CourtListener 10783528•Perez v. Dimenco CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 2/3/26 Perez v. Dimenco CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
JESUS MADRIGAL PEREZ, C101372
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and (Super. Ct. No.
Respondent, STK-CV-URP-2019-0000701)
v.
ROSEANNE DIMENCO,
Defendant, Cross-complainant and
Appellant.
Defendant Roseanne Dimenco appeals from the trial court’s order disqualifying
the law firm representing her after it hired an attorney who previously worked for the law
firm representing plaintiff Jesus Madrigal Perez. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We adopt the facts from the court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion to disqualify
defendant’s counsel. Defendant does not argue the court’s recitation of facts was
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incorrect or unsupported by the declarations submitted by the parties, only that the facts
do not support disqualification.
Eurik O’Bryant worked for the law firm Sekhon & O’Bryant when plaintiff
retained the law firm as counsel in the present case. O’Bryant reviewed plaintiff’s initial
case file and initiated communications with opposing counsel before Simran Sekhon took
over the case. The time records show O’Bryant billed 0.1 hours (or six minutes) in this
case. O’Bryant also billed 0.5 hours (or 30 minutes) in plaintiff’s related unlawful
detainer case.
O’Bryant subsequently left the Sekhon & O’Bryant law firm and joined Kroloff,
Belcher, Smart, Perry & Christopherson (Kroloff), which represents defendant in the
present case. Before O’Bryant’s departure, plaintiff’s file was downloaded from the
Sekhon & O’Bryant law firm’s cloud server by someone other than Sekhon. O’Bryant
declared that, after leaving the Sekhon & O’Bryant law firm, he had access to plaintiff’s
files on a hard drive, which he deleted without sharing with anyone at Kroloff. He also
declared that he had access to plaintiff’s files via cloud storage at the time of the
disqualification motion, but he never accessed the files nor did the attorney currently
representing defendant at Kroloff have access to plaintiff’s files. Kroloff built an ethical
wall around O’Bryant concerning this case and he has not worked on this case in any
capacity.
Seven months after O’Bryant left the Sekhon & O’Bryant law firm, plaintiff filed
a motion to disqualify Kroloff from representing defendant. The trial court granted the
motion, finding O’Bryant was in possession of confidential information related to
plaintiff’s case.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously disqualified Kroloff from
representing her. We disagree.
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“ ‘Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] In exercising that discretion, the trial court is
required to make a reasoned judgment [that] complies with the legal principles and
policies applicable to the issue at hand. [Citation.] Discretion will thus be deemed to
have been abused if the trial court fails to exercise discretion where such exercise is
required.’ ” (National Grange of Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. California Guild
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 (National Grange).)
Under rule 1.9(b) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct (rule 1.9(b)), “A
lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously
represented a client [¶] (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and [¶]
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by [specified
confidentiality provisions] that is material to the matter; [¶] unless the former client gives
informed written consent.” (Fns. omitted.)
Among the purposes of this rule “is to protect the confidential relationship [that]
exists between attorney and client, a relationship which continues after the formal
relationship ends. [Citation.] The fiduciary nature of that relationship requires the
application of strict standards. [Citation.] For that reason, a former client may seek to
disqualify a former attorney from representing an adverse party by showing that the
former attorney possesses confidential information adverse to the former client.
[Citation.]
“ ‘In order to seek disqualification, the former client [does not need to] establish
that the attorney actually possesses confidential information. It is enough to show that
there was a “substantial relationship” between [the subjects of] the former and the current
representation. If the former client establishes the existence of a substantial relationship
between the two representations the court will conclusively presume that the attorney
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possesses confidential information adverse to the former client and order
disqualification.’ ” (National Grange, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.)
Here, the trial court found O’Bryant had access to confidential materials in the
current matter via cloud storage at the time he was employed by the firm that represented
defendant. This meets the standard for disqualification under rule 1.9(b) because
O’Bryant worked for a firm that represented a client (plaintiff) in the same matter as
defendant, whose interests are materially adverse to defendant’s interest, and O’Bryant
acquired plaintiff’s case file. Defendant argues this finding cannot support
disqualification because O’Bryant declared he never looked at the records he had access
to in cloud storage. O’Bryant’s actual access is irrelevant. Rule 1.9(b)(2) requires only
that the lawyer acquire the information, which O’Bryant did when he downloaded
plaintiff’s file. There is no indication plaintiff’s case files in cloud storage were
somehow blocked or walled from O’Bryant’s access while employed with Kroloff. His
ability to access the files in a cloud storage that is under his control constitutes
possession. (See People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215 [possession may be
imputed when property is immediately accessible and subject to a person’s dominion and
control].) Thus, the record supports the trial court’s finding that O’Bryant was in
possession of plaintiff’s confidential case information, making whether O’Bryant’s prior
work in the case was substantially related to the current representation irrelevant.
(National Grange, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 716-717.)
Defendant also argues O’Bryant never established an attorney-client relationship
with plaintiff making disqualification unnecessary. But rule 1.9(b) does not require that
plaintiff demonstrate an attorney-client relationship with O’Bryant for O’Bryant to be
disqualified from representing defendant. Further, “[c]ase law abounds with examples of
orders disqualifying counsel that have not been the product of motions by present or
former clients. (See, e.g., Meza v. H. Muehlstein & Co., Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
969, 980-981 . . . [law firm disqualified after hiring attorney who was privy to
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adversary’s privileged work product information]; People v. Peoples (1997)
51 Cal.App.4th 1592, 1599 . . . [defense attorney with direct familial connections to
victim, witnesses and the defendant disqualified on court’s own motion]; Woods v.
Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931, 937 [in a divorce action, court properly
granted wife’s motion to disqualify counsel for husband who had formerly represented
the family business]; see also DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 829, 832 [‘Standing arises from a breach of the duty of confidentiality
owed to the complaining party, regardless of whether a lawyer-client relationship
existed’].)” (Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204.) In any event,
“[a]n attorney represents a client--for purposes of a conflict of interest analysis--when the
attorney knowingly obtains material confidential information from the client and renders
legal advice or services as a result.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil
Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1148.) O’Bryant met this standard when
his law firm provided legal services to plaintiff based on O’Bryant’s consultation with
plaintiff and the confidential information O’Bryant possessed in cloud storage.
Citing rule 1.10 of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, defendant argues
the conflict of interest between O’Bryant and plaintiff cannot be imputed to Kroloff,
because O’Bryant did not substantially work on plaintiff’s case when with the Sekhon &
O’Bryant law firm and Kroloff instituted an ethical wall separating O’Bryant from
plaintiff’s case. While rule 1.10 does not appear to require disqualification of a law firm
based on an associated attorney’s disqualification in all circumstances, defendant has not
shown as a factual matter that Kroloff met the standard provided by rule 1.10 exempting
it from disqualification. Indeed, as relevant here, rule 1.10 requires disqualification of a
law firm unless, among other things, the prohibited lawyer is timely screened and written
notice is promptly given to the former client with a description of the screening
procedures employed. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.10(a)(2).) The only factual assertion
in the record relating to a screen is O’Bryant’s declaration that provides he has not
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discussed or worked on the matter and that “an [e]thical [w]all has been erected.” This is
insufficient to meet the standard exempting Kroloff from vicarious disqualification given
there are no facts in the record establishing the steps Kroloff took to screen O’Bryant or
inform plaintiff of the screen. As a result, the trial court did not err by disqualifying
Kroloff from the case.1
Finally, defendant contends plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Kroloff from
representing defendant was made in bad faith given that it was filed seven months after
O’Bryant joined Kroloff and a week before trial. Defendant does not explain how to
determine whether plaintiff’s timing constitutes waiver of the disqualification motion.
Indeed, the authority defendant cites demonstrates the timing of a motion to disqualify
has limited bearing on the issue of disqualification in this case. “It would be naive not to
recognize that the motion to disqualify opposing counsel is frequently a tactical device to
delay litigation. [Citation.] ‘[Judicial] scrutiny [is required] to prevent literalism from
possibly overcoming substantial justice to the parties.’ [Citation.] However, ultimately
the issue involves a conflict between a client’s right to counsel of his[, her, or their]
choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility. ‘The
preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the
integrity of the bar is paramount . . . . [The client’s recognizably important right to
counsel of his[, her, or their] choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics
[that] run to the very integrity of our judicial process.’ ” (Comden v. Superior Court
(1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 915.) Defendant does not present any argument or analytical
framework for assessing whether plaintiff has waived his motion to disqualify O’Bryant
or Kroloff in light of the ethical considerations at issue here. Thus, defendant has not
demonstrated error in the trial court’s ruling. (Department of Alcoholic Beverage
1 Given this conclusion, we will not address whether the employment of a paralegal
by both firms results in Kroloff’s disqualification.
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Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078
[“Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general
abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review”].)
DISPOSITION
The order disqualifying Kroloff from representing defendant is affirmed.
Defendant shall pay costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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