People v. Diaz CA2/3

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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Diaz CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B336661

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA387967)
v.

DONIVAN DIAZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
Julie Caleca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In 2014, a jury convicted Donivan Diaz and two
codefendants of the first degree murder of Andrew Todd Cherry.
The jury also found true felony-murder special-circumstance
allegations that the murder occurred during a robbery and a
burglary. In 2020, Diaz petitioned for resentencing under Penal
Code former section 1170.95.1 After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied Diaz’s petition on the grounds that Diaz was a
major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. On appeal, Diaz contends
there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
findings. We disagree and therefore affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Burglary and Robbery2
In January 2011, Diaz lived with his brother Michael
Onley. Diaz was dating Porscha Chambers. On January 22,
Chambers and Ryan Whitmore, a woman Diaz had met that day,
were at Diaz’s and Onley’s residence. Diaz suggested they go to a
party. Diaz told Chambers they would go to Cherry’s house first

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the statute as section 1172.6 for
the remainder of this opinion.
2 We take the facts from the evidence admitted at Diaz’s
trial. We previously granted Diaz’s Request for Judicial Notice of
the record from his direct appeal, which includes transcripts from
his trial. The trial court in the instant matter admitted the
transcripts into evidence, and its ruling was based on trial
testimony.

2
to drink and smoke. Diaz, Whitmore, and Chambers went to a
gas station to meet Cherry. Chambers purchased alcohol from a
nearby store.
As planned, Diaz, Chambers, Whitmore, and Cherry then
went to Cherry’s house. Cherry, a large, tall man, lived alone.
He sold marijuana. He also had a talking parrot.
Diaz did not have a cell phone. While at Cherry’s house,
Diaz made two or three calls using Chambers’s phone. Diaz
called Octivan Moore, known as “No-Good.” After the calls,
Chambers saw that Diaz was “antsy” and “fidgety.”
Diaz then asked Chambers to go to the store. When she
returned approximately three to five minutes later, Diaz asked
her to go to his car to retrieve something. The car was parked
across the street from Cherry’s house.
While at Diaz’s car, Chambers saw Onley and Moore
standing under a tree. Chambers then received a call from
Onley. Chambers believed Onley was calling her from Moore’s
cell phone. Onley asked Chambers where Diaz was, and she
replied that he was inside Cherry’s house. Onley also asked if
the door to the house was open. Chambers replied that it was.
Onley and Moore pulled hoods over their heads and walked
towards Cherry’s house. As they approached, Whitmore was
trying to leave the house. She and the two men were “fighting
over the door.” One of the men “grabbed” her, but she broke free.
Onley and Moore went inside. Whitmore approached Diaz’s car,
where Chambers was standing. Whitmore asked Chambers for
her purse from the car. Whitmore looked scared.

3
While outside, Whitmore heard what sounded like
gunshots.3 She ran away. Chambers started to follow her but
stopped and returned to Diaz’s car. Chambers then saw Diaz,
Onley, and Moore exit Cherry’s house. Onley and Moore were
carrying white bags or pillowcases, which appeared to have
something inside of them. Diaz returned to his car. Onley and
Moore went to a different car.
Diaz told Chambers they needed to find Whitmore. They
found her outside a nearby church and forced her to get in their
car. Diaz drove them to a party. He went inside for 10 to 15
minutes, while Chambers and Whitmore waited in the car. Diaz
then dropped Whitmore off at an unidentified house and drove
himself and Chambers to a motel, where they met Moore and a
woman. Moore and Diaz talked. After 45 minutes, Moore and
the woman left. Diaz and Chambers stayed at the motel.
The next day, Chambers told Diaz she was concerned that
she had left fingerprints in Cherry’s house. Diaz responded he
had “gotten it already.” On a different day, Diaz told Chambers
he had returned to Cherry’s house on January 23 and saw Cherry
lying face down. Diaz did not check to see if Cherry was alive,
but simply picked up the “stuff” that belonged to him and
Chambers. He told Chambers “they” had robbed Cherry and

3 Evidence at trial established that Whitmore was high on
PCP on the night of January 22, 2011, and that PCP can impair
memory and perception and cause paranoia.

4
killed Cherry’s bird because it “talked too much.”4 At some point,
Chambers saw Cherry’s laptop at Diaz’s house. Diaz confirmed
the laptop belonged to Cherry.
Discovery of Cherry’s Body and Investigation
Cherry typically called his mother every day. The last time
they spoke was on January 22 between 8:15 p.m. and 8:30 p.m.
On January 23, Cherry’s sister could not reach him by phone, he
did not show up for a party to celebrate his son’s birthday, and
his brother went to his house to look for him but did not find him.
On January 24, Cherry’s family members went to his house and
forced open a door. They found Cherry lying face down in a pool
of blood in the living room. His hands were tied behind his back,
and his feet were bound by a jump rope.
Cherry had suffered seven gunshot wounds: four to the
back of his head, one to his neck or ear area, and two to his
legs. A medical examiner determined Cherry died from the
gunshots to his head and ear area. He weighed 317 pounds and
was approximately six feet tall.
Los Angeles Police Department detectives recovered nine
expended .22-caliber bullet casings near Cherry, including “right
at the entrance, as well as right at the threshold of the front

4 Chambers’s use of “they” appeared to refer to Diaz as well
as Onley and Moore. The testimony was as follows:

“[Prosecutor]: Okay. Did [Diaz]—did you tell the
police that [Diaz] told you that they robbed [Cherry]?
“[Chambers]: Yes.
“[Prosecutor]: And did [Diaz] tell you that, in fact,
they had robbed [Cherry]?
“[Chambers]: Yes.”

5
door.” Investigators found blood around Cherry’s body and on the
floors in the living room, the kitchen, a hallway near a bedroom,
and by the front door. There was also blood on the soles of
Cherry’s feet.
Detectives found no signs of forced entry, other than the
door Cherry’s family members had forced open. The house was
“ransacked.” Detectives observed a computer missing from a cut
cord and open drawers with clothing on the floor nearby. A couch
was overturned. Insulation in the attic was pulled back
immediately around the attic entrance. Detectives also found a
dead bird with a “twisted” neck. There was an off-white rocky
substance in the house, which was determined to be
approximately one ounce of rock cocaine. Detectives also found a
scale with white residue that appeared to be for drugs.5
Detectives discovered Diaz’s fingerprint on Cherry’s screen
door and Whitmore’s prints on a mug.
In July 2011, detectives interviewed Whitmore. The
prosecution played a recording of the interview at trial.
Whitmore said a man and a woman took her to Cherry’s house.
At some point, she decided to go outside to get her purse. Two
men who were entering the house tried to grab her, and she got
scared. She left, then heard gunshots and went to a nearby
church. The couple who had brought her to the residence found
her by the church, screamed “ ‘come on,’ ” grabbed her, put her in
their car after she resisted, and later dropped her off

5 Prosecution witnesses testified that this was a large
amount of cocaine that would have a high value, and that one
could assume based on the amount of cocaine and the scale with a
white substance on it that Cherry’s home was “a place where
somebody was selling dope.”

6
“somewhere.” Whitmore identified Diaz as the man who drove
her to Cherry’s house and forced her into the car, and Chambers
as the woman who was with him.
In August 2011, Diaz and Chambers were arrested.
Detectives interviewed Chambers. The prosecution played
excerpts of the interview at trial. Chambers initially denied
knowing what happened to Cherry, but later recounted being
inside his house sometime in January 2011. She described seeing
Onley and Moore enter Cherry’s house wearing hoods. She also
saw Diaz, Moore, and Onley leave the house together. Diaz said
something like, “ ‘oh my god, oh my god, oh my god’ ” and “ ‘come
on, come on,’ ” asked where Whitmore went, and said they needed
to find her. Chambers did not see Diaz with a gun at any time on
January 22.
During the interview, Chambers recounted: “[Diaz] told me
that they have robbed [Cherry] or whatever . . . . [¶] He was like,
you don’t know the dude. No-Good, he said that he think the
dude No-Good, shot him or whatever. I’m like how you don’t
know if you shot him or not, he’s like my head was down. I’m like
how you don’t know? It’s a sound, there’s no way that you cannot
hear a gunshot, you know I’m saying, so how you don’t know if he
dead or not? He just talking about they hurried up and made me
leave.”
In January 2011, Onley was wearing a G.P.S. ankle
monitor. According to the monitor, at 9:07 p.m. on January 22,
Onley was on West 53rd Street, the street on which Cherry lived.
Onley then went inside a residence from 9:10 p.m. until 9:17 p.m.
The next day, Onley returned to the same residence from
8:18 p.m. to approximately 8:30 p.m.

7
Less than a year before June 2011, a man stole Deserie
Sherlock’s cell phone. Cell phone records established that in
January 2011, there were calls between Sherlock’s phone and
Sylvia Ortega’s phone. Ortega lived with Moore and had children
with him. There was also a call from Sherlock’s phone to Moore’s
father’s phone.
Chambers testified that in January 2011, Diaz occasionally
used her phone to make and receive calls. On January 22, cell
phone records established there were six calls between Sherlock’s
phone and Chambers’s phone between 6:19 p.m. and 7:50 p.m.
Then, at 8:12 p.m. and at 8:13 p.m., there were two calls from
Chambers’s phone to Sherlock’s phone. Chambers also received a
call from Sherlock’s phone at 9:07 p.m. In all, on January 22,
Chambers’s phone communicated with Sherlock’s phone 23 times.
That was the only day the two phones were in contact.
Sherlock’s phone communicated with a cell tower near
Moore’s house at 8:13 p.m. Between 8:29 p.m. and 8:49 p.m.,
Sherlock’s phone’s cell tower communications followed the
geographic trajectory of Onley’s ankle monitor from Moore’s home
to near Cherry’s residence. Sherlock’s phone had 19 incoming
and outgoing calls between 8:49 p.m. and 9:24 p.m., all of which
utilized a cell phone tower consistent with the phone being near
Cherry’s address.
The prosecution presented evidence that Diaz, Onley, and
Moore were 51 Troubles gang members. The prosecution’s gang
expert explained that the 51 Troubles gang engaged in “lots of
shootings, lots of murders.”
The defense submitted testimony from Cherry’s neighbors
who said they had seen him alive, or heard fireworks or gunshots,
on January 23, the day after the robbery.

8
Jury Verdict and Direct Appeal
In 2014, a jury found Diaz, Onley, and Moore guilty of the
first degree murder of Cherry (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), with a
true finding on felony-murder special-circumstance allegations
that the murder was committed while the defendants were
engaged in a robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and
a true finding on an allegation that a principal discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)). The jury found the gang
allegation not true. The trial court sentenced Diaz to life without
the possibility of parole.
In 2016, on direct appeal, this court struck an imposed
parole revocation restitution fine and otherwise affirmed the
judgment.
Resentencing Proceedings
In 2020, Diaz filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. He alleged he had been convicted of first or
second degree murder under a felony murder or natural and
probable consequences theory; he was not the actual killer; he did
not, with intent to kill, aid or abet the actual killer; he was not a
major participant in an underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life; and he could not be convicted
of murder under a currently valid theory. The trial court
appointed counsel.
The People argued that in finding the felony-murder
special circumstance true, the jury either found Diaz was the
actual killer, an aider and abettor who had intent to kill, or a
major participant in the robbery and burglary who acted with
reckless indifference for human life.
Diaz filed a brief in support of his initial petition, arguing
that the jury’s special-circumstance findings did not preclude

9
relief and that he was not a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference. The People filed a supplemental brief,
indicating they did not oppose an order to show cause and
requesting an evidentiary hearing because Diaz’s felony-murder
special-circumstance finding predated our high court’s decisions
in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
In 2021, the trial court denied Diaz’s petition without an
evidentiary hearing. It concluded that based on the jury’s felony-
murder special-circumstance finding, Diaz was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law.
A different panel of this court reversed on appeal. The
People conceded, and we determined, that reversal was
warranted due to our high court’s intervening opinion in People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong), which held that a felony-
murder special-circumstance finding made before Banks and
Clark does not preclude a petitioner from eligibility for
resentencing under section 1172.6. We remanded with directions
to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing.
On remand, the People filed an evidentiary hearing brief
requesting that the trial court take judicial notice of our decision
from Diaz’s 2016 appeal, the clerk’s transcript from the appeal,
and reporter’s transcripts from his trial. Diaz filed an
evidentiary hearing brief that attached this court’s opinion
resolving the appeal from the denial of his first petition for
resentencing.
In January 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing. The parties did not submit additional evidence. The
court denied Diaz’s petition, finding the People had proven

10
beyond a reasonable doubt that Diaz was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life and was therefore
not entitled to resentencing. The court recited the facts in the
case as established at trial, then considered each of the Banks
and Clark factors before denying the petition. Diaz timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Denial of the Petition
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707–708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) It added section 189, subdivision (e),
which establishes that “[a] felony-murder conviction may no
longer rest on the mere commission of and intent to commit an
underlying felony. If a defendant was not the actual killer or an
aider and abettor acting with intent to kill, the statute now
requires that the defendant be a major participant in the felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 875 (Emanuel), citing § 189,
subd. (e)(3).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95,
now section 1172.6, to the Penal Code, which created “a
procedural mechanism for those previously convicted of murder
under a theory amended in [Senate Bill No. 1437] to petition for
resentencing.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 880; see also
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) If a defendant files a petition
setting forth a prima facie case that he or she could not be
presently convicted of murder because of changes to the law

11
implemented by Senate Bill No. 1437, the trial court must issue
an order to show cause. (Emanuel, at p. 880; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Within 60 days, “ ‘the court must hold an evidentiary hearing at
which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, “beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder” under state law as amended by Senate Bill
No. 1437 . . . .’ ” (People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 41;
§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1), (3).) At the hearing, the trial court sits as
“a fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 294–295.)
B. Standard of review
We review the trial court’s order after an evidentiary
hearing for substantial evidence. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 885.) “ ‘We “ ‘examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
[Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job
in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the
relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make
determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480.)
Our substantial evidence review includes circumstantial evidence
and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. (People v.
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) We may reverse the trial court’s

12
order only if it is clear that “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is
there sufficient substantial evidence to support [it]” ’ . . . .”
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
C. “Major participant” and “reckless indifference”
factors
Our high court in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, and Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, addressed the factors a court considers in
determining whether a defendant was a “major participant” in an
underlying felony who acted with “reckless indifference to human
life.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 883 [Banks and Clark
guide the analysis in § 1172.6 felony murder case].)
In Banks, the court considered the factors applicable to a
court’s determination of a “major participant.” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at pp. 794, 803.) These factors are: “What role did the
defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to
one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in
supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the
defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the
killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,
and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in
the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was
used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
In Clark, the court explained “reckless indifference to
human life.” This requirement “encompasses a willingness to kill
(or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if
the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the
outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617;
accord, Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 883.) Reckless

13
indifference involves “both subjective and objective elements.”
(Clark, at p. 617.) “The subjective element is the defendant’s
conscious disregard of risks known to him or her.” (Ibid.) “As to
the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard
‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’
[Citations.]” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins).) The objective analysis of recklessness is determined
by “what ‘a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s conduct “ ‘involved a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person in the actor’s situation would observe.’ [Citation.]”
(Clark, at p. 617.)
Clark also enumerated factors a court is to consider when
determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–622.) In
Scoggins, our high court summarized those factors: “Did the
defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the
felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the
defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have
the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What
was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of
the felony and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge
of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of
using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to
minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; Clark, at pp. 618–622.)
“ ‘The degree of risk to human life is crucial to the [reckless
indifference] analysis.’ [Citation.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th

14
at p. 884.) However, being aware of the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any violent felony is insufficient, thus our high court
has “made clear that participation in a ‘ “garden-variety armed
robbery,” ’ i.e., one in which the only factor supporting a reckless
indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun,
is insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.”
(Ibid.; People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 449 (Hin)
[“participation in an armed robbery is insufficient, without more,
to establish reckless indifference to human life”].)
“ ‘[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 618, quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Instead, we
“analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
[the defendant] acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; accord, Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 885.)
D. Major participant factors
Role in planning the criminal enterprise that led to the
death.
There is evidence that Diaz played a significant role in
planning the burglary and robbery. Cell phone data and other
testimony established that Diaz, using Chambers’s phone, and
Moore, using Sherlock’s stolen cell phone, were in frequent
communication on January 22, including in the hours before the
crimes at Cherry’s home. In her interview with police, Chambers
said Diaz went to another person’s house and Diaz asked for
Cherry’s telephone number, then he called Cherry. Chambers
further testified that before they went to the gas station, Diaz
had already told her they were going to Cherry’s house to drink
and smoke. Diaz, Chambers, and Whitmore then met Cherry at

15
a gas station and went to his house. This evidence demonstrates
Diaz arranged the defendants’ access to Cherry’s house.
Once inside Cherry’s home, Diaz used Chambers’s phone to
call Moore at least twice. After the calls, Diaz appeared antsy
and fidgety. Diaz also asked Chambers to leave the house twice,
once to go to the store and, when she quickly returned, to get
something from his car. It is reasonable to infer that he did not
want her present for whatever would take place.
Onley called Chambers while she was at Diaz’s car and
asked where Diaz was before Onley and Moore entered Cherry’s
home. Onley and Moore’s nefarious purpose was unmistakable to
Chambers when she saw them putting hoods on their heads,
further suggesting advanced planning.
Diaz’s acts of seeking Cherry out on the night of the
murder, gaining entry to Cherry’s home, communicating with
Moore throughout that night, and Diaz’s apparent awareness
that Chambers should not be in Cherry’s house after a certain
point in time, all indicate Diaz had a substantial role in planning
the crimes. (Cf. In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1019
[defendant “instrumental in setting up the plan and carrying it
out” because he used prior connections with drug dealer the
group planned to rob “to arrange and set up what turned into the
fatal encounter”].)
Supplying or using lethal weapons.
Although Cherry was fatally shot, there was no evidence as
to whether Diaz supplied or used a weapon. The only evidence
identifying a shooter was Chambers’s testimony that Diaz told
her Moore shot Cherry.

16
Awareness of the dangers.
The third Banks factor requires consideration of Diaz’s
“awareness . . . of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
There is no evidence to show whether Diaz knew Onley or
Moore had a weapon before the crimes occurred. There is also no
evidence as to whether he was aware of his cohorts’ violent
nature before the crimes. That Onley and Moore were gang
members is insufficient to show violent propensity. (See Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 805, 810 [no evidence gang members in
armed robbery had previously committed murder, attempted
murder, or any violent crime]; In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
960, 976 [same].)
However, it is reasonable to infer that Diaz was aware of
the likely need to use significant force to carry out the burglary
and robbery. At over 300 pounds and six feet tall, Cherry was a
large man. He also sold drugs. (See, e.g., People v. Bascomb
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089 (Bascomb).) The evidence
established that Diaz would have known it was highly likely that,
at a minimum, a demonstrable threat of significant force would
be necessary to accomplish a robbery of Cherry in his own home,
and that it would be necessary to restrain or subdue Cherry in
some fashion to carry out the crimes.
Further, “[w]hatever petitioner may or may not have
believed about the plan for the robbery at the outset . . . he was
clearly aware of the risk of death once the robbery was
underway.” (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 461.) The
evidence established that although nine shots were fired, and
Cherry suffered seven gunshot wounds, not all nine shots could

17
have been fired in immediate succession. Instead, Cherry was
shot, then bled in several areas of his house and in such a way
that he got blood on his feet and blood on the floor before being
tied up and fatally shot. Even if Diaz was not the shooter and
had not planned the use of lethal force, after those initial shots
the risk of death would have been obvious. (People v. Montanez
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 273 [“warning signs that the crimes
posed a serious risk of danger to the victims accumulated as the
crimes unfolded”].)
Presence at the scene and role in the victim’s death.
There is substantial evidence that Diaz was at the scene of
the murder. Diaz contends the evidence does not establish
exactly where he was inside the house when Moore killed Cherry.
Yet, Diaz’s own statement to Chambers established his presence
at the scene of the killing. Diaz told Chambers he thought Moore
shot Cherry but was unsure because his “head was down.” Thus,
he claimed he did not see who shot Cherry because he was not
looking, or he was deliberately avoiding seeing, not because he
was in a different room.
Diaz also asserts there is no evidence he could have
intervened or restrained his cohorts to prevent the murder. He
argues that because Cherry was shot after being tied up, this
“suggests an impulsive decision to kill by the shooter.” We
disagree.
Diaz was present for the events leading up to the murder,
including the initial shots, the movement of Cherry in the house,
the binding of Cherry’s hands and feet, and the fatal shots.
(Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 152 (Tison) [concluding
non-shooters’ “participation in the crime was anything but minor”
because they were physically present for events leading up to the

18
murder, which took place after kidnapping and robbery].) Diaz
did not leave the house until the ordeal was over, accompanied by
Moore and Onley carrying Cherry’s possessions out of the house.
His continued presence for all the acts that culminated in
Cherry’s killing supported a finding that he was a major
participant.
The two cases Diaz cites for the proposition that he could
not have intervened while present at the scene are materially
different. Both involved evidence that the defendant was unable
to restrain his cohorts or otherwise intervene during a quickly
unfolding shooting. (Cf. People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
970, 989 [during carjacking defendant was on passenger side and
did not have opportunity to intervene when shooter on driver’s
side “ ‘[went] crazy’ and began to shoot”]; In re Ramirez (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 384, 405 [during unplanned killing in response to
victim resistance, defendant was “on the street, and there were
cars parked in the parking lot between their location and where
the shooting occurred”].) There is no such evidence here. In
between an initial shot or shots and the fatal shots, Cherry
moved around his house and was tied up and bound. Irrespective
of the exact circumstances of the fatal shots that were fired, this
was not a quickly unfolding shooting as in either Ramirez case.
Actions after lethal force.
The final Banks factor considers Diaz’s actions after Cherry
was fatally shot. Diaz left the house with his cohorts. He
searched for a potential witness and forced her into his car. He
then went to a party and met up with Moore at a motel. They
talked. There is no indication that Diaz was angry or upset with
Moore or Onley for how the night’s events unfolded. Diaz later
returned to Cherry’s home to remove any incriminating evidence.

19
Onley also returned to the house. Diaz saw Cherry face down but
did not do anything at that point, or earlier, to call for help. He
never checked to see if Cherry was alive. He did, however, obtain
Cherry’s stolen laptop computer. (People v. Gonzalez (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1358, 1386 [defendant made no attempt to come to
victim’s aid or summon help after victim was shot, “chose to flee
with the shooter,” and accompanied cohort in disposing of murder
weapon].)
Considering the totality of the above factors, there was
substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Diaz
was a major participant in the burglary and robbery.
E. Reckless indifference factors
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s
conclusion that Diaz acted with reckless indifference to human
life.
Use of or awareness of the presence of weapons and
knowledge of cohorts’ likelihood of killing.
The record is silent as to whether the plan for the burglary
and robbery involved the use of a lethal weapon, whether Diaz
used a weapon, whether he knew Moore or Onley had armed
themselves, or whether he knew his cohorts had committed
violent crimes. This factor therefore does not weigh in favor of
finding Diaz acted with reckless indifference. (See Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885 [defendant did not use a weapon
during robbery and no evidence defendant knew codefendant
would bring a gun or had a propensity for violence]; People v.
Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 126, 128; accord, People v.
Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 317, 318.)

20
Duration of the crime.
We next consider the length of the interaction. “Where a
victim is held at gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise restrained in
the presence of perpetrators for prolonged periods, ‘there is a
greater window of opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly
culminating in murder. The duration of the interaction between
victims and perpetrators is therefore one consideration in
assessing whether a defendant was recklessly indifferent to
human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.)
Here, the burglary began when Diaz entered Cherry’s
home, which cell phone data suggested was around one hour
before Onley and Moore arrived. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42
Cal.4th 147, 170 [burglary requires entry with intent to commit
theft or any felony].) However, our high court’s reasoning in
Emanuel suggests the “relevant timeframe” is the “period of the
violent confrontation.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886.)
G.P.S. evidence showed Onley was inside Cherry’s home
beginning at 9:10 p.m. and ending by 9:17 p.m.6

6 The evidence created a reasonable inference that violence
may even have begun slightly before Onley and Moore entered
the house. Whitmore was extremely intoxicated upon arriving at
Cherry’s home, she seemed “happy,” and she gave Cherry a lap
dance. However, as Onley and Moore approached the front door,
Whitmore was attempting to leave in a manner that suggested
something had already started to happen inside. She forced her
way out of the house, looked scared, and demanded her purse, all
before she heard gunshots and fled. In one portion of her
interview with police, Chambers said that when Onley and Moore
opened the door to Cherry’s house, Chambers saw Whitmore
“screaming. She’s like, she just jumped out of the porch and she
screaming like she just standing there like shocked and they

21
A six or seven-minute period is not a lengthy interaction
pointing towards reckless indifference by itself. (See Emanuel, at
p. 886 [nine-minute duration “neutral”]; Scoggins, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 681 [defendants had “only a brief conversation
before Powell pulled out a gun and shot Wilson. The witnesses
estimated that the entire interaction lasted between a few
seconds and three to five minutes.”].) Yet, assuming that the
violence did not begin until Onley and Moore entered the house,
within that six or seven-minute period, nine shots were fired, but
not all at once. Cherry was shot, moved through the house, had
his hands and feet bound, and was ultimately shot again,
including in the back of the head. In the same period, the house
was ransacked and items from Cherry’s home were placed in bags
or pillowcases to be carried away.7 As the trial court found,
Cherry was “taken to various parts of the residence during the
infliction of his seven gunshot wounds, all the while [appellant],
along with the other individuals, ransack[ed] the home and
ultimately [left] with the stolen items.” Whitmore heard
gunshots almost immediately after Onley and Moore entered,
indicating that the entire six or seven-minute period was filled
with increasingly severe violence.
The manner in which the crimes unfolded here
demonstrates that each minute provided “ ‘a greater window of

snatched her, they try to snatch her in but she’s fighting them off
so like they pushed her off and they closed the door.”
7 It is possible that Diaz and Onley further ransacked
Cherry’s house when they each returned after the killing.
However, at least some searching or gathering of items occurred
during the six or seven-minute incident, evidenced by Onley and
Moore carrying items out of the house.

22
opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly culminating in
murder.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620; see Tison, supra,
481 U.S. at pp. 151–152 [defendants kidnapped and guarded
victims at gunpoint while father decided whether to kill victims];
cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [“how quickly the shooting
occurred” indicated defendant “lacked control over” the actions of
cohorts].) Under the circumstances of this case, the duration of
the crimes weighed in favor of a finding of reckless indifference.
(See In re Parrish (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 [“brevity of the
robbery” did not make defendant “less blameworthy”]; cf.
Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886 [no prolonged period of
restraint and interaction was nonviolent for most of the nine-
minute period].)
Efforts to minimize the risks of violence during the felony.
As our high court recently emphasized, this factor considers
efforts at the planning stage and not actions to “restrain
confederates or aid victims” during a robbery. (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 887.) We may consider circumstantial evidence
to determine whether Diaz planned the robbery to minimize the
risks of violence, which includes knowledge of whether his
collaborators had a propensity for violence. (Ibid.) A defendant
may plan a crime to minimize the risk of violence when the crime
is to occur without the use of weapons (cf. ibid.; Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 683), or to take place in public and thus in the
presence of potential witnesses. (Scoggins, at p. 683 [“Scoggins
agreed to have the confrontation take place in a public parking
lot during the daytime, when the possible presence of witnesses
might reasonably be thought to keep his accomplices within the
bounds of the plan”].)

23
Here, Diaz attempted to exclude a witness and planned for
the crime to take place in a private home. Diaz and his
accomplices planned the robbery for a time when they knew
Cherry was home. Cherry was a large man who likely would not
be easy to subdue and was known to sell drugs. This was not like
an ordinary armed robbery in a store or of a person on a street,
“ ‘in which resistance, if any, would be slight, and armed
resistance likely nonexistent. This was the planned, . . . robbery
of a known drug dealer at his residence.’ ” (Bascomb, supra, 55
Cal.App.5th at p. 1090.) Violence was more likely because
“confronting people inside the home was part of the plan.” (Ibid.)
As the court explained in Emanuel, “the absence of efforts
to minimize the risk of violence cannot be said to weigh in favor
of a finding of reckless indifference.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 888.) However, as described in Emanuel, if a defendant
planned an armed home invasion robbery at 3:00 a.m. “with
knowledge of several armed occupants and a methamphetamine
operation within,” then “a trier of fact might reasonably conclude
that the objective risk of violence posed by the crime and
reasonably anticipated by the perpetrator is graver than the risk
of violence inherent in any violent felony.” (Id. at p. 889, citing In
re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1005.) Here, Diaz
planned a home invasion robbery of Cherry, a drug dealer, when
he knew Cherry would be home. While the objective risk of
violence posed by this crime and reasonably anticipated by Diaz
may not have been as grave as the example in Emanuel, the trial

24
court could reasonably conclude the risk was still graver than the
generic risk of violence inherent in any violent felony.8
Physical presence at the scene and an opportunity to
restrain cohorts or aid the victim.
“Proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it
may be particularly significant where . . . the murder is a
culmination or a foreseeable result of several intermediate steps,
or where the [co-]participant who personally commits the murder
exhibits behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal
force. In such cases, ‘the defendant’s presence allows him to
observe his cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that he shared in
their actions and mental state. . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s
presence gives him an opportunity to act as a restraining
influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a
restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably more at
fault for the resulting murders.’ [Citation.]” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 619.)
Our high court recently clarified that “[a]lthough we
consider whether a defendant acts as a restraining influence on
his cohorts, it is not incumbent on a defendant to actually
prevent the violence or attempt to do so by any means necessary.”
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891.) Rather, “[t]he essential
question underpinning our analysis is not whether [Diaz] did
enough to try to stop [his codefendant’s] unplanned act of
violence; it is whether [Diaz] acted with the requisite mens rea,

8 The circumstances here indicated a graver risk of violence
than that presented in Emanuel “where [the] defendant plan[ned]
to commit an unarmed robbery of a marijuana dealer at a public
park in the middle of the afternoon . . . .” (Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 889.)

25
i.e., reckless indifference to human life. The focus should not be
on the ultimate efficacy of his actions, but on what his actions
reveal about his mental state.” (Ibid.)
There is no direct evidence to establish exactly what Diaz
did during the six or seven minutes that culminated in Cherry’s
killing. But the nature and duration of the incident were such
that all three men had to have been involved in at least some
aspect of the crimes: shooting Cherry in the legs, restraining him,
tying him up, shooting him in the head and face, ransacking or
searching the house, and gathering the items Onley and Moore
eventually took out of the house. The only logical inference from
the evidence is that Diaz was actively engaged in one or more of
these activities. Even if Diaz’s conduct was limited to ransacking
the house while Onley and Moore perpetrated the direct violence
on Cherry, Diaz was present in the house the entire time. It is
reasonable to conclude that he shared their mental state. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) While “the opportunity for
intervention may have been brief, the shooters . . . made their
intentions clear, affording [Diaz] ‘the time to observe and react
before the murder.’ [Citation.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 892.)
Cherry’s killing was not the result of a single shot, intended
to be nonlethal. Although the fatal shots did not happen without
warning, there is no evidence that Diaz “advocated” that he and
his cohorts leave or did anything else to restrain his cohorts. (Cf.
Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891; id. at p. 879; People v. Keel
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 560 [factor neutral where cohort’s
decision to shoot was made “quickly” in response to victim’s
“unexpected resistance”].) Indeed, Diaz told Chambers he merely
kept his “head down.” (In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 54

26
[defendant did nothing to intercede or stop shooting by
confederates during five-second countdown during robbery].)
In addition, a failure to aid a victim after a shooting may
show reckless indifference. (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 450;
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619; but see Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 893, quoting Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679
[“ ‘when different inferences may be drawn from the
circumstances, the defendant’s actions after the shooting may not
be very probative of his mental state’ ”].)
Diaz did nothing to aid Cherry. This is probative of his
mental state because there is no evidence that Diaz thought aid
was on its way. (Cf. In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559.)
There were neither witnesses who would presumably come to
Cherry’s aid, nor any indication that law enforcement would
arrive shortly. Indeed, Diaz was intent on tracking down
Whitmore and forcing her into his car, thereby effectively
preventing her from revealing that anything was amiss at
Cherry’s house. The facts here are unlike cases in which the
defendant might have assumed the victim was likely to receive
aid, such that failure to render aid was not probative of reckless
disregard for the victim’s life. (Cf. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 894; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 680.) Rather, Diaz left
Cherry alone inside his house at night, making it unlikely that he
would receive aid in any timely manner. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S.
at p. 141 [reckless indifference where non-shooter defendants
made no effort to help victims and left them in a desert].)
Diaz contends that because the shots to Cherry’s head were
lethal, any assistance would have been futile. However, there is
no evidence that Cherry died immediately or that Diaz knew this.
He did not check to see if Cherry was still alive, even when he

27
returned to the residence later. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, 593 [defendant never checked for pulse or
breath]; cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 680 [“Scoggins walked
over to the crime scene and checked if [the victim] was still
breathing after the shooting”].)
F. Totality of the circumstances
In sum, the evidence establishes that Diaz played a
significant role in planning the burglary and home invasion
robbery. Diaz planned or participated in planning the crime for a
time when the victim was home. Cherry was a large man who
sold drugs. Diaz would have known that it would be necessary to
use or threaten significant force to rob Cherry. Diaz was present
at the scene of the killing, which came after initial, non-fatal
shots to Cherry’s legs, after Cherry had moved or was forced to
move to several areas of the house, and after Cherry’s hands and
feet were bound. After Cherry was shot four times in the back of
the head, Diaz left with his cohorts, forced a witness into his car,
met up with Moore, and failed to assist the victim. He also
returned to the crime scene to recover potentially incriminating
evidence. To be a major participant, “what is required is that
petitioner was a major participant in a robbery known to carry a
grave risk of death, not that he was a major participant in the
murder.” (People v. Richardson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1085,
1092; see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) The evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
decision, establishes that Diaz was a major participant in a
burglary and robbery, which, as it unfolded, revealed a grave risk
of death.
As for reckless indifference, even though the crimes took
place during a relatively short period, they occurred in a violent

28
manner that established a risk of lethal violence and presented
Diaz with an opportunity to act as a restraining influence. Yet
there is no evidence that Diaz attempted to stop or minimize the
violence or to aid Cherry after the fact, creating a reasonable
inference of a mental state of reckless indifference. Considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
determination, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the finding that Diaz acted with reckless indifference because he
had a “willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to
achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically
desire that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
The Banks and Clarks factors support the trial court’s
denial of Diaz’s petition for resentencing.

29
DISPOSITION
The order denying Diaz’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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