CourtListener 10784939•In re G.S. CA2/2
Texte intégral
Filed 2/5/26 In re G.S. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re G.S., a Person Coming B344542
Under the Juvenile Court (Los Angeles County
Law. Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP00133A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
W.T.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sumako McCallum, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Owen P. Martikan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
W.T. (Mother) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support an assertion of dependency jurisdiction on the basis that
she poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to her non-
minor dependent child, G.S. (born May 2007), also known as E.S.1
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 subdivisions (a)
and (b).2 We conclude the evidence of a single physical
altercation between mother and E.S. is insufficient to
demonstrate a risk of serious physical harm warranting
dependency. The order of dependency is reversed, and the case
remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
1 Throughout the proceedings, G.S., went by the name E.S.
As the juvenile court did and both parties also do on appeal, we
will refer to the minor as E.S.
2 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Mother and presumed father, T.S. (father), are the parents
of four children. E.S., the oldest child, has identified with a male
name and male pronouns since he was about 12 or 13 years old.
His parents have been aware of this since middle school, but he
formally told them of his gender identity about two to three
months before the incident giving rise to this case. E.S. has three
younger brothers. A.S. was eleven years old when this case
began, and twins El.S. and C.S. were five years old. E.S.
graduated from high school in 2024 and is now attending college.
He turned eighteen years old in May 2025.3 Until January 2025,
the family was living together in Monterey Park.
On the afternoon of January 11, 2025, mother was giving
E.S. a ride to his church. E.S. was in the passenger seat, and his
three siblings were in the back seat. They were running a bit
late, and mother thought she needed gas. She turned the car
around to go to a gas station. E.S. rolled his eyes and made
mother angry when he called her a “bitch”. Mother went to grab
his glasses, and scratched E.S.’s face. E.S. reached for the
steering wheel and mother tried to hit him and grabbed his hair.
Then, she bit him on the arm intending to stop him from
interfering with her driving. Mother pulled over and let E.S. out
of the car. E.S. went to the home of a cousin and uncle in San
Gabriel, and later moved to the home of a non-related caregiver.
E.S. sustained several scratches on his face, small
abrasions on his forehead and lower lip, and red bite marks on
both his hands. He thought he caused the injury to his lower lip
3 We hereby grant respondent’s request for judicial notice
regarding E.S.’s age.
3
when he bit it. It does not appear that any of the injuries
required medical attention.
The altercation came to the attention of the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) when a concerned church member informed
Monterey Park Police of E.S.’s injuries. E.S. told the
investigating social worker that an incident like this had never
happened before, and that generally his parents do not really hit
him or his siblings. There was an incident during the pandemic
when he cut his hair without permission and mother got angry
with him. She hit him in the stomach and legs, but he does not
remember any resulting marks or bruises. E.S. also remembered
sometimes being physically disciplined as a child with a “smack
on the lip.” But he said there was no current physical discipline.
E.S.’s siblings said they get yelled at when they are in
trouble, and generally denied any physical discipline by their
parents. Although, C.S. said that father had hit him before when
he was in trouble. Father stated that he and mother “don’t hit
our kids.”
There was a prior child welfare referral in 2013 when a
teacher at E.S.’s school noticed some scratches on the right side of
his face. E.S. said mother accidentally scratched his face when
she was reaching for some napkins. The incident was considered
an accident, and the referral was determined to be unfounded.
Apart from the current case and the 2013 referral, the family has
had no other contact with the Department. Both parents were
cooperative with Department representatives.
E.S. denied being afraid to return home, but preferred to
remain with his caregiver. While he felt physically safe in the
family home, E.S. did not feel his emotional needs were met.
4
When the social worker talked to E.S. about returning home he
started crying and refused to return, leaving no alternative but to
detain him.
Both parents wanted E.S. to return home. Mother
expressed that E.S. needs counselling, stating, “[s]he has
something inside that we don’t understand.”
B. Procedural Background
The Department filed a dependency petition on January 15,
2025, alleging that E.S. had suffered or was at risk of serious
physical harm (§ 300, subds. (a) [intentional physical harm] and
(b) [failure to protect]) due to two altercations with mother
(namely, the January 2025 and pandemic incidents). The
petition also alleged the younger siblings were at a substantial
risk of harm due to the abuse inflicted upon E.S (§ 300, subd. (j)).
The juvenile court held a detention hearing the next day, and
determined a prima facie showing had been made that E.S. was a
minor described in section 300, and remaining in the family home
was contrary to his welfare. The court ordered weekly monitored
parental visits and medical and mental health examinations for
all four children.
The jurisdictional hearing was held on February 26, 2025.
The juvenile court determined that there was a history of abuse
based upon the “smack on the lip” E.S. reported had occurred
when he was a young child, the incident during the pandemic
when he was hit in the legs and stomach, and the unfounded
2013 referral. The court found that in each of those incidents
mother inflicted physical harm upon E.S. The court concluded
that, together with the prior incidents, the “serious” injuries
mother caused in the January 2025 incident warranted
jurisdiction. The court sustained allegations against both
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parents under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), thereby
finding that E.S. suffered or was at risk of serious physical
harm.4
The juvenile court concluded that it was reasonably
necessary to remove E.S. from the family home for his physical
safety, and it would be detrimental to return him. Case plans
were approved for mother and father that consisted of individual
and possible family counselling with E.S. if recommended by a
therapist, and weekly monitored visits.
Mother timely appealed the order asserting jurisdiction and
sustaining E.S.’s removal from the family home.
DISCUSSION
A. Possible Mootness
Mother appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings. Father did not. The juvenile court sustained findings
under section 300 subd. (a) and (b) against both parents.
However, the factual allegations of the petition are directed only
against mother. As a result, we asked the parties to file letter
briefs addressing the legal significance, if any, of father’s
omission from the notice of appeal.
The parties acknowledge that father’s failure to appeal
from the jurisdictional finding could possibly moot mother’s
appeal. “[W]here jurisdictional findings have been made as to
both parents but only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal
may be rendered moot.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283.)
However, both parties argue we should address mother’s appeal
on the merits because the underlying allegations concern physical
4 The allegations of a serious risk of harm to his younger
siblings under section 300 subd. (j) were dismissed.
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abuse of a child, and if sustained, could result in mother’s
inclusion in the California Child Abuse Central Index (CACI).
Our Supreme Court has recognized a parent’s inclusion in
the CACI has severe legal consequences. (Id. at p. 278.) When a
parent has made a showing that sustained allegations of physical
child abuse have been or will be reported to CACI, the parent has
demonstrated ongoing harm arising from a juvenile court order,
warranting appellate review. (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042,
1053.) In other cases, when the alleged conduct is likely but not
indisputably reportable, “courts have discretion to conduct a
merits review of the parent’s claim even if the case is moot.”
(Ibid.)
Given the nature of the allegations sustained against
mother, we will exercise our discretion to address her arguments
on the merits.
B. Standard of Review
“The Department has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that [E.S. was a dependent] of the
court under section 300.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
“‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we
look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T. (2017)
3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
“‘Substantial evidence is evidence that is “reasonable,
credible, and of solid value”; such that a reasonable trier of fact
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could make such findings.’” (In re G.Z. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 857,
876.) “Substantial evidence is not synonymous with any
evidence; a decision supported by a ‘“mere scintilla of evidence”’
need not be affirmed on appeal. [Citation.] Further, ‘“‘[w]hile
substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences
must be “a product of logic and reason” and “must rest on the
evidence.”’”’” (Ibid.) “‘“‘“[I]nferences that are the result of mere
speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].”
[Citation.] “The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a
trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole
record.”’”’” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046 (J.A.),
italics omitted; accord, In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315,
323–324.)
“‘The parent has the burden on appeal of showing there is
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's order.’” (In re
E.G. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 707, 721.)
C. Application of the Law to the Facts.
Section 300, subdivision (a) provides that a child comes
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if the “child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by
the child’s parent.” Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) authorizes
jurisdiction if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as
a result of . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent ... to
adequately supervise or protect the child.” The statute does not
define “serious physical harm or illness,” but instead leaves the
matter to “common intelligence [to] discern what injuries fall
within its reach.” (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428,
438.)
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Here, there is no question that mother had an
inappropriate physical altercation with E.S. She reacted
physically to his adolescent impatience and taunting by hitting
him and biting his arm when he reached for the steering wheel.
She caused minor abrasions and bruising on his face and hands.
“But the evidence in the record before us does not support a
finding that [E.S.’s] injuries amounted to ‘serious physical harm’
under section 300, subdivision (a). . . . “‘Although there may be an
“I know it when I see it” component to th[e] factual determination
[of what constitutes ‘serious physical harm], . . . we believe that
parents of common intelligence can discern what injuries fall
within its reach.’ [Citation.] We conclude that [E.S.’s] harm fell
outside the statute’s reach.” (In re Isabella F. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 128, 132, 138–139 (Isabella F.) [holding that a single
incident in which a mother inappropriately scratched her child’s
face during an altercation did not warrant jurisdiction].)5
While a court may consider past events in reaching a
determination that a child requires juvenile court protection
(Isabella F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 139; see also In re N.M.
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165), the past events here do not
provide evidence of a risk of serious physical harm. The incident
prompting the child welfare referral in 2013 was considered an
accident and the referral was determined to be “unfounded.” The
child abuse reporting statutes provide that an “‘[u]nfounded
5 The same reasoning applies to the jurisdictional finding
under section 300, subdivision (b). (In re D.M. (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 634, 640 (D.M.) [“The Legislature chose to use the
term ‘serious physical harm’ throughout section 300. ‘“When a
word or phrase is repeated in a statute, it is normally presumed
to have the same meaning throughout.”’ [Citation.]”].)
9
report’ means a report that is determined by the investigator who
conducted the investigation to be false, to be inherently
improbable, to involve an accidental injury, or not to constitute
child abuse or neglect.” (Pen. Code § 11165.12, subd. (a).)
Because the 2013 incident did not provide a basis for the juvenile
court to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of a past event of
physical abuse between mother and E.S., the court should not
have considered this incident in reaching its jurisdictional
finding.
E.S. also recalled being physically disciplined as a child
with a “smack on the lip,” and that mother “hit him in the
stomach and legs” when he cut his hair without permission.
Neither do either of these past events, alone or in combination,
provide sufficient evidence to warrant jurisdiction. “‘“[A] parent
has a right to reasonably discipline his or her child and may
administer reasonable punishment[.]”’” (D.M., supra, 242
Cal.App.4th at pp. 640-641.) “Whether a parent’s use of
discipline on a particular occasion falls within (or instead
exceeds) the scope of this parental right to discipline turns on
three considerations: (1) whether the parent’s conduct is
genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the punishment is
‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was ‘warranted by
the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of punishment
was reasonable or excessive.’” (Id. at p. 641.)
Even reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the
juvenile court’s findings, there is simply not enough detail here
for us to conclude that these events demonstrate a future risk of
serious physical harm. All we know is that mother once smacked
E.S. on his lips, and several years later, hit him in the stomach
and legs. We don’t know what level of force was used (although
10
from E.S.’s statements, it does not appear that either incident
resulted in injury), or whether the conduct was genuinely
disciplinary or warranted in the circumstances. To conclude that
either incident was an incident of prior excessive discipline would
require resort to inferences based on speculation or conjecture.
(J.A., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046 [“‘“‘“[I]nferences that are
the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a
finding [citations].”’”’”], italics omitted.) Thus, these incidences
cannot be used to support a finding of a prior history of physical
abuse.
Accordingly, we conclude that mother has met her burden
to show that there was insufficient evidence that she posed a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to E.S. to warrant the
exercise of dependency jurisdiction. We reach our conclusion
based on an assessment of the physical harm allegations of the
petition and the evidence supporting them. But our rejection of
the physical harm basis for dependency does not mean that we
see no reason for the juvenile court’s concern for E.S.’s welfare.
Even though E.S. feels safe in the family home, and has no
concern for physical injury there, our review of the record and the
arguments reveal that E.S.’s discovery of his identity has
presented challenges for him and his parents. Counsel for
mother, E.S., and for the Department all alluded to this at the
dispositional hearing. As mother acknowledged, “[s]he has
something inside that we don’t understand.” However, such
evidence was not developed and did not form the basis of the
juvenile court’s decision. It is therefore not a basis for affirming
that court’s ruling. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 606.)
Nonetheless, we hope that the services provided to E.S. and his
family since February 2025 have helped them all come to a better
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understanding of who he is and how to relate to each other as a
family.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order of February 26, 2025, sustaining
the allegations of the dependency petition is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
SIGGINS*
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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