CourtListener 10777539•In re P.V. CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 1/21/26 In re P.V. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re P.V., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B337624
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 2021020959)
Law. (Ventura County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
P.V. and another minor set fire to an elementary school.
After a contested restitution hearing, the minors were ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, direct victim restitution of over $1
million dollars. Appellant contends newly enacted Welfare and
Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3), which limits a
minor’s liability for restitution to their apportioned percentage of
fault, applies retroactively and requires remand for a new
restitution hearing.1 We disagree and affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In July 2021, appellant and E.S. recorded themselves
engaging in a series of destructive acts after they broke into an
elementary school, vandalized a classroom, and started a fire.
The Ventura County District Attorney’s Office filed a
section 602 petition alleging appellant committed arson,
burglary, and vandalism. After a contested adjudication hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared P.V. a ward of
the court, and placed her on probation.
In April 2024, after a contested restitution hearing, the
juvenile court ordered appellant to pay $1,025,000 directly to the
Ventura Unified School District, jointly and severally, with her
co-offender, E.S.
Discussion
Appellant contends this court should remand for a new
restitution hearing based on newly amended section 730.6,
subdivision (b)(3). Specifically, she contends Assembly Bill No.
1186 is an “ameliorative change” and pursuant to In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), “this provision will apply
retroactively to all cases not yet final on its operative date,” like
the present case. As we shall explain, appellant is mistaken.
Section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “It is the intent
of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is
found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs an
economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
restitution directly from that minor.” (Ibid.) The purpose of
direct victim restitution is to make the victim whole, rehabilitate
the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior. (Luis M. v.
Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 305; In re Anthony M.
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.)
Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023-
2024 Reg. Sess.) amended the rule governing restitution in
juvenile delinquency proceedings pursuant to section 730.6. As
amended, the statute eliminates the requirement that a juvenile
court impose a separate restitution fine. (Former § 730.6, subds.
(a)(2)(A), (b)(1); Stats. 2015. Ch. 131, § 1.) It also replaces the
“joint and several liability” provision formerly imposed by section
730.6, subdivision (h) with “several liability.”
Section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3) provides: “For the
purposes of victim restitution, each minor shall be held severally
liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally liable as co-
offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on each
minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic
losses included in the order of restitution. The aggregate amount
of apportioned liability for all minors involved shall not exceed
100 percent in total.” (Ibid.; Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.)
The issue here is whether section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3)
applies retroactively or prospectively. Because the question at
issue involves interpretation of statutory language, our review is
de novo. (People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 593.)
“It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to
operate prospectively absent an express declaration of
retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the
Legislature, intended otherwise.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991)
53 Cal.3d 282, 287; accord, People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1,
3
11 (Burgos) [in the absence of an express retroactivity provision,
a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear
from extrinsic sources that the lawmakers intended a
retrospective application].) An exception to this presumption is
that newly enacted legislation that reduces punishment may
apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments. (Burgos, at pp. 12-
13; Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744-745.)
Appellant contends the legislative history suggests the law
was to be applied retroactively. Appellant cites the Assembly
Floor Analysis from August 18, 2024 for Assembly Bill No. 1186,
which states this bill “[p]rospectively eliminates the requirement
that a minor adjudged to be a ward of the court pay a restitution
fine.” (Assembly Floor Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 1186, p. 2,
italics added.) Appellant surmises that because none of the other
amendments were listed as applying “prospectively,” the
Legislature presumably intended only the elimination of the
restitution fine be prospective. We are not persuaded.
The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the existing
law and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof.
(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659.) In this case, the
Legislature is presumed to have known that eliminating a
restitution fine is an ameliorative benefit that would operate
retroactively pursuant to Estrada. By contrast, direct victim
restitution is not a punishment and therefore Estrada’s inference
of retroactivity does not apply. (See People v. Harvest (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 641, 650, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Pittman (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260 [“The purpose of
victim restitution is compensation, which does not involve an
affirmative disability or restraint, and which has not historically
been regarded as punishment”]; People v. Hanson (2000) 23
4
Cal.4th 355, 361 [“restitution fines are punishment”]; People v.
Gross (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1322 [“unlike restitution
fines, direct victim restitution is imposed to protect public safety
and welfare, not to punish the defendant”].) As such, no
“prospective” designation was needed.
Appellant also contends that limiting a minor’s liability for
restitution to their apportioned percentage of fault fits within the
language of Burgos that an individual is to be treated “more
leniently” as a result of the change in the law. (Burgos, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 13.)
Although the Legislature may have believed several
liability would be more fair than joint and several liability,
particularly in cases involving minors, the amendment does not
reflect an intent to “lessen punishment.” (See Burgos, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 24 [uncodified legislative findings established intent
to promote fairness and reduce potential for prejudice but did not
reflect intent to lessen punishment within meaning of Estrada].)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude section 730.6,
subdivision (b)(3) does not fall within Estrada and therefore does
not operate retroactively.
Disposition
The judgment (restitution order) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
5
Ferdinand D. Inumerable, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Torres & Torres and Steven A. Torres, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Xiomara Costello, Stefanie Yee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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