CourtListener 10793868•People v. Hepburn-Martin CA6
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Filed 2/13/26 P. v. Hepburn-Martin CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H046342
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1497284)
v.
AVAILEK HEPBURN-MARTIN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
In 2017, a jury convicted Miguel Antonio Cornejo and his codefendant,
Availek Hepburn-Martin, (collectively “appellants”) of two counts of second
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2),1 one count of assault
with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3), and
one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 4). The trial court
sentenced appellants to identical indeterminate terms of 55 years to life
consecutive to determinate terms of seven years.
On appeal, appellants jointly argue that the trial court committed
instructional error in that it: (1) failed to instruct the jury on the second degree
murder charges that it must find they personally acted with malice as aiders and
abettors; and (2) improperly instructed the jury on the now invalid natural and
probable consequences theory of murder liability. Appellants also jointly argue
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
that their convictions must be vacated because the trial court repeatedly used
“racially discriminatory language” throughout the trial proceedings in violation of
the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Finally, appellants argue they are entitled to a
remand for resentencing so that the trial court can exercise its discretion to decide
whether to strike the firearm enhancements imposed in connection with count 1 in
favor of imposing a lesser firearm enhancement and, if this claim is deemed
forfeited due to trial counsels’ failure to object, they each received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
Hepburn-Martin separately argues that, due to intervening changes to the
law of murder, the trial court’s instructions to the jury on felony murder are now
erroneous. Hepburn-Martin further argues that the cumulative impact of the
instructional errors he has raised, both individually and in concert with Cornejo,
deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Finally, Hepburn-Martin contends that the
trial court applied an incorrect standard of review when evaluating his motion for
a new trial.
As we explain below, we conclude that the jury instruction relating to aider
and abettor liability for murder was erroneous as it failed to instruct the jury that it
had to find appellants personally acted with malice, and the Attorney General has
failed to prove that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on
these conclusions, we need not reach appellants’ joint argument that the jury was
erroneously instructed on the now invalid natural and probable consequences
theory of murder liability or Hepburn-Martin’s separate arguments that the court
erred in giving a now-erroneous instruction on felony murder and that the
instructional errors were cumulatively prejudicial. We also need not reach
appellants’ claim that they are entitled to resentencing on the firearm
enhancements imposed in connection with count 1. However, we do not find the
2
trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial or that appellants have met
their burden of proving that the trial court’s comments violated the RJA. We will
therefore vacate appellants’ second degree murder convictions and remand the
matter for possible retrial on count 1 and count 2 and associated enhancements.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Procedure
1. Charges, verdict, and sentencing
On April 7, 2016, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a first
amended information charging Cornejo, Hepburn-Martin, and Tearri Richard with
two counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); counts 1, 2) and three counts
of assault with a semiautomatic weapon (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 3, 4, 5). The
information further alleged that, as to count 1, Cornejo and Hepburn-Martin
personally used a firearm causing death or great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds.
(b), (c), (d)). Finally, the information alleged as special circumstances that the
murders (counts 1 and 2) were committed while the three defendants were
engaged in robbery and burglary as well as that the three defendants had been
convicted of more than one murder in this proceeding. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17),
(3).)
After a jury trial, Cornejo and Hepburn-Martin were found guilty of two
counts of second degree murder (counts 1 and 2),3 and one count of assault with a
firearm (count 4).4 On count 3, the jury found appellants not guilty of assault with
2
This court granted Hepburn-Martin’s request for judicial notice of the
record in the related appeal (H049531, H049539) from the trial court order
denying appellants’ petitions for resentencing under section 1172.6.
3
The jury found both appellants not guilty of first degree murder in counts
1 and 2 and consequently made no findings on the special circumstances
allegations associated with the first degree murder charges.
4
The jury acquitted Richard on all charges.
3
a semiautomatic firearm but found them both guilty of the lesser included offense
of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).
The jury acquitted appellants of the final count of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (count 5). The jury also found true the allegation attached to count 1 that
appellants personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury.
The trial court sentenced both Cornejo and Hepburn-Martin to indeterminate terms
of 55 years to life consecutive to determinate terms of seven years.
Hepburn-Martin and Cornejo timely appealed.5
2. Petitions for resentencing
On April 10, 2019, Cornejo and Hepburn-Martin filed separate petitions for
resentencing under section 1172.6, alleging that the prosecution had proceeded on
the theory that they were guilty of first or second degree felony murder, and they
could no longer be convicted of first or second degree murder under the current
law. The trial court issued an order to show cause, finding that the petitions
established a prima facie case for relief.6 The parties stipulated to admitting new
evidence for the trial court’s consideration in connection with the section 1172.6
hearing. The evidence consisted of certain postings on former codefendant
Richard’s social media accounts, as well as messages and photos found on his
cellphone, from both before and after the murders. The photos showed Richard
holding various types of guns, and the text messages referred to weapons that
Richard was trying to sell. In addition, Hepburn-Martin introduced evidence that,
in 2019, Richard shot and killed someone during a road rage incident.
5
This court stayed the appeals and remanded appellants’ cases to the trial
court for the limited purpose of conducting proceedings pursuant to former section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6).
6
After the trial court issued an order to show cause on the petitions, the
district attorney sought writ relief from this court. We summarily denied the
district attorney’s writ petition by separate order on May 10, 2021 (H048945).
4
At the outset of the section 1172.6 hearing, the trial court presented the
parties with an eight-page “rough written [s]tatement of [d]ecision[,]” asking the
parties to review it and provide their thoughts “so that if I am obviously incorrect
about something, I can fix it now rather than down the road when this matter gets
reviewed.” The district attorney pointed out the decision repeatedly used the
phrase “probable cause” rather than “prima facie case” in discussing the initial
threshold for scheduling an evidentiary hearing on a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The court responded, “I’m old school and I tend to use old
terms, but I'll change that now.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
stated, “The motions are denied” but made no reference to its written statement of
decision as setting forth its findings and reasoning in the matter.7
By separate order dated May 19, 2022, we granted Hepburn-Martin’s
motion to augment the record to include the trial court’s unsigned order. In that
document, the court wrote that the People had proved beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of implied malice second degree murder under current law and that
both Cornejo and Hepburn-Martin were “guilty of implied malice murder in part
as the actual perpetrator and in part as the aider and abettor.” However, the
decision still uses the phrase “probable cause” rather than “prima facie case,”
reflecting that this version of the document did not incorporate the modifications
discussed at the hearing.
This court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying the petitions for
resentencing in a nonpublished opinion. (People v. Hepburn-Martin (Oct. 13,
2023, H049531, H049539 [nonpub. opn.] (Hepburn-Martin)).) By separate order
7
After Hepburn-Martin and Cornejo appealed from the trial court’s orders
denying their petitions for resentencing, this court stayed briefing in the instant
appeal (H046342) pending disposition of those appeals (H049531, H049539).
5
dated January 31, 2024, this court lifted the stay in the instant appeal from the
judgments of conviction.
B. Facts8
1. The prosecution case
a. Alejandro Solorzano’s testimony
Solorzano sold marijuana for Bryan Lang[9] by advertising on Craigslist.[10]
He would arrange for potential buyers to meet with [Bryan] to complete the
transaction. Assuming they negotiated a high enough price, [Bryan] would pay
Solorzano a commission on the sale of approximately $100 per pound. On
average, buyers purchased around five pounds of marijuana from [Bryan].
A couple of days prior to the murders, Hepburn-Martin contacted
Solorzano through Craigslist, and they arranged to meet at a restaurant in San Jose
on the evening of September 23, 2014. The restaurant was across the street from
[Bryan]’s home. Hepburn-Martin told Solorzano he owned a marijuana
dispensary in Walnut Creek, and he was interested in purchasing five pounds of
“Girl Scout Cookies”[11] for $10,000. Solorzano expected that he would make a
8
Except as otherwise noted, the factual recitation is taken from this court’s
prior opinion from the orders denying the petitions for resentencing, Hepburn-
Martin, supra, H049531, H049539 [nonpub. opn.]. Empty brackets [ ] denote
deletions from the prior opinion. Brackets enclosing material (other than parallel
citations) denote insertions or additions by this court, unless otherwise specified.
We include additional facts presented at trial and related to the issues presented on
appeal in connection with our discussion of those issues below.
9
The prior opinion refers to Keith Lang as “Keith” and to Bryan Lang as
“Lang.” To avoid any confusion, we have substituted Bryan’s name in brackets
where appropriate in the factual recitation section and refer to members of the
Lang family by their first names in the remainder of this opinion.
10
“Solorzano initially invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination but testified after being granted use immunity.”
11
“This referred to a specific strain of marijuana.”
6
$1,000 commission on the deal at that price. Although Solorzano told Hepburn-
Martin that he had the Girl Scout Cookies strain available, he knew that [Bryan]
actually had a different strain of marijuana.
Solorzano met Hepburn-Martin in the restaurant’s parking lot and walked
with him across the street to [Bryan]’s house. [Bryan] met them at the front door
and the three men went to his bedroom. [Bryan]’s fiancée, Lisa Luna, was in the
room working on her computer.
[Bryan] brought out some samples of the marijuana, but Hepburn-Martin
did not like them and asked if [Bryan] had anything else. [Bryan] left the room
and returned with three or four more samples. Hepburn-Martin said he needed to
show the samples to his associates.[12] Solorzano and Hepburn-Martin went
outside and walked across the street carrying a small amount of marijuana to show
to Hepburn-Martin’s associates, Cornejo and Richard, who were waiting on the
sidewalk. Cornejo indicated that they would take the marijuana even though they
did not “love [the quality].” Solorzano and Hepburn-Martin[13] walked back
toward [Bryan]’s house. [Bryan] was standing outside and Hepburn-Martin asked
if it was all right if Cornejo and Richard came inside as well. [Bryan] agreed, and
all five men went back to [Bryan]’s bedroom. All of the bags of marijuana were
on the bed and [Bryan] said “ ‘Let’s see the money.’ ” Either Cornejo or Richard
12
“According to Solorzano, when he met Hepburn-Martin in the parking
lot, Hepburn-Martin mentioned he had brought two friends with him who were
waiting in his car.”
13
During trial, Solorzano testified that he walked back to the house that
night with Hepburn-Martin even though he acknowledged, after viewing the
security footage from outside Bryan’s house, that the person he walked back with
was wearing somewhat different clothing than that worn by Hepburn-Martin.
When Solorzano resumed his testimony the following day, he corrected his
testimony and said that he walked back to Bryan’s house with Cornejo, not
Hepburn-Martin.
7
handed a backpack to Hepburn-Martin, who reached inside and pulled out a black
semiautomatic pistol. Hepburn-Martin pointed the weapon at [Bryan] and said,
“ ‘Give me all the weed.’ ”[14]
[Bryan] said, “Ah, shit,” and tried to twist the gun out of Hepburn-Martin’s
grasp. Solorzano said they struggled for 10 to 20 seconds before he heard a
gunshot. Solorzano had his hands up, saying “ ‘Don’t shoot me.’ ” Someone
pistol-whipped Solorzano in the face, and he believed it was Hepburn-Martin since
he was the only person Solorzano saw with a gun that night. Solorzano fell to the
ground and someone wearing boots stomped on his face. Afterward, he saw one
or two people running out carrying bags of marijuana.
Solorzano saw Luna grabbing at [Bryan] and looking at his gunshot wound.
She asked “ ‘What do I do’ ” and Solorzano told her to call the police. Luna had a
mark on her face and Solorzano believed she had been pistol whipped as well.
Solorzano left the house and met with his friends at a nearby pizzeria, then took a
taxi to his friend’s house. He put some ice on his face and spent a couple of hours
watching television and checking Facebook.
b. Lisa Luna’s testimony
Luna had been dating [Bryan] for seven years and frequently stayed at his
house, though she did not live there. On September 23, 2014, she was in
[Bryan]’s bedroom transferring photos from her phone onto her computer. She
was not fully paying attention but heard [Bryan] talking to someone on the phone.
At some point, Luna became aware that three or four other people had entered the
bedroom with [Bryan] though she was not focused on what the men were saying.
14
“On cross-examination, Solorzano admitted that he had never previously
told anyone, including police officers, that Hepburn-Martin made this demand on
the night of the shooting. Solorzano further admitted that he ‘made up this …
story of robbery, because it removes [him] from the situation.’ ”
8
When the tone of the conversation changed, Luna looked up from her computer.
She saw the men were looking at marijuana on the bed and “they weren’t happy
with the way it smelled or something.” Luna paid special attention to one man,
whom she later identified as Cornejo, who was giving [Bryan] “a tone attitude.”
[Bryan] sounded uncomfortable and said he did not understand why
Cornejo was upset because he never claimed the marijuana “smelled a certain
way.” The other men in the room left, leaving [Bryan] and Luna alone in the
bedroom. Luna heard [Bryan], apparently looking at the monitor displaying the
feeds for the security cameras outside the house, say “ ‘Why aren’t they leaving?
They’re still here. ... They’re coming back.’ ” Luna saw [Bryan] leave his
bedroom for about 30 seconds, but then he came back in followed by Cornejo.
[Bryan] was walking backwards with his hands up, as if trying to push Cornejo out
of the room or to push Cornejo’s arms away from him. Luna saw that Cornejo
was pointing a gun at [Bryan].
Luna heard a gunshot as Cornejo fired his weapon and she saw [Bryan]’s
arms drop. Immediately after that shot, Luna was hit in the back of the head but
she did not know who or what hit her.[15] Luna said that she was not aware anyone
other than Cornejo and [Bryan] were in the room with her. At the same time as
she was hit in the head, Luna heard a second gunshot and thought perhaps she had
been shot. She could only hear “faintly” and there was ringing in her ears. Luna
fell to floor between the desk and the dresser. While on the ground, she heard
three or four more gunshots.
15
“Luna was transported to the hospital by ambulance after the shooting for
treatment of her head wound, which was ‘open and bleeding.’ ”
9
After her ears stopped ringing, Luna rolled over and saw Solorzano[16]
standing by the bedroom door. Solorzano had blood all over his face and “looked
like he was shocked.” She then saw [Bryan] on his hands and knees, fighting to
breathe. [Bryan] then collapsed onto his stomach. Luna looked at Solorzano
because she was not sure who he was or what he planned to do, but he just left the
room. Luna crawled over to [Bryan], rolled him onto his back, and tried to
perform CPR. She called 911 and spoke to the dispatcher while trying to continue
CPR. When she heard sirens, she went outside to direct first responders to
[Bryan]’s bedroom.
In the hallway outside [Bryan]’s bedroom, Luna could hear [Bryan]’s
mother, Diane, who was also on the phone with 911. Luna heard Diane tell the
dispatcher that her husband had been shot and her son “was on the ground.”
At the time of the shooting, Luna was not aware anyone else was in the
room besides herself, [Bryan], and Cornejo. Cornejo was the only person that
Luna saw with a gun that night. Cornejo’s gun was chrome, and approximately
seven to eight inches in length. In all, she heard four to five shots fired, but only
saw Cornejo fire the first shot. Luna knew that [Bryan] owned a chrome revolver
at some point, which he kept on top of a piece of furniture near the front door out
of sight. Luna did not know if he still owned that gun on the day of the shooting
and denied seeing it near him when she was attending to him.
c. Diane Lang’s testimony
On September 23, 2014, Diane, [Bryan]’s mother, was in her bedroom
watching television with her husband, Keith, who had fallen asleep. She heard a
thump. At first, she continued to watch television, but when she heard a second
16
“Luna testified she did not know Solorzano and had never seen him prior
to that day.”
10
thump, she turned the volume down and listened. Diane heard a third thump so
she muted the television and went to [Bryan]’s bedroom door but did not hear
anything. She tried to open the door, but it would not open, even though it had no
lock. Diane threw herself at the door with her shoulder and the door flew open.
Inside, Diane saw a light-skinned Black man with a thin face, thin nose, and
average build, approximately 5 foot 11 inches tall, holding a gun pointed at the
floor. The man, whom Diane identified as Cornejo, looked straight at her. Diane
described the gun Cornejo was holding as a black semiautomatic handgun
approximately seven to eight inches in length. She glanced toward the bed but did
not see [Bryan] or Luna. Diane slammed the door shut and ran toward her
bedroom, screaming at her husband, “ ‘He has a gun. Get up. He’s got a gun. Get
your gun.’ ”
Diane ducked into the hallway bathroom and jumped into the bathtub but
realized she had no way to escape if Cornejo followed her. She left the bathroom
and headed toward her bedroom again. She saw Keith in the doorway to the
bedroom and heard a gunshot. Diane started to duck and kept running when she
heard a second shot, saw a flash, and some plates on her dresser shattered. She ran
around Keith and jumped into the bedroom closet.
Diane heard a third gunshot and came out of her bedroom. The front door
to her house was open, and Keith was lying face down on the bathroom threshold.
Diane called his name, but he did not respond. She ran to the kitchen to call the
police and saw Luna and [Bryan] on the floor of his bedroom.[17] Luna was trying
to breathe into [Bryan]’s mouth. Diane called 911 and then ran back to Keith, but
17
“After appellants fled her home, Diane returned to [Bryan]’s bedroom
and saw him lying in the spot where she had previously seen Cornejo standing
with his weapon pointed at the floor.”
11
she could not tell if he was still breathing. She passed [Bryan], and saw he was
turning gray, and heard Luna talking to 911 as well.
Diane heard a total of three gunshots in the house, and believed she heard
two more gunshots outside, after she saw Keith lying on the floor. Before she
originally came out from her bedroom to investigate the noises, she heard three
thumps, all of which sounded like they came from [Bryan]’s bedroom.
d. Police investigation
In gathering evidence at the scene, police discovered a fully loaded .357-
caliber revolver beneath [Bryan]’s body. Police also found a fully loaded black
.38-caliber revolver on the floor next to Keith’s leg. Neither of these weapons had
been fired and no other guns were found in the house.
Inside the home, police found a total of six shell casings and three spent
projectiles. Five of the six recovered shell casings were found in [Bryan]’s room.
Two of these casings were .380-caliber and three casings were .45-caliber. The
sixth shell casing, also .45-caliber, was found on the living room floor directly
across from [Bryan]’s bedroom.
One spent projectile, a .45-caliber bullet, was lodged in the wall behind
[Bryan]’s bedroom door, approximately two feet above the floor. A second spent
.45-caliber bullet was on the dresser in Diane’s bedroom. That bullet had drywall
material on it, and there was a strike mark on the wall of the hallway, which
indicated the bullet ricocheted off that wall before continuing into the bedroom
and landing on the dresser. The third spent projectile, also .45-caliber, was found
underneath Keith’s body. There was a bullet strike mark on the shower tile at a
height of 4 feet 3 inches above the floor. Based on the strike mark and Keith’s
wounds, the bullet hit Keith in the chest, exited through his back, then struck the
shower tile before falling to the floor. Two other projectiles, a [nominal] .38-
12
caliber copper jacket[18] and a .45-caliber bullet, were recovered from [Bryan]’s
body.
The two .45-caliber casings recovered from the threshold of [Bryan]’s
bedroom and from the living room were consistent with the shooter firing down
the hallway toward the bathroom and Diane’s bedroom.
According to a ballistics and firearms expert, the four .45-caliber shell
casings found in the [Bryan] home were all fired from the same (.45-caliber)
firearm and the two .380-caliber shell casings were fired from the same (.380-
caliber) firearm. If the .45-caliber spent projectiles recovered at the scene were
fired from the same firearm as the .45-caliber shell casings, the expert testified that
the weapon used was a Glock .45 automatic [] pistol. The expert also opined that
if the [nominal] .38-caliber projectile found at the scene was fired from the same
firearm as the .380-caliber shell casings, the firearm used was a .380
semiautomatic pistol.
Police found approximately 17 pounds of marijuana inside the house—7.5
pounds in [Bryan]’s room, and approximately 10 pounds in both the family room
and living room. More marijuana was found in a drying room, and there were
approximately 15 marijuana plants growing in the backyard.
e. Autopsy evidence
[Bryan] was shot three times from a distance of at least two to three feet
and the cause of death was “multiple gunshot wounds.” One .45-caliber bullet hit
[Bryan] in the upper back, caused trauma to his spine, lacerated his aorta and the
18
The firearms expert explained that the “nominal caliber of the fired
jacketing simply refers to a family of cartridges it could have come from.” Due to
the damage to this projectile, he was not able to specify its caliber as it “could
have come from a .380 auto bullet, could have come from a .38 special bullet,
could have come from a .357 bullet, 9-millimeter Luger, [or] 9-millimeter short.”
13
left ventricle of his heart, traversed part of his left lung, then exited through the
lower left side of his chest. Based on the bullet’s trajectory and the fact that it was
found lodged in the wall two feet above the floor, it appeared that [Bryan] was
either bent over or on his knees when the shot was fired. Due to the severity of the
damage to [Bryan]’s heart, he would have collapsed and died soon after being hit
by this bullet.
A second .45-caliber bullet struck [Bryan] in his lower back on the right
side, hitting his spine, his left adrenal gland, and left kidney before lodging in his
lower left abdomen. The trajectory of this bullet was nearly horizontal from right
to left and back to front. While the injuries from this shot were serious, they were
not necessarily fatal. Due to the fact that more blood had pooled in [Bryan]’s
chest cavity than in his abdomen, it appeared that the shot which entered his upper
back preceded the shot that entered his lower back. Based on the trajectories of
both bullets, the shooter would have been positioned to [Bryan]’s right.
The third bullet, a [nominal] .38-caliber, entered the left side of [Bryan]’s
left thigh traveling from left to right. The bullet fragmented on the way, but it did
not hit [Bryan]’s femur or major blood vessels and would not have been fatal in
and of itself. Based on the trajectory, it was likely that the shooter was positioned
on [Bryan]’s left side when he fired, but it was possible that, if the other two shots
preceded this one, [Bryan] might have spun around.
[Bryan] also had two injuries, consistent with being struck by a firearm, on
the top of his head. [Bryan]’s scalp was lacerated and his skull was superficially
fractured which indicated that significant force was used. The blows could have
caused [Bryan] to collapse, become dazed or even concussed.
Keith was shot at least once, but not at close range, and the cause of death
was determined to be “perforating … gunshot wound of the chest.” The first
14
injury was a bullet graze on his right hand. The second injury was where a bullet
entered the left side of Keith’s chest and went through his left lung, his aorta, and
his right lung before exiting his right back. The trajectory of the bullet was front
to back, left to right, and slightly upward. Although the injuries to Keith’s aorta
and lungs were fatal, he might have been able to take some steps before collapsing
from blood loss. The bullet strike on the shower tile four feet three inches from
the floor suggested Keith was standing when he was shot and the bullet hit the tile
after exiting his body. It was possible that both the graze wound and the chest
wound were caused by the same bullet, hitting Keith’s hand first before continuing
into his chest. Keith also had abrasions on his right knee and left forehead, which
were consistent with him falling to the floor after being shot.
2. Defense case
[Bryan]’s brother, David, testified in codefendant Richard’s case. On
September 23, 2014, David was living at his parents’ house and he arrived home
from work between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. Diane, Keith, [Bryan], and Luna were all
at home when he got there. After taking a shower and changing his clothes, David
left the house around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. As he was leaving, David saw four or five
men standing near the front gate. [Bryan] was standing by the front door and
seemed a little nervous. David asked [Bryan], “ ‘Is everything okay?’ ” and
whether he wanted David to stay because “ ‘[t]hese guys are kind of fishy.’ ”
[Bryan] patted his hip and said he had things “ ‘under control.’ ” David saw that
[Bryan] had a .357 revolver tucked into his waistband. David assumed the men by
the gate were there to buy marijuana from [Bryan].
Officer Rick Yu testified that, in 2005, he pulled [Bryan] over for a traffic
violation involving tinted windows. While Yu was writing the traffic citation,
[Bryan] got upset and said, “ ‘You’re just a punk-ass Chinaman cop. Without that
15
badge you ain’t shit.’ ” [Bryan] signed the citation and then said, “ ‘You [sic]
punk-ass motherfuckers like you are the ones that need to get killed and shit.
We’ll meet again, motherfucker.’ ” As he said this, [Bryan] made a gesture with
his hand that simulated a gun shooting Yu. Yu arrested [Bryan] for threatening a
police officer and on the way to jail, [Bryan] said, “ ‘Everyday someone dies.
Their family member gets killed and shit.’ ”
3. Final arguments and jury instructions
After the close of evidence, the prosecutor argued that both Cornejo and
Hepburn-Martin, as well as codefendant Richard, were guilty of first degree felony
murder of both [Bryan] and Keith as direct perpetrators or aiders and abettors.
The prosecutor also argued that the defendants could be found guilty of (1) second
degree malice murder of both [Bryan] and Keith as direct perpetrators or aiders
and abettors, and (2) the second degree murder of Keith under the natural and
probable consequences theory as either direct perpetrators or aiders and abettors of
the second degree murder of [Bryan].
The jury was instructed that it could find Cornejo and Hepburn-Martin
guilty of Keith’s murder under one of four theories: (1) as the actual killer; (2) as a
direct aider and abettor; (3) as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; or (4) under the first degree felony murder rule. The jury
found both Cornejo and Hepburn-Martin guilty of the second degree murder of
both [Bryan] and Keith.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Request for judicial notice
Hepburn-Martin sought to augment the record on appeal with the signed
version of the trial court’s 2021 memorandum order denying the petitions for
16
resentencing.19 By separate order dated July 19, 2024, this Court deemed the
motion to augment the record on appeal as a request to take judicial notice and
deferred ruling on the request until consideration of the merits of this appeal.
The Attorney General opposes the request for judicial notice on the grounds
that: (1) the superior court lacked jurisdiction to sign this memorandum order after
remittitur issued on the appeal challenging that order (H049531); (2) “the
unsigned decision is already part of the record, and the signed copy adds nothing
because the decision remains a product of the court’s prehearing views”; and (3)
the memorandum order, prepared in 2021, is not relevant to evaluating whether the
trial court erred in denying the 2018 motion for new trial.
The signed, filed-stamped order is a proper subject of judicial notice (Evid.
Code, § 452, subd. (d)), but we only take judicial notice of relevant materials.
(See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422,
fn. 2 [“any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue”].)
The trial court’s unsigned memorandum order is already part of the record
in this appeal. By order dated September 12, 2024, this court granted Hepburn-
Martin’s request to take judicial notice of the record, which included that 2021
unsigned order, in the appeal from the denial of his petition for resentencing
(H049531). Hepburn-Martin does not explain how the signed, filed-stamped order
is of any assistance in resolving the issues presented in this appeal. He does not
indicate how, if at all, the content of those two documents differs and, if so, what
impact those differences would have on our analysis. We deny the request to take
judicial notice of the 2024 signed, filed-stamped order because it is duplicative of
something already in the record on appeal and not relevant.
19
The document indicates that it was signed on June 24, 2024, and bears a
filed-stamped date of June 25, 2024.
17
B. Instructional error: aiding and abetting
Hepburn-Martin and Cornejo argue that the trial court failed to
appropriately instruct the jury that, in order to find them guilty of implied malice
murder as aiders and abettors, the jury must find that they personally acted with
malice. The Attorney General concedes that the trial court’s instruction was
insufficient but argues that the error was harmless.
As discussed below, we agree that the jury was not properly instructed that,
to be convicted of second degree murder, an aider and abettor must have
personally acted with malice. (See People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972,
982 (Langi) [the previous standard jury instructions on aider and abettor liability
“create[] an ambiguity under which the jury may find the defendant guilty of
aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding that he personally acted
with malice”].) We also conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show
that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required under the
standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).
1. Additional background
a. Evidence of appellants’ mental state
At trial, Luna testified that, just before the shooting, she saw Bryan
struggling with Cornejo, trying to push Cornejo’s gun away so it was not pointing
at him. Luna then heard a gunshot. Diane testified that, when she burst into
Bryan’s bedroom, she saw Cornejo standing there holding a gun.
However, Solorzano testified that Hepburn-Martin was the person who shot
Bryan as Bryan tried to wrestle Hepburn-Martin’s gun away from him. Solorzano
admitted lying to the police when he was initially interviewed about the shootings,
but claimed that he began “telling them [i.e., the police] the truth” when the officer
pointed out that he could be prosecuted.
18
b. Jury instructions on aiding and abetting
Prior to deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
Nos. 400, 401, and 520. As given, CALCRIM No. 400 stated: “A person may be
guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he may have directly committed the crime. I
will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he may have aided and abetted a
perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. [¶] A person is guilty of a crime
whether he committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator. [¶]
Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting
of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred
during the commission of the first crime.”
CALCRIM No. 401 instructed the jury that: “To prove that the defendant is
guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the
commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing the crime; AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact
aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and
abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or
she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime. [¶] If all of these
requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been
present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor. [¶] If
you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to
prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the
defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at
19
the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or
her an aider and abettor.”
Finally, CALCRIM No. 520, in pertinent part, provided that: “To prove that
a defendant is guilty of second degree murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1.
The defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person; AND [¶]
2. When the defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought;
AND [¶] 3. He killed without lawful justification. [¶] There are two kinds of
malice aforethought, express malice and implied malice. Proof of either is
sufficient to establish the state of mind required for murder. [¶] The defendant
acted with express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] The defendant
acted with implied malice if: [¶] 1. He intentionally committed an act; [¶] 2. The
natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3.
At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; AND [¶] 4. He
deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
In his rebuttal argument,20 the prosecutor advanced two theories of second
degree murder liability: (1) direct aiding and abetting “where you have the
defendant with the .380 and the defendant with the .45 and the third defendant
aiding and abetting each other in the second degree murder of Bryan Lang[,]” and
(2) indirect liability for the natural and probable consequences of the “murder of
Keith Lang and the pistol-whipping, [section] 245, and the one for David[21] Lang,
are they a natural and probable consequence of violence to Bryan Lang in the
bedroom? Is it reasonably foreseeable that if you’re going to murder somebody in
20
The prosecutor’s closing argument was focused on convincing the jury to
find appellants guilty of first degree murder under a felony murder theory.
However, the prosecutor indicated he would respond in rebuttal, if appellants
sought to “explain why [they] are only guilty of second degree[]murder.”
21
David was not one of the victims, so we presume the prosecutor meant to
say “Diane Lang,” the alleged victim in count 5, instead.
20
the bedroom, people around might see that, might get -- the violence may spread
to them, that the defendants might want to hurt them to deter them from calling for
help or from interfering? And is it reasonably foreseeable that somebody in the
house might come to their son's aid and get caught in the cross fire [sic].”
2. Applicable law and standard of review
“We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the
independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction,
we consider “ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied
the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” [Citation.]’ ”
(People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028 (Richardson).) We consider
the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume that jurors are intelligent persons and
capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are
given.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
If a trial court incorrectly instructs on an element of a charged offense such
that the error impermissibly shifted or lowered the burden of proof for that
element, the applicable standard of prejudice is the Chapman standard. (See Rose
v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal
constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez), the California
Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising
from an instruction based on an invalid theory or with omitted required elements.
Specifically in Lopez, the California Supreme Court stated that for the error to be
harmless, the state must show “it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for
a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings
21
that would support a valid theory of liability.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 568.) “[W]hile
‘overwhelming’ evidence may demonstrate harmlessness, a court’s analysis of
whether the evidence is ‘overwhelming’ in this context is not as subjective or free-
ranging as that term might imply. Instead, the analysis requires a court to
rigorously review the evidence to determine whether any rational juror who found
the defendant guilty based on an invalid theory, and made the factual findings
reflected in the jury’s verdict, would necessarily have found the defendant guilty
based on a valid theory as well. [Citation.]” (Ibid) “The question here is not the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a valid theory, but its opposite.” (Id. at p.
591.)
“We do not focus exclusively on the evidence favorable to the verdict, and
we do not presume the existence of any facts the jury might reasonably infer in
favor of the prosecution.” (People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219, 243
(Madrigal), citing People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400 (Mil).) “We do not view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. We review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, and in doing so, we do not
reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citations.]” (Madrigal, at
p. 243.) “The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient—even if there is
significant countervailing evidence, and the testimony is subject to justifiable
suspicion.” (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1167 (Valenti),
citing People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) “If a thorough review of
the record shows there is any evidence that a rational juror could find as a basis for
reasonable doubt as to any erroneously omitted element, then the error requires
reversal, even when there is ‘ample evidence’ to support a finding of guilt.”
(Madrigal, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 243, citing Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1166.)
22
“Second degree murder is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree
murder.’ [Citation.] Malice may be either express, i.e., when a defendant
manifests an intention to kill, or implied. [Citation.] “ ‘Malice is implied when
the killing is proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which
are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Thus, implied malice includes an objective
component—an act that is dangerous to life—and a subjective component—the
defendant’s awareness of and disregard for the danger.” (Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 299.) Intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant’s acts
and the circumstances of the crime. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.)
A person can be convicted of aiding and abetting second degree murder
based on implied malice. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990 (Reyes);
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850 [“ ‘[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill
1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second
degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing
can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her
conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life’
”].)
“In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator
is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the
actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-
endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider
and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering
23
act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by
the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit
the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that
the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human
life.’ [Citation.]” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)
3. Analysis
In this case, like in Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972, the jury instructions
failed to apprise the jury that “to be guilty as a direct aider and abettor of second
degree murder, an accomplice must have acted with the mental state of implied
malice. …” (Id. at p. 983.)22 The Attorney General acknowledges that the
instructions “did not expressly make this point,” but instead argues “the omission
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” We conclude that failure to provide the
proper instruction was error and therefore turn to whether the Attorney General
has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.
In People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, the California Supreme Court
discussed circumstances an appellate court may consider in analyzing whether the
failure to instruct on an element of the offense was harmless error. (Merritt,
supra, at pp. 831–832.) For example, was the missing element “accurately
described” to the jury by “both parties”? (Id. at p. 831.) Did the defendant
concede or admit the missing element? (Ibid.) Was “ ‘the omitted element
… uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, …’ [Citation.]”? (Id.
22
In 2023, the Judicial Council added to the pattern instructions CALCRIM
No. 526 (Implied Malice Murder: Aiding and Abetting), which makes clear that an
aider and abettor must personally harbor implied malice. (Jud. Council of Cal.,
Criminal Jury Instructions: Revisions and Additions, Invitation to Comment,
Comments submitted by June 30, 2023, pp. 50-54.; CALCRIM No. 526.)
24
at p. 832.) Finally, does “what the jury, properly instructed, necessarily found
support[] the conclusion that the error did not contribute to the verdict”? (Ibid.)
None of the circumstances discussed in Merritt can be said to apply here.
Neither the prosecutor nor any of the defense attorneys told the jury that it had to
find that Hepburn-Martin and Cornejo personally acted with malice before either
could be individually convicted as aiders and abettors to the murders of Bryan and
Keith. In fact, the prosecutor’s argument was that appellants could be convicted
of murder based entirely on their participation in the drug transaction, regardless
of whether the killings were intentional or accidental.
In discussing the theory of aiding and abetting, the prosecutor explained
that the only intent that mattered was that appellants “intend[ed] to help the person
do the crime.” At oral argument, the Attorney General indicated that “the crime”
at issue was the “life endangering act” of the direct perpetrator shooting the .45-
caliber firearm at both Bryan and Keith, and thus it was irrelevant that the jury did
not know who used which weapon. We disagree that the jury would parse the
instructions to substitute the concept of “life endangering act” (as discussed in
CACLRIM No. 520) in place of “the crime” (as discussed in CALCRIM No. 401).
This is especially so because the appellants were charged with having committed
the murders during a robbery or burglary, meaning that the jury would certainly
read “the crime” in CALCRIM No. 401 as referencing robbery or burglary,23 not
23
In closing argument, the district attorney expressly told the jury that he
was “going to focus on the instructions that I think apply to this case, and that’s
the felony murder with the underlying felonies being burglary and robbery. [¶]
Specifically, I’m going to focus on instructions [CALCRIM Nos.] 540A and
540B, which the Court read to you. I’m not going to spend my time right now
talking about second-degree murder.” He also subsequently told the jurors “you
don’t have to decide who ultimately shot and killed the two victims under this
scenario when you have this underlying robbery …. As long as all three are guilty
of the robbery, any shooting, whether you did it yourself or whether a
coparticipant did it, you’re good for that killing, and that’s first-degree felony
25
the amorphous concept of a “life endangering act” described in CALCRIM No.
520. In any event, the People have the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the failure to instruct was harmless and we see no reason to think the jury read
CALCRIM Nos. 401 and 520 in the way the People suggest.
In addition, appellants never admitted or conceded that they aided and
abetted the fatal shootings of Bryan and Keith, nor did they admit that they
personally acted with malice that night. For his part, Cornejo’s attorney argued
that he shot Bryan, in the leg, in self-defense and, as he was not armed with the .45
caliber firearm, was not responsible for fatally shooting Keith. However, the jury
was instructed that, “In their … closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case,
but their remarks are not evidence.” (Italics added.) The evidence presented at
trial was conflicting as to whether it was Hepburn-Martin or Cornejo that shot
Bryan in the leg with the .380-caliber as he fought for control of that weapon.
As another consideration, the trial record does not reflect uncontested
evidence supported by overwhelming evidence that Hepburn-Martin or Cornejo
individually harbored malice to support a second degree murder conviction under
an aiding and abetting theory. As discussed above, Bryan and Keith were both
fatally shot by a .45 caliber weapon. Luna testified at trial that Bryan was
struggling with Cornejo, trying to keep the gun from being aimed at him, when she
heard a gunshot. Diane, after coming into Bryan’s room, also identified Cornejo
as the only person she saw with a firearm. However, Solorzano testified that
murder.” Finally, just before concluding his argument, the district attorney told
the jury, “The defense [in their closing arguments] did not articulate a second-
degree murder theory to you. But if there was one that they were going to
articulate, it would probably be found in CALCRIM [Nos.] 401 and 402 where
you have—it’s the aiding and abetting scenario where you have the defendant with
the .380 and the defendant with the .45 and the third defendant aiding and abetting
each other in the second-degree murder of Bryan Lang.”
26
Hepburn-Martin was the person who shot Bryan as Bryan tried to wrestle
Hepburn-Martin’s gun away from him. Solorzano also testified that Hepburn-
Martin was the only person he saw with a gun. The only gunshot wound on the
front of Bryan’s body was from the .380 caliber firearm.24 During closing
argument, however, after the prosecutor conceded that he could not prove which
defendant was carrying the .45 caliber firearm, he argued that it did not matter
since the jury could still find appellants guilty of murder under the felony murder
theory or as aiders and abettors. Such a concession by the prosecutor, at a
minimum, reflects that the evidence when presented to the jury left unresolved the
question of whether it was Hepburn-Martin or Cornejo who fired the fatal shot
from the .45 caliber firearm resulting in Bryan’s death.
Similarly, the evidence regarding whether either appellant acted with
malice when Keith was shot was not overwhelming. Appellants entered Bryan’s
bedroom, presumably to purchase marijuana as agreed beforehand. There was no
evidence that appellants knew anyone other than Solorzano, Bryan, and Luna were
present in the house. Once Bryan had been shot, Diane burst into the room, saw
Cornejo25 holding a gun and ran down the hall. As she ran, Diane called out to
Keith, who had been asleep, that someone was in the house with a gun, and Keith
should get his gun. As Keith entered the hallway, apparently with his gun out, he
was shot and killed by whoever was carrying the .45 caliber firearm. This
24
As mentioned earlier, Cornejo’s counsel stated in closing argument that
Cornejo was the person who was armed with and used the .380 caliber firearm on
the night of the shooting. This, by itself, is not dispositive. “Unsworn statements
of counsel are not evidence because unsworn testimony in general does not
constitute ‘evidence’ within the meaning of the Evidence Code. [Citation.]”
(People v. Kiney (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 807, 815.)
25
Again, Solorzano testified that Hepburn-Martin shot Bryan as they fought
over the gun.
27
evidence, at most, gives rise to an inference that appellants knew they might be
confronted by someone who was also armed as they tried to flee the house, but this
is not overwhelming, uncontroverted evidence that whoever was not armed with
the .45 caliber personally acted with malice in aiding and abetting Keith’s
shooting.
It also cannot be said that the jury’s findings on the firearm enhancement
for count 1, pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), necessarily support a
finding that Hepburn-Martin and Cornejo harbored the necessary malice to be
convicted of second degree murder as aiders and abettors. Such a finding does not
establish which person used the .45 caliber weapon and it is also consistent with a
conclusion that either Hepburn-Martin or Cornejo fired the non-fatal shot from the
.380 caliber firearm into Bryan’s leg causing great bodily injury or death.
Therefore, the jury’s verdicts on that enhancement do not “support[] the
conclusion the [instructional] error [on aiding and abetting liability] did not
contribute to the verdict.” (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 832.)
“If a thorough review of the record shows there is any evidence that a
rational juror could find as a basis for reasonable doubt as to any erroneously
omitted element, then the error requires reversal, even when there is ‘ample
evidence’ to support a finding of guilt.” (Madrigal, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p.
243, citing Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1166.) While some of the
evidence presented at trial could have hypothetically supported a finding of
implied malice, there was also ample evidence “that a rational juror could find as a
basis for reasonable doubt” (Madrigal, supra, at p. 243) as to the omitted element
that appellants must have personally acted with malice to be found guilty as aiders
and abettors. Consequently, we find that the Attorney General has failed to show
28
beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error was not harmless as to
counts 1 and 2.26
C. Motion for new trial
Hepburn-Martin argues that the trial court employed the incorrect standard
in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdicts were
contrary to the evidence pursuant to section 1181, subdivision 6.27 The Attorney
General counters that the trial court, in fact, applied the correct standard and did
not err in denying the motion. Because we will order a possible new trial for
count 1 and count 2 for the previously discussed reasons, we address Hepburn-
Martin’s claim of error to the extent it would apply to his remaining convictions
for count 3 and count 4.
26
Because we have concluded that appellants are entitled to reversal of
their convictions on counts 1 and 2 due to the instructional error discussed above,
we need not reach their joint argument that they are entitled to reversal of their
convictions on these counts because the jury was also instructed on the since-
invalidated natural and probable consequences theory of liability. We also need
not reach their joint argument that they are entitled to resentencing on the firearm
enhancement associated with their conviction on count 1, or Hepburn-Martin’s
separate arguments that his convictions on counts 1 and 2 must be reversed
because: (1) there was instructional error on the felony murder theory of liability;
and (2) the cumulative effect of the instructional errors deprived him a fair trial.
To the extent Hepburn-Martin or Cornejo claim that either of the aforementioned
errors also require reversal of their convictions on count 3 and count 4, we need
not and do not consider such claims. No definitive arguments have been made as
to those counts and an appellant is required to supply the reviewing court with a
cogent argument which is supported by citations to the record. We will disregard
conclusory arguments not supported by relevant legal authority. (City of Santa
Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B).)
27
Cornejo also brought a motion for new trial, but he does not join in
Hepburn-Martin’s argument or separately argue that his motion was improperly
denied.
29
1. Additional background
Following appellants’ convictions, Hepburn-Martin moved for a new trial,
arguing, among other things, that the verdicts were contrary to the law or evidence
under section 1181, subdivision 6. While that motion was pending, appellants
petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6.
The court conducted two hearings on Hepburn-Martin’s motion for new
trial in March and April 2018. Just prior to submitting the matter, Hepburn-
Martin’s counsel discussed the standard of review that applies to his motion,
explaining that “as the thirteenth juror, if the Court disagrees with the jury’s
verdict, if it believes that the verdict was contrary to the law or evidence ... the
Court actually extends no evidentiary deference to the jury’s verdict. [¶] … [T]he
defendants are entitled to an independent evaluation from the Court.”
The trial court denied Hepburn-Martin’s motion for a new trial. In
explaining its ruling, the court acknowledged that it “struggle[d] with this because
there is a lot about the prosecution’s testimony that I don’t believe, and obviously
the jury didn’t believe a lot of it either. However, the jury did believe in a
… version of the facts that did come into evidence in a manner consistent with the
verdict[s]. [¶] And I—while I respect the decision of the jury for purposes of the
1181 motion, I’m of my own mind that I believe that the evidence does sustain the
verdict.”
2. Applicable legal principles
In determining a new trial motion brought under section 1181, subdivision
6, the trial court accords no evidentiary deference to the verdict. (Porter v.
Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 133 (Porter).) “Instead, it independently
examines all the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to prove each
required element beyond a reasonable doubt to the judge, who sits, in effect, as a
30
‘13th juror.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, the court considers “the proper weight to be accorded
to the evidence” and then determines whether “sufficient credible evidence”
supports the verdict. (People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633 (Robarge) [“It
has been stated that a defendant is entitled to two decisions on the evidence, one
by the jury and the other by the court on motion for a new trial”].) If the court is
not convinced that the charges have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it
may rule that the jury’s verdict is “ ‘contrary to [the] ... evidence’ ” within the
meaning of section 1181, subdivision 6. (Porter, supra, at p. 133.) In doing so,
the judge acts as a 13th juror who is a “holdout” for acquittal. (Ibid.) Thus, the
grant of a new trial is “the equivalent of a mistrial caused by a hung jury.” (Ibid.)
In its independent assessment of the evidence, the trial court is guided by a
presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict and the proceedings in its
support. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 729 (Fuiava) [trial court should
not disregard the verdict but instead consider the proper weight to be accorded to
the evidence and then decide whether the verdict is supported by sufficient
credible evidence].) The presumption that the verdict is correct, however, does
not affect the court’s duty to apply its independent determination to the probative
value of the evidence. (People v. Dickens (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1252.)
The court has broad discretion in ruling on a new trial motion, and the
court’s ruling will not be overturned absent a clear and unmistakable abuse of that
discretion. (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th 622, 730.) The court abuses its discretion,
however, where it misconceives its duty, applies an incorrect legal standard, or
fails to independently consider the weight of the evidence. (Robarge, supra, 41
Cal.2d 628, 634 [trial court erroneously deferred to jury’s determination of
credibility].)
31
3. Analysis
The record here reflects that the trial court understood and applied the
correct standard in evaluating Hepburn-Martin’s motion for new trial. The trial
court stated that it was denying the motion, despite reservations about some of the
prosecution’s evidence, because the “jury did believe in a … version of the facts
that did come into evidence in a manner consistent with the verdict[s].” The trial
court went on to say that it “respect[s] the decision of the jury for purposes of the
1181 motion, I’m of my own mind that I believe that the evidence does sustain the
verdict.”
We are not persuaded by Hepburn-Martin’s reliance on comments made in
subsequent proceedings by the trial court expressing its concerns about the quality
of some of the evidence presented at trial, particularly Solarzano’s testimony and
the inability to conclusively state which of the appellants was armed with the .380-
caliber firearm and which was armed with the .45-caliber firearm that night.
Those comments, made months after the hearing on the motion for new trial, are
entirely extraneous to our consideration of whether the trial court applied the
proper standard when it denied that motion in April 2018.
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion. The trial court’s statements make clear that it independently assessed the
evidence presented at trial and, while it found some of that evidence not credible,28
“it independently examine[d] all the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient
to prove each required element beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” (Porter, supra, 47
Cal.4th at p. 133.)
28
Since the jury acquitted Richard on all charges and did not convict
appellants of first degree murder on a felony murder theory, the jury obviously
disbelieved at least some of the prosecution’s evidence as well.
32
D. Racial Justice Act (RJA)
Appellants argue that their convictions must be vacated because the trial
court repeatedly used “racially discriminatory language” throughout the trial
proceedings and thereby violated the RJA. The Attorney General counters that the
trial court’s comments did not violate the RJA or, in the alternative, that any such
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the Attorney
General and find that appellants have not met their burden of showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the trial court’s comments violated the RJA.
(§ 745, subds. (a).)
1. Additional background
Appellants assert that the trial court used “racially discriminatory language”
multiple times during the proceedings, including “unredacted use of the N-word
and S-word, comparing appellant[s]’[] language to ‘speak[ing] Jive,’ comparing
Black men with dreadlocks to lions, suggesting that deported persons are liars and
thieves, and referencing the defendants’ skin tone multiple times.” We recount the
specific instances below.
a. Pretrial in limine motions
While discussing whether a potential defense witness could testify as to a
violent encounter with Bryan, the prosecutor mentioned there was “good reason to
believe” the witness to that encounter was “quite possibly deported.” The trial
court remarked, “Deportees are known to have an animus furandi. Intent to
return.” After the court asked itself if it had used the “proper Latin term,” it said
“Oh, animus furandi is intent to steal[,]” and then said, “Animus revertendi.
That’s the term I’m looking for.”
The parties discussed the admissibility of various text messages between
Hepburn-Martin and others. Certain of these text messages contained the word
33
“nigga” and, during the discussion of these messages, both counsel for Hepburn-
Martin and the trial judge quoted from the messages without redacting that word.
In addition, the court addressed the admissibility of a Facebook photo
depicting codefendant Richard and two others, neither of whom were appellants,
at a shooting range. Hepburn-Martin’s counsel opposed admission of the
photograph because Hepburn-Martin’s and Cornejo’s hairstyles were similar to
those of the two other men in the photograph and the jury might be implicitly
biased against appellants. The court stated that, “The hairstyles are pretty generic.
Mr. Donte Clark[29] has long dreads, like half the NFL does these days. [¶] It’s
kind of a cool look actually. Makes them all look like lions.”
Next, the parties discussed the meaning of a phrase, “Where da licks?” in a
text message sent by Richard to Hepburn-Martin before the shooting. The
prosecution argued that the phrase referred to robbery. The defense argued that a
police officer should not be permitted to testify to the meaning of the phrase based
on his conversations with other officers and that the court should not take judicial
notice of a definition that appears in the Urban Dictionary. The court
subsequently expressed that it found it “utterly fascinating that we’re spending this
much time over words.” The court then briefly analogized the discussion to a
scene from “the movie Airplane! with the black men sick from food poisoning on
the plane, and they’re complaining to the stewardess. The stewardess can’t
understand them. And Barbara Billingsley comes up and says ‘Stewardess, maybe
I can help. I speak Jive.’ And she’s talking to him—and there’s subtitles. You
know what I’m talking about; right?” The court then ruled that both parties could
present experts to opine on the phrase’s meaning.
29
The trial court was referring to Donté Clark, who was identified by
Richard’s counsel as a potential expert witness.
34
b. Conferences during trial, outside jurors’ presence
In discussing a text message in which Richard was purportedly trying to
dispose of a stolen gun, the prosecutor pointed out that the message was consistent
with Solorzano’s testimony that, while in Bryan’s room, Richard handed Hepburn-
Martin the backpack from which Hepburn-Martin produced a gun. The court
responded that Solorzano described the person who got the backpack as “ ‘very
dark, very black’ ” but, in the court’s opinion, “all three of [the defendants] are
lighter than I am.”30
During the conference on jury instructions, the court returned to
Solorzano’s testimony that one of the perpetrators was very dark-skinned and
observed, “well, there’s no dark-skinned black man present here.” Then, during
the hearing on the new trial motion, when Hepburn-Martin argued he was not one
of the two shooters, the court again referenced Solorzano’s description and
observed that none of the defendants had very dark skin.
At trial, the parties discussed whether Officer Yu would be permitted to
testify about an unrelated prior incident in which Bryan called the officer a
“Chinaman.” The prosecutor argued that testimony about Bryan’s possible
prejudice against Asians was not relevant. The court interjected with a description
of a television show called Kung Fu, which was set in the “Old West.” The court
indicated that, in the show, when certain persons “refer to a Chinaman [they]
would get karate chopped in the neck.” After the prosecutor responded that he
thought the word was “maybe commonly used” by “our parents and
30
On cross examination, Solorzano confirmed that in describing one of the
suspects to a police officer he stated, “And there was another one that was, like, a
little wide-ish [sic]. He could have been, like, a little Asian. That’s why I’m
looking for someone like that. And the third one, he was just all black, black,
black, black. I’m not trying to be racist or anything.”
35
grandparents,” the court stated, “Well, yeah, they also used words like ‘nigger’
and ‘spick’ and ‘hebe’ and things like that too.”
2. Applicable legal principles
In 2020, the Legislature enacted the RJA “with a stated aim ‘to eliminate
racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays
no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ (Stats. 2020,
ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).) To that end, the RJA prohibits the state from seeking or
obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 945–946.)
Section 745, subdivision (a) enumerates four categories of conduct which,
if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, establish a violation of the RJA. (§
745, subds. (a)(1)–(a)(4).) Section 745, subdivision (a)(2) provides, in relevant
part, that a violation has occurred if “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and
during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement
officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially
discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin,
or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful. This
paragraph does not apply if the person speaking is relating language used by
another that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a racially
neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
“Racially discriminatory language” is defined as “language that, to an objective
observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited
to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the
36
defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical
appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)
Where a defendant’s claims are based on the trial record, he or she may
raise the alleged violation of section 745, subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the
conviction or sentence. (§ 745, subd. (b).) If a court finds a violation of the RJA,
section 745(a), subdivision (e) mandates specific remedies. Specifically, if a court
finds, after entry of judgment, “that a conviction was sought or obtained in
violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence,
find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with
subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).) However, “if the court finds that only
the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the
court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new
sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than
that previously imposed.” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(B).)
Section 745 has been amended several times since its enactment. As
originally enacted, section 745 applied prospectively to cases in which judgment
had not been entered prior to January 1, 2021. (§ 745, former subd. (j); Stats.
2020, ch. 317, § 3.) Under this version of the statute, defendants could raise an
alleged violation by filing a motion in the trial court or, if judgment had been
entered, by filing either a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under
section 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction. (§ 745, former subd. (b);
Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.) The original statute also mandated various remedies
which were specific both to the type of violation found as well as the procedural
posture of the case when the violation was established. (§ 745, former subd. (e);
Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.)
37
Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended section 745 through
enactment of Assembly Bill No. 256 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2022, ch.
739, § 2.) Among other changes not relevant to our analysis, this amendment
made the statute retroactive “[t]o all cases in which judgment is not final.” (§ 745,
subd. (j)(1).)
The Legislature amended section 745 a third time through Assembly Bill
No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2024. (Stats. 2023, ch.
464, § 1.) This amendment added the following language to subdivision (b) of
section 745: “For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim
alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or
sentence.” As a consequence, “[t]he statute now provides that postjudgment RJA
claims based on the trial record may be raised on direct appeal from the conviction
or sentence (including to cases with judgments entered before January 1, 2021).”
(People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 810.)31
3. Analysis
Since the appellants are raising the RJA claims on direct appeal, we are
tasked with reviewing the trial court record to determine whether they have
established entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. We conclude
several of the examples listed by appellants consisted of the trial court “relating
language used by another that is relevant to the case” or were related to certain
witnesses “giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the
suspect” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2)), both of which are expressly permitted by the RJA.
The remaining instances identified by appellants, certain of which could be
deemed incautious, have not been shown to consist of language that, “to an
31
The RJA was amended again, effective January 1, 2026 (Stats. 2025, ch.
784, § 2.5 (Sen. Bill No. 734); Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 2 (Assem. Bill No. 1071)),
but those amendments have no bearing on the analysis of the issues before us.
38
objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias.” (§ 745, subd.
(h)(4).) We consider the specific examples in more detail below, addressing them
in chronological order.
a. Statements made during in limine hearings
While discussing a potential defense witness who may have been deported,
the trial court meant to observe, in Latin, that deportees have an intent to “return.”
The court initially used the word “furandi,” which means “steal,” but quickly
corrected itself, substituting “revertendi.”32 On this record, the trial court’s aside
about deportees (who may be of any race, ethnicity, or national origin) does not
violate the RJA because its comments were not directed at appellants (or to any
cognizable group that appellants may be part of) and thus did not “exhibit[] bias or
animus towards” appellants “because of [their] race, ethnicity, or national
origin.”33 (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
During in limine hearings, the court considered two text messages between
Hepburn-Martin and others which contained a variation on the “N” word, ending
in “a.” During the discussion of whether the text messages should be admitted
into evidence, both Hepburn-Martin’s attorney and the trial court quoted the texts.
However, it is clear that, in using the word in question, the court was “relating
language used by another that is relevant to the case” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2)) and
therefore its usage also does not violate the RJA.
32
We do not attest to the accuracy of the trial court’s Latin.
33
There is nothing in the record which definitively establishes appellants’
race. Luna testified that the three men who came into Bryan’s room that night
were “African American” but also said that Cornejo appeared to be of “mixed”
race. Her testimony was based entirely on this one encounter, however, and is not
conclusive on the matter. Assuming appellants are African American or Black, it
is still their burden to demonstrate that the court’s remarks were “about” their race
or “exhibited bias or animus towards” them “because of [their] race.” (§ 745,
subd. (a)(2).)
39
Another in limine discussion involved the meaning of a phrase, “Where da
licks?” in a text that Richard sent to Hepburn-Martin before the shooting. The
prosecution theory was that these words meant “robbery,” but the defense
contended that these words meant “to hustle and get money quickly,” “drug
deals,” or “different things.”
Therefore, the issue before the court was related to the parties’ competing
interpretations of what this particular phrase, communicated between the
defendants prior to the murder, meant and whether it was appropriate to allow the
parties to utilize a police officer or other experts to testify about those competing
interpretations for a jury. Before reaching a decision, the court analogized the
parties’ lengthy discussion about the phrase’s meaning to a scene from the movie
Airplane! Though the scene in question invokes a racialized and satirical
interaction between a white flight attendant, two black passengers, and a white
passenger in a movie, appellants have not articulated the manner in which the trial
court’s reference to this scene “used racially discriminatory language about the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin” or was “otherwise exhibit[ing] bias
or animus towards” appellants “because of [their] race, ethnicity, or national
origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2); see People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709,
722–723 [assuming defense counsel advised her client to use “slang terms
regarding defendant’s manner of speaking, when considered in the context of
giving advice to testify authentically, we find no violation of the RJA”].)
Although we certainly do not condone the mention of this scene from Airplane! by
the trial court, appellants have not explained how the movie reference, in the
context of the dispute about how the court should allow the parties to use expert
witnesses to interpret “Where da licks?” for the jury, reinforces negative
stereotypes about “Black speech.” Beyond conclusory statements in their briefs,
40
they have not explained how these references to the movie exhibited bias or
animus towards the defendants because of their “race, ethnicity, or national
origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
While such a showing might be theoretically possible, it has not been made
here. The burden is on the appellants, not the courts, to set forth relevant
arguments and supportable evidence under the RJA. Furthermore, appellants
offered no evidence showing how an objective observer would view the trial
court’s reference to the Airplane! scene as “explicitly or implicitly appeal[ing] to
racial bias.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).) On this trial court record, appellants have not
established error under the RJA.
Finally, while discussing the admissibility of a photograph posted on social
media which showed Richard and two other men, neither of whom were Hepburn-
Martin or Cornejo, at a shooting range,34 the trial court commented that the
hairstyle of the man with “long dreads” in the photograph is “pretty generic”
before opining “like half the NFL does these days. [¶] It’s kind of a cool look
actually. Makes them all look like lions.”
We disagree with appellants’ assertion that the trial court “compared Black
men who had dreadlocks to animals (lions).” Again, in setting forth a claim that a
violation of the RJA has occurred, the appellants have the burden of proving that
the trial court used “racially discriminatory language” or “exhibited bias or
34
Hepburn-Martin’s counsel stated that one of the men “kind of has hair
similar” to “Cornejo[’s] hairstyle at the time [of the shootings,] … [whereas] [t]he
other [man] kind of has short hair, which I believe [] Hepburn-Martin had at the
time [of the shootings].” Sergeant Davies testified that Hepburn-Martin’s
hairstyle has apparently always been similar in length (i.e., short) to how it
appeared in court and photographs of Hepburn-Martin on social media did not
show him with dreadlocks. Luna testified at trial that one of the men she saw in
Bryan’s bedroom had hair that went below his ears that “wasn’t dreadlocks” or
“braids,” but was “kind of twisted.”
41
animus” towards appellants because of their “race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(2)). While the court expressed its belief that the dreadlock look
was “kind of cool” and those with that hairstyle, including NFL players, “look[ed]
like lions,” the appellants have not established through the record the court was
associating dreadlocks to a particular race, ethnicity, or national origin.
Specifically, they have not provided any evidence that the dreadlock hairstyle is
limited to being worn only by “Black” men such that the court’s reference to a lion
could have only meant a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin.
Nor does the record reflect that the trial court was in fact “compar[ing]
[appellants] to an animal” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4)). Specifically, there is no evidence
that appellants had dreadlocks at the time of trial or before which might lead to an
inference that when it was referencing “lions,” the trial court was referring to
appellants in any way. For example, appellants have not cited anything in the
record, such as testimony or exhibits, which indicate appellants had dreadlocks.
Appellants have not asked that we take judicial notice of any evidence that
connects that specific hairstyle with African Americans or Blacks in general such
that it could be argued the trial court’s statements were in fact directed at
appellants. Therefore, appellants have not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the language used by the trial court “compare[d] the defendant to an
animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture,
ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)
b. Comments on appellants’ skin tone
During trial, at the conference on jury instructions, and during the hearing
on the motion for a new trial, there were discussions regarding the various shades
of skin color of the suspects. In fact, the testimony of the three eyewitnesses,
Solorzano, Luna, and Diane, as to the skin color of the men they saw that night,
42
was somewhat inconsistent. Solorzano testified that Hepburn-Martin was a “light-
skinned black dude.” Luna described Cornejo as “medium” complected (and
testified the other two men had “darker” skin), whereas Diane described him as
“light skinned.” On each occasion, the trial court commented that, in his opinion,
none of the defendants could be described as “dark-skinned” and all had lighter
skin than himself. The court’s comments, while arguably gratuitous, do not
violate the RJA because they “relat[e] language used by another [i.e., Solorzano,
Luna, and Diane] that [wa]s relevant to the case.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
c. Racial slurs
Finally, we address the trial court’s use of several racial slurs used by
others during a discussion about whether to allow a potential defense witness to
testify that Bryan had called an Asian police officer a “Chinaman.” After the
prosecutor suggested that there was a time in history where that word was “more
socially acceptable,” the trial court pointed out people in the past “also used words
like ‘nigger’ and ‘spick’ and ‘hebe’ and things like that too.” While the trial
court’s recounting of these racial slurs by other people is discomfiting, the context
of the court’s exchange with the prosecutor makes clear that the trial court was
explaining that common usage of racial epithets in the past by Bryan (in his
exchange with a police officer) cannot justify their usage in any era. More
specifically, in finding little credence in the position taken by the prosecutor, the
trial court found that people of that era who directed racially pejorative terms, like
“Chinaman,” toward Asian people, used similarly racially pejorative terms toward
Blacks, Latinos, and Jewish people. Although we do not suggest it was advisable
for the court to provide specific examples of such pejorative and racist terms
spoken by others toward different racial groups, appellants have not explained on
appeal how this alone or in conjunction with any other statements was a violation
43
of the RJA or was directed “towards the [appellants] because of the [appellants’]
race.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
The Legislature enacted the RJA “with a stated aim ‘to eliminate racial bias
from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at
all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ ” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §
2, subd. (i).) Although we do not find appellants have met their burden of
establishing a violation of the RJA on this record, we caution the trial courts that
the interjection of any irrelevant comments about race, ethnicity, or national origin
will be appropriately and carefully scrutinized under the statute. Therefore, we
strongly suggest that judges and practitioners fully appreciate how tangential
references to movies, hairstyles, or language, although possibly not a violation of
the RJA, may still cause our reviewing courts and the public to question the
propriety of making such references or statements in a trial court setting.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgments are reversed, and the convictions are vacated. The matter is
remanded for possible retrial on counts 1 and 2. Following any retrial and
resulting conviction(s), if any, on counts 1 and 2, the trial court shall reinstate
appellants’ convictions on counts 3 and 4 and resentence appellants under current
law.
44
____________________________
WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
DANNER, ACTING P. J.
_____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
The People v. Hepburn-Martin et al.
H046342
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