Milder v. Holley CA2/5

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Filed 1/23/26 Milder v. Holley CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ANDREW MILDER, B331152

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BC581072)

SHAWN HOLLEY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
Andrew Milder, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Nemecek & Cole, Marshall R. Cole, and Mark Schaeffer for
Defendants and Respondents.
Andrew Milder (plaintiff) initiated arbitration proceedings
against his former attorney, Shawn Holley (Holley), and her law
firm, Kinsella Weitzman Iser Kump & Aldisert, LLP (KWIKA)
(collectively, defendants). Plaintiff later filed a lawsuit to void
the arbitration agreement and end the arbitration proceedings.
The trial court resolved that lawsuit in defendants’ favor, and we
affirmed on appeal. In this appeal, the question concerns only
attorney fees, namely, whether the trial court erred in awarding
defendants fees incurred in prevailing on appeal from the
judgment entered against plaintiff.

I. BACKGROUND1
A. Plaintiff’s Demand for Arbitration
Plaintiff engaged defendants to represent him in a criminal
matter in 2011. Defendants’ retainer agreement included an
arbitration provision. The arbitration section of the retainer
agreement stated that, subject to exceptions not applicable here,
“[t]he prevailing party in any action, arbitration, or proceeding
arising out of or to enforce any provision of th[e]
[a]greement . . . will be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs incurred in that action, arbitration, or proceeding, or in the
enforcement of any judgment or award rendered.”
After Holley moved to be relieved as counsel in the criminal
case, plaintiff initiated arbitration proceedings against her. A
few months later, plaintiff filed an amended demand for

1
In reciting the pertinent background facts, we draw on this
Court’s prior opinions in Milder v. Holley (Jan. 31, 2017,
B267974) [nonpub. opn.], Milder v. Holley (Dec. 16, 2021,
B298984, B303175) [nonpub. opn.], and Milder v. Holley (Dec. 16,
2021, B299122) [nonpub. opn.].

2
arbitration against both defendants alleging breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unfair business practices
based on defendants’ failure to deliver “the ‘highest quality legal
services’” as promised.

B. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit to Void the Arbitration Agreement
Several months after initiating the arbitration, plaintiff
filed a civil complaint in superior court seeking a declaratory
judgment that the retainer agreement’s arbitration provision was
void. Plaintiff alleged he was fraudulently induced to agree to
the arbitration provision based on a false representation in the
retainer agreement that attorney fees and other costs incurred by
both sides in arbitration are “usually substantially less” than
proceedings in court. Soon after he filed the complaint, plaintiff
filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order
prohibiting defendants from proceeding with the arbitration,
which the trial court denied.
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the
complaint without leave to amend in October 2015, reasoning
that plaintiff's theory of fraud in the inducement must be decided
by the arbitrator rather than the trial court. Plaintiff appealed,
and this court reversed, holding plaintiff was correct that claims
of fraud specifically concerning alleged inducement to agree to an
arbitration provision must be decided by a court, not the
arbitrator. (Milder v. Holley (Jan. 31, 2017, B267974) [nonpub.
opn.] (Milder I).)
On remand, plaintiff contended he was entitled to a jury
trial and “the full gamut of discovery.” The trial court allowed
limited discovery, severed plaintiff’s declaratory relief cause of

3
action, and held a hearing on what it characterized as plaintiff’s
affirmative defense to arbitration.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
determined plaintiff did not establish he was fraudulently
induced to agree to the arbitration provision. The trial court
entered judgment for defendants and granted their post-
judgment motion for $241,048.50 in attorney fees.

C. Competing Petitions to Vacate and Confirm the
Arbitration Award
While plaintiff’s lawsuit to void the arbitration agreement
was pending, the arbitrator dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with
prejudice after he declined to participate in the proceedings. The
arbitrator awarded defendants the full amount of their requested
attorney fees ($59,892.50) plus most of their requested costs
($19,705.98).
Plaintiff and defendants then filed competing petitions to
vacate and confirm the arbitration award. Among other things,
plaintiff argued that his agreement to arbitrate was fraudulently
induced and that Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.3 prohibits
an award of fees and costs against a consumer in arbitration.2
The trial court rejected these arguments and entered a judgment
confirming the arbitration award.

D. Milder II and Milder III
Plaintiff appealed the adverse judgment entered in
connection with his lawsuit to void the arbitration agreement and

2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

4
the adverse judgment confirming the arbitration award. This
Court resolved these appeals in separate opinions issued on the
same day in 2021.
In Milder v. Holley (Dec. 16, 2021, B299122) [nonpub. opn.]
(Milder III), this Court determined the arbitration was a
consumer arbitration within the meaning of section 1284.3 and
the award of fees and costs in the arbitration therefore could not
stand. We further held, however, that because plaintiff “never
timely raised section 1284.3 as reason not to go forward with the
arbitration,” he “forfeit[ed] any challenge to the arbitration
generally and the arbitrator’s dismissal of his complaint in
arbitration specifically.” We therefore reversed the judgment
confirming the arbitration award and remanded for the trial
court to enter a new and different order confirming that award
without assessing any attorney fees and costs.
In Milder v. Holley (Dec. 16, 2021, B298984, B303175)
[nonpub. opn.] (Milder II), this Court affirmed the judgment in
the action to void the arbitration agreement and a $241,048.50
post-judgment attorney fees award. We held, among other
things, that section 1284.3 did not bar the award of attorney fees
in plaintiff’s lawsuit to void the arbitration agreement. We
explained “the challenged award concerns fees incurred in
litigation—not the arbitration—and nothing in Code of Civil
Procedure section 1284.3 precludes giving effect to a contractual
provision providing for payment of prevailing party attorney fees
in litigation, even litigation relating to arbitration.”

5
E. Award of Appellate Attorney Fees in Connection with
Milder II
Following our decision in Milder II, which affirmed the
judgment in defendants’ favor on plaintiff’s action to void the
arbitration agreement, defendants filed a motion in the trial
court seeking to recover their attorney fees in that appeal.
Plaintiff opposed an award of fees and argued, among other
things, that the requested fees were barred under section 1284.3.3
Echoing this Court’s holding in Milder II, the trial court
determined section 1284.3 did not apply because “[d]efendants
seek appellate attorney fees incurred in litigation, not
arbitration.” The trial court determined the amount of fees
defendants requested was reasonable and awarded defendants
$175,631.80 in fees and costs.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based
on purported errors of law and irregularities in the proceedings,
including contentions that the trial court misconstrued section
1284.3 and erred in striking a request to disqualify the court.4
The trial court denied the new trial motion, finding it lacked
jurisdiction to grant a motion for a new trial concerning a post-

3
Plaintiff’s opposition also asserted the claimed fees were
excessive. He did not specifically challenge the attorneys’ rates
or hours billed, however.
4
Plaintiff argued the judge should be disqualified because
she made rulings that plaintiff was challenging on appeal in a
separate lawsuit against the arbitrator, the arbitration services
provider, and the provider’s chief executive. The trial court
struck the statement of disqualification because, among other
things, it “demonstrate[d] on its face no legal grounds for
disqualification . . . .”

6
judgment order for attorney fees, there had been no irregularity
in the proceedings or error of law, and, “[t]o the extent [p]laintiff
[wa]s moving for a new trial regarding” the trial court’s order
striking his “[s]tatement of [d]isqualification,” there were no
“grounds for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section
657 as to such [o]rder.”

II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s briefing in this appeal understands the holding
in Milder III, i.e., that section 1284.3 bars an award of attorney
fees in arbitration, to mean defendants may not recover attorney
fees in litigation relating to the arbitration.5 But as we explained
in Milder II, that is not correct. Our reasoning in Milder II
applies equally to the fees award at issue here and requires
affirmance. Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of his motion for a
new trial lacks merit because he cannot demonstrate prejudicial
error.6

5
Plaintiff does not argue in this appeal that the fee award
was excessive.
6
We decline defendants’ request in their respondents’ brief
that we expressly state they are entitled to their attorney fees
incurred in this appeal or permit them to move for attorney fees
in this Court. (See, e.g., Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1267.)

7
A. Section 1284.3 Does Not Prohibit Attorney Fees in
Litigation Relating to Arbitration
Section 1284.3, subdivision (a) provides that “[n]o neutral
arbitrator or private arbitration company shall administer a
consumer arbitration under any agreement or rule requiring that
a consumer who is a party to the arbitration pay the fees and
costs incurred by an opposing party if the consumer does not
prevail in the arbitration, including, but not limited to, the fees
and costs of the arbitrator, provider organization, attorney, or
witnesses.” As we have already discussed, we construed this
subdivision in Milder III to preclude an arbitrator from awarding
attorney fees and costs incurred in arbitration against a
consumer. However, as we emphasized in Milder II, “nothing in
Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.3 precludes giving effect to a
contractual provision providing for payment of prevailing party
attorney fees in litigation, even litigation relating to arbitration.”
The retainer agreement between plaintiff and defendants
provides for prevailing party fees and costs incurred “in any
action, arbitration, or proceeding arising out” of the agreement.
Plaintiff does not dispute defendants’ fees incurred in defending
his action to void the arbitration agreement arise out of the
retainer agreement. Rather, he principally argues section 1284.3
precluded the arbitrator from conducting the arbitration—an
issue we held forfeited in plaintiff’s challenge to the judgment
confirming the arbitration award in Milder III. That issue is not
now before us.
Plaintiff further argues the trial court erroneously believed
this Court had already awarded defendants their appellate
attorney fees. Plaintiff highlights a remark by the trial court at
the hearing “that this is more of the attorneys’ fees that the

8
Court of Appeal already awarded. [¶] So that’s my focus.” Read
in context, however, the trial court was emphasizing this Court
had previously affirmed an attorney fee award in Milder II
(holding section 1284.3 does not preclude a fee award in litigation
concerning the retainer agreement).7 The trial court correctly
determined there was no bar to enforcement of the contractual
provision for attorney fees, and there is no indication it did not
exercise discretion in determining the amount to which
defendants were entitled. (Mepco Services, Inc. v. Saddleback
Valley Unified School Dist. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1045
[discussing scope of trial court’s discretion with respect to
contractual fee awards].)
Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court somehow erred in
determining defendants were the prevailing party—after the
judgment entered in their favor was affirmed on appeal—is
unavailing. Plaintiff suggests defendants won only a “transient
victory” in his action to void the arbitration agreement because
he believes his reading of section 1284.3 will someday be
vindicated. Regardless of whether plaintiff’s optimism is well-
founded, the high court’s use of the phrase “transient victory” in
Lackey v. Stinnie (2025) 604 U.S. 192 concerns the temporary

7
Moments before making the statements quoted in plaintiff’s
opening brief, the trial court explained it was “focused on that
fact that [plaintiff] appealed the judgment and the . . . order
awarding attorneys’ fees and the Court of Appeal opined that the
judgment and post-judgment order granting defendant[ ]s[’]
motion for attorneys’ fees was affirmed. And so they also
awarded the costs on appeal. [¶] So now this is just a motion for
fees and further appellate attorneys’ fees.”

9
nature of a preliminary injunction and has no relevance to this
case.

B. There Is No Basis to Reverse the Order Denying
Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial
“New trial motions, as creatures of statute, are solely
granted on the grounds enumerated in Code of Civil Procedure
section 657; all other grounds are in excess of jurisdiction.
[Citation.]”8 (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506-1507.) We review
the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion
that resulted in prejudicial error. (Smith v. Magic Mountain LLC
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1135; Crouch v. Trinity Christian
Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1018.)
Plaintiff has not shown prejudicial error here because, for
the reasons we have discussed, his position that section 1284.3
precludes defendants’ recovery of fees and costs incurred in the
prior appeal lacks merit. Neither of the two grounds on which he
moved for a new trial impact this legal conclusion. His
contention that there was an error of law simply restates the
question. And his claims of irregularity arising from alleged bias
among the judiciary also fail. There is no need for us to dissect
these claims in detail because the identity of the judicial officer
does not bear on whether section 1284.3 applies—there were no

8
Plaintiff did not ask the trial court to reconsider its ruling
under section 1008 or pursuant to its inherent power to
reconsider its own orders.

10
evidentiary or other threshold rulings determining the answer to
this pure question of law.9
Plaintiff also argues, for the first time on appeal, that a
new trial was warranted by newly discovered evidence—i.e., this
Court’s holding in Milder III that section 1284.3 barred
defendants’ recovery of attorney fees incurred in arbitration. The
argument is forfeited and lacks merit for several reasons: a legal
principle is not evidence, both Milder II and Milder III were
decided before defendants moved for appellate attorney fees, and
our holding in Milder III is inapposite in this appeal.
Another argument plaintiff raises for the first time on
appeal—that a notice of related cases was not timely filed—is
also forfeited. Moreover, even if plaintiff’s speculation that he
might have avoided “repeat unfavorable rulings against him” is
correct, it has no direct relationship to the order granting
defendants appellate attorney fees.

9
Plaintiff does not contend in this court that the fees should
have been awarded in a reduced amount. Plaintiff also has not
shown that a different judicial officer would have exercised
discretion to reduce the fees based merely on the conclusory
contention made in the trial court.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders are affirmed. Defendants are
awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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