CourtListener 10781962•People v. Celaya CA2/3
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Filed 1/30/26 P. v. Celaya CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B336516
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA026961)
v.
DANNY ROBERT CELAYA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Juan Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Cynthia Grimm, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H. Thakor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In 1995, a jury convicted Danny Robert Celaya of second
degree robbery, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, and
evading a police officer with willful disregard for the safety of
others. As to the robbery count, the jury also found that a
principal was armed with a firearm. The trial court found that
Celaya had suffered several prior strikes and had served a prior
prison term within the meaning of former Penal Code
section 667.5, subdivision (b).1 The court sentenced Celaya to a
total term of 52 years to life as a third strike offender. Following
a partial reversal on direct appeal, Celaya’s sentence was reduced
to 27 years to life.
In 2023, the trial court resentenced Celaya pursuant to
section 1172.75. The court struck Celaya’s one-year prior prison
term enhancement but denied his request to strike the firearm
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c), and denied his
motion to strike his prior strike convictions under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. On appeal,
Celaya argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying
these requests. We find no abuse of discretion. Celaya also
argues, and the People concede, that the abstract of judgment
must be amended to accurately reflect his actual custody credits,
and that several fines and fees must be reduced or vacated. We
agree and affirm the judgment as modified.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Offenses
We summarize the facts of the underlying offenses from the
opinion issued in Celaya’s direct appeal. (People v. Celaya (Feb.
28, 1997, B100073 [nonpub. opn.] (Celaya).) In April 1995,
Patrick Richards carried out an armed robbery at a market.
Richards obtained money from the market’s cash register while
Celaya waited outside in a stolen truck. Celaya was the getaway
driver. When police officers attempted to stop the truck, Celaya
sped away and drove up to 100 miles per hour on the freeway and
on residential streets. Eventually, Celaya and Richards were
apprehended. Police officers found two guns and ammunition in
the truck. Celaya later asked a police officer if she had found “his
gun” in the car.
At trial, Richards testified. According to Richards, on the
morning of the robbery, he picked Celaya up in the stolen truck.
Celaya had a gun he wanted to sell to Richards’s brother. As
Celaya drove the truck to Richards’s brother’s home, Richards
instructed Celaya to stop at the market. Richards claimed he did
not tell Celaya that he was carrying a gun, and he got back into
the truck without saying anything about the robbery. When
police pulled up behind the truck, Celaya decided to speed away.
Only after Richards tossed stolen money out of the truck’s
window did Celaya ask Richards what was going on. At that
point, Richards told Celaya he had robbed the market.
Procedural History
The People charged Celaya with second degree robbery
(§ 211; count 1), during which a principal was armed with a
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)); unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 2); and evading a
3
peace officer (id., § 2800.2; count 3). The information further
alleged that Celaya had suffered five prior strike convictions:
robbery, two attempted robberies, and two attempted murders,
all from the same 1986 case. The information also alleged that
Celaya had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In November 1995, a jury found Celaya guilty on all counts
and found true the principal gun use allegation. The trial court
found the prior conviction and prior prison term allegations true.
The trial court sentenced Celaya to a term of 52 years to
life, as follows: (1) 25 years to life on count 1, plus one year for
the section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) firearm enhancement and
one year for the prior prison term enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b); (2) a consecutive 25 years to life on
count 2, plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement;
and (3) 25 years to life on count 3, plus one year for the prior
prison term enhancement. The court stayed imposition of the
one-year sentence for the prior prison term enhancement on
count 2, and stayed the entire sentence imposed as to count 3.
The court struck the remaining section 667.5, subdivision (b)
prior prison term enhancement.
Celaya appealed. In an unpublished opinion, a panel of
this court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that Celaya’s convictions for robbery and
unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle stemmed from different
operative facts and occurred on different occasions. (Celaya,
supra, B100073.) The court therefore stayed the sentence
imposed for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. (§§ 667,
subd. (c), 654.) On remand, the trial court amended the abstract
4
of judgment to reflect the modification, thus reducing Celaya’s
sentence to an aggregate term of 27 years to life.
After Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) was
passed, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Celaya as eligible for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. Although it is not
included in the record, it appears that Celaya subsequently filed
a motion seeking a full resentencing.
In March 2023, the People opposed Celaya’s motion,
arguing the resentencing should be limited to striking the now-
invalid one-year prior prison term enhancement. The opposition
recited Celaya’s criminal history, which began in 1982, and
emphasized that Celaya was on parole when he committed the
underlying offenses in 1995. The opposition also provided
evidence that Celaya had incurred 20 CDCR rules violations
while in prison. In 2020, the parole board denied him parole
based on its assessment that he posed an unreasonable risk to
public safety. The People attached as exhibits the appellate
opinion from Celaya’s direct appeal, CDCR rules violations
reports, and a transcript from Celaya’s 2020 parole hearing.
In his reply, Celaya asserted that striking at least one of
his strikes would not endanger public safety. He asked to be
sentenced as a second strike offender to a middle term sentence.
In December 2023, in advance of the resentencing hearing,
Celaya filed a Romero motion. He asked the court to strike one or
more of his prior strikes based on his prior convictions for
robbery, attempted robbery, and attempted murder. Celaya
argued his prior strike convictions were all from the same 1986
case, but he did not otherwise assert arguments based on the
nature or facts of the underlying strike offenses. He stressed that
5
in the 1995 robbery, no one was injured; he was only the driver,
and it was his codefendant Richards who had a gun; and he did
not know Richards had robbed the market until he drove away.
Celaya also asked the court to consider that he had already
spent 28 years in custody as a third strike offender while serving
a sentence of 27 years to life. He described his father’s
alcoholism and his own childhood behavioral problems, including
his affiliation with a gang when he was 9 or 10 years old. He
asserted that he was 29 years old at the time of the offenses and,
“at now nearly 57 years of age,” he had “likely” aged out of
criminality. Celaya’s motion further indicated that he had a
substance abuse history dating back to when he was 11 years old,
but he had been sober since May 2020 and was participating in
Narcotics Anonymous. Celaya also recounted other rehabilitation
efforts, such as his vocational education while in prison. He
described his future employment and sobriety-related plans if
released. The motion also asserted that Celaya’s only two violent
rule violations while in prison occurred more than 25 years
earlier, in 1997 and 1998. He emphasized that he had broken a
leg in 2014, due to a calcium deficiency, and now had metal rods
implanted in the leg. Celaya thus argued that striking one or
more of his prior strikes was in the furtherance of justice, and he
should be resentenced, at most, as a second strike offender.
At the resentencing hearing, the court struck Celaya’s
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement and
denied his Romero motion. It also denied his request to dismiss
the one-year firearm enhancement.
Regarding the Romero motion, the court first recognized
that dismissal of a prior strike is appropriate only in
extraordinary circumstances. It reasoned Celaya had not met
6
that standard after considering the facts of the underlying 1995
convictions. The court specifically noted that Celaya was the
“driver that went on the pursuit and crashed into someone,” and
that he was on parole at the time. The court also observed that
Celaya committed the underlying offenses only 38 days after he
had been released from prison after serving time for the 1986
convictions, which included attempted murder. The court
acknowledged that Celaya’s prior convictions for robbery,
attempted robbery, and attempted murder were all from the
same case, but emphasized that the attempted murder
convictions were “serious offense[s].”
The trial court further considered Celaya’s “20 rule
violations since he’s been in state prison. [The] [m]ost recent
violation occurred on June 26th, 2019, and that was a use of a
controlled substance . . . . 2016, again use of a controlled
substance. 2013, willfully delaying a peace officer. 2011,
promotion of gang activity. Celaya was in possession of an
address book with . . . Mexican Mafia . . . [¶] names, addresses
and was found guilty [on] January 10th of 2012. [¶] In 2010,
possession of a deadly weapon . . . he was adjudicated guilty on
that . . . . [A] 1987 . . . fighting. 1997 attempted assault on
staff.[2] Mutual combat in 1994. Manufacturing alcohol in 1996.
‘92 physical altercation . . . I know those are a long time ago, but
. . . Mr. Celaya is unable to follow the rules while even in custody
2 As Celaya points out on appeal, the trial court incorrectly
stated that Celaya engaged in an attempted assault on staff in
1997. The violation occurred in 1987. The record supports
Celaya’s assertion that his last rule violation for “any type of
violence” occurred in June 1998, when he was cited for battery on
an inmate.
7
. . . I find no extraordinary circumstances to strike the strike.”
The court reasoned: “The defendant at the time was certainly—
fell within the spirit of the Three-Strikes Legislation, involved in
violent offenses, and had just served state prison for two
attempted murders . . . .” The court also noted that in 2020, a
parole board found Celaya continued to “ ‘pose an unreasonable
risk to public safety.’ ”
Regarding Celaya’s request to strike the firearm
enhancement under section 1385, the trial court addressed the
mitigating factors enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
and found none applied. The court reasoned: “I see no evidence to
strike the enhancement. The court can refuse to strike an
enhancement not only if the defendant poses a danger to the
community, but also in the interest of justice. The court can look
at the interest of justice factors in and of itself without
considering any future dangerousness, even though the parole
board has determined [Celaya] still poses a reasonable risk of
danger to the community . . . the court will not strike [the firearm
enhancement] and it’s a one-year enhancement.” The court
concluded by summarizing: “It’s not in the interest of justice to
strike the strike and it’s not in the interest of justice to strike the
enhancement.”
The court reduced Celaya’s sentence on count 1 to 26 years
to life after striking the invalid one-year prison prior. It
resentenced Celaya to two years on count 2, and the low term of
16 months on count 3, with both counts remaining stayed. The
court imposed $300 restitution and parole revocation fines, a $90
total criminal conviction fee, and a $120 total court operations
fee.
Celaya timely appealed.
8
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.75 Resentencing
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75, subdivision (a)
invalidated sentence enhancements imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 667.5. With
exceptions not relevant here, the statute requires that sentences
that include these invalid enhancements be recalled and the
defendant resentenced.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), provides in relevant part:
“(1) Resentencing pursuant to this section shall
result in a lesser sentence than the one originally
imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety. Resentencing
pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.
“(2) The court shall apply the sentencing rules
of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes
in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.
“(3) The court may consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary
record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition,
if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that
circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no
longer in the interest of justice.”
9
Celaya invoked section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), to ask
the trial court to apply changes in the law regarding the
dismissal of sentence enhancements. Effective January 1, 2022,
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1385.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), now
provides that “the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.”
Subdivision (c)(2) provides that in evaluating whether to dismiss
an enhancement, “the court shall consider and afford great
weight” to evidence of certain enumerated mitigating
circumstances.
“It is well established, however, that section 1385,
subdivision (c) applies by its terms to a sentence ‘enhancement,’
but not to a sentence derived from the alternative sentencing
scheme of the Three Strikes law.” (People v. Dowdy (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 1, 9 [collecting cases].) Rather, “a trial court has the
authority to strike prior strikes under section 1385(a) and
Romero at a section 1172.75 resentencing.” (People v. Rogers
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 345 (Rogers).) Section 1385,
subdivision (a) provides that trial courts may dismiss a criminal
action “in furtherance of justice.”
We review the trial court’s sentencing decision at a
section 1172.75 resentencing for an abuse of discretion. (Rogers,
supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 364.) “[S]ection 1172.75,
subdivision (d), vests the superior court with broad discretion
based on an inherently factual inquiry.” (People v. Garcia (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857.) “Under an abuse of discretion
standard, ‘ “we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are
10
correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 857.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Celaya’s Romero Motion
A. Applicable legal principles
“ ‘ “[T]he Three Strikes law does not offer a discretionary
sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but establishes a
sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the
defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless the
sentencing court ‘conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme
should be made because, for articulable reasons which can
withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as
though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme.’ ” ’
. . . Thus, the Three Strikes law establishes a ‘strong
presumption’ in favor of a harsher sentence and requires the
court to explicitly articulate its reasoning if it is to depart from a
harsher sentence by granting the Romero motion.” (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428.)
When determining whether to dismiss a strike, a court
“must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances
of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).)
We review a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
375; People v. Edwards (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 523, 528
11
(Edwards); People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140
(Avila).) This is a challenging standard. “ ‘[B]ecause the
circumstances must be “extraordinary . . . by which a career
criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very
scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike
as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation
of which the law was meant to attack” [citation], the
circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that
the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme
must be even more extraordinary.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Vargas
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 641 (Vargas), quoting Carmony, at p. 378.)
Accordingly, “[o]nly in an extraordinary case—where the
relevant factors manifestly support the striking of a prior
conviction and no reasonable minds could differ—would the
failure to strike be an abuse of discretion.” (Edwards, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 529.) “Examples are where the trial court was
unaware of its discretion to dismiss; where the court considered
impermissible factors; or where the sentencing norms established
by the ‘Three Strikes’ law produce an arbitrary or patently
absurd result. It is not enough to show reasonable people might
disagree about whether to strike a prior conviction. There is no
abuse of discretion unless the trial court’s decision is so irrational
or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id.
at p. 528; see also Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.)
B. No abuse of discretion
The trial court denied Celaya’s Romero motion based on
permissible factors, and there is no indication it was unaware of
its discretion, relied on impermissible factors, or that its denial
was arbitrary or irrational. The trial court correctly considered
the nature and circumstances of Celaya’s 1995 felonies, stating
12
that he was the getaway driver who crashed into someone. It
also emphasized that Celaya’s 1995 felonies occurred soon after
he was released on parole. The court acknowledged Celaya’s
prior strikes were from a single 1986 case, but stated they
involved serious offenses, including attempted murder
convictions.
The trial court also properly considered Celaya’s
background, character, and prospects. (Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 161.) The court referenced Celaya’s 20 rule
violations while in prison, some of which involved gang activity
and physical violence. The court acknowledged that the violent
infractions had occurred “a long time ago,” yet reasoned Celaya’s
numerous violations demonstrated an inability to follow rules.
While the trial court recognized the parole board found Celaya a
risk to public safety, its decision did not rest on this finding.
Rather, the court found it was not in the “interest of justice” to
dismiss a strike, after correctly acknowledging that
circumstances must be “extraordinary” to warrant dismissal.
On appeal, Celaya contends the trial court abused its
discretion because it did not consider postconviction factors and
other evidence he asserts showed that “ ‘continued incarceration
is no longer in the interest of justice.’ ” We disagree.
The evidence Celaya highlights was in the record, and he
presented arguments to the trial court based on that evidence.
Celaya’s Romero motion discussed his current age, his time
served, his physical condition, his sobriety, his efforts at
rehabilitation, his future employment plans, and that his violent
rule violations were long ago. At the hearing, the trial court
expressly considered Celaya’s argument that his role in the
robbery was limited to being the getaway driver. During the
13
hearing, Celaya also emphasized how long ago his strike offenses
occurred. The court acknowledged that Celaya’s rule violations
for violent behavior occurred many years earlier and that he had
not incurred a rule violation since 2019. Further, Celaya’s age at
the time of his 1986 prior strike convictions was clear from the
record, as was the amount of time that had passed since his 1995
offenses.
There is no indication in the record that the court
disregarded any relevant factor or any of Celaya’s arguments.
Indeed, the trial court told Celaya directly: “[Defense counsel]
argued the reasons in a written motion as to why I should grant
that Romero motion. I listened to what he had to say. I listened
to what the People had to say. I looked at your prior history. I
looked at your comportment in state prison. I looked at all the
things that the court must look at, and I determined that it’s not
in the interest of justice to strike the strike and it’s not in the
interest of justice to strike the enhancement.” The “court is
presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the
absence of an affirmative record to the contrary,” so “the fact that
the court focused its explanatory comments” on only some of the
evidence, does not mean that Celaya has “demonstrated that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike
prior convictions.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305,
310.)
As we understand his argument, Celaya also contends the
trial court improperly failed to consider that, due to various
changes in the law since he was convicted of the crimes
underlying his prior strikes, if he were tried today on the same
facts, he may not have been convicted of crimes that would
constitute strike offenses. He cites, for example, the changes in
14
the law effected by Senate Bill Nos. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
and 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), Supreme Court precedent
concerning the kill-zone theory, and Supreme Court cases
requiring the dismissal of one strike when two prior strike
convictions arise from a single act against a single victim
(Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 640, 649) or from a single act
that harmed two victims (People v. Shaw (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1089,
1093).
Celaya did not make these arguments in the trial court or
present any information to the court about the factual basis of
the prior strike convictions or the legal theories under which he
was convicted. We reject Celaya’s argument that, in the absence
of any defense request, the trial court erred by failing to sua
sponte investigate the underlying factual or legal basis of the
prior strike convictions. Indeed, Celaya cites no authority, and
we are aware of none, to support this claim. Instead, Celaya
relies on People v. Tatlis (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1266, in which
the trial court was found to have erred by refusing a defendant’s
request for a probation report, for purposes unrelated to an
attempt to undermine the validity of a prior strike. Tatlis does
not support Celaya’s argument that the trial court erred by
failing to conduct its own investigation into Celaya’s prior strikes
when the defense made no such request. (See People v. Bullock
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985, 990 [on remand for resentencing
following appeal, trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing
to order updated probation report; defendant did not request
report, there was no evidence the trial court acted on incomplete
information, and no evidence there was information appellant
wanted the court to consider which it did not].)
15
We further have no basis to conclude that Celaya’s trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request a
probation report or to provide the court with historical
information about the strikes. The record does not disclose
whether defense counsel had information about the prior strikes,
or whether that information would have been helpful to Celaya.
Further, defense counsel provided the court with significant
information about Celaya’s background and mitigating
circumstances. On appeal, Celaya merely speculates that
additional information about the 1986 convictions may have
offered a basis for the court to consider dismissing one or more of
Celaya’s strikes. This is insufficient to establish that counsel’s
performance was deficient or that any deficient performance was
prejudicial. (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.)
Celaya further asserts several arguments based on the
remoteness of the strikes, his current amount of time served, and
his changed circumstances due to his current age and conduct in
prison. The trial court considered these facts. None was
dispositive or mandated that the court dismiss the strikes. (See
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [that 13 years passed
between strike and current felony was insignificant since
defendant did not refrain from criminal activity during that time
and “did not add maturity to age”]; Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1144 [“middle-age status alone does not remove [a
defendant] from the spirit of the Three Strikes law”].)
Celaya’s arguments essentially ask us to reweigh the
evidence, which is not this court’s role. The trial court here
properly considered Celaya’s background and prospects,
including that two of the strikes were attempted murder
convictions, he committed the instant offenses almost
16
immediately after being released on parole for prior crimes, and
he had a history of rule violations in custody. (See People v.
Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906 [defendant’s extensive
criminal history and parole and probation violations were “strong
indication[s] of unwillingness or inability to comply with the
law”].) Even though Celaya proffered evidence of efforts at
rehabilitation, the trial court could find the weight of the
evidence suggested a lack of reform, well after the age Celaya
could be considered a youthful offender. (People v. Bernal (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1170 [presence of mitigating evidence is not
enough to render trial court’s denial of Romero motion an abuse
of discretion].) On the totality of the evidence before it, the trial
court reasonably determined Celaya did not fall outside the spirit
of the Three Strikes law.
“[A]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment about
appropriate sentencing for that of the trial court, but instead
must give due regard to the discretion vested in that court.
[Citations.] The appellate court can find a reversible abuse of
discretion only if it concludes that no reasonable judge would
have agreed with the trial court’s decision. [Citations.] Unless
that standard is met, the appellate court must affirm the
decision, even if it ‘ “might have ruled differently” ’ on the Romero
motion ‘ “in the first instance.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dain
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 258.)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
Declining To Strike Celaya’s Firearm Enhancement
Under section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), a court “shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so.” The court here considered the mitigating factors enumerated
in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), and found none applied. It
17
further found that it was not in the interest of justice to dismiss
the firearm enhancement for the same reasons it declined to
dismiss one or more strikes.
Celaya contends that even though no mitigating
circumstances applied under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), the
trial court erred in not dismissing the principal use enhancement
for the same reasons it should have dismissed one or more of his
prior strikes. For the reasons described above as to the Romero
motion, Celaya fails to establish the trial court abused its
discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.)
Celaya also contends that the trial court improperly
considered only his current dangerousness, citing People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215. Gonzalez is inapposite. In
that case, the court considered the trial court’s analysis under
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), which directs that proof of
enumerated mitigating circumstances “weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
Here, it is undisputed that none of the enumerated mitigating
circumstances applied. Further, the trial court explicitly stated
its ruling did not rest on Celaya’s danger to the community—
currently or at any time—but on “the interest of justice” as
permitted under section 1385, subdivision (c)(1).
Celaya has not established that the trial court applied an
incorrect legal standard or abused its discretion in declining to
strike the firearm enhancement.3
3 Because we find no abuse of discretion, we do not address
Celaya’s argument that trial court errors violated his federal
constitutional right to due process.
18
IV. The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Amended To
Accurately Reflect Celaya’s Custody Credits
Celaya asserts, and the People concede, that the trial court
miscalculated his actual custody credits at resentencing. We
agree with the parties.
Celaya was originally sentenced on December 13, 1995. At
that time, the court awarded 240 days of actual custody credits.
The amended abstract of judgment issued after the
section 1172.75 resentencing reflected total actual custody credits
of 9,902 days. However, the parties agree that between
December 13, 1995, and the date of his resentencing, December
13, 2023, Celaya accrued 10,228 days of actual custody credit.
Thus, Celaya was entitled to 10,468 days of actual custody credit:
the 240 days awarded previously for presentence actual custody
credit, plus the 10,228 days accrued between the date of the
original sentencing and resentencing. (People v. Buckhalter
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [defendant entitled to all actual custody
days since arrest, including date of resentencing]; §§ 2900.1,
2900.5, subd. (d).)
The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect
Celaya’s actual custody credits of 10,468 days. (People v.
Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 981, 993; People v. Boyd
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 74–75.)
V. The Criminal Conviction and Court Operations Fees
Must Be Stricken
We also agree with the parties that the criminal conviction
and court operations fees must be stricken.
The trial court imposed a $30 criminal conviction fee on
each count pursuant to Government Code section 70373. It also
imposed a “court operation fee” of $40 per count pursuant to
19
section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). However, Government Code
section 70373 only applies to convictions after the statute’s
January 1, 2009 effective date. (People v. Davis (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 998, 1000.) Similarly, the court operations fee is
only applicable to convictions after the statute’s 2003 operative
date. (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753, 754.) Because
Celaya suffered the convictions in 1995, the criminal conviction
and court operations fees must be stricken.
VI. The Restitution Fine Is Vacated
Celaya argues, and the People agree, that the restitution
fine imposed must be vacated pursuant to a recent amendment to
section 1465.9. We agree. Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly
Bill No. 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1) amended section 1465.9 to
add subdivision (d), providing that any portion of a restitution
fine under section 1465.9 that is not paid within 10 years must be
vacated. (§ 1465.9, subd. (d) [“Upon the expiration of 10 years
after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to
Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be
unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment
imposing those fines shall be vacated.”]; In re Mattison (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066.) The restitution fine was originally
imposed in 1995, and Celaya was resentenced over 20 years later.
We therefore vacate the fine.
VII. The Parole Revocation Fine Is Reduced
Finally, Celaya asserts, and the People concede, that the
parole revocation fine must be reduced from $300 to $200. At
Celaya’s original sentencing, the statutory minimum restitution
fine was $200, and section 1202.45 required the imposition of a
parole revocation fine in an equal amount. (Former § 1202.45.)
At the resentencing hearing, the court imposed a $300 restitution
20
fine and imposed and stayed a $300 parole revocation fine.
However, because the trial court originally imposed a $200
restitution fine, and the court may not impose a more severe
punishment on resentencing, we agree with the parties that the
stayed parole revocation fine must be reduced to $200, matching
the originally imposed restitution fine.
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DISPOSITION
We direct the clerk of the Superior Court to prepare and
forward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
amended abstracts of judgment: (1) awarding Danny Celaya
10,228 days of actual custody credit for the period between
December 13, 1995, and December 13, 2023, in addition to the
240 days of presentence actual custody credit previously awarded
(total 10,468); (2) striking the criminal conviction and court
operations fees under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government
Code section 70373; (3) vacating the restitution fine under Penal
Code section 1465.9, subdivision (d); and (3) reducing the parole
revocation fine to $200. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
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