CourtListener 10784080•Hwang v. Hotaki CA1/1
Texte intégral
Filed 2/4/26 Hwang v. Hotaki CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
OLIVIA HWANG et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A173438
v. (Alameda County
CHRIS HOTAKI et al., Super. Ct. No. 22CV022586)
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs Olivia Hwang and John Su appeal from an order granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants in this dispute about a real estate
purchase. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Defendant Sylvan Investments, Inc. (Sylvan) buys, renovates, and
resells residential properties. The company is owned and managed by
defendant Basil Yaqub.1 In 2018, Sylvan purchased two adjoining properties
in Hayward, and Yaqub had a fence installed down the middle of a driveway
1 Plaintiffs allege that defendant Chris Hotaki, who has no ownership
interest in Sylvan, “was Mr. Yaqub’s business partner in the transaction at
issue.”
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that was between the two properties. Yaqub attested that the fence was
installed because it “optimized the privacy of the [p]roperties and also
allowed both [p]roperties to use the driveway in an equal fashion.” He
further attested that he did not know the location of the property line or if
the fence’s “position was commensurate with the true boundary line between
the [p]roperties.” No evidence was presented that Yaqub knew or might have
known the location of the property line.
Hwang and Su later purchased one of the two properties from Sylvan.
Yaqub, who is also a real estate agent, was the agent for Sylvan, and Hwang
and Su were represented by their own agent.
The written information Hwang and Su received about the property at
the time of the purchase was extensive and is undisputed, with much of this
information being in the form of general advisories as opposed to seller
disclosures.2 In the seller’s disclosures Hwang and Su were told, “Fence built
in the middle of the driveway. Shared between both homes.” On a different
disclosure form, Yaqub circled the word “fence” when indicating that he was
aware of “[f]eatures of the property shared in common with adjoining
landowners . . . whose use or responsibility for maintenance may have an
effect on the subject property.” This form also stated that the property was
being sold “as is.”
In other materials, Hwang and Su were advised and informed that
“[f]ences . . . may not represent the actual boundary lines,” that the sellers
“do not provide any guarantee or warranties,” and that the sellers are “not
responsible for identifying the location of boundary lines or other items
2 According to Hwang and Su, “[a]dvisories are general warnings or
recommendations that appear throughout standard disclosure forms; they are
not factual representations about th[e] specific issue [regarding the fence].”
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affecting title.” A buyers’ inspection advisory stated that the buyers were
“STRONGLY ADVISED TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDITION AND
SUITABILITY OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROPERTY,” including “lot size,
age of improvements and boundaries.” It advised the buyers “that only an
appraiser or land surveyor . . . can reliably confirm square footage, lot size,
[p]roperty corners and exact boundaries of the [p]roperty.” And it cautioned
that property boundaries can only be determined by an appraiser or surveyor,
that fences “may not represent actual boundary lines,” that the real estate
brokers had not verified any boundary lines, and that the buyers should hire
their own appraiser or surveyor if they wanted information about the
property’s boundaries.
Finally, Hwang and Su’s offer to purchase the property included a
signed copy of the buyers’ inspection advisory in which they acknowledged
they were informed that “[f]ences . . . and other barriers or markers do not
necessarily identify true [p]roperty boundaries” and were “STRONGLY
ADVISED” to investigate the condition and suitability of the property,
including its “lot size . . . and boundaries.”
After purchasing the property, Hwang and Su discovered that the fence
encroached into their lot. Relying on a survey company’s report, their
complaint alleged that the company “confirmed that the fence sits 6.2 – 7.3
feet into [Hwang and Su’s] property (it is not straight) and the fence runs
approximately 143 feet long, depriving us of approximately 1,140 square feet
of our land.” (Italics added.) In other words, if Hwang and Su thought the
fence marked the property’s boundary when they purchased the property, the
survey showed that they received more—not less—property on that side of
their house than they had thought. Nonetheless, Hwang and Su complain that
the “placement of the fence . . . obstruct[s their] access to the property they
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purchased and paid for and provides no convenience to them.” In their
appellate briefing, defendants argue that for Hwang and Su “[t]o make full
use of their property [they] simply need[] to move their fence to the actual
property line.” Apparently, Hwang and Su tried to do just that at one point,
but new owners of the adjoining property “threatened to call the police.”
II.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is warranted if “all the papers submitted show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).)3 A party moving for summary judgment may meet its initial
burden of production by showing “one or more elements of the cause of
action . . . cannot be established”; the burden then shifts to the other party to
show a triable issue of material fact exists. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (Aguilar).) We
consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Id.
at p. 843.)
As a court of review, we “ ‘independently review the parties’ papers
supporting and opposing [a motion for summary judgment], using the same
method of analysis as the trial court. Essentially, we assume the role of the
trial court and apply the same rules and standards.’ ” (Apex Solutions, Inc. v.
Falls Lake National Ins. Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1256.) The burden
of demonstrating error on appeal, however, remains on the objecting party.
(See Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657,
708 [judgment is presumed correct even on de novo review of a summary
3 All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise specified.
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judgment].) As a result of this burden, the appellant must identify a triable
issue by citing “evidence in the record.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles
(1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 178, fn. 4.)
The parties here largely agree on the governing law. “ ‘ “[T]he elements
of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: ‘ “(1) the defendant
must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must
have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant
must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to
defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and
would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or
suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the
fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” ’ ” ’ ” (RSB Vineyards,
LLC v. Orsi (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1096–1097.) “ ‘A real estate seller
has both a common law and statutory duty of disclosure. . . . “In the context
of a real estate transaction, ‘it is now settled in California that where the
seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the
property . . . and also knows that such facts are not known to, or within the
reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller is
under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1097; see also Civ.
Code § 1102 et seq.) “The obligation to disclose, however, only [arises] if
defendants [have] actual or constructive knowledge of the deficiencies.” (RSB
Vineyards, at p. 1097.)
The parties also agree that “pre-printed disclosures” are legally
inadequate to relieve sellers of their duty to disclose known material facts,
and they agree that a pre-printed “as is” sale clause does not immunize
sellers if there was a misrepresentation. (See, e.g., Civ. Code § 1668;
Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1500;
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Loughrin v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1195.) Lastly, they
agree that Yaqub, as both the seller and the seller’s real estate agent, had a
“dual duty” to disclose material facts. (See Holmes v. Summer (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)
Hwang and Su’s contentions about the specific nature of the
information that Yaqub allegedly concealed evolved during this litigation.
But in their reply brief in this court they clarify that their complaint is that
Yaqub “did not tell [them] that the boundary had not been verified.” Thus,
while they accept that no evidence shows that Yaqub actually knew the
location of the property line or had a duty to disclose it, they argue that he
nonetheless should have told them he had not checked whether the fence
aligned with the property line. According to them, Yaqub therefore “did not
disclose enough facts to put a buyer on alert of what he did.”
Appellants argue at length that Yaqub’s legal arguments attempt to
“collapse the seller’s affirmative duty to disclose material facts into the
buyer’s duty to investigate.” They maintain that even if they inadequately
investigated the property’s boundary line, any such failure did not absolve
Yaqub of his duty to disclose that he “did not know whether the fence was put
on the property line.” As part of their argument, they contend that reliance
on “boilerplate forms” to excuse concealment would be contrary to public
policy We are not persuaded.
While we agree with Hwang and Su that a seller’s duty to disclose is
not necessarily affected by a buyer’s failure to investigate, their claim for
fraudulent concealment nonetheless fails under the undisputed facts of this
case. These facts reveal that Hwang and Su were informed—if not
specifically, then certainly functionally—that Yaqub had not checked
whether the fence aligned with the property line. Whether in the form of
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specific seller disclosures or general advisories, the materials Hwang and Su
received unequivocally relayed to them that the seller did not know the
location of the boundary line and was making no warranties about it.4 Again,
the materials made clear that “[f]ences . . . and other barriers or markers do
not necessarily identify true [p]roperty boundaries,” and that “only an
appraiser or land surveyor . . . can reliably confirm . . . exact boundaries of
the [p]roperty.” Having been given this information, Hwang and Su simply
could not have reasonably believed Yaqub had checked the fence’s alignment
with the property line, and they therefore could not have reasonably relied on
any assumption he had. Stated another way, because Hwang and Su could
not have reasonably believed Yaqub checked the property line, they cannot
insist that his failure to disclose what they plainly should have understood
amounted to a fraudulent concealment. We simply cannot agree with Hwang
and Su’s insistence that Yaqub’s “disclosures [were] misleading, as they
create[d] a false impression that the fence’s placement was proper or at least
verified.”
In reaching our conclusion, we necessarily reject many of Hwang and
Su’s ancillary contentions. For example, they contend that the trial court’s
ruling was improperly based on the theory that they failed to investigate and
verify the property line. But we do not rely on such a theory. They also
contend that the trial court’s ruling “improperly relied on the ‘as-is’
provision.” But we do not rely on this provision either.
Defendants sustained their burden of establishing that some of the
elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment cannot be satisfied because
4 We reject Hwang and Su’s suggestion that considering the content of
pre-printed advisories is irrelevant in evaluating whether a cause of action
for fraudulent concealment has been established.
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Yaqub did not conceal the fact that he had not checked the location of the
property line, and because Hwang and Su cannot reasonably claim that they
were misled by the materials they were given. They have not satisfied their
burden to show that there is a triable issue of material fact on these points.
(§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment entered following the grant of summary judgment in the
defendants’ favor is affirmed.
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_________________________
Humes, P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
Hwang et al. v. Hotaki et al. A173438
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