People v. Lopez CA4/3

CourtListener 10778064Calctapp22 janv. 2026

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Filed 1/22/26 P. v. Lopez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064646

v. (Super. Ct. No. 21WF1937)

KARINA JANETTE LOPEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Elizabeth G. Macias, Judge. Affirmed.
Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Karina Janette Lopez appeals from her convictions for drug and
identity theft crimes, contending the trial court wrongly denied her motion to
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suppress. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) We conclude the motion was correctly denied
because (1) probable cause supported a search incident to arrest and (2) the
result of that search warranted a vehicle search. We affirm.
FACTS
A loss prevention worker saw a man walk out of a Home Depot
store in Huntington Beach with unpaid merchandise. When the worker
identified himself, the man abandoned the merchandise and got into the front
passenger seat of a white Chevy Colorado truck. The worker reported the
truck’s license plate number to the police.
A nearby police officer stopped a white Colorado with the same
license plate number “just east” of the store. The front passenger matched the
description of the man who took the items from Home Depot. There were two
occupants in the back seat. In the truck’s uncovered bed, the officer saw
packaged Home Depot merchandise.
The worker arrived at the truck with another officer and
identified the front passenger as the man he had confronted. The worker told
the officers the merchandise in the truck bed was from another Home Depot
store.
The officers ordered the driver, Lopez, to exit the truck. Lopez
claimed: “But sir, I gave somebody a ride.” A third police officer searched her,
finding a bag appearing to contain methamphetamine in her left bra cup. The
officers searched the truck. Inside of “a purse on the floorboard of the driver’s
seat” were “two pipes . . . consistent with pipes used to smoke

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All further statutory references are to this code.

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methamphetamine,” a scale, small Ziploc bags, a wallet, a checkbook, a debit
card, a club card, and a driver’s license for someone besides Lopez. Inside of a
drawstring backpack in the backseat of the truck were found “various
amounts of checkbooks, ID cards, [and] passports.”
Lopez was arrested and charged with offenses including
possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378;
count 1) and identity theft involving more than 10 victims (§ 530.5,
subd. (c)(3); count 3).
Lopez moved to suppress the items found in the searches. (See
§ 1538.5.) The trial court denied the motion. It explained: “I will say that
certainly there can be an innocent explanation. Ms. Lopez happened to have
been shopping at Home Depot, had all those items that she purchased in the
back of her truck, and the individuals simply asked for a ride and Ms. Lopez
agreed to give them a ride. The problem with that is that you normally don’t
have two other individuals in the backseat, and then somehow the person
that conveniently asks for a ride ends up in the front seat. [¶] The
circumstances under which Ms. Lopez was stopped, the information that law
enforcement knew at the time, the information that law enforcement
subsequently gathered as a result of the stop make it so that it’s not just
suspicion. It does rise to the level of probable cause, and so they are grounds
to search Ms. Lopez. They had grounds to search the vehicle. So the Court is
denying the motion to suppress.”
Lopez then pleaded guilty to all counts. The court placed her on
two years of formal probation.
DISCUSSION
We disagree with Lopez’s claim the search of her bra was
unreasonable. Probable cause to arrest justifies a warrantless search of the

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arrestee. (People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742.) “‘“In
determining whether . . . [a] search or seizure was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment,”’” but “‘“defer to
the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence.”’” (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053.)
In our independent judgment, the trial court correctly found
there was probable cause to arrest Lopez. It is undisputed her passenger took
Home Depot merchandise out of the store without paying for it. (See People v.
Shannon (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649, 654 [larceny elements].) That man left
the Home Depot and, when confronted, left the merchandise behind and
entered the Colorado’s empty front passenger seat. Lopez then drove him and
two others away from the store in the Colorado, which was already loaded
with Home Depot merchandise from another store. As the trial court
insightfully observed, this is less consistent with giving an innocent ride to
someone than it is with participating in theft. (See People v. Diaz (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1172, 1178 [“Probable cause is not a high bar” and “[o]ne need
not be a legal technician to grasp the concept”]; see also People v. Swanson-
Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 742 [“‘getaway driver . . . may properly
be found liable as an aider and abettor’”]; cf. § 32 [accessory to felony].)2
We find little guidance in the cases Lopez discusses. To be sure,
mere proximity to crime suspects does not amount to probable cause. (See
Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) 444 U.S. 85, 91.) And probable cause to arrest one

2
Because, as Lopez correctly notes, the prosecutor explicitly told
the trial court “I’m not going to offer consent” as a theory, we decline to
entertain the Attorney General’s contention on that point. (See Robey v.
Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1242–1243 [declining to reach consent
based on “limited record”].)

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vehicle occupant does not necessarily justify arresting all of the occupants.
(See, e.g., United States v. Di Re (1948) 332 U.S. 581; People v. Temple (1995)
36 Cal.App.4th 1219; In re Dung T. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 697; People v.
Gonzalez (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 432.) We have more here than proximity.
Lopez was the driver, not a mere passenger. (Cf. Di Re, at pp. 586–587.)
Waiting in a truck with two passengers in the back seat but with the front
passenger seat free—with a bed carrying merchandise from another Home
Depot—Lopez drove an undisputed thief who had just abandoned Home
Depot merchandise after being confronted by the loss prevention worker
away from the crime scene.
Finally, the fruit of the search incident to arrest—a substance in
Lopez’s bra that looked like methamphetamine—established probable cause
to search the truck. (See Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 234–235
[valid “reason to believe” relevant evidence contained within vehicle justifies
vehicle search].) Lopez does not contend otherwise, stating in her reply brief:
“[I]f the search of appellant’s undergarments was incident to a lawful arrest,
police could thereby derive probable cause from the fruits of that body search
to thereafter search her drawstring backpack and purse for controlled
substances.”

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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