CourtListener 10785285•Velaro v. LG Electronics Alabama CA2/8
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Filed 2/6/26 Velaro v. LG Electronics Alabama CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
VELARO, INC., B336280
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22SMCV02457)
v.
LG ELECTRONICS ALABAMA,
INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Jay Ford, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Atabek & Co., Jon A. Atabek, Nyja A. Prior and Shirin
Ehyaei for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Calvin E. Davis,
Christopher R. Wagner and Crystal W. Yu for Defendant and
Respondent.
___________________________
Velaro, Inc. (Velaro), sued LG Electronics Alabama, Inc.
(LG), for breach of contract and services rendered. The trial court
granted LG’s motion to dismiss the operative first amended
complaint based on improper forum, as the contract underlying
Velaro’s claims contained a forum selection clause mandating
resolution of all disputes arising thereunder in Alabama. After
entry of judgment in its favor, LG moved for attorney fees under
Code of Civil Procedure sections 1021, 1032, and 1033.5. In the
alternative, LG also sought fees under Civil Code section 1717. 1
The trial court awarded LG the attorney fees it incurred in
litigating its motion to dismiss. Noting LG was not the party
prevailing on the contract for purposes of section 1717, the court
determined LG was nonetheless entitled to its fees under sections
1021, 1032, and 1033.5. It found the attorney fee provision in the
parties’ contract broadly authorized an award of fees for the
prevailing party in any dispute arising under the contract,
including the application of the contract’s forum selection clause.
Velaro seeks reversal of the attorney fee award. It asserts
section 1717 alone governs all attorney fee motions arising from
contract claims and, therefore, LG was not entitled to its fees
because it was not the “prevailing party on the contract” per the
applicable statutory definition. (§ 1717, subd. (b)(1).) Velaro also
argues that, if allowed to stand, the attorney fee award in this
case will pave the way for inconsistent and absurd outcomes.
We find these contentions unpersuasive, and we affirm.
1 Except for references to Civil Code section 1717, which we
will refer to as “section 1717,” all undesignated statutory
references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
BACKGROUND
I. The Live Chat Agreement
LG services and sells parts and accessories for LG products
in the United States. Velaro is a technology corporation that
provides live-chat, traffic monitoring, consulting, and customer
services to clients.
In 2008, LG executed an agreement to purchase a license
for Velaro’s software application enabling real-time
communication between LG’s customers and staff on its website
(Live Chat Agreement). The Live Chat Agreement had the
following forum selection clause and choice of law provision:
“This Agreement shall be governed by, construed, interpreted and
enforced according to the laws of the State of Alabama and of the
United States of America, without regard to principles of conflict
of laws and rules. Each party hereby consents to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Alabama and United
States Federal Courts located in Alabama to resolve any dispute
arising out of this Agreement.”
The Live Chat Agreement remained in place for the next
14 years and was amended periodically. Relevant to this appeal
is the parties’ February 2022 amendment adding the following
attorney fee provision: “ ‘The prevailing party in any dispute or
proceeding arising hereunder shall be entitled to recover its costs
and expenses incurred therein (including reasonable attorneys’
fees and expenses).’ ”
II. The Underlying Action
In November 2022, Velaro sued LG for breach of contract
and services rendered. Its operative first amended complaint
(FAC) alleged LG terminated the Live Chat Agreement prior to
the expiration of the two-year term to which the parties had
3
recently agreed and refused to pay the full amount due. The FAC
further alleged that sometime after May 26, 2021, LG’s Digital
Channel Operations Manager clicked through an updated version
of a “ ‘Terms of Service’ ” agreement, which contained a forum
selection clause and choice of law provision requiring the parties’
disputes to be resolved in Los Angeles and under California law,
respectively. According to the FAC, the click-through agreement
superseded the Live Chat Agreement’s forum selection clause and
choice of law provision.
In January 2023, LG moved to dismiss the FAC under
sections 410.30 and 418.10 based on the Live Chat Agreement’s
forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion in
April 2023, and a judgment of dismissal was entered in LG’s
favor in May 2023.
III. LG’s Motion for Attorney Fees
In July 2023, LG filed a motion for attorney fees under
sections 1021, 1032, and 1033.5. In the alternative, LG sought to
recover its attorney fees under section 1717. Arguing it was a
prevailing party under both section 1032 and section 1717, LG
asserted entitlement to the $64,000 in fees it incurred in
defending the underlying case.
In October 2023, the trial court awarded LG the attorney
fees it incurred in litigating its motion to dismiss. In support of
its ruling, the court first observed that under DisputeSuite.Com,
LLC v. Scoreinc.com (2017) 2 Cal.5th 968 (DisputeSuite), LG
“is clearly not the prevailing party under Civil Code § 1717”
because it “merely obtained a dismissal of [the underlying] . . .
action” and “ha[d] yet to prevail on the contract dispute between
the parties.” Immediately thereafter, however, the trial court
acknowledged LG “only argue[d] Civil Code § 1717 in the
4
alternative” and “primarily argue[d] it is entitled to recover fees
under” sections 1021, 1032 subdivision (b), and 1033.5,
subdivision (a). In analyzing LG’s entitlement to fees under
those provisions, the court noted the breadth of the Live Chat
Agreement’s attorney fee provision, which “encompasses any
dispute” thereunder, “including any dispute over the
interpretation and enforcement of a specific provision.” The court
concluded that because LG “prevailed on its motion to dismiss
based on the forum selection clause[,]” LG was “entitled to
recover those fees incurred in litigating the motion to dismiss
only.”
Velaro timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
A. Statutory Framework – Attorney Fees
“Under the American rule, each party to a lawsuit
ordinarily pays its own attorney fees. [Citation.] Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021, which codifies this rule, provides: ‘Except
as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the
measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors
at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the
parties . . . .’ In other words, section 1021 permits parties to
‘ “contract out” of the American rule’ by executing an agreement
that allocates attorney fees. [Citations.] Thus, ‘ “[p]arties may
validly agree that the prevailing party will be awarded attorney
fees incurred in any litigation between themselves, whether such
litigation sounds in tort or in contract.” ’ ” (Mountain Air
Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th
744, 751 (Mountain Air).)
5
Sections 1032 and 1717 are “[t]he two basic statutes
regularly employed by the courts to award fees in contract
cases . . . .” (Sears v. Baccaglio (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1139
(Sears).) These statutes “differ in their analytic approach to the
issue” (ibid) but ultimately “provide[ ] complementary discretion
for the award of statutory costs, including fees where they may be
properly considered as costs.” (Id. at p. 1158.)
Section 1032, subdivision (b) provides: “Except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”
For purposes of section 1032,“ ‘[p]revailing party’ includes . . . a
defendant in whose favor dismissal is entered . . . .” (§ 1032,
subd (a)(4).) When authorized by contract, statute, or law,
attorney fees are recoverable as costs under section 1032.
(§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)
Section 1717, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically
provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to
enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties
or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be
the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the
party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Ibid.,
italics added.) Thus, “[b]y its terms . . . , Civil Code section 1717
has a limited application. It covers only contract actions, where
the theory of the case is breach of contract, and where the
contract sued upon itself specifically provides for an award of
attorney fees incurred to enforce that contract.” (Xuereb v.
Marcus & Millichap, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342
(Xuereb); Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
6
984, 993 (Maynard) [recognizing section 1717’s limited
application].)
For purposes of section 1717, “the party prevailing on the
contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the
action on the contract.” (§ 1717, subd. (b)(1).) Fees awarded
under section 1717 “are allowable costs under Section 1032 as
authorized by” subdivision (a)(10)(A). (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(5)(B).)
B. Standard of Review
“ ‘ “On review of an award of attorney fees after trial, the
normal standard of review is abuse of discretion. However, de
novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the
determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney
fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to
statutory construction and a question of law.” ’ [Citations.] In
other words, ‘it is a discretionary trial court decision on the
propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, but
a determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award is a
question of law to be reviewed de novo.’ ” (Mountain Air, supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 751.)
Here, “the material facts are largely not in dispute” and, as
discussed below, Velaro’s arguments present questions of law
regarding the legal basis for LG’s fee award. (Mountain Air,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 751.) Thus, “our review is de novo.” (Ibid.)
II. Analysis
A. Velaro Has Not Shown Civil Code Section 1717
Alone Governs All Fee Motions in Contract
Cases
Velaro argues that per Sears, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 1136,
and the plain language of section 1021, “all motions for attorneys’
fees arising from contract claims are governed by the definition of
7
‘prevailing party’ set forth in . . . [section] 1717.” Further, Velaro
contends, under Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 698 (Exxess), the broad language of the Live Chat
Agreement’s attorney fee provision does not render section 1717
inapplicable. Velaro therefore asserts that pursuant to
section 1717, subdivision (b) and our Supreme Court’s
interpretation thereof in DisputeSuite, supra, 2 Cal.5th 968, LG
was not a “prevailing party on [a] contract” entitled to attorney
fees, such that reversal is required. (See DisputeSuite, at p. 976
[defendant who successfully enforced forum selection clause in
the parties’ contract was not the “prevailing party on the
contract” under section 1717 because the lawsuit had since been
refiled and remained pending in the proper forum].)
As discussed below, we reject Velaro’s contentions as
unsupported by the authorities on which they rely.
As an initial matter, we note that the Supreme Court in
DisputeSuite considered only a claim for attorney fees made
under section 1717. (See DisputeSuite, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 971
[“we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that defendants were not prevailing parties for purposes
of section 1717”].) DisputeSuite contains no discussion or
analysis of any claim for attorney fees pursuant to sections 1021,
1032, and 1033.5. Therefore, DisputeSuite is dispositive as to the
section 1717 claim, but not as to the alternative claim for
attorney fees, upon which the trial court ultimately relied here.
Contrary to Velaro’s assertion, Sears did not hold that
section 1717 governs all attorney fee motions arising in the
context of contract claims. There, the Court of Appeal addressed
a limited question: “Can a party denied additional damages on
his cross-complaint, and ordered to return part of a payment on
8
the complaint, be considered the ‘prevailing party’ entitled to
attorney’s fees pursuant to section 1717?” (Sears, supra,
60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139.) The court answered this question
affirmatively and concluded that “[a] party can fail to recover a
net monetary judgment and yet prevail for purposes of collecting
fees in an action founded in contract.” (Ibid.)
In so doing, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s
contention that “the Code of Civil Procedure provides the only
statutory basis permitting an award of attorney fees in th[e] case”
before it. (Sears, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1142.) After
analyzing section 1717’s legislative history, as well as
section 1032, the court explained the relationship between these
statutes as follows: “[S]ection 1717’s definition of prevailing
party depends upon an equitable determination of which party
obtained ‘a greater relief in the action’ [citation] and permits the
court to find no party prevailed. . . . [S]ection 1032 requires a
prevailing party to be identified but also allows the court, in its
discretion, to determine how the section may apply and, in those
‘situations other than as specified,’ [citation] to fix the amount of
costs to be received or apportioned between the parties. Thus,
section 1032 does not supplant or conflict with section 1717, but
rather provides complementary discretion for the award of
statutory costs, including fees where they may properly be
considered as costs.” (Id. at p. 1158.)
In short, based on the unique outcome in the trial court
proceedings in question, the appellate court in Sears discerned no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney fees to
the defendant under section 1717. (Sears, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1139, 1143, 1159.) The Sears court did not hold
9
section 1717 applies to all fee motions arising from contract
claims.
We acknowledge that, as Velaro observes, the Sears court
made the following remark while harmonizing sections 1717 and
1032: “Section 1717 is the applicable statute when determining
whether and how attorney’s fees should be awarded under a
contract.” (Sears, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) But “[a]n
appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the
court’s opinion but only ‘for the points actually involved and
actually decided.’ ” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599,
620.) Accordingly, considering the facts, the specific question
considered, and the conclusions reached in Sears, we conclude it
does not—as Velaro contends—“h[o]ld that all motions for
attorneys’ fees arising from contract claims are governed by the
definition of ‘prevailing party’ set forth in” section 1717.
Nor would such a holding be consistent with other relevant
cases. In Maynard, plaintiff Catherine Maynard prevailed on her
negligence claim against broker BTI, but the trial court found for
BTI on all other claims, including contract causes of action.
The trial court awarded attorney fees to Maynard as the
prevailing party with a “ ‘net judgment against BTI.’ ” (Maynard,
supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 989.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on the broad
language of the attorney fee agreement in the contract, which
authorized an award of attorney fees concerning “any dispute[.]”
“If the contractual provision limits an award of attorney fees to
the party who has prevailed on the contract, fees may be awarded
only to that party, and [section 1717] is invoked.” (Maynard,
supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 990.) On the other hand, where the
contractual fee provision is broader, section 1717 is not
10
controlling. “While prevailing on the contract is alone significant
if the attorney fee provision limits fee entitlement to the party
prevailing on the contract claim, it is not controlling if the
provision authorizes fees to the party prevailing in the resolution
of the entire controversy.” (Maynard, at p. 993.)
“An agreement to pay attorney fees to the prevailing party
in an action not governed by [section 1717] or some other statute
is controlled by the more general provisions found in the Code of
Civil Procedure.” (Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 993–
994.) Applying those “general provisions,” the appellate court
concluded that plaintiff was the prevailing party pursuant to
section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) because she obtained a net
recovery in the action.
Thus, neither Sears nor Maynard support Velaro’s
assertion that section 1717 is the exclusive mechanism for
analyzing all motions for attorney fees arising from contract
claims. We likewise reject Velaro’s contention that sections 1021
and 1033.5 demonstrate section 1717’s unequivocal application to
all fee motions arising in contract cases.
Section 1021 states: “Except as attorney’s fees are
specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of
compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the
agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to
actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter
provided.” (Ibid.) As noted above, the statute’s first clause
codifies the American rule and permits parties to contract out of
it. (§ 1021; Mountain Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 751.) The
statute’s second clause, read in context with the first, provides
that regardless of how attorney fees are allocated, parties are
entitled to their costs as set forth in the subsequent statutory
11
provisions. (§ 1021.) Section 1033.5 clarifies that attorney fees
authorized by contract, statute, or law, including fees awarded
under section 1717, are recoverable as costs, rather than
damages. (§ 1033.5, subds. (a)(10), (c)(5)(B); Sears, supra,
60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150 [Legislature added section 1033.5 to
confirm attorney fees awarded under a contract “must be claimed
as costs” rather than “treated as damages”].) Nothing in the
unambiguous language of these statutes, nor the caselaw
explaining their respective purposes, demonstrates “[s]ection
1717 applies to all fee motions arising from contract claims,
regardless of which code section the motion is filed under[,]”
as Velaro contends.
Similarly, Exxess does not support Velaro’s position that no
matter the language of the attorney fee provision, parties cannot
avoid section 1717’s application. Exxess stemmed from litigation
involving the parties to a commercial lease and their dual-agent
broker. (Exxess, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 702–703.)
Ultimately, the lessor dismissed its complaint against the lessee
and, per a settlement agreement, the lessee dismissed its cross-
complaint against the lessor and the broker. (Id. at pp. 703–704.)
Thereafter, the broker successfully moved for an award of
attorney fees. (Id. at p. 705.)
The Court of Appeal reversed the fee award. (Exxess,
supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 702, 716.) In support of its holding,
it first observed section 1717 governed the broker’s fee request as
to the lessee’s declaratory relief claim, reasoning the claim was
“ ‘on the contract’ for purposes of section 1717” because the lessee
“requested that the trial court determine the parties’ rights and
duties under the lease.” (Exxess, at p. 707.) The court then
acknowledged that in contrast to section 1717, subdivision (b)(2),
12
which states there is no prevailing party in cases dismissed by
way of settlement, the lease broadly defined the term “ ‘prevailing
party’ ” to “contemplate[ ] an award of attorneys’ fees to a cross-
defendant who is dismissed as a result of a settlement.” (Exxess,
at p. 707.) But, the court explained, section 1717’s “definition of
‘prevailing party’ . . . is mandatory and cannot be altered or
avoided by contract.” (Exxess, at p. 707.) Thus, the court
reasoned, the lease provisions “conflict[ing] with the ‘prevailing
party’ definition under section 1717 are void” and, therefore,
“despite the language of the lease, no attorneys’ fees [could] be
awarded with respect to the [lessee’s] claim for declaratory
relief.” (Id. at pp. 707–708, fn. omitted.)
In other words, the appellate court in Exxess held that
where section 1717 applies, parties cannot circumvent the
statute, including its definitions and other restrictions on
entitlement to attorney fees thereunder, by contractually
agreeing to contrary provisions. (Exxess, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 707–708.) But as noted above, “section 1717 has a limited
application” and “covers only contract actions, where the theory
of the case is breach of contract, and where the contract sued
upon itself specifically provides for an award of attorney fees
incurred to enforce that contract.” (Xuereb, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1342; § 1717, subd. (a).)
The attorney fee provision in Exxess tracked section 1717’s
language and fell squarely within its purview. It stated, in
relevant part: “ ‘If any Party or Broker brings an action or
proceeding to enforce the terms hereof or declare rights hereunder,
the Prevailing Party . . . or Broker in any such proceeding action,
or appeal thereon shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.’ ”
(Exxess, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 702–703, italics added.)
13
By contrast, the fee provision here does more than award
attorney fees to the party prevailing in an action seeking to
enforce the Live Chat Agreement. Specifically, the Live Chat
Agreement broadly states: “ ‘The prevailing party in any dispute
or proceeding arising hereunder shall be entitled to recover its
costs and expenses incurred therein (including reasonable
attorneys’ fees and expenses).’ ” (Italics added.) Exxess is
inapposite and does not assist Velaro in demonstrating reversible
error.
The analysis in Thompson v. Miller (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
327 (Thompson) is more instructive. In Thompson, plaintiff
shareholders entered into a Share Purchase Agreement with
defendant Miller containing the following attorney fee clause:
“ ‘The prevailing party in any dispute under this Agreement shall
be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees incurred in such
dispute.’ ” (Id. at p. 333.) Plaintiffs filed suit against Miller
alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and elder abuse. (Id. at
p. 332.) At trial, Miller pointed to language in the Share
Purchase Agreement confirming that plaintiffs were not relying
on Miller’s representations as a defense to plaintiff’s claims. The
jury returned a verdict for defendant Miller. (Id. at p. 329.)
After trial, Miller moved for attorney fees, and the trial
court denied the motion, relying on Exxess and finding that the
attorney fee provision was not “broad enough to encompass
plaintiffs’ tort claim.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at
p. 334.) The Court of Appeal reversed, noting the difference
between the language in Exxess (“an ‘action’ to enforce the
contract”) and the language in the Share Purchase Agreement
(“a ‘dispute under’ the agreements”). (Thompson, at p. 335,
italics omitted.) “A major difference between the two provisions
14
is the term ‘dispute’ instead of ‘action.’ Another difference is
Exxess Electronixx dealt with an action to enforce the terms of a
contract; we deal with a dispute ‘under’ a contract.” (Ibid.)
“While ‘dispute’ includes a conflict giving rise to an action,
it is not necessarily limited to such a conflict. As a matter of
plain language, whether plaintiffs’ tort claims are defeated by
their statements in the agreements that they did not rely on
Miller’s representations is a dispute—that is, a conflict or
controversy—under the Share Purchase Agreements . . . . Any
conflict concerning the effect of the agreements gives rise to a
right to an attorney fees award by the prevailing party.”
(Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 337.)
Here, similar to the broad clauses in Maynard and
Thompson, the attorney fee clause applies to “any dispute or
proceeding arising hereunder.” This provision is broad enough to
encompass the dispute between Velaro and LG regarding the
proper forum for litigation, as the trial court correctly found.
In sum, for the reasons discussed above, Velaro has not
demonstrated that section 1717 governs all motions concerning
contractual attorney fee provisions. Nor has it shown that
section 1717 applies on the facts of this case. We therefore reject
Velaro’s contention that reversal is required because LG was not
the “party prevailing on the contract” under section 1717,
subdivision (b).
B. Affirmance of LG’s Attorney Fee Award Will
Not Lead to Inconsistent or Absurd Results
Next, although not entirely clear, Velaro appears to assert
that, if upheld on appeal, the attorney fee award in this case will
pave the way for “inconsistent and absurd results.” Endeavoring
to illustrate its point in the context of this case, Velaro notes it
15
filed a new action in Alabama in April 20232 and asserts:
“If [Velaro] ultimately prevails on its claims in Alabama, the trial
court there must consider whether [Velaro] is the ‘prevailing
party’ under . . . [section] 1717. When doing so, that trial court
will also have to decide whether to award [Velaro] its fees for the
very same motion to dismiss and attorney fee motion that the
underlying trial [sic] awarded to [LG].” Further, in its reply
brief, Velaro asserts that it ultimately prevailed on the merits in
Alabama.
We are not persuaded by Velaro’s argument for two
reasons. First, it incorrectly treats the Alabama action as a
continuation of the underlying case. Although the Alabama case
concerns the same claims and allegations set forth in Velaro’s
FAC, the two matters are separate and distinct, with the
underlying case having come to a close upon entry of the
judgment of dismissal in LG’s favor.
Second, Velaro assumes the parties’ future disputes over
attorney fees will require application of section 1717. Absent any
explanation grounded in law or the record on Velaro’s part, we do
not see why California law will govern the parties’ entitlement to
fees in a case litigated in Alabama under Alabama law as
required under the Live Chat Agreement.
2 Velaro’s December 26, 2024 request for judicial notice of the
Alabama complaint (filed on April 20, 2023) is hereby granted.
Velaro’s August 6, 2025 and December 18, 2025 requests for
judicial notice of documents filed in the Alabama case during the
pendency of this appeal are denied as irrelevant.
16
Finally, we note Velaro’s concern that if affirmed, the fee
award in this case will pave the way for “competing fee motions,
one by the party who purports to have prevailed ‘on balance’
under Section 1717, and the other by the party who prevailed
under the putative brightline standard of Section 1032(a)(4)
argued by [LG]. Permitting competing fee motions will inevitably
lead to inconsistent rulings between trial courts, where both
parties could claim fee awards for the same litigation.”
This argument misunderstands the nature of LG’s fee
motion as well as the nuanced nature of the trial court’s ruling.
Here, LG moved for attorney fees primarily under sections 1021,
1032, and 1033.5 and only sought fees under section 1717 in the
alternative. In granting LG’s motion, the trial court recognized
LG could not recover attorney fees based on its alternative
theory, but found LG entitled to its fees “incurred in litigating the
motion to dismiss only” per its primary theory. The court
correctly arrived at this conclusion because, as discussed above,
sections 1021 and 1032—rather than section 1717—apply here.
The trial court did not “face competing fee motions.”3
3 Although “competing fee motions” were not at issue in this
case, we note that the trial courts routinely face such motions at
the conclusion of litigation. (See, e.g., Maynard, supra, 216
Cal.App.4th at p. 989 [after trial court’s decision on the merits,
both plaintiff and defendant sought attorney fees, each alleging it
was the prevailing party].)
17
DISPOSITION
The order granting LG’s motion for attorney fees is
affirmed. LG shall recover its costs on appeal.
UZCATEGUI, J.*
We Concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, appointed
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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