People v. Adams CA2/1

CourtListener 10781442Calctapp29 janv. 2026

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Filed 1/29/26 P. v. Adams CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340879

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA103213)
v.

DAVID ANTHONY ADAMS, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Douglas W. Sortino, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody and Richard B. Lennon, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Chelsea Zaragoza,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Appellant David Anthony Adams, Jr.—whom a jury convicted
of second degree murder in 2015—challenges the trial court’s
refusal to strike his prior “strike” conviction at his Penal Code1
section 1172.75 resentencing. Adams contends his background
and the circumstances of the murder demonstrate that he falls
outside the spirit of the “Three Strikes” sentencing scheme (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12).
We conclude, however, that Adams’s challenge amounts
to a request that we “substitute [our] judgment about appropriate
sentencing for that of the trial court,” which we cannot do.
(People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 258.) We therefore reject
his challenge and affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.

A. The Murder and Adams’s Original Sentencing
For context, we provide the following account of the murder
derived from our opinion in Adams’s direct appeal. (People v.
Adams et al. (Aug. 8, 2017, B269551) [nonpub. opn.] (Adams).)
Adams and his codefendant, Nicholas Hempstead, were both
members of Trey-57, a street gang affiliated with the Crips.
The victim, Deon Davis, was a member of the PDL gang, which was
affiliated with the Bloods and an enemy of Trey-57. On August 31,
2013, Lisa Caesar, an associate of the Trey-57s, told Adams and his
friends that Davis had forced her niece into prostitution and had
taken her niece’s car. Caesar, Adams, Hempstead, and another
friend, Lonzo Eddings, confronted Davis at a residence and

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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attempted to retrieve the car. They argued, and Adams punched
Davis.
The owner of the residence where the fight took place
objected, and Adams suggested they go to another location. Davis
willingly accompanied the group to a location in territory controlled
by Trey-57. Davis challenged the others to a fight, Adams accepted,
and they carried the fight into an alley.
“Caesar testified that, when the youths stopped in the alley,
they conversed in tones so low that Caesar could not hear them.
Eddings came out of the alley and told her, ‘ “ . . . [Hempstead] is
going to shoot him.” ’ Caesar told Eddings, ‘ “I didn’t come here for
that” ’ and ‘tell him no.’ Eddings returned to the alley, and, in a few
seconds, Caesar heard Hempstead say, ‘ “Fuck that. I got him right
here.” ’ Caesar saw that Hempstead was wearing gloves and had
a black object that was the size of a handgun. Hempstead shoved
Adams aside and walked toward Davis, who was deeper into the
alley.” (Adams, supra, B269551.)
“Adams walked up to [Caesar and Eddings] and said, ‘ “Start
running to the car.” ’ ” As Caesar and Eddings did so, they heard
multiple gunshots. Caesar got into her car and “ ‘never looked
back.’ ” “ ‘Within seconds’ Eddings got into the car; then Adams
arrived five seconds after Caesar. Caesar did not intend to wait for
Adams or Hempstead. After Caesar started the car, but before she
could put the car in gear, Hempstead got into the car. . . . [¶] . . .
As they were driving away, Eddings looked at Hempstead and said,
‘What the fuck did you do?’ Hempstead answered, ‘ “That was for
[Cook, Eddings’s brother, who had died in a possibly gang-related
shooting].” ’ Adams and Hempstead laughed and made Crips hand
signals.” (Adams, supra, B269551.)
In 2015, a jury convicted Hempstead of first degree murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189), and found true a gang allegation (§ 186.22,

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subd. (b)(4)) and that Hempstead had personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm proximately causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). (Adams, supra, B269551.) The same jury convicted
Adams of second degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and found
true a gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)).
At sentencing, the prosecution requested that the court
sentence Adams to 36 years to life in prison. The prosecutor argued
that Adams’s “long criminal history[,] beginning when he was
14 years old,” supported the request: In 2006, Adams suffered a
conviction for grand theft and “was given the benefit of the deferred
entry of judgment program.” Then, in September 2007, Adams
sustained two convictions for burglaries of Target stores, and in
November 2007, he suffered a robbery conviction—a strike under
the Three Strikes law—after he physically struggled with a security
guard while attempting to burglarize a Target store.2 In 2010,
while on parole for the 2007 robbery, Adams committed another
burglary and served 32 months in state prison. And in 2013, while
still on parole for the 2010 burglary, Adams aided and abetted the
instant murder.
The trial court denied Adams’s request, pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), to strike
his prior strike conviction and sentenced Adams to 36 years to life
in prison. The sentence consisted of a 15-year-to-life base term,
doubled due to Adams’s prior strike, a five-year prior serious felony
conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a one-year prior

2 The copy of the probation report included in our appellate
record does not reflect any 2006 proceedings for grand theft against
Adams, nor does the report describe the 2007 crimes as involving
Target stores. Adams, however, does not dispute the prosecution’s
characterization of his criminal history.

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prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On appeal, we
affirmed the judgment. (See Adams, supra, B269551.)

B. Section 1172.75 Resentencing Proceedings
Several years after Adams’s conviction, the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b) to eliminate sentence enhancements
for prior prison terms unless the prior terms were for sexually
violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) Then, via Senate
Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), the Legislature enacted
section 1172.75 to provide a resentencing procedure that extends
the prohibition on certain prior prison term enhancements to
all persons currently incarcerated in jail or prison. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3.) Section 1172.75 requires a “full resentencing” of any
defendant serving a term on a judgment that includes a qualifying
enhancement. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 358;
see § 1172.75, subd. (c); People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025)
18 Cal.5th 838, 875.)
In 2023, the court set Adams’s case for a section 1172.75
resentencing and appointed the public defender to represent him
in the proceedings. Prior to the resentencing hearing, defense
counsel filed a motion requesting that—in addition to striking the
invalidated prior prison term enhancement—the court strike the
five-year prior serious felony enhancement and Adams’s prior
strike conviction for robbery. In the motion, defense counsel argued
that Adams fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law because
he was only 21 years old when he committed the offense, and his
current age (32 years old) rendered him a low recidivism risk.
Adams did not present any other mitigating evidence.
At the September 2024 resentencing hearing, defense counsel
reiterated the requests in the motion and made the additional

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request that the court resentence Adams to the lesser offense of
manslaughter. In support of the requests, defense counsel proffered
the following facts concerning the circumstances of the murder
and Adams’s background and postconviction conduct: Adams was
“under the influence” when he aided and abetted the murder. He
grew up surrounded by gangs, drugs, and violence, and “was shot
twice at the age of 12 in the leg and 14 in the back while walking
to school.” Adams’s father, who physically abused him, suffered
a brain aneurysm when Adams was 11 years old and died shortly
before Adams committed the murder. Adams suffered a stab
wound during a 2019 prison riot that left him with severe mobility
challenges and memory loss. And while in prison, Adams had been
working and “engaging, to some extent, in programming”—namely,
a 2019 program concerning the “green environment” and a May
2024 “self-awareness and improvement group.”
Finally, defense counsel noted that, although Adams would
be eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing in 2038, “only
17 percent of inmates who come before the parole board are granted
parole each year[,] and that’s been a consistent statistic for the last
several years.”
The court responded that, in its view, the parole board’s
standards were “lax,” and the board “seem[ed] to be releasing
everybody they c[ould].” The court then asked whether the record
contained any evidence supporting the facts proffered concerning
Adams’s background and the circumstances of the offense. Defense
counsel responded, “This is Mr. Adams[’s] reporting.” The court
likewise asked for more details concerning Adams’s involvement in
the prison riot, but apart from “know[ing] that [Adams] received [a
rule violation report] for participating in the riot,” defense counsel
“[did not] have the answer to the court’s question.”

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After hearing argument from the prosecutor, the court struck
the one-year and five-year enhancements, but declined to strike
Adams’s prior strike or make further reductions to his sentence.
The court explained, in pertinent part:
“I don’t believe the strike should be stricken. I believe
[Adams] is still within . . . the spirit of the Three Strikes law . . . .
[N]or will I take the opportunity to exercise my discretion to reduce
this to voluntary manslaughter. [¶] . . . [T]his was a gang murder,
pure and simple, . . . [Adams] knew what was going to happen, . . .
was happy after it happened, he ha[s] a lengthy criminal history,
he had plenty of time to turn his life around and do the right thing
and he chose to continue in this behavior.”
The court sentenced Adams to an aggregate term of 30 years
to life in prison. Adams timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Adams contends the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to strike his prior strike conviction. (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Carmony) [appellate court reviews a
trial court’s refusal to strike a prior strike conviction for abuse of
discretion].) We are not persuaded.
The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) A defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating “ ‘ “the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary.” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376.)
“[A] ‘ “decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable
people might disagree.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 377.)
A trial court may strike a prior strike conviction in
cases brought under the Three Strikes law when dismissal is
“in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.) The standards for striking a prior strike

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are “stringent” and the circumstances must be “ ‘extraordinary . . .
by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit
of ’ ” the law. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Factors to
consider are “the nature of the charged and prior offenses and the
defendant’s ‘background, character, and prospects.’ [Citation.]”
(Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1193, 1207.) If these factors “manifestly support the striking of a
prior conviction and no reasonable minds could differ[,] the failure
to strike would constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Carmony, supra,
at p. 378.)
Here, Adams fails to demonstrate that “no reasonable minds
could differ” that he falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Accepting as true that
Adams’s childhood trauma and his young age at the time of the
offense weigh in favor of striking the prior strike, the record also
supports that Adams was a career criminal who aided and abetted
a gang-related murder while still on parole for a prior offense. And
although Adams had already served eight years of his sentence
at the time of the resentencing hearing, the record reflects he had
engaged in only limited rehabilitative programming. The record
thus supports that the court “ ‘balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law,’ ” and we therefore cannot reverse “ ‘even if we might have
ruled differently in the first instance.’ [Citation.]” (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
Accordingly, we affirm.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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