CourtListener 10784074•People v. Miramontez CA2/6
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Filed 2/4/26 P. v. Miramontez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B339100
(Super. Ct. No. 2020006844)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
JAVIER MIRAMONTEZ, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Javier Miramontez, Jr., appeals from the judgment
following his guilty plea to three counts of forcible lewd act on a
child (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (b)(1)), and his admissions of
special allegations for each count of substantial sexual contact
with a victim under the age of 14 (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)), that
the crimes involved the same victim on separate occasions
(§ 667.6, subd. (d)(1)), the victim was particularly vulnerable
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 4.421(a)(3)), Miramontez took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the
crimes (rule 4.421(a)(11)), and he engaged in violent conduct that
indicates a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)). The trial
court sentenced Miramontez to 24 years in state prison.
Miramontez contends the trial court erred by failing to find
a factual basis for his guilty plea (§ 1192.5, subd. (c)) and by
failing to hold a second competency hearing (§§ 1368, 1369). He
also requests this court issue a certificate of probable cause
(§ 1237.5). The Attorney General moves to dismiss the appeal.
We deny the motion to dismiss and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An amended information charged Miramontez with four
counts of forcible lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 1,
3, 4, 5), with the special allegations noted above, and one count of
sexual penetration of a child age 10 or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b);
count 2).
In March 2023, defense counsel declared a doubt regarding
Miramontez’s competence to stand trial. (§ 1368, subd. (b).) The
court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed Katherine
Emerick, Ph.D., to examine Miramontez. (§ 1369, subd. (a)(1).)
Dr. Emerick submitted a report that concluded Miramontez was
competent.
At the prosecutor’s request, the court also appointed John
Lewis, Ph.D., who submitted a report of his competency
evaluation. Dr. Lewis’s report discussed a report by Kimberly
Smith, Psy.D., completed on April 26, 2023, including her
diagnosis that Miramontez had Asperger’s disorder/autism
spectrum disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder, and her
2 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
2
conclusion that he was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Lewis
disagreed and concluded Miramontez was competent.
At a hearing in July 2023, Miramontez’s counsel stated,
“[T]he defense has retained a neuropsychologist, Dr. Smith, who
has opined that he’s not competent.”
The competency hearing was held in January 2024. The
court stated it had two reports—those of Dr. Emerick and Dr.
Lewis. The parties submitted the issue of competency on those
two reports. Defense counsel did not offer or refer to the report
by Dr. Smith. The court found Miramontez competent to stand
trial and reinstated criminal proceedings.
The record does not show that Dr. Smith was appointed by
the court or that her report was ever filed or was ever before the
trial court. Nor is it part of the record on appeal.3 Nor did the
defense request a second competency hearing or renew its
suggestion that Miramontez was incompetent.
In May 2024, Miramontez pleaded guilty to counts 1, 4, and
5, and admitted the special allegations. Miramontez signed a
felony disposition statement acknowledging the maximum prison
term of 30 years and the agreed-upon disposition of 24 years. He
initialed the following statement: “I agree that the court may
consider the following as proof of the factual basis for my plea,”
followed by check-marked boxes for the preliminary hearing
transcript, police reports, and probation report. Miramontez also
initialed this statement: “I admit that I did what is alleged in the
counts of the (complaint) (information) to which I am pleading
guilty or no contest.” The disposition statement included factual
descriptions of counts 1, 4, and 5 in the amended information.
3 We denied a motion to augment the record on appeal with
Dr. Smith’s report because it was not before the trial court.
3
Miramontez also acknowledged that he discussed the facts and
elements of the charged offenses and allegations with his
attorney, he read and understood the felony disposition
statement, and he understood his constitutional rights and the
consequences of his plea.
Before accepting the guilty plea, the court noted the
previous finding that Miramontez was competent and asked
defense counsel if there were “any 1368 issues.” She responded,
“No, not at this time.” The prosecutor stated he was ready to
take the plea “[u]nless defense has anything else to add to the
record.” Defense counsel responded, “No. That’s fine, your
Honor.” The court found Miramontez understood the nature of
the charges and the consequences of his pleas and admissions; he
“knowingly, intelligently, and understandingly waived his
rights”; and his waiver of rights and pleas and admissions were
“free and voluntary.”
The next court appearance after the guilty plea was the
sentencing in June 2024. Defense counsel agreed there was no
legal reason to not proceed to sentencing. The court imposed the
agreed-upon sentence of 24 years in prison. On the prosecution’s
motion, counts 2 and 3 were dismissed. The court did not make a
finding regarding a factual basis for the guilty pleas.
Miramontez filed a notice of appeal. The trial court denied
Miramontez’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Factual basis for plea
Miramontez contends the judgment is invalid because the
trial court did not make a finding of a factual basis for the guilty
plea. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c).) We conclude Miramontez may not
appeal this issue because it affects the validity of the plea and the
trial court did not issue a certificate of probable cause to
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authorize the appeal. (§ 1237.5; rule 8.304(b)(1); People v.
Zamora (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1627, 1632–1633 [no challenge to
factual basis without certificate].)
Additional competency hearing
Miramontez also contends the trial court should have
conducted a second competency hearing sua sponte after the
guilty plea but before sentencing. A certificate of probable cause
is not required to appeal “[t]he sentence or other matters
occurring after the plea or admission that do not affect the
validity of the plea or admission.” (Rule 8.304(b)(2)(B).)
Accordingly, a certificate of probable cause is not required to
challenge the trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing
after a guilty plea but before sentencing. (People v. Oglesby
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 818, 824–828.)
Here, Miramontez’s notice of appeal did not check the box
to appeal from postplea issues that did not affect the validity of
the plea. Instead, the notice references an “[o]ther basis for this
appeal” and requests a certificate of probable cause because
“defendant’s attorney . . . performed deficiently prior to, during,
and after the guilty plea” by, among other things, “not adequately
pursuing a competency hearing.” (Italics added.) “We liberally
construe a party’s notice of appeal.” (People v. Gray (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 148, 159; rule 8.304(a)(4).) And here, the notice
could be read broadly to include the purported failure to conduct
a competency hearing after the guilty plea. Accordingly, we deny
the Attorney General’s request to dismiss the appeal. But we
conclude there was no error because the trial court was under no
obligation to hold a second competency hearing sua sponte before
sentencing.
“When a competency hearing has already been held and the
defendant has been found competent to stand trial, . . . a trial
5
court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second
competency hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial
change of circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious
doubt on the validity of that finding.” (People v. Jones (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1115, 1153.)
Here, no change of circumstance or new evidence was
presented suggesting that Miramontez was not competent after
his plea. When Miramontez pleaded guilty, his attorney told the
trial court there were no competency issues at that time. The
next time the case was on calendar was for sentencing, and
defense counsel indicated there was no legal cause why judgment
should not be pronounced. At no point after the competency
hearing was Dr. Smith’s report mentioned or any suggestion
made that Miramontez was incompetent. In short, there was no
new evidence regarding competency and no change in
circumstance after the guilty plea.
Because “no issues regarding [Miramontez’s] mental
competency were raised” after the finding of competence, “[t]here
was no reason for the court to suspect his competency status had
changed.” (People v. Oglesby, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.)
Accordingly, Miramontez has not shown that the court was
required to conduct a second competency hearing before
sentencing.4
Certificate of probable cause
Miramontez asks this court to issue a certificate of probable
4 Miramontez contends in the alternative that the trial
court should have held a second competency hearing before the
guilty plea was entered. We conclude Miramontez may not
appeal the validity of the guilty plea based on a claim of mental
incompetence because no certificate of probable cause was issued.
(People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1100.)
6
cause. We have no authority to do so. The plain language of
section 1237.5 allows an appeal following a guilty plea if “[t]he
trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause
for such appeal.” (§ 1237.5, subd. (b), italics added.) Denial of a
certificate of probable cause is not an appealable order. (People v.
Nigro (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 506, 510–511.) On appeal, we may
not circumvent the certificate requirement by considering
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying a certificate. (People v. Castelan (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
1185, 1188 [rejecting contrary authority]; see People v. Mendez,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1097–1098 [strict compliance with
§ 1237.5 required].) Instead, a defendant may challenge the
denial of a certificate of probable cause by filing a petition for
writ of mandate. (Castelan, at p. 1188.) Miramontez did so here,
and we denied the petition. (Miramontez v. Superior Court (May
9, 2025, B344156) [nonpub. order].) The request that we issue a
certificate of probable cause is denied.
DISPOSITION
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The judgment
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.
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Anthony J. Sabo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Marks & Brooklier and Donald D. Marks for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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