorizes one-year conservatorships over
individuals who are “gravely disabled” by a mental health
disorder or chronic alcoholism. Persons subject to the LPS Act
are entitled to a court or jury trial on whether they are gravely
disabled, and the trial court must personally advise them of this
right. (Welf & Inst. Code, § 5350;2 Prob. Code, § 1828,
subd. (a)(6).) Probate Code section 1828, incorporated by
reference into Welfare and Institutes Code section 5350, provides
“before the establishment of a conservatorship of the person or
estate, or both, the court shall inform the proposed conservatee
of . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the right . . . to have the matter of the
establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury.” (Prob. Code,
§ 1828, subd. (a)(6).)
Both parties rely on Conservatorship of C.O. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 894 (Conservatorship of C.O.) In that case, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the
conservatee3 was gravely disabled. The court’s written citation
for conservatorship recited that the conservatee had a right to a
jury trial on the issue of grave disability and that the conservatee

trial court failed to consider appointing a family member as his
conservator.
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. Section 5350, subdivision (d)(1) provides in
part: “The person for whom conservatorship is sought shall have
the right to demand a court or jury trial on the issue of whether
the person is gravely disabled.”
3 The proceeding at issue was a petition for reappointment
of a conservator, which required a finding that the conservatee
was gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of C.O., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.)

4
had to request a jury trial within five days before the hearing.
The conservatee did not request a jury trial. (Conservatorship of
C.O., at p. 901.) At the hearing, the trial court never advised the
proposed conservatee of his right to a jury trial or elicited his
waiver on the record even though the proposed conservatee was
present. (Id. at p. 902.) Instead, the court relied on counsel’s
representation that his client was requesting a court trial. At no
time during the proceedings did the conservatee object to the
court conducting the trial.
The conservatee argued on appeal that the court had
violated his statutory rights and constitutional rights of due
process and equal protection of law by not advising him on the
record of his jury trial right and not obtaining a personal waiver
of that right. (Conservatorship of C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 902.) The appellate court agreed that the trial court’s failure
personally to advise the conservatee of his jury trial right
violated Probate Code, section 1828, subdivision (a)(6).
(Conservatorship of C.O., at p. 909 [where a proposed conservatee
“is able to and willing to attend the hearing [citation], the trial
court must directly advise a proposed conservatee of his or her
right to a jury trial over the matter of the establishment or
reestablishment of the conservatorship”].)
The court, however, rejected the conservatee’s argument
that the failure to obtain a personal waiver from him was
statutory error: “We hold that (absent circumstances suggesting
the proposed conservatee’s counsel lacked actual authority,
counsel disregarded his client’s wishes, or that the proposed
conservatee was actually unaware of his right to a trial by jury)
counsel may waive on behalf of the proposed conservatee his or
her right to have the matter of establishment or reestablishment

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of the conservatorship decided by jury trial.” (Conservatorship of
C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 911.)4
The appellate court then turned to whether the trial court’s
failure to advise the conservatee personally of his right to a jury
trial was structural error or whether to obtain a reversal, the
conservatee had to show prejudice from the failure to advise him
personally of his right to a jury trial. The appellate court held
the error was not structural. It further held the conservatee had
failed to show prejudice given the record affirmatively showed his
waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary
(Conservatorship of C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 918–919),
and the evidence supported that “it is not reasonably probable
that an outcome more favorable to C.O. would have resulted had
the trial court personally advised him of his jury trial right” (id.
at p. 919).5

4 The court also rejected the conservatee’s argument that
due process and the guarantee of equal protection of law required
the trial court to obtain a personal waiver on the record of his
right to a jury trial. (Conservatorship of C.O., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 916, 917.)
5 K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 133, 144
distinguished Conservatorship of C.O. where the (1) conservatee
was never given the opportunity to demand a trial or advised of
her jury trial right on the issue of grave disability; and (2) the
conservatee’s mere participation in what the conservatee and her
counsel presumed was a hearing, but the trial court thought was
a trial, did not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
conservatee’s jury trial right. As the appellate court explained:
“Here, however, the record contains no indication that K.R.’s
counsel purported to waive K.R.’s jury trial right or that the trial
court acted to accept any such waiver. Instead, it appears that

6
More recently, Division Four of this District followed
Conservatorship of C.O. in concluding substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s implicit finding that the conservatee
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial at the
reappointment hearing and that any error in advising the
conservatee was harmless. (Conservatorship of B.K., supra,
___ Cal.App.5th at pp. ___ [[2026 Cal.App.LEXIS 40, at pp. *15–
*16].) There, in prior hearings, the conservatee told the trial
court she wanted a jury trial because she wanted to “ ‘get off
conservatorship.’ ” (Id. at p. *4.) On the day of trial, the
conservatee was present in court with counsel. The court
indicated it had not “ ‘as of yet’ ” seen a waiver. (Id. at p. *5.)
Counsel told the court his client wanted a trial that day and if so,
the trial would have to be a court trial. The court then confirmed
this was the conservatee’s wish, and said, “ ‘So that means you
are waiving and giving up your right to have a jury trial to have a
court trial today with me; is that right?’ ” (Id. at pp. *5–*6.) The
conservatee responded in the affirmative to which her counsel
joined. (Id. at p. *6.) The conservatee then participated in the
ensuing trial “without objection” and the appellate court
concluded there was no evidence that counsel lacked authority or
otherwise “disregarded [the conservatee’s] wishes.” (Id. at
p. *11.) Finally, the court concluded even if arguably “an
additional advisement was required before the court accepted
[the conservatee’s] waiver, any such error was harmless” because

both K.R. and her counsel proceeded reasonably in assuming the
March 2 proceeding was simply the statutorily authorized
hearing on the conservatorship petition. At bottom, the record in
this case lacks the requisite facts to warrant a finding of
harmless error under C.O.” (Ibid.)

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the court’s finding that the conservatee was gravely disabled was
supported by the evidence and there was no suggestion that the
outcome would have been different if the trial had been before a
jury. (Id. at pp. *15–*16.)
The same cannot be said here. H.M.’s counsel did not
waive H.M.’s right to a jury on his behalf. H.M.’s counsel made
no representation to the court H.M. was aware of his right to a
jury trial and wanted to waive that right. Although H.M.
responded “[j]udge” when his counsel asked if he preferred a jury
trial or a court trial, that response occurred when H.M. was being
assisted by an Arabic language interpreter when H.M. needed an
Armenian language interpreter. H.M.’s one-word statement
“[j]udge” cannot be characterized as a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his statutory right to a jury trial. Indeed, after the
Public Guardian admitted H.M. needed an Armenian language
interpreter, the trial court postponed trial to obtain an Armenian
interpreter. Even after H.M. had the assistance of an Armenian
interpreter, neither the court nor H.M.’s counsel informed H.M.
of his right to a jury trial or asked whether he was waiving that
right. We therefore reject respondent’s contention that the
totality of the circumstances shows H.M.’s waiver of a jury trial
was knowing and voluntary.
Respondent also argues that “[t]here is substantial
evidence of H.M.’s disorganized thoughts” thus supporting an
“implied finding” by the trial court “to proceed . . . with the court
trial under the circumstances.” The trial court did not rely
(either expressly or impliedly) on “disorganized thoughts” when it
determined H.M. waived a jury trial. Instead, the court expressly
found it would waive jury trial at H.M.’s “request.”

8
In sum, the record does not show anyone informed H.M. of
his right to a jury trial in a language he understood. For the
same reason, we cannot conclude H.M. knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to a jury trial. Absent such a conclusion, we also
cannot conclude the court’s failure to advise H.M. of his jury trial
right in a language H.M. understood was harmless.

DISPOSITION
The conservatorship order is reversed. The case is
remanded for a new trial.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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