People v. Iniguez CA4/2

CourtListener 10786719Calctapp10 févr. 2026

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Filed 2/10/26 P. v. Iniguez CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083456

v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI901482)

SABAS INIGUEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael Dauber,

Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.

David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, James M. Toohey,

and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
Defendant and appellant Sabas Iniguez appeals from the order of the San

Bernardino County Superior Court summarily denying his Penal Code section 1172.6

petition for resentencing.1 We will reverse and remand with instructions to issue an order

to show cause and to hold an evidentiary hearing.

BACKGROUND

The facts leading to defendant’s conviction and some details of his sentencing are

taken from his appeal from the judgment in case No. E067733 (People v. Iniguez

(June 16, 2017, E067733) [nonpub. opn.] (Iniguez)).

Defendant worked for a group of drug distributors employed by the Sinaloa drug

cartel. After law enforcement seized 13 pounds of methamphetamine from defendant’s

group, the supplier began demanding payment for the drugs and threatening them and

their families. Defendant’s distribution group responded by kidnapping the supplier and

two of his men, killing the supplier and one of the men, and attempting to kill the other

man. Defendant participated in the crimes by acting as a lookout. (Iniguez, supra,

E067733.)

In 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder (§ 187,

subd. (a), counts 1 & 2), one count of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted

murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 3), three counts of kidnapping for ransom (§ 209,

1 Section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6 without change in the text,
effective June 30, 2022 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For the sake of simplicity, we will
refer to the provision by its new numbering. All further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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subd. (a), counts 4, 5, & 6), three counts of kidnapping for the purpose of committing

robbery and/or murder (§ 209, subd. (b)(1), counts 7, 8, & 9), and one count of

participation in a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 10).

The jury also found true (i) a robbery-murder and a kidnapping-murder special

circumstance in connection with the murder counts (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (B)); (ii)

a gang enhancement as to counts 1 through 9 (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); and (iii) an

enhancement as to counts 4 through 6 for the discharge of a firearm by a principal in a

gang-related crime causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).

After the jury’s verdict, defendant and the People entered into a sentencing

agreement in which defendant received a total prison term of 50 years to life and

dismissal of counts 4, 5, and 6 in exchange for defendant’s testimony against two of his

alleged accomplices. The trial court sentenced defendant in keeping with that agreement.

We affirmed the judgment. (Iniguez, supra, E067733.)

In August 2022, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing that was

opposed by the People. At the February 2024 prima facie hearing, the trial court denied

the petition and defendant appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant argues and the People concede that reversal of the order

summarily denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is called for because the jury was

given instructions that permitted it to find defendant guilty of murder under the felony

murder rule or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and allowed him to

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find him guilty of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences

doctrine. We agree.

A. Statutory Backdrop

In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019) that amended sections 188 and 189 to

significantly limit the reach of the felony-murder rule and to eliminate the natural and

probable consequences doctrine in cases of first and second degree murder as it applies to

aiding and abetting. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The bill also

added section 1172.6 to provide a procedural mechanism for defendants who could no

longer be convicted of murder because of the amendments to petition for retroactive

relief. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.); Lewis, supra, at p. 959.)

The Legislature later amended section 1172.6 effective January 1, 2022, to provide

resentencing relief to defendants convicted of attempted murder under the natural and

probable consequences doctrine. (Sen. Bill No. 775; Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; § 1172.6,

subd. (a)(1); People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)

To obtain section 1172.6 resentencing relief with respect to a murder or attempted

murder conviction, a defendant must file a petition that alleges (i) a complaint,

information, or indictment was filed against defendant that allowed the prosecution to

proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based

solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and

probable consequences doctrine; (2) the defendant was convicted of murder or attempted

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murder following a trial; and (3) the defendant could not now be convicted of murder or

attempted murder because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective

January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

As relevant here, section 189 as amended effective January 1, 2019, provides that

a participant in the perpetration of a robbery or kidnapping (or attempted perpetration of

those crimes) in which a death occurs is liable for first degree murder only if it is proven

that the participant was the either (i) the actual killer; (ii) was not the actual killer but

with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,

requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the first degree murder; or,

(iii) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference

to human life.

Upon receipt of a petition that sets forth the required allegations, the trial court

must conduct a prima facie analysis and hearing to determine the defendant's eligibility

for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) & (c); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

(Strong); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 960.) Although the court should not reject

the petition’s factual allegations without first conducting an evidentiary hearing, it may

make a credibility determination adverse to the defendant if the court’s own documents

refute those allegations. (Lewis, at p. 971.)

We review de novo the trial court's denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima

facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)

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B. Defendant’s Section 1172.6 Petition Seeking Resentencing on His Murder Convictions

Defendant filed a form petition seeking resentencing on his two murder

convictions that set forth the allegations required by subdivision (a) of section 1172.6 and

the trial court appointed counsel to represent him. In briefing submitted for the prima

facie hearing, defendant argued he could not presently be convicted because he was not

present when the murders took place. The People opposed the petition on the grounds

that the jury found true the special circumstances that the murders were committed during

the commission of a robbery and kidnapping and on the ground that defendant was a

major participant in the robbery and kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference.

At the prima facie hearing, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the parties’

argument, the jury instructions, and the jury’s verdicts. The court focused on the special

circumstance robbery instruction (CALCRIM No. 703) given to the jury. The instruction

directs the jury that, if it decides the defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not

the actual killer, then they must consider the special circumstance of murder during the

commission of a robbery or kidnapping and decide (i) if the defendant acted with the

intent to kill, or (ii) whether the defendant was a major participant in the crime before or

during the killing and, whether defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life

during that participation.

The trial court went on to acknowledge that the jury had been given instructions

on the felony murders, including one that “also noted natural and probable consequence.”

The court also said that “there was plenty of natural and probable consequence

instructions” given and that the kidnapping special circumstance instruction included

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natural and probable consequences. Even so, it denied defendant’s petition “based on the

robbery special circumstances, which natural and probable consequence was not given in

that instruction.” In other words, it appears the trial court found that giving instructions

that allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of murder based on theories of liability that

had been abrogated by Senate Bill No. 1437 was harmless because the jury also received

instructions on the still valid theories of being a major participant who aided and abetted

with an intent to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 1172.6,

subd. (a)(3) [no eligibility for resentencing relief if the defendant could presently be

convicted of murder or attempted murder despite the amendments to sections 188 and

189 that became effective Jan. 1, 2019].)

The difficulty here, however, is defendant was convicted in 2012, well before

California’s Supreme Court issued its decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788

(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). Banks clarified the law

concerning major participant findings by identifying a series of considerations to assist in

the inquiry whether a defendant is a “major participant.” (Banks, supra, at pp. 798–804.)

Clark reiterated the Banks elements and substantially clarified the considerations relevant

to determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.

(Clark, supra, at pp. 611–623.)

In People v. Strong, the Supreme Court held that (i) unless a felony murder

defendant was tried after Banks, a major participant finding will not defeat an otherwise

valid prima facie case for section 1172.6 resentencing relief and, (ii) unless a defendant

was tried after Clark, a reckless indifference to human life finding will not defeat an

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otherwise valid prima facie case for such relief. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,

721.) Because defendant was convicted before Banks and Clark, the special

circumstance findings that he was a major participant who acted with reckless

indifference to human life do not preclude him from establishing a prima facie case for

resentencing relief.

C. Defendant’s Attempted Murder Conviction2

As to defendant’s conviction for attempted murder, the parties agree with the trial

court that the jury found true the allegation as charged that defendant committed that

crime willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.

But, as the parties point out, the instructions given to the jury on that issue did not

require the jury to find that defendant personally intended to kill the victim of the

attempted murder. Rather, the jury was instructed that the “defendants” were charged

with attempted murder, a crime that required the intent of “a defendant” to kill and for a

defendant to take a direct but ineffective step to that end. Because the jury was provided

with the abrogated natural and probable consequences instructions and because the

instructions given with respect to the still valid aiding and abetting instructions only

required a finding that one of the defendants harbored and intent to kill, the trial court

erred when it denied defendant the opportunity for resentencing on his attempted murder

conviction.

2 Although defendant’s section 1172.6 petition did not request resentencing with
respect to his attempted murder conviction, that issue was decided by the trial court, and
the parties addressed the issue on appeal and agree that the court erred when it summarily
denied resentencing on that conviction.

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DISPOSITION

The trial court’s orders denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for

resentencing on his convictions for murder and attempted murder are reversed and the

matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an order to show cause and

hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ
P. J.

We concur:

MILLER
J.
CODRINGTON
J.

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