CourtListener 10789684•People v. Langley CA1/3
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Filed 2/11/26 P. v. Langley CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171870
v.
(Mendocino County
MATTHEW DAVID LANGLEY, Super. Ct. No. 22CR02858)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted Matthew David Langley of perjury and offering a false
or forged instrument — he forged documents and submitted them to the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to transfer the victim’s vehicle to
himself. On appeal, relying on In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651
(Williamson), he argues his conviction for offering a false and forged
instrument must be reversed because he should have been charged under a
more specific misdemeanor statute, Vehicle Code section 20. He also
contends the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings that require
reversal of both convictions. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Stephen Price’s wife, Margaret Price, passed away in March 2020. At
the time of her death, she held title to a 2012 Ford Escape. She never
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transferred title to Stephen,1 nor did he attempt to transfer title after she
passed.
In 2021, Stephen hired Langley to clear and mill trees on his property.
He paid Langley approximately $25 per hour — totaling $5,100 — and
allowed Langley to keep some wood. He also allowed Langley to use the Ford
Escape while working on the property to transport equipment up the half-
mile gravel driveway. But Stephen rejected Langley’s request to obtain the
car in exchange for his services. Langley later stopped working for Stephen,
but he continued to use the car despite Stephen’s many requests for its
return. Stephen warned Langley that if the car was not returned, he would
report it as stolen. Langley did not return the car, and Stephen contacted the
police.
The investigating officer determined that the car was registered to
Langley, not Margaret. A DMV review of the ownership registration
certificate — identifying the legal owner of a vehicle — showed Langley
owned the Ford Escape. The certificate of title — the document, completed
under penalty of perjury, reflecting that the owner is giving up their interest
in a particular vehicle — purported to bear Margaret’s signatures. The
signatures were dated September 15 and 17, 2021, over one year after she
had passed away. A statement of facts, attached to these documents and
completed by Langley under penalty of perjury, indicated the vehicle was
transferred to him as an inheritance and thus exempt from any tax.
An officer contacted Langley at his home and located the Ford Escape
on his property. The officer confirmed that the Vehicle Identification Number
and license plate matched that of the missing car. Langley told the officer he
1 For clarity, we use first names when referring to the Prices
individually. We intend no disrespect.
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earned the car by working for Stephen, and Stephen gave him title. He
acknowledged that Margaret had passed away and admitted putting her
signature on the title. The officer impounded the car.
The Mendocino County District Attorney charged Langley with perjury
and offering a forged instrument. (Pen. Code, §§ 118, subd. (a), 115, subd. (a);
undesignated statutory references are to this code.) The complaint also
alleged he had a prior felony strike conviction of driving under the influence,
with bodily injury. (§§ 1170.12, 667, subd. (e).) Before trial, the prosecution
moved to impeach Langley if he testified with two prior felony convictions —
a 2013 conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or
more, causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)), with an enhancement for
personally inflicting great bodily injury (former § 12022.7); and a 2019
conviction for driving under the influence with a prior felony conviction (Veh.
Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). The trial court determined the two convictions
were crimes of moral turpitude and thus admissible for impeachment
purposes.
In his pretrial motion, Langley requested permission to impeach
Stephen with several convictions — two 1970 felony convictions for burglary
(former § 459), and 1977 felony convictions for robbery (§ 211), rape by threat
(former § 261), and lewd or lascivious act with a child under 14 (former § 288,
subd. (a)). The trial court denied the request after finding that, although
these were all crimes of moral turpitude, their probative value was
substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect — the convictions were
between 44 and 53 years old. It further noted there was no evidence Stephen
had been anything other than law abiding since his last felony conviction.
A jury found Langley guilty of both counts, and the trial court found
the prior strike allegation true. After the verdict, Langley moved for a new
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trial, arguing he should have been charged with a violation of Vehicle Code
section 20 — knowingly making a false statement in documents filed with the
DMV — rather than section 115 — knowingly procuring or offering any false
or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office.
According to Langley, the general statute includes the same conduct as
Vehicle Code section 20, indicating the Legislature intended his conduct to be
prosecuted only under the more specific statute. The court denied the
motion. It struck Langley’s prior strike and sentenced him to three years in
prison for perjury, with a concurrent term of two years for offering a forged
instrument.
DISCUSSION
Langley urges us to reverse his felony conviction for offering a false or
forged document because, pursuant to Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651, his
conduct could only be charged under Vehicle Code section 20, a more specific
misdemeanor statute. (§ 155, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 40000.5.) Generally,
prosecutors may choose to proceed under either of two statutes prohibiting
the same conduct. (People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157.)
But under “the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same
conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended
that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.” (People
v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) It applies when “each element
of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special
statute” or when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the
special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the
general statute.” (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 295–296.) After
independently reviewing this issue of statutory interpretation, we disagree
with Langley. (In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945, 949.)
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Section 115 provides, “[e]very person who knowingly procures or offers
any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any
public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed,
registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is
guilty of a felony.” (§ 115, subd. (a).) Vehicle Code section 20 makes it
“unlawful to use a false or fictitious name, or to knowingly make any false
statement or knowingly conceal any material fact in any document filed with
the [DMV] or the Department of the California Highway Patrol.”
We see nothing in Vehicle Code section 20 indicating the Legislature
intended to supplant section 115 when prosecuting the offering of false or
forged documents to the DMV. True, section 115 is more general than
Vehicle Code section 20 in that “it applies to a broader range of documents
that may be filed in any public office.” (Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 88.)
But section 115 prohibits procuring or offering a forged instrument — a
provision that lacks any precise counterpart in Vehicle Code section 20.
(Murphy, at p. 88; People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 585–586.)
And although it “is not correct to assume that the [Williamson] rule is
inapplicable whenever the general statute contains an element not found
within the four corners” of the specific law, it does not appear from the
statutory context that the way Langley violated Vehicle Code section 20
“would inevitably constitute a violation” of section 115. (People v. Jenkins
(1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502; Murphy, at p. 86.) A person violates Vehicle Code
section 20 by omitting a material fact or including a false fact in a genuine
instrument or document. (People v. Molina (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 221, 226.)
This does not necessarily and commonly result in a filing or recording of a
forged instrument, i.e., a violation of section 115. (People v. Wood (1958)
161 Cal.App.2d 24, 27–28 [“[c]learly, no forgery was involved” for defendant
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filing documents with DMV “containing false statements as to the dates of
[car] sales”].) Vehicle Code section 20 is, in this sense, considerably broader
than section 115. Here, Langley was charged with offering multiple
documents to the DMV to record a fictitious transfer of Margaret’s car and
forging her signature on a transfer of title. He was appropriately prosecuted
under section 115 for offering a false or forged instrument for filing, whether
or not his conduct also violated Vehicle Code section 20.
None of Langley’s cited authorities — which involve making false
statements to state agencies — alter this conclusion, contrary to his
assertions. (E.g., Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 85 [reversing conviction
under § 115 for falsely reporting car as stolen where violation of Veh. Code,
§ 10501 — making or filing a false report of a vehicle theft is a
misdemeanor — would commonly violate § 115]; People v. Ruster (1976)
16 Cal.3d 690, 699 [reversing conviction for grand theft by false pretenses
after concluding defendant’s conduct of “applying for aid under a false
identity” is “apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment
insurance fraud,” prohibited under the Unemp. Ins. Code].) Here, nothing in
the statutes indicates — and Langley fails to identify anything — that
forging a transfer of title is the most common way to violate Vehicle Code
section 20. Nor is there any indication the Legislature intended to limit the
penalty for forgery to a misdemeanor. Reviewing other provisions of the
Vehicle and Penal Code confirms that possessing and using counterfeit and
forged driver’s licenses may be prosecuted as felonies. (§ 470a & Veh. Code,
§ 4463 [criminalizing forging and counterfeiting a driver’s license as a
felony].) In sum, the Williamson rule does not bar Langley’s prosecution
under section 115.
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Next, Langley argues the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting
his request to impeach Stephen with his prior felony convictions. He further
contends this ruling violated his constitutional right to present a complete
defense. Generally, prior felony convictions are admissible to impeach
witness credibility. (Evid. Code, § 788.) But under Evidence Code section
352, the court has the discretion to exclude evidence if it involves “ ‘undue
time, confusion, or prejudice which outweighs its probative value.’ ” (People
v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 932.) A court retains broad discretion to
admit or exclude impeachment evidence, and we uphold its ruling unless
there was an abuse in the exercise of that discretion — an “arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)
We find no such abuse of discretion.
“ ‘Remoteness’ or ‘staleness’ of prior conduct is an appropriate factor to
consider in a section 352 analysis.” (People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
727, 739.) Conduct that is too remote may strongly weigh in favor of
exclusion. (Ibid.) Stephen’s last felony conviction was more than four
decades ago, meeting “any reasonable threshold test of remoteness.”
(People v. Burns (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 734, 738.) The staleness of the
offenses is relevant because, as the trial court noted, he led “a blameless life
in the interim.” (Harris, at p. 739.) On this record, excluding these prior
convictions was not an abuse of discretion. In light of this ordinary
application of Evidence Code section 352, we conclude the court’s ruling did
“ ‘not infringe on [Langley’s] due process right to present a defense.’ ”
(People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 445.)
Finally, Langley argues the trial court erred by allowing the
prosecution to impeach him with two felony convictions for driving under the
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influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23153, subd. (b)) — a 2013
conviction enhanced for personally inflicting bodily injury (§ 12022.7), and a
2019 conviction enhanced with a prior felony conviction within 10 years —
after erroneously deeming them crimes of moral turpitude. (Evid. Code,
§ 788; People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 314–315 [prior felony convictions
involving crime of moral turpitude admissible for impeachment].) The People
concede the 2013 conviction was not a crime of moral turpitude. But
resolving whether the remaining conviction was a crime of moral turpitude is
unnecessary. Even assuming the court erred as to both counts, it is not
reasonably probable that Langley would have obtained a more favorable
result in the absence of the error. (Castro, at p. 319; People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
The prosecution’s case was strong. (People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d
at p. 318.) For Langley’s perjury conviction, he admitted to lying on the DMV
form transferring title of the vehicle — falsely stating the vehicle was a gift
and that there was no purchase price. He further acknowledged lying on the
statement of facts, signed under penalty of perjury, that the vehicle was an
inheritance and could not be taxed. (People v. Kim (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
857, 865 [perjury cases based on a false filing requires omission or
misstatement of fact to be material].) For his offering a false and forged
instrument conviction, he admitted placing Margaret’s signature on the
certificate of title directly under language stating this signature was made
under penalty of perjury. Given his admissions, the exclusion of the
impeachment evidence would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome.
(People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A171870; People v. Langley
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