People v. Barron CA2/3

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Filed 2/5/26 P. v. Barron CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B328972

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA123877
v.

LARRY DARNELL BARRON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David C. Brougham, Judge. Sentence
vacated; remanded with instructions.

Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Xiomara Costello and Nancy Lii Ladner,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Larry Darnell Barron of the first degree
murder of Luis Padilla, assault with a firearm on Martha Padilla,
the attempted robberies of Luis and Martha, the robberies
of Freddy Gamino and Eduardo Cruz, and being a felon
in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Barron contends the
prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument and
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero
motion.1 Barron also argues the court should have exercised
its discretion to strike or dismiss one or more of his firearm
enhancements.
We reject Barron’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct and
find no abuse of discretion in the denial of his Romero motion.
However, we vacate his sentence and remand the matter for
further proceedings on the firearm enhancements under Penal
Code section 1385, subdivision (c).2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The robberies and shooting
Around 9:20 p.m. on January 3, 2020, Eduardo Cruz was
outside his apartment complex in Pomona. His friend Freddy
Gamino was with him. Cruz saw a group of six or seven African
American men yelling at a Hispanic man who had come into the
complex. One of the African American men “came at” Cruz and
Gamino. He was thin with tattoos and braids. He was carrying
a handgun, and he hit Cruz on the forehead with it, yelling,
“ ‘What hood are you from?’ ”

1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
2 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.

2
The man told Cruz “[t]o bring out everything that [he] had.”
Cruz took the keys to his truck and some money out of his
pockets and handed it over to the man. The man then went
toward Gamino. He pointed the gun at Gamino’s head and pulled
the trigger, but “[t]he bullet did not come out.” The man took
Gamino’s wallet.
Martha Padilla Serbin and her son Luis were in the
courtyard of the apartment complex at about the same time.
They were collecting cans from the dumpster. Martha saw about
six Black men “hitting a guy.” Two of the Black men then
approached Martha and Luis. One of them had “[v]ery curly”
shoulder-length hair. He was wearing a red hat.
The man asked Martha if she’d “taken any photos or
videos of him.” He demanded her cell phone. He was yelling;
he put the gun to Martha’s forehead “[s]everal times.” He hit her
“[h]ard” with the gun and punched her in the stomach.
The man felt the outside of Martha’s jacket pockets.
He “started to threaten [her] that he was going to kill [her]
son.” The man called Martha a “bitch” and a “motherfucker.”
He aimed his gun at Luis’s head and said, “Boom.” The man
searched Luis’s pockets.
Luis told the man not to harm them—“[t]hat we were not
doing anything to him.” In Spanish, Martha told the man not
to harm her or her son. The man replied, “ ‘Don’t speak Spanish,
bitch.’ ” The man pushed Luis and Luis fell to his knees. Luis
asked him not to shoot. The man put the gun to Luis’s head and
asked Martha if she “wanted to see how he was going to kill [her]
son, bitch.” Then he “went again boom,” and then “made some
signal with his fingers that he was from a very dangerous gang.”

3
Martha hugged Luis so the man would shoot her instead
of Luis. Martha “wanted to hug him and put [her] body right
next to his butt,” but “[e]verything happened so quickly and [she]
wasn’t able to.” Martha heard a gunshot and both she and Luis
“fell to the side.” Luis was shot. Martha also was shot in her
right hand. The men “took off running.”
Police and paramedics arrived quickly.
Luis had been shot in the back. He never regained
consciousness. Luis died on December 1, 2020. He was 26 years
old. The cause of death was “complications of [a] remote gunshot
wound to the back.”
About a week after the shooting, Detective Alex Nguyen
stopped a car with five people in it. Barron was the front
passenger. Barron had curly hair and was wearing a red beanie
cap. Behind the front passenger seat, Nguyen found a loaded,
unregistered Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter semiautomatic
handgun. Testing showed the bullet that struck Luis was
fired from that handgun.
Body damage to the car Nguyen stopped appeared to be
the same body damage seen in surveillance video from a security
camera at Cruz’s apartment complex of a car leaving the scene
of the shooting.
Cruz identified Barron in a photo six-pack. At trial,
Martha identified Barron as the man who shot her and her
son Luis.
2. The charges, trial, verdicts, and sentence
The People charged Barron with the attempted murder
of Luis (count 1), the attempted murder of Martha (count 2),
the robberies of Gamino and Cruz (counts 3 and 4, respectively),
possession of a firearm by a felon (count 5), and the attempted

4
robberies of Luis and Martha (counts 6 and 7, respectively).
In counts 1 and 2, the People alleged Barron personally used
and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury or death. In counts 3 and 4, the People
alleged Barron personally used a firearm. The People also
alleged Barron had two prior strikes.3
After Luis died, the prosecution amended count 1 to allege
murder.
The case went to trial in September 2022. On the felon-
with-a-gun count, Barron stipulated he had a felony conviction,
so the jury was told only that. Barron chose not to testify.
The jury found Barron guilty on counts 1 (finding the
murder to be in the first degree), 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. On count 2,
the jury convicted Barron of the lesser offense of assault with
a firearm on Martha.4 The jury also found all of the firearm
allegations true. Barron waived jury on his strike priors and,
in a bench trial, the court found true the allegation that Barron
had suffered two prior strikes.

3 In the information filed in October 2020, the People named
Timothy Lee Wright as a co-defendant. As to both defendants,
the People alleged gang allegations on all counts, and “principal”
firearm allegations on counts 6 and 7. On September 16, 2022,
the court severed Wright’s trial on the prosecution’s motion. On
the same date, the prosecution announced “unable to proceed”
on the gang enhancements and related firearm allegations
based on the passage of Assembly Bill No. 333.
4 The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on
the attempted murder charge in count 2. At that juncture, the
prosecution moved to dismiss the attempted murder charge,
and to accept the verdict on the lesser charge.

5
The trial court denied Barron’s oral motions for a new trial
and to strike his strikes under Romero. The court sentenced
Barron to 199 years to life calculated as follows: On count 1
(murder of Luis) 25 to life, tripled under the Three Strikes law,
plus 25 to life for the firearm; on count 2 (assault with a firearm
on Martha) 25 to life plus the midterm of four years for the
firearm; on counts 3 and 4 (robberies of Gamino and Cruz,
respectively) 25 to life plus 10 years for the firearm; on count 5
(felon with a gun) the midterm of two years doubled; and on
counts 6 and 7 (attempted robberies of Luis and Martha,
respectively) 25 to life plus 10 years for the gun. The
court ordered the sentences on counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 to run
consecutively to one another. The court ordered the sentences
on counts 5 and 7 to be served concurrently, and the sentence
on count 6 to be stayed.
DISCUSSION
1. The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument in closing
did not constitute misconduct, nor has Barron
shown prejudice
a. Barron’s contentions
Barron contends the prosecutor’s closing argument
in rebuttal—after defense counsel had presented his closing—
constituted misconduct so egregious as to render his convictions
a denial of due process. We disagree.
Barron complains the prosecutor’s reference to Martha
as “a phenomenal witness” was impermissible vouching, and his
statements to the jury that she’d had to go through “[t]he seventh
layer of hell” was an impermissible appeal for sympathy. The
prosecutor referred to his own mother and his wife, and noted
“mothers are a different breed.” The prosecutor continued,

6
“The pain of losing her son is one thing, but
the cycle that she goes through every single
night . . . . What if I put my hand here? What
if I . . . dove in front of him? What if I saved
him? . . . And she recalls and reiterates that
every single night in her head.”
The prosecutor added, “The simple fact of the matter is she goes
to that dark place and she relived it for you and you saw it.
It was genuine in every regard.”
Barron also contends the prosecutor’s argument about Cruz
was an appeal for jurors’ sympathy. The prosecutor talked about
“events” that are “terrible” that a person “will forever remember.”
The prosecutor then said,
“I’m talking about . . . Eduardo Cruz. I’m
talking about the grown man, hardworking
dude that works at a welding shop that comes
in here and relives that event on that witness
stand for you. That he came in here with
tears in his eyes remembering the day that
he thought he was going to die.”
Barron’s counsel did not object to any of these arguments.
Barron argues his attorney was ineffective in failing to object.
b. Governing law
“ ‘ “[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude to vigorously argue
his or her case.” ’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 480
(Rodriguez). See also People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293,
1330 (Seumanu) [criminal prosecutor has much latitude when
making a closing argument].) “The rules are well settled.”
(Seumanu, at p. 1330.) A prosecutor’s argument “may be
strongly worded and vigorous so long as it fairly comments on

7
the evidence admitted at trial or asks the jury to draw reasonable
inferences and deductions from that evidence.” (Ibid., citing
People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 215. See also People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 289 [prosecutors are granted
wide latitude during arguments, and are permitted to draw
from matters not in evidence that are common knowledge
or illustrations drawn from common experience].) So long
as a prosecutor’s assurances regarding the apparent honesty
or reliability of prosecution witnesses are based on the facts
of the record and the inferences reasonably drawn from
those facts—rather than any personal knowledge or belief—
his comments do not constitute improper vouching. (People
v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 337.)
A prosecutor commits misconduct, however, when his
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the
trier of fact. A defendant who attacks the prosecutor’s remarks
to the jury must show that, in the context of the whole argument
and the instructions, there was a reasonable likelihood the
jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an
improper or erroneous manner. (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019)
8 Cal.5th 548, 657; see also People v. Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
1152, 1159; People v. Henderson (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 533, 548.)
Courts do not lightly infer that a jury is likely to have understood
the prosecutor’s argument in the most damaging sense.
(Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1337; see also People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667.) As a reviewing court,
we must consider the challenged statements in the context of

8
the argument as a whole to make our determination. (Cowan,
at p. 1159.)
c. No reversible error
As noted, Barron’s counsel did not object to any of the
arguments by the prosecutor that he now complains of, nor did
he ask the court to admonish the jury. “It is well settled that
making a timely and specific objection at trial, and requesting
the jury be admonished . . . , is a necessary prerequisite
to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal.”
(Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1328; People v. Pearson (2013)
56 Cal.4th 393, 426.) “The primary purpose of the requirement
that a defendant object at trial to argument constituting
prosecutorial misconduct is to give the trial court an opportunity,
through admonition of the jury, to correct any error and mitigate
any prejudice.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 254.)
Anticipating the forfeiture problem he faces, Barron argues
his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s statements was
constitutionally deficient. To prevail on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate both that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694.) If the record on direct appeal
sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act, a reviewing
court must reject an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one,
or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. (People v.
Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189.)

9
Here, defense counsel could have had valid reasons
to refrain from objecting. Martha, who testified through an
interpreter, was a grieving mother whose son had been shot
to death while she literally held him in her arms. Cruz, who also
testified through an interpreter, was a reluctant witness. It’s
difficult to tell from the proverbial “cold record,” but he seemed
to be uncomfortable with having to testify. Defense counsel may
well have believed objecting to the prosecutor’s comments about
these vulnerable victim witnesses would not be well received
by the jurors.
In any event, even if we were to overlook Barron’s failure
to preserve the issue and address its merits, we would find
no prejudicial error. The prosecutor’s reference to Cruz as
a “hardworking dude that works at a welding shop” was not
improper. Cruz testified he’d just come home from work, after
9:00 at night. While the record doesn’t indicate whether Cruz
had “tears in his eyes” when he testified, the following exchange
with the prosecutor did take place:
“Q: Mr. Cruz, when you had the gun at your
forehead and the man was asking you to
take everything out of your pockets, how
did you feel at that time?
“A: That that was it for me.
“Q: Did you think you were going to die?
“A: Yes.”
As for Martha, the prosecutor’s reference to her as “a
phenomenal witness” did not constitute impermissible vouching.
“ ‘Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor either (1)
suggests that evidence not available to the jury supports the
argument, or (2) invokes his or her personal prestige or depth of

10
experience, or the prestige or reputation of the office, in support
of the argument.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 480. See
also Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1329 [personal assurances
of the witness’s veracity may constitute vouching].) But
prosecutorial assurances, “ ‘based on the record, regarding the
apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses, cannot
be characterized as improper “vouching,” which usually involves
an attempt to bolster a witness by reference to facts outside
the record.’ ” (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 257.
See also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433 [prosecutor
may properly argue witness is telling the truth based on the
circumstances of the case]; Rodriguez, at p. 483 [prosecutor may
make assurances regarding apparent honesty or reliability of
witness based on facts of the record and inferences reasonably
drawn from them].) The prosecutor here never suggested he
knew Martha personally or that facts outside the record bore
on her credibility.
As for eliciting sympathy, the prosecutor’s comments about
Martha going through a “cycle” every night of whether she could
have saved Luis presents a closer question. Prosecutors are not
permitted to give the equivalent of a victim impact statement
to the jury. But here, the prosecutor’s argument was based on
the evidence admitted at trial, permissible inferences from that
evidence, and common experience. Martha testified she “hugged
[her] son” so Barron would shoot her instead. She told the jury,
“I wanted to hug him and put my body right next to his butt,”
but “[e]verything happened so quickly and I wasn’t able to.” The
prosecutor’s argument that Martha would “relive” the shooting,
wondering if she could have done anything differently to save

11
Luis, was a scenario that would be a “common experience” for
a parent who had lost a child to violence.5
Moreover, the prosecutor’s statements about Cruz and
Martha came after defense counsel had questioned the reliability
of their testimony in his closing argument. Defense counsel told
the jury, “I do believe that grief and the trauma that Ms. Padilla
went through clouded her memory.” He continued, “Everything
that she remembered, she added on to make it as traumatic
and scary as it was for her when she was going through it that
night.” Counsel questioned both witnesses’ identification of
“the man” as Barron. When a defense attorney questions the
credibility or reliability of a witness, the prosecutor is permitted
to respond; he may make assurances based on the facts of the
record and reasonable inferences from those facts. (People v.
Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 740.)
Finally, any error is harmless in any event. The record
contains “overwhelming evidence” of Barron’s guilt. (See People
v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469, 480.) The 9-millimeter
pistol he later admitted was his was the weapon used to shoot
Luis. In his second interview with detectives, Barron admitted
having been at the scene and having pointed his gun at Martha
(though—as discussed below—he continued to claim he didn’t
know how the gun went off).

5 The prosecutor’s mention of his own mother and his wife,
while perhaps unwise, did not exceed the limits of permissible
argument. He did not go beyond the mere mention of their
existence to suggest, for example, how they would feel if their
child were killed.

12
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Barron’s Romero motion
a. Barron’s motion and the court’s ruling
In the information, the People alleged Barron had suffered
two prior strikes, one in 2014 for first degree burglary and one
in 2006 involving a gang enhancement. Barron waived jury
on the priors and the court conducted a bench trial. At the
beginning of the court trial, the prosecution clarified that the
2006 strike prior was a conviction for possession of a firearm
by a felon, with a gang enhancement. After reviewing prison
packets from the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, the court found the two strike priors to be true.
On the date set for sentencing, the court asked Barron’s
counsel, “You are making an oral motion under People versus
Romero to strike one or more of those strike convictions; is that
correct?” Counsel replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” Counsel argued,
“The base terms of the charges for which Mr. Barron was
convicted carry life and are high enough to protect the public
and to satisfy the victim’s family that Mr. Barron is paying a
serious price for the loss of their loved one’s life.” Counsel asked
the court to “exercise [its] discretion under Penal Code 1385,” and
to strike Barron’s strikes and “sentence him on the base terms.”
Apparently in anticipation of the defense’s oral Romero
motion, the prosecution had filed a written opposition to any
request to “strike a strike.” Citing Barron’s criminal history, laid
out in the probation report, the prosecutor argued, “A chronology
of Barron’s adult criminal offenses and incarcerations shows
that he is the archetype violent offender who should be punished
under the Three Strikes Law with a severely long prison
sentence.”

13
The court acknowledged it had “discretion to strike
the strikes” under People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148
(Williams). The court noted the factors Williams instructed trial
courts to consider. The court detailed Barron’s criminal history,
including a 2004 car theft; a 2005 conviction for possession of
a firearm by a felon, carrying a loaded firearm, and possession
of narcotics while armed; a 2006 conviction, again for possessing
a firearm as a felon and participating in a criminal street gang,
resulting in a four year prison sentence; a 2011 conviction for
auto theft and possession of narcotics in prison, resulting in a
three year prison sentence; and a 2014 conviction for first degree
burglary, resulting in a six year prison sentence. The court
stated Barron was paroled in 2019. He committed the crimes
in this case at the beginning of the next year.6
The court then ruled: “[W]hen I examine all the factors
cited in Romero, as well as other information about him gleaned
from the probation report, and the People’s motion and from
the trial record, Mr. Barron seems to squarely fall within
the parameters of the Three-Strikes Law with a very strong
dedication to life as a career criminal.” The court denied
the motion and proceeded to sentence Barron.
b. Governing law
“[T]he Three Strikes initiative, as well as the legislative act
embodying its terms, was intended to restrict courts’ discretion
in sentencing repeat offenders.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th
at p. 528.) The law “does not offer a discretionary sentencing

6 According to the probation report, Barron was released
from prison in April 2018 and discharged from parole on April 23,
2019. He committed the crimes in this case on January 3, 2020,
fewer than nine months later.

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choice . . . but establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied
in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying
strike,” unless the court concludes it should make an exception
to the scheme because—“ ‘for articulable reasons [that] can
withstand scrutiny for abuse’ ”—the “ ‘defendant should be
treated as though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes
scheme.’ ” (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 337–338
(Strong).)
“Consistent with the language of and the legislative
intent behind the three strikes law,” our Supreme Court has
“established stringent standards that sentencing courts must
follow in order to find such an exception.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).) The law “not only
establishes a sentencing norm[;] it carefully circumscribes
the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires
the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so.” (Id. at p. 378.)
The court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of
one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Williams, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) A court’s “great power” to dismiss a
prior strike conviction should be used only in “ ‘extraordinary’
circumstances, when the ends of justice demand it.” (People v.
Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1105.)
We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss or not to
dismiss a strike prior for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at pp. 371, 374–375.)

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c. No abuse of discretion
The trial court here acted well within its discretion in
denying Barron’s motion to dismiss his strikes. The “nature
and circumstances” of Barron’s January 2020 crimes exhibited a
callous disregard for human life. Barron put his gun to Martha’s
forehead, hit her hard with it, and punched her in the stomach.
He then pushed her son Luis, who fell to his knees, aimed his gun
at Luis’s head, threatened to kill him, and said “Boom.” Barron
then shot both Luis and Martha as Martha wrapped her arms
around her son to try to protect him by shielding him with
her body. Barron also used his gun to rob Cruz and Gamino,
even attempting to fire his gun at Gamino’s head.
The record does not reveal the facts of Barron’s prior
strikes. We know, however, that one of them was first degree
burglary. First degree burglary carries a high risk of violence
should the intruder and the property owner happen upon each
other. (See Magness v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 270, 275
[burglary laws recognize “ ‘ “the danger that the intruder will
harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended
crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will in
anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inviting
more violence” ’ ”].)7

7 The Attorney General asserts this conviction was for
a violent felony, citing section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21). The
Attorney General is mistaken. First degree burglary is a violent
felony if another person (other than an accomplice) was present
in the residence. Otherwise, first degree burglary is a serious
felony only. (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21), 1192.7, subd.
(c)(18).) Nothing in the record indicates a “person present”
allegation was made, admitted, or proved in Barron’s 2014
burglary case.

16
The other strike involved possession of a firearm, as did
another of Barron’s felony convictions. The strike offense also
included an enhancement of active participation in a criminal
street gang under section 186.22, subdivision (a). Barron
committed his first felony offense at age 18, and by the time
he shot the victims in this case at age 33, he had convictions for
a number of felonies, resulting in prison terms of three, four,
and six years.
Barron contends “[h]is priors were not violent.” Strictly
speaking, that’s correct. One might quibble, however, with
the notion that a convicted felon who carries a loaded firearm
and illegally possesses ammunition (Barron’s 2005 crimes),
or a convicted felon who possesses a firearm while actively
participating in a criminal street gang (Barron’s 2006 crime),
does not pose a risk to public safety. Moreover, that a majority
of a defendant’s priors were nonviolent “cannot, in and of itself,
take [him] outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law when
the defendant is a career criminal with a long and continuous
criminal history.” (Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.)
Barron also says he “expressed remorse at what happened”
when police interviewed him. “Expressing remorse at what
happened” is not the same as saying, “I’m sorry I shot the
victims.” In his first interview with detectives, Barron
repeatedly, and vigorously, denied having been at the scene or
involved in any way in the robberies and shooting. In a second
interview three days later, Barron admitted having been there
and having had his 9-millimeter Smith & Wesson “on” him.
Barron told the detectives a “confrontation” with “two guys”
“turned into” “a little light-weight scuffle.” Barron admitted
he “[drew] down” on Martha but claimed “she hit the gun” and

17
“made [Barron] fire it off.” Barron said, “[S]he must’ve hit
the motherfucka, it went off.”
Later in the interview, Barron told the detectives, “I’m
willing to accept it. I’m hurt, but I’m trying to stay strong, too
ass well [sic], but tell his family I really apologize, and all this
happened over nonsense. Tell ‘em, you know what I’m saying,
I apologize and whatever—whatever the consequences mean,
Imma accept it.” Barron reiterated, “I don’t know, like, I don’t
even know how the gun went off, honestly. . . . I don’t know
if she, like, hit it, but it went off. And she ended up getting
shot.”8
In sum, there is nothing favorable to Barron in his current
or prior convictions or his background, character, or prospects.
(Cf. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 162–164 [defendant’s
DUI conviction followed three similar convictions; record “devoid
of mitigation” related to priors; in 13 years since prior strike
defendant often in prison or jail]; People v. Vasquez (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 374, 387 [“there are no extraordinary circumstances
in [the] record—none—that would mitigate against the
application of the Three Strikes law”]; People v. Beasley (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 495, 502 [same].)

8 As the Attorney General notes, when the prosecutor read
a victim impact statement from Luis’s cousin at the sentencing,
in which the family member recounted the family’s vigil while
Luis lay in the hospital for months, Barron exclaimed, “The
hospital killed him. What are you talking about?” The court
admonished Barron. When the prosecutor read the family
member’s statement that “Some days were good. Some days
weren’t,” Barron again spoke out: “That’s some bullshit.
He said—motherfucker. What the fuck?”

18
3. Remand is appropriate for the trial court to
consider whether to dismiss any of Barron’s firearm
enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)
Barron contends the court did not consider dismissing
any of his four firearm enhancements under section 1385,
subdivision (c). Barron acknowledges his counsel didn’t ask
the court to dismiss any of the enhancements, and he contends
his attorney was constitutionally ineffective in that failure.
The Attorney General contends Barron has forfeited the issue.
We exercise our discretion to consider the issue nevertheless,
to resolve Barron’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Trial courts have discretion to strike or dismiss firearm
enhancements “in the interest of justice” under section 1385.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (c).) Section 1385 states “the court shall dismiss
an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
states sentencing courts “shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove” certain
enumerated mitigating circumstances, and “[p]roof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
Of the nine mitigating circumstances listed in the statute, the
only one that conceivably applies to Barron is subparagraph (B):
that “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) Subparagraph (B) provides, “In this
instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall
be dismissed.” (Ibid.)

19
The presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance
does not create a presumption in favor of dismissal. (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032–1033 (Walker).) Instead,
“absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety,
a court must assign significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present. In practice,
the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless
the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even
the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that
dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1038.)
However, “[s]ection 1385(c) does not mean that, whenever
a listed mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court
must dismiss all enhancements unless it finds dismissal would
endanger public safety. The California Supreme Court has
explained that, even without ‘a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety,’ the trial ‘court retains the discretion
to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns
significant value’ to the presence of any listed mitigating
circumstances.” (People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144,
1157, quoting Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)
Here, the trial court imposed four firearm enhancements,
one for each of the crimes against the four victims. The record
contains no discussion of whether dismissal of any of the four
enhancements would endanger public safety, or of the factors
listed in the California Rules of Court.9 In short, we can’t tell

9 When considering whether to strike a firearm
enhancement, a trial court considers the same factors considered

20
whether the court considered the requirements of section 1385,
as amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 721, § 1). Remand therefore is necessary. We of course
offer no views on how the court should rule on any request by
counsel to dismiss or strike one or more of Barron’s firearm
enhancements.
DISPOSITION
Larry Darnell Barron’s sentence is vacated and the matter
is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with section
1385, subdivision (c). Barron’s convictions otherwise are
affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

when handing down a sentence in the first instance. (Nazir v.
Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 497. See Cal. Rules
of Court, rules 4.410, 4.421, 4.423, 4.428(b).)

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