CourtListener 10784935•People v. Bloxton CA2/4
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Filed 2/5/26 P. v. Bloxton CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B339243
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA083915
v.
JODECI BLOXTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed.
Maggie Shrout, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant-appellant Jodeci Bloxton of five
counts of first degree ATM robbery, five counts of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, and one count of possession of a firearm
by a felon. The jury also found firearm allegations true on the
robbery and assault charges. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial
court found that Bloxton sustained two prior strike convictions.
The trial court sentenced him to 145 years to life plus 16 months
in state prison.
Bloxton raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues
that the trial court prejudicially erred when it refused to allow
him to reopen his case and testify, even though he had explicitly
waived his right to testify, and the trial court had already
instructed the jury. Second, he contends that his trial counsel
was prejudicially ineffective by not requesting that the trial court
dismiss four of his firearm enhancements under Penal Code
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B).1 We reject these contentions
and affirm the judgment.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), provides that a sentencing
court “[i]n exercising its discretion” to dismiss a sentencing
enhancement “shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove” certain enumerated mitigating
circumstances, and “[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.”
2
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2023, a jury convicted Bloxton of possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count one); five counts of first
degree automated teller machine robbery (§ 211; counts two, four,
six, eight, and ten); and five counts of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts three, five, seven,
nine, and eleven). The jury also found that Bloxton personally
used a semiautomatic handgun in the commission of counts 2
through 11. The trial court found that Bloxton had sustained two
prior strike convictions. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12, subds.
(a)–(d).) The court sentenced him to 145 years to life plus 16
months in state prison. The court sentenced him to 16 months in
state prison on count one. On each of the remaining 10 counts,
the court sentenced him to 25 years to life under the Three
Strikes law, plus a middle term of four years for each gun
enhancement on each count. The court stayed sentencing under
section 654 on the five assault counts (counts three, five, seven,
nine, and eleven). Bloxton timely appealed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Counts two through eleven
Between November 2021 and August 2022, two individuals
robbed five different ATM repairmen at gunpoint as they worked
on ATM machines in various locations throughout Los Angeles
County.2 Based on the evidence presented and stipulations by
2 These five robberies involved Schools First Credit Union,
Bank of America, Edwards Federal Credit Union, Chase, and
Wells Fargo ATMs, respectively.
3
the parties, it appears that these individuals successfully robbed
hundreds of thousands of dollars from those five ATM machines.
Police eventually arrested Bloxton and Naima Straughter.3
Although none of the witnesses identified Bloxton as
having committed any of the five robberies/assaults, extensive
circumstantial evidence presented at trial indicated that Bloxton
and Straughter were the individuals who robbed and assaulted
the five ATM repairmen.4 For instance, the same gray Acura ILX
was involved in the Schools First Credit Union, Bank of America,
Edwards Federal Credit Union, and Chase ATM robberies. That
car’s license plate was traced to Straughter, and Bloxton was
driving the car on January 27, 2022, when police stopped him for
a traffic violation. Bloxton and Straughter were living together
in the Lancaster apartment where police executed a search
warrant. Straughter had pictures of Bloxton and their dogs on
her cell phone. They both posted pictures and videos to social
media of themselves with large amounts of money right after
many of the robberies had occurred.
As part of their investigation into Bloxton and Straughter,
officers had placed a GPS tracker on the Acura. On September
22, 2022, the day officers arrested Bloxton and Straughter, they
tracked the Acura to a Citibank ATM. Surveillance video footage
showed the Acura and a Dodge Challenger circling a strip mall
3 Straughter was charged with having committed counts two
through eleven along with Bloxton but is not a party to this
appeal.
4 None of the witnesses identified Bloxton as having
committed any of the five robberies because, in each instance, the
assailants either wore face masks or the victims could not see
their faces.
4
where the Citibank ATM was being repaired by a technician.
Bloxton and Straughter sent each other text messages that day
about their location and the presence of police in the area. When
the police stopped the Challenger that day, Bloxton was driving,
and Straughter was the passenger. The police recovered a
number of items from the Challenger and the Acura, including
cell phones, face masks, gloves, dark clothing, hoodies, and a gun.
The police also recovered a pair of brightly colored boxer shorts
and a pair of shoes from Bloxton’s home. The boxer shorts were
similar to the ones worn by the suspect in one of the robberies,
and the shoes matched ones worn by the gunman in another of
the robberies. Boxton admitted to police that a Nike face mask, a
pair of gloves, the shoes, and the gun recovered from the traffic
stop belonged to him.
Data extracted from Bloxton’s and Straughter’s cell phones
showed searches for such things as the location of broken ATMs,
stories about ATMs being robbed, and stories about ATM
repairman being robbed. Text messages between Bloxton and
Straughter showed they were surveilling ATMs that were being
repaired and would send a pin drop of the location of the ATM.
On the day of the Wells Fargo ATM robbery, Straughter texted
her location, which was at the bank, to Bloxton.
Count one
On August 19, 2022, around 11:00 p.m., Deputy Sheriff
Nicholas Zimmer conducted a traffic stop on a black BMW in
Lancaster. The basis for the stop was various Vehicle Code
violations. Codefendant Straughter was the driver, and Bloxton
was seated in the front passenger seat. Deputy Zimmer
recovered a loaded semiautomatic handgun from underneath the
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front passenger seat of the car. The serial number of the gun had
been scratched off. Bloxton admitted to the deputy that the gun
belonged to him.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Bloxton’s late request to testify
We reject Bloxton’s contention that the trial court
prejudicially abused its discretion by denying his request to
testify, which came after he had waived his right to testify, and
after the trial court had already instructed the jury.
A. Relevant law
A criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional
right to testify in his own defense. (Harris v. New York (1971)
401 U.S. 222, 230; People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214–215.)
To exercise that right, however, the defendant must make “a
timely and adequate demand to testify.” (People v. Alcala (1992)
4 Cal.4th 742, 805 (Alcala).) “When the record fails to disclose a
timely and adequate demand to testify, ‘a defendant may not
await the outcome of the trial and then seek reversal based on his
claim that despite expressing to counsel his desire to testify, he
was deprived of that opportunity.’ ” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53
Cal.4th 735, 762–763.)
A request to testify following the close of evidence, such as
was made here, is deemed a motion or request to reopen the
defense case, and may be granted upon a defendant’s showing of
good cause. (See §§ 1093, 1094; People v. Riley (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 754, 766.) A trial court’s decision to deny a
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defendant’s request to reopen a case in order to testify is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Masters (2016) 62
Cal.4th 1019, 1069 (Masters).) In determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion, the reviewing court considers four
factors: “ ‘ “(1) the stage the proceedings had reached when the
motion was made; (2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) in
presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would
accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance
of the evidence.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Background
Prior to the prosecution presenting its final witness, the
trial court asked Bloxton if he had conferred with his attorney
about whether he planned to testify. Bloxton stated that he had
told his attorney that he wanted Straughter to testify. Defense
counsel stated that, for tactical reasons, she was not going to call
Straughter as a witness. Bloxton briefly spoke with counsel and
informed the court that he was going to testify. The prosecution
rested later that day.
After the prosecution rested, a recess was taken, then the
trial court asked Bloxton whether he still planned to testify. The
court noted that Bloxton had two prior convictions of moral
turpitude, informed Bloxton that those prior convictions could be
used to impeach him if he were to testify, and directed Bloxton to
discuss the matter with his attorney. After Bloxton spoke with
his attorney, counsel informed the court that Bloxton was going
to exercise his right to remain silent. The following exchange
occurred:
7
Court: Mr. Bloxton, have you had a chance to speak with
your attorney regarding whether you want to testify or not?
Bloxton: Yeah.
Court: And at this time, Ms. Brown, does your client wish
to testify in this case?
Ms. Brown: No, your honor. He is going to exercise his
right to remain silent.
Court: And, Mr. Bloxton; is that correct?
Bloxton: (Nods head in the affirmative.)
COURT: Again, I want to make sure this is
your decision, this is what you want to do.
If you want to testify, you can. You have a
right not to testify as well. The jury
cannot use that against you.
So what is your decision at this time? Do
you want to testify or do you not want to testify?
Bloxton: Nah.
COURT: You don’t want to testify?
Bloxton: Uh-uh.
The jury returned, and the trial court instructed the jurors.
8
The following day, before the jury was brought in, defense
counsel informed the court that Bloxton wanted to testify. The
court stated: “[T]he court did inform Mr. Bloxton that it’s too late
for that. He was given the opportunity yesterday. He indicated
he did not want to testify. So the court is not going to allow him
to testify at this point.”
C. Analysis
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by concluding that Bloxton’s request to testify was untimely and
inadequate. (Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 805.) As mentioned
above, in determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Bloxton’s request to reopen his case and
testify, we consider: “ ‘ “(1) the stage the proceedings had reached
when the motion was made; (2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack
thereof) in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the
jury would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the
significance of the evidence.” ’ ” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p.
1069.)
We begin by analyzing the first two Masters factors, which
bear most directly on our resolution of the issue presented.
Turning to these factors, it was not unreasonable for the trial
court to deem Bloxton’s request untimely and inadequate given
that the court had already given Bloxton ample opportunity to
exercise his right to testify in his own defense. Before instructing
the jury, the court carefully asked Bloxton repeatedly whether he
wished to testify in his defense. After discussing the matter with
his attorney, including the fact that his two prior crimes of moral
turpitude could be used to impeach his credibility, Bloxton chose
to exercise his right to remain silent. Because the matter was
9
thoroughly addressed by the trial court at the close of the
prosecution’s case, at which point Bloxton waived his right to
testify and invoked his right to remain silent, it was not
unreasonable for the court to deny Bloxton’s request to testify
once the court had already fully instructed the jury.
Although in our view the first two Masters factors are most
relevant in resolving the question presented, we will likewise
address the other factors. Regarding the third Masters factor,
Bloxton contends that because jury deliberations had not yet
begun, allowing Bloxton to testify would not have put the
prosecution at an unfair advantage or created a danger that the
jury may give his testimony more weight than it deserved. The
Attorney General counters that this factor does not play a
significant role in this case, and in any event, the trial court
could reasonably conclude that the jurors would accord Bloxton’s
testimony undue emphasis in light of the unusual circumstance
of Bloxton testifying after they had been instructed and were
expecting closing arguments. We agree with the Attorney
General. This factor is not as relevant as the first two factors
given that the trial court’s stated basis for its ruling emphasized
the untimeliness of Bloxton’s request, as well as the fact that
Bloxton had already explicitly waived his right to testify in his
defense. Moreover, the trial court could reasonably conclude that
changing the order of things at the time of Bloxton’s request may
unduly confuse the jurors.
Bloxton lastly argues that the fourth Masters factor cuts in
his favor because the significance of a defendant testifying in his
own defense “cannot be underestimated.” In addition to invoking
the general importance of testifying in one’s own defense as a
fundamental constitutional right, Bloxton notes that his counsel
10
did not call any other witnesses in his defense, and that his own
“version of events would have been extremely significant.” As the
Attorney General points out, however, the relevance of this last
factor is unknowable here because neither Bloxton nor defense
counsel proffered the substance of Bloxton’s testimony.
Although we agree with Bloxton that the right to testify in
one’s own defense is fundamental to our criminal justice system,
Bloxton has not satisfied his burden on appeal of demonstrating
that the trial court abused its discretion by deeming his request
to testify untimely given the circumstances.
II. Bloxton’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
Bloxton next argues that, under section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(B), the trial court was required to dismiss all but one of the
five four-year firearm enhancements it imposed unless it found
that striking the enhancements would endanger public safety,
and trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by not raising that
argument in the trial court. We are unpersuaded.
In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Bloxton must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
and (2) it is reasonably probable that he would have obtained a
more favorable result absent counsel’s allegedly deficient
conduct. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–
688, 694–695.) “Reversal . . . on the ground of inadequate counsel
is mandated only if the record affirmatively reveals no rational
tactical purpose for [counsel’s] act or omission.” (People v. Terrell
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253 (Terrell).) “ ‘[E]xcept in those
rare instances where there is no conceivable tactical purpose for
counsel’s actions,’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
11
generally must be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus
based on matters outside the record on appeal.” (People v.
Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 172.) Applying these principles, we
conclude that Bloxton cannot sustain his burden of satisfying
either element of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
First, we analyze whether the record demonstrates that
trial counsel’s performance at sentencing was deficient. At the
beginning of sentencing, counsel made a Romero5 motion,
requesting that the trial court strike one or both of Bloxton’s
prior strike convictions, one of which occurred when Bloxton was
19 and the other when he was 22. Counsel argued that, although
the charges in the instant case were “serious,” “[n]obody was
significantly injured in any of these robberies,” and there was no
evidence the gun was ever fired. Had the trial court granted the
Romero motion, this could have reduced Bloxton’s sentence
significantly more than a motion for relief under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B). In this court’s view, it is entirely plausible
that trial counsel was well aware that section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(B) could apply here, but believed that the best tactical
strategy for her client was to instead emphasize the Romero
motion, which allowed her to argue that Bloxton’s youth at the
time of his prior strike offenses warranted leniency. It is
similarly plausible that trial counsel believed bringing a motion
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) may be somewhat futile
given that her client engaged in five armed robberies—crimes
that could easily result in innocent people being gravely injured,
creating a danger to public safety. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2)
[courts should not dismiss enhancements where doing so would
5 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
12
endanger public safety].) In other words, on this record, it is
plausible that trial counsel made a calculated tactical decision to
focus on the Romero motion, reasonably believing that this
approach would place her client in the best position to get relief
at sentencing. Bloxton therefore cannot meet his burden of
demonstrating that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.
(See Terrell, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253 [reversal on
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds is not warranted if the
record reveals a rational tactical purpose for counsel’s conduct].)
Second, even assuming trial counsel had sought relief
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), on this record, it is not
reasonably probable that doing so would have led to a more
favorable outcome for Bloxton. On this point, the trial court’s
comments when denying Bloxton’s Romero motion and imposing
sentence are telling:
In evaluating [Bloxton’s] sentence, the court has
considered the general objectives in sentencing
including but not limited to protecting society,
punishing the defendant, deterring the defendant from
future offenses, and deterring others from criminal
conduct by demonstrating its consequences.
This court also considered whether [Bloxton] had
a record of committing similar crimes or crimes of
violence. The court has considered whether [Bloxton]
participated in this crime due to any provocation,
coercion, or duress not amounting to a defense, the
answer is no; and whether the defendant was youthful
in age with no significant prior criminal record.
13
The court thought about the nature, the
seriousness and the circumstances of this crime, and
whether [Bloxton] would be a danger to others if not
imprisoned.
And when I look at this case, I just see no legal
basis to strike his strikes even though I feel bad for
him. And the reason for that is back in 2012, he was
convicted of a robbery. That’s his first strike. In 2016,
when he was 23 years old, he was convicted of first
degree burglary, his second strike. And it looks like the
crimes he’s committing, it’s getting more and more
serious.
Now, the facts in this case [are] that he, along with
a codefendant, robbed five automated teller machines,
repair people while they were conducting routine
maintenance of the ATMs. And I know, defense, you
indicated that, you know, it doesn’t appear to be a
serious crime, nobody was injured, but I disagree.
When these repair individuals had guns pointed to
them, that’s significant to them. I believe there was
also evidence that [Bloxton] had possibly pistol-whipped
somebody.[6] And—and the most shocking thing
about this case is that a lot of these crimes were
committed in broad daylight, with other cars driving by,
6 The evidence presented at trial indeed showed that one of
the ATM repairmen was hit in the back of the head with a gun as
he was robbed.
14
with other people around, with a total disregard for the
safety of other people and—and, personally, without
fear of any consequences.
Again, this is a case where the jury found
[Bloxton] guilty. So based on all the information that
has been provided to the court, based on the reasoning
the court has stated, the court is not satisfied on how
dismissing any of [Bloxton’s] prior strikes would be in
the interest of justice and[ ] therefore, defense motion
will be denied.
Prior to pronouncing Bloxton’s sentence, the court stated
that the circumstances in aggravation “far outweigh any
mitigation in this case.” Based on these comments, it is clear
that the trial court had decided, in the interests of justice, and
out of concerns regarding the danger Bloxton posed to society,
that it would not reduce his sentence. Given the thoroughness of
the trial court’s rationale for its ruling, and because the court was
steadfast in imposing the sentence it did, we conclude that it is
not reasonably probable that Bloxton would have received a more
favorable outcome had trial counsel made a motion under section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) to have firearm enhancements
stricken. Bloxton thus cannot satisfy his burden of
demonstrating that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
performance.7
7 In arguing that trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective,
Bloxton contends that the trial court could not have made a
showing that Bloxton posed a danger to public safety. Bloxton
argues: “Here, in order to deny a request to strike the four gun
15
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COLLINS, J.
enhancements, the trial court would have had to make a showing
that [striking the enhancements] would be a danger to public
safety. It would not have been able to do so.” We reject this
contention, and instead conclude, given the circumstances of
Bloxton’s offenses, that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court, in imposing the sentence it did, to conclude that
Bloxton posed a danger to public safety.
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