People v. Ortega CA4/1

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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Ortega CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084409

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD290598)

JUAN LUIS ORTEGA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Evan P. Kirvin, Judge. Affirmed.

George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Kelly Johnson,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Juan Luis Ortega of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), and found true allegations that he personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court
sentenced him to a 26-year-to-life state prison term: 25 years to life for the
murder and one year for the deadly weapon enhancement. Ortega’s sole
contention is that his counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to
request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, requiring reversal of his
murder conviction. Ortega concedes the record does not reveal why his
counsel did not request the instruction, but he maintains there is no
satisfactory reason not to ask for it in his case, pointing out the defense that
his counsel pursued—that he did not commit the crime—had no reasonable
chance of success given the trial court’s refusal to permit third party
culpability evidence. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
In the morning of June 18, 2021, police responded to a home in Mira
Mesa after receiving a neighbor’s radio call about a man covered in blood,
running in the street. Officers came upon Ortega, who was agitated, cursing
and yelling that he wanted to get back inside the house. Ortega was wearing
only cargo shorts, and had a large amount of blood on his torso, as well as his
arm and leg. Officers entered the home and found Robert Lizotte in the
garage on the floor, with a kitchen knife embedded in his face. The knife
matched a set of knives found in the kitchen. There was no other individual
in the house. Lizotte had blunt force injuries, as well as at least 16 stab
wounds. The stab wound to his head penetrated portions of his brain, and
was immediately life threatening. Lizotte died from the multiple stabbings.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Neighbors that morning who witnessed Ortega running out of Lizotte’s
house described him as “very erratic” and “really panicky.” One neighbor,
J.N., started recording Ortega because the situation was scary, Ortega was
very concerned, and there was blood. J.N. knew what people looked and
acted like when under the influence of illegal drugs, and it seemed to her that
Ortega was on a drug and was acting consistently with what she had seen in

that respect. Ortega was anxious for the officers to come.2
The day before, Lizotte’s off-and-on girlfriend, J.F., was at Lizotte’s
house, where she saw Ortega. J.F. had met Ortega in 2014, when she and
Lizotte were living together. The three were going out to attend a funeral,
but beforehand, J.F. saw Lizotte and Ortega enter Lizotte’s garage, where
she knew they were using drugs. J.F., who was in drug recovery and had
been around people under the influence of methamphetamine, knew that
Lizotte was still using methamphetamine. Ortega said things to J.F. that
made her think he was under the influence of methamphetamine, including
asking her if Lizotte was hiding anyone in his house or asking Lizotte if he
was involved in a rumor about Ortega raping someone. However, Ortega did
not seem angry at Lizotte and Lizotte did not appear to be annoyed or
irritated with Ortega.
J.L. was good friends with both Ortega and Lizotte, and lived around
the corner from Lizotte. Ortega showed up at J.L.’s house around 10:00 p.m.
on June 17, 2021, and told her he was going to Lizotte’s house. J.L. also went
to Lizotte’s house that night to give Lizotte a haircut; she had spent time in
Lizotte’s garage many times with both Lizotte and Ortega. After she arrived,

2 Lizotte’s house had surveillance cameras, and numerous surrounding
homes also had surveillance cameras. A camera trained on Lizotte’s
backyard fence from about 9:00 a.m. on June 17, 2021, to 6:00 a.m. on June
18, 2021, did not show anyone climb over.
3
another individual, J.R., showed up at Lizotte’s house. J.L. later told officers
that Ortega had been talking about using drugs that night, but J.L. did not
recall seeing drugs in the house. J.L. did not see Lizotte and Ortega fighting
or engaged in any conflict.
J.R. was another good friend of Lizotte’s who went to his house almost
every day. He arrived at Lizotte’s house at about 3:00 a.m. on June 18, 2021,
where he saw Lizotte and Ortega, whom J.R. had known for about five years.
J.R. was under the influence of drugs and had done methamphetamine at
Lizotte’s house before. J.R. stayed only a couple of hours, and when he left
only Lizotte and Ortega remained. J.R. felt Ortega looked “a little bit
bothered” that night, and that Ortega and Lizotte had something to talk
about. He told officers later that Ortega seemed to be irritating Lizotte a lot.
Ortega was saying things to J.R. like, “What would happen if I pulled a gun
on you or if I pulled a knife on you,” and had been talking about pulling a gun
or a knife all night. J.R. told officers he was trying to keep his contact with
Ortega at a minimum that night because of how Ortega was acting.
Another friend of Lizotte’s, E.M., went to Lizotte’s house on the night of
June 17, 2021, to return a wheelbarrow he had borrowed. At the house, E.M.
saw only Lizotte and Ortega, whom he had never met before. While there,
E.M. smoked methamphetamine, as did Lizotte and Ortega. E.M. told police
that Ortega that night kept talking about killing and death; Ortega made a
comment about killing people in different apartment buildings to make the
property value go down, which made E.M. uncomfortable. E.M. left after just
about an hour partly because of how Ortega was making him feel.
Ortega’s blood on June 18, 2021, contained both methamphetamine and
amphetamine, a methamphetamine metabolite, at 65 and 9 nanograms per
milliliter respectively. A toxicologist testified at trial that there is no per se

4
level or limit for when a methamphetamine user becomes impaired, as with
alcohol.
In Limine Request to Present Third Party Culpability Evidence
Before trial, Ortega’s counsel moved to admit evidence that a neighbor
of Lizotte’s who had used drugs with him and had argued about some missing
methamphetamine could have committed the murder. The trial court denied
the request as to that individual, finding there was no specific direct or
circumstantial evidence linking him to the crime. It ruled the probative
value was outweighed by the undue consumption of time, confusion of issues
and prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. The court explained,
however, that Ortega was free to argue that someone else had committed the
crime.
Defense Case
Ortega testified in his defense that he did not hurt or kill Lizotte; there
was nothing Lizotte could have done or said that would lead Ortega to hurt
him. He had known Lizotte since the mid-1990’s and considered him like an
older brother. He and Lizotte had been roommates on occasion. Their
friendship included using drugs together. Ortega had struggled with
addiction through periods of his life.
Ortega recounted the events of June 17, 2021, including attending the
funeral with Lizotte and J.F. and returning to Lizotte’s house, where they
smoked methamphetamine and washed their cars. Ortega left Lizotte’s

5
house a couple of times to visit friends, went to the store, and returned to

Lizotte’s house for the last time at about 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning.3
According to Ortega, he helped J.R. return to his car, then walked back
in the house, where Lizotte was on the couch watching a video. Ortega made
a joke about what Lizotte was watching, but when Lizotte ignored him, he
went to the backyard to smoke a cigarette. Ortega then reentered the house
to the living room. Lizotte was not there, and Ortega assumed he went to
sleep. Ortega decided to lay down and close his eyes, because his vision was
getting blurry. After he rested, he got up and injected methamphetamine
again in a bathroom, which “knocked [him] to [his] feet.” The shot was “very,
very, very overwhelming”; the intensity of the methamphetamine made him
close his eyes and drop to the floor.
After a while, Ortega felt a fast movement or thuds from behind, which
spooked him. He thought police were coming into the house, so out of
paranoia he got up and hid in the bathtub with the shower curtain closed.
He waited, but heard nothing. He thought he was “trippin’ ” and assumed it
was an effect from being high. He left the bathroom trying to “shake it off”

3 Ortega recalled the events: “Um, I believe I stopped by to visit a friend
of mine, um, [A.S.], and I stopped by to let him know how the funeral went,
let him know that I was at [Lizotte’s]. Um, I stopped very briefly— [¶] He
has one of my friends’ urns of another friend that had passed away, so I think
I smoked a cigarette with him, and then—um, he’s another big brother of
mine, and he, um—and so he just told—just told me, you know, what I’m
saying, like, don’t get into any—don’t get into any trouble out here, you know,
and then just—that’s it. [¶] You know, and then I returned back to
[Lizotte’s], and then I believe I went to the store a couple times, and then,
um—and then that’s about it.” He also remembered seeing E.M. at Lizotte’s
house. Ortega testified he noticed E.M. seemed “down on his luck,” so
Ortega, who worked in property management and had knowledge of
government programs, gave him a business card to try to get him a place to
stay.
6
and called towards the living room to Lizotte. Lizotte’s bedroom door was
open and Ortega could not see him in his bed, so he checked the garage,
where he found Lizotte on the floor and unresponsive. Ortega ran up, got
down on his knees and tried to feel a pulse, but then saw the knife and
panicked. He then tried to lift Lizotte up, putting his arms around him but
he was dead weight. Ortega ran back and forth from the body to the door,
trying to find a light switch. He then heard something behind him, thought
he saw shapes indicating somebody was hiding, then ran back into the house,
changed clothes when he saw all the blood on him, and ran outside where he
eventually asked neighbors to call police.
A crime scene specialist later documented the scene. While conducting
a walk-through of Lizotte’s house, she saw that a window of the northwest
bedroom was open and lacked a screen. The windowsill and the window’s
track had apparent bloodstains, but she did not swab it or dust it for
fingerprints. Nor did the specialist do DNA swabs on drawers containing the
similar kitchen knives, or the door handles of the kitchen and backyard
sliding doors. She located shoes and clothing with bloodstains wrapped in a
towel in the master bathroom. There was a pair of scissors and glass breaker
in the garage, but they were not swabbed or tested. Though Lizotte’s house
had surveillance cameras, no cameras captured any of the home’s exit and
entry points. Lizotte’s house also had a doorbell camera that would send
notifications to his phone, but police did not take screen captures of any of
those notifications.
Closing Arguments
Defense counsel pointed out to the jury that the case against Ortega
was based on circumstantial evidence. She emphasized that witnesses saw
no fighting or disagreements between Lizotte and Ortega on June 17, 2021,

7
but said they were great friends. Counsel discussed the fact that detectives
did not make efforts to view Lizotte’s phone or the doorbell camera footage,
and did not test blood on the windowsill or other items in the house that were
consistent with injuries Lizotte had sustained. She argued it was reasonable
to conclude someone could have accessed the house without being captured on
surveillance video because Ortega left via a back sliding glass door and was
not seen on video. She argued Ortega did not try to hide his bloody clothing
or leave in his car, and he had no injuries despite the fact Lizotte had 16
different stab wounds, including some that were three to four inches deep,
requiring much force. Counsel pointed out that Lizotte was five inches taller
than Ortega and weighed almost 30 pounds heavier, though Ortega suffered
no injuries. She argued there was no evidence of motive because Ortega did
not kill Lizotte.
DISCUSSION
Ortega contends his counsel was prejudicially ineffective for not
requesting a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication or pursuing that

defense.4 He argues the issue is cognizable on direct appeal because there
could be no reasonable basis for his counsel’s decision to present a defense
based on creating reasonable doubt that Ortega committed the crime (which
he characterizes as “hopeless”) versus an intoxication defense, which he says

4 Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible on whether the
defendant “actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with
murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
express malice aforethought.” (§ 29.4; see also People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th
968, 975.) CALCRIM No. 625 instructs the jury that it may consider evidence
of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the defendant
acted with an intent to kill or with deliberation and premeditation. That
instruction’s use note states the instruction is “a specific application of
CALCRIM No. 3426, Voluntary Intoxication, to homicide.” CALCRIM No.
3426 is used in nonhomicide offenses requiring a specific intent.
8
was “the only defense that was supported by substantial evidence.” Ortega
points to evidence that surveillance video did not show anyone other than
him entering Lizotte’s house after J.R. left, or that anyone other than he and
Lizotte were in the house from then on. He also argues the failure of police to
collect evidence is not a substitute for affirmative evidence, and it was not
likely to raise a reasonable doubt. According to Ortega, “[t]he possibility that
there might have been a way for some person who wanted Lizotte dead
somehow to kill him and get away with doing so completely undetected had
no realistic chance of raising a reasonable doubt.”
I. Legal Standards
We apply well-settled standards to Ortega’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 954.) To
make out such a claim, “ ‘ “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was
prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.
[Citation.] ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 80; see
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) “ ‘ “ ‘Reviewing courts
defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a “strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e accord great deference to counsel’s tactical
decisions’ [citation], and we have explained that ‘courts should not second-
guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight’
[citation]. ‘Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and counsel’s

9
decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 86; see also In re Long
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773; Strickland, at p. 694.)
“ ‘In determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we
exercise deferential scrutiny. [Citations.] The appellant must affirmatively
show counsel’s deficiency involved a crucial issue and cannot be explained on
the basis of any knowledgeable choice of tactics.’ ” (People v. Loza (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 332, 351.) “ ‘When the record on direct appeal sheds no light on
why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged, defendant must show
that there was “ ‘ “no conceivable tactical purpose” ’ for counsel’s act or
omission.” ’ ” (People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 679; see also People v.
Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 1014; People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181,
198.) Thus, where the record is silent in this way, “ ‘ “ ‘unless counsel
was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be
rejected.” ’ ” (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 982; Barrett, at p.
1014.)
The California Supreme Court in People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610
addressed a claim of ineffective assistance on grounds of defense counsel’s
failure to ask for a voluntary intoxication jury instruction. There, the
defendant, who shot his robbery victim in the chest, killing her, testified at
trial that he did not intend to kill the victim, only to scare her. (Id. at pp.
630-631.) The defendant had used cocaine and methamphetamine “all night
on the night of the murder.” (Id. at p. 631.) The court held his counsel was
not ineffective for failing to request a voluntary intoxication instruction:
“According to defendant, he did harbor a specific intent when he fired the
third and fatal shot—to scare the victim, and nothing more. An instruction

10
on voluntary intoxication as negating specific intent would have been
inconsistent with defendant’s theory of the case. Accordingly, we cannot say
that defense counsel had no rational tactical purpose in not requesting an
instruction on intoxication.” (Wader, 5 Cal.4th at p. 643.)
Later, in People v. Olivas (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 758 (Olivas), the
Sixth District Court of Appeal considered a similar ineffective assistance
claim where the defendant was convicted of numerous felonies arising out of
his continuous abuse of a minor over an eight-year period. (Id. at pp. 760,
770-771.) The appellate court rejected the claim, finding “multiple tactical
reasons” supported counsel’s decision not to request a voluntary intoxication
instruction, despite evidence the defendant was drunk when he touched the
victim. (Id. at p. 722.) First, it was inconsistent with the defendant’s
primary defense theory, which was that he had not committed the crimes:
that the victim had lied when she was young because she did not like the
defendant, and even if the jury believed her, the victim did not describe
things that met the requirements for the offenses. (Id. at p. 771.) The court
observed that though counsel argued there was insufficient evidence of force,
that argument did not undermine the primary defense theory in the same
way as a voluntary intoxication instruction would have. (Ibid.) Further,
assuming there was evidence the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated
during some of the incidents, he “offered no evidence at trial to demonstrate
how that intoxication might have resulted in his inability to formulate the
specific intent necessary” for the offenses. (Id. at pp. 771-772.) In the
absence of such evidence, his counsel “could reasonably have made the
tactical decision not to request a voluntary intoxication instruction.” (Id. at
p. 772.)

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II. Ortega Has Not Demonstrated Constitutionally Ineffective Assistance
As in People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th 610 and Olivas, supra, 248
Cal.App.4th 758, Ortega has not met his burden to show ineffective
assistance, because a defense based on voluntary intoxication would have
been inconsistent with his primary defense theory that he did not kill Lizotte.
Under the circumstances, Ortega has not overcome the strong presumption
(In re Long, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 773) that his counsel’s decision to forego
instruction on voluntary intoxication was within the broad range of
reasonable professional assistance.
Nor did Ortega’s counsel’s tactical decision “f[a]ll below an objective
standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. (People v.
Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 80; see also In re Long, supra 10 Cal.5th at p.
776.) His counsel plainly determined that the state of the evidence tying
Ortega to Lizotte’s murder—including his presence at the house in the early
morning hours alone with Lizotte, the blood on his clothing, his odd or
paranoid comments that morning, and possible friction between him and
Lizotte—was outweighed by evidence tending to show Ortega’s innocence—
his and Lizotte’s long friendship, the testimony of witnesses seeing nothing
amiss between the men, the absence of injuries to Ortega’s body,
investigators’ failure to swab or test numerous items for fingerprints or DNA,
the lack of surveillance on certain doors of Lizotte’s house, and Lizotte’s home
being a hub for drug use. In our view, counsel reasonably decided the
evidence was such to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of jurors as to
whether Lizotte had committed the brutal stabbing murder of his longtime
friend. We are cautioned not to “ ‘ “ ‘second-guess reasonable, if difficult,
tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight’ ” ’ ” (People v. Coffman and
Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 86; People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p.

12
954; People v. Loza, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 351) and we decline to do so
here.
Further, we agree with the People that there is no evidence Ortega’s
methamphetamine use that night affected the “actual formation of specific
intent” or his ability to premeditate and deliberate as required to warrant
such an instruction. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 647, 677-678;
accord, Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 771-772; People v. Verdugo
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 295 [defendant is entitled to voluntary intoxication
instruction only where there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s
voluntary intoxication and the intoxication affected the defendant’s actual
formation of specific intent].) Williams held a defendant convicted of first
degree murder was not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction in the
face of evidence he was “ ‘probably spaced out’ ” on the morning of the
killings, and his police interview statements that he was “ ‘doped up’ and
‘smokin’ pretty tough then’ ” around the time of the killings. (Id. at p. 677.)
The court held that even if the “scant” evidence was substantial, there was
“no evidence at all that voluntary intoxication had any effect on defendant’s
ability to formulate intent.” (Williams, at pp. 677-678; see also People v.
Ivans (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1662 [substantial evidence did not support
an instruction on voluntary intoxication where, even though the defendant
testified “he had been high on speed for a month and had been awake for
three or four days,” the defendant “gave detailed testimony about the events”
on the morning of the crime].) Here, Ortega’s ability to drive after he smoked
methamphetamine that night, and his detailed recollection of events, cuts
against such a conclusion.
In reply, Ortega cites to evidence that after he injected
methamphetamine in the bathroom, he felt overwhelmed, sat on the floor,

13
and got paranoid, hearing noises, but this is the sort of scant evidence that
does not shed light on his ability to formulate intent, premeditate or
deliberate. He also points to the toxicologist’s testimony about symptomology

of methamphetamine on users generally.5 The toxicologist was unable
ultimately to give any opinion on the symptoms caused by the levels of
methamphetamine found in Ortega’s blood.!(9 RT 1943)! The question here is
whether in view of the evidence, Ortega’s counsel’s decision not to seek a
voluntary intoxication instruction was reasonable. Since the court properly
refuses an instruction that is not supported by substantial evidence (People v.
Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 677; see also People v. Souza (2012) 54
Cal.4th 90, 116; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 99),
we conclude it was.
Ortega seeks to distinguish Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th 758 as
analytically different. According to him, the Court of Appeal in that case
failed to consider that some of the charged sex offenses (violation of section
269) did not require a specific intent, and thus a voluntary intoxication
offense would not have applied to those counts. He argues “[t]he actual
tactical considerations applicable to the question whether to rely on
intoxication negative specific intent [sic] thus would have been whether to

5 The toxicologist explained that a user in a “binge phase” stage of
methamphetamine use “may experience a rapid flight of ideas or an inability
to focus on one thing at a time, so their speech might be rapid or incoherent,
they may have very large or boisterous movements because it can cause
involuntary muscle controls or the inability to sit still. Pulse is usually
elevated, body temperature is elevated, so an individual may sweat, and it
can cause dilated pupils as well.” She testified a methamphetamine user in a
“crash phase” “may have problems with their balance and coordination, have
disorganized or slow speech, maybe not able to fully answer questions.” We
do not see this generic testimony about such symptoms as substantial
evidence that Ortega’s “intoxication affected [his] actual formation of specific
intent.” (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 677.)
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rely on a defense to all charges, or to rely on a defense that, if accepted, would
have no effect on the five counts of violating section 269—charges that would
have resulted in a sentence virtually equivalent to one of life without parole.”
He argues that this is what made pursuing a voluntary intoxication
instruction unreasonable, and made the “only reasonable tactical decision”
the one based on a defense to all counts. Ortega argues that his case involved
only one count to which voluntary intoxication applied, and his counsel’s
defense had no realistic chance of success, particularly in view of the court’s
refusal to allow third party culpability evidence. The argument does not
convince us to disregard Olivas, which did not engage in the analysis posited
by Ortega. Cases do not stand for propositions not considered. (People v.
Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1078.) And we disagree with the
argument’s premise, that is, Ortega’s assessment of the existence or strength
of the evidence in this record pointing to his innocence.
We are not persuaded by Ortega’s other arguments to the contrary,
which rely on the asserted weakness of an innocence defense. Ortega argues
the defense was based on speculation and “had no realistic possibility of
success” whereas the voluntary intoxication defense was “not completely
hopeless.” According to Ortega, voluntary intoxication “was the only defense
that was supported by substantial evidence.” We question Ortega’s
application of standards this court applied in People v. Superior Court
(Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485 to assess the reasonableness of
counsel’s decision to pursue a defense of innocence based on the trial

15
evidence.6 Setting that aside, “ ‘ “it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” ’ ” (People v.
Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 378.) We cannot say on this record that
Ortega’s counsel’s tactical decision was so unreasonable as to amount to
constitutionally ineffective assistance.
Ortega’s other cited authorities are unavailing. In U.S. v. Span (9th
Cir. 1996) 75 F.3d 1383, for example, involving the defendants’ encounter
with marshals looking for a suspect, defense counsel’s failure to request a
particular jury instruction was “the result of a misunderstanding of the law”;
he thought an unlawful arrest instruction also covered an excessive force
defense. (Id. at pp. 1389-1390.) It was a situation where counsel “intended to
present an excessive force defense but failed.” (Id. at p. 1389.) Counsel also
failed to establish a foundation for an excessive force defense, which would
have allowed the defendants to obtain reversal on appeal. (Ibid.) Thus,
“[c]ounsel’s errors with the jury instructions was not a strategic decision to

6 In People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela), supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 485, a
panel of this court addressed whether a magistrate made factual findings or
reached a legal conclusion so as to apply the proper standard of review to the
magistrate’s dismissal of charges at a preliminary hearing. (Id. at pp. 490,
496-499.) Pointing to the magistrate’s statement that there was no evidence
the defendant saw a knife, we said: “To conclude there was ‘no evidence of X’
does not constitute a finding of ‘not X.’ This is because ‘[a]n absence of
evidence is not the equivalent of substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘No
finding can be predicated on the absence of evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 498.) This
court held the trial court’s statement was a legal conclusion about the
sufficiency of the evidence that we reviewed independently. (Id. at p. 499.)
Given the inapposite context, Valenzuela and the case it cites for its
underlying proposition, Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
634, 655, do not convince us that Ortega’s counsel’s strategy here—to instill
reasonable doubt on whether Ortega was the killer—was wholly
unreasonable.
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forego one defense in favor of another.” (Id. at p. 1390.)7 Here, it is apparent
from Ortega’s counsel’s strategy that she did not inadvertently or mistakenly
omit a voluntary intoxication instruction, which would have been
inconsistent with the proffered defense that Ortega did not kill Lizotte. This
court is not bound by the other federal district court authorities Ortega relies
upon. (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431.)
Ortega further argues People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261 is
instructive. But in Hussain, counsel for a defendant charged with grand
theft failed to request a “claim of right” instruction—an instruction
explaining that a defendant’s good faith belief, even if mistaken, that he has
a right or claim to property negates felonious intent for purposes of theft—
despite the fact that “[c]laim of right was the core of defendant’s defense to
the grand theft charge.” (Id. at p. 270.) Thus, “there [could] be no
satisfactory reason not to request an instruction to support the core of the
defense.” (Id. at p. 271.) The court found the omission prejudicial, as
evidence showed the defendant had limited education, as well as inability to
read or write the English language in a case involving lien sale documents
and issues with transferring title to vehicles. (Id. at p. 272.) Thus, the
defendant’s “[c]ounsel’s failure to request an instruction on the key point of
his client’s defense, which would have supported his argument, deprived
defendant of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and
require[d] reversal of his conviction.” (Ibid.) Hussain is inapposite here,
where Ortega’s claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request

7 The Ninth Circuit has since described U.S. v. Span as “exceptional”
based on the egregiousness of the facts and magnitude of counsel’s
incompetence in mishandling of the jury instructions. (Weighall v. Middle
(9th Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 1058, 1063 & fn. 10.)
17
an instruction relevant to a different defense, not the defense his counsel
pursued.
Ortega urges us to review the evidence in the light most favorable to
him, applying standards to determine whether a record contains substantial
evidence to support giving an instruction. But the question here is whether
Ortega he has overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s decisions
were within the range of reasonable professional competence. We conclude
that on the state of the evidence, Ortega’s counsel’s performance was not
deficient. Given that conclusion, we need not reach the issue of prejudice.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

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