People v. Champagne CA4/1

CourtListener 10777428Calctapp21 janv. 2026

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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Champagne CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084663

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. FMB23000430)

MICHAEL DAVID CHAMPAGNE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Sarah Oliver, Judge. Affirmed.
Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Michael David Champagne appeals from his conviction on five felony
offenses, contending (1) the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process by misinforming him of the minimum probation term
available, (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to inform the trial court of the correct minimum probation term, and (3) the
cumulative impact of the errors rendered the proceeding fundamentally
unfair. The People concede the trial court erred when advising on the
minimum probation term. Even so, we conclude it did not rise to the level of
a federal constitutional error, and we perceive no prejudice from the
misadvisement. Champagne’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim relies
on—and thus fails for—the same prejudice argument. And we conclude the
cumulative effect of these claimed errors does not require reversal. We
therefore affirm.
I.
In November 2023, Champagne subjected his wife to hours of physical
and mental abuse in their shared residence. Based on these events, the
People charged Champagne with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1); assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 245(a)(4); count 2); criminal threats (§ 422(a); count 3);
injuring a spouse (§ 273.5(a); count 4); and false imprisonment by violence
(§ 236; count 5).
At a pretrial hearing, the court noted the parties had not come to an
agreement on a plea bargain, despite “some attempts,” and they were set to
go to trial the next day. The court informed Champagne the maximum
prison time for the charged offenses was seven years and four months in state
prison. The court also acknowledged the People’s “current [plea bargain]
offer . . . is [four] years of probation with 180 days in the county jail.” With
custody credits and the work-release program, the court informed
Champagne that, under this offer, he would “be released today” and needed
to serve about 16 more days “on the weekend work-release program.”

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Champagne asked about probation details before asking if the plea bargain
offer could remain open “for one more day” so he could “get a second
opinion . . . before we proceed to trial.” The court offered to delay the jury’s
arrival time to allow Champagne more time to consider the offer, and the
People agreed to keep the offer open until 1:30 p.m. the next day. The court
assured Champagne he would “have time to think about [the offer]” and to
“[t]alk to whoever [he] need[ed] to.”
Next, Champagne asked to clarify the court’s reference to a plea
bargain offer of four years of probation because “[his] understanding was
[three years].” In response, the court explained it “would have to impose
[four] years [of] probation” because the charges involved domestic violence.
But the court also said, “I’ll let [your counsel] follow up with that.” Defense
counsel immediately “confer[red] with” Champagne, though that conversation
was not reported. The court then asked defense counsel, “Anything else?”
Defense counsel responded, “No, your Honor.”
The trial convened the next day with no further mention of the plea
bargain offer.
A jury found Champagne guilty on all charges. The court sentenced
Champagne to three years in prison followed by a period of parole.
II.
A.
Champagne argues the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process when it misinformed him of the minimum probation
term. We accept the People’s concession that the court erred but conclude it
did not amount to a federal constitutional error, and we discern no prejudice.

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1.
A court has a “duty not to misstate the law, whether intentionally or
not.” (People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695, 734-735.) As the
People concede, here the trial court erred when it told Champagne it would
have to impose four years of probation because the minimum probation term
for a domestic violence crime is three years, not four. (§ 1203.097(a)(1).)
We disagree, however, that the error violated Champagne’s federal due
process rights. Champagne relies solely on Goodwillie to establish a due
process violation, yet Goodwillie is distinguishable. In Goodwillie, the trial
court and prosecutor misinformed the self-represented defendant of his
eligibility for good conduct credits against his sentence. (Goodwillie,
147 Cal.App.4th at p. 701.) The defendant said he would accept the discussed
plea bargain “‘right now’” if he was given 50 percent credit against his
sentence. (Id. at p. 731.) The court and the prosecutor, however, told the
defendant—mistakenly and incorrectly—that he was ineligible for 50 percent
credit. (Id. at pp. 731, 733.) Critically, the defendant “attempted to negotiate
a different deal, but the court stopped him.” (Id. at p. 732.) The court
directed the prosecutor to instead present the “last best offer,” which included
only 15 percent credit. (Ibid.) The defendant expressly rejected that offer.
(Ibid.) On appeal, our division concluded the defendant’s federal due process
right was violated because the “trial court’s and the prosecutor’s
misunderstanding brought the plea bargaining process to a halt” and “caused
[the defendant] to reject an offer . . . that he had indicated a willingness to
accept.” (Id. at p. 735.)
Here, unlike in Goodwillie, the court never prohibited Champagne from
further negotiating a plea bargain. Rather than halting negotiations, the
court expressly let Champagne’s counsel “follow up” on the minimum

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probation term and the prosecutor kept the offer open long enough for
Champagne to get a second opinion. And Champagne never indicated he was
willing to accept a plea bargain offer of three years of probation as opposed to
four years. As a result, the error here does not amount to a federal due
process violation, so it does not require applying the heightened standard for
assessing prejudice used in Goodwillie. (See Goodwillie, 147 Cal.App.4th at
p. 736.)
2.
We discern no prejudice from the court’s misadvisement about the
minimum probation term of the plea bargain offer.
An error that does not implicate a federal constitutional right is
harmless unless it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The defendant bears the
burden to establish prejudice under the Watson standard. (People v.
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 910.)
Champagne has not satisfied that burden here. In People v.
Miralrio (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 448, the appellate court found no prejudice
from the misadvisement under the Watson standard because “nothing in the
record on appeal suggests defendant would have accepted the . . . proffered

deal if he had been correctly advised.”1 (Miralrio, at p. 463.) Champagne
argues that, unlike Miralrio, he “likely” would have accepted an offer of
three years of probation because (1) trial counsel “presumably” advised him

1 Despite assuming a due process violation, Miralrio disagreed with
Goodwillie and applied the Watson standard for prejudice. (Miralrio,
167 Cal.App.4th at p. 462.) Though we apply the Watson standard for a
different reason, discussed above, Miralrio serves as an example of assessing
Watson prejudice in the context of plea bargain misadvisement.
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he had a weak defense and was presumptively ineligible for probation outside
the plea bargain process; and (2) the record indicates he “showed his interest
in a plea bargain” when he asked the court about the conditions of the
proposed work-release program, asked for time to get a second opinion, and
mentioned he understood the offer to be for three years of probation. Even
were we to accept Champagne’s presumption about trial counsel’s
advisements, such knowledge had not been enough for Champagne to accept
the earlier “attempts” to reach a plea bargain on the eve of trial. Instead, his
decision to move forward with trial despite these factors makes it less
probable he would have chosen differently without the benefit of hindsight
from knowing his posttrial verdict and sentence. As to his purported interest
in a plea bargain, Champagne asks us to infer from it that he “would have
likely accepted an offer of three years of probation.” But that inference is
speculative, as it is equally likely Champagne took his chance at trial given
he requested time for a second opinion “before we proceed to trial.”
Accordingly, Champagne has not established it is reasonably probable he
would have chosen differently had the trial court not misstated the minimum
probation period.
Thus, Champagne has failed to carry his burden to establish prejudice.
B.
Champagne also argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to inform the court the minimum probation term was three
years, not four. We disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance, an appellant must show
(1) “counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)
The prejudice prong requires the appellant to show a “reasonable

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probability”—one that “undermine[s] confidence in the outcome”—“that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” (Id. at p. 694.) An appellant’s claim that “with competent
advice [the appellant] would have accepted a proffered plea bargain” must be
“corroborated independently by objective evidence”; a later “self-serving”
statement by the appellant is “insufficient in and of itself to establish
prejudice.” (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 938, 945.)
Here, Champagne’s arguments for prejudice from his counsel’s failure
to correct the trial court about the minimum probation term are the same as
those offered to prove the prejudice from the trial court’s error. They thus fail
for the same reasons discussed above.
By not satisfying the prejudice prong, Champagne falls short of
establishing a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel.
C.
Finally, Champagne challenges the cumulative effect of these asserted
errors by arguing they created a fundamentally unfair trial setting. But “we
have found each error or possible error to be harmless when considered
separately.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567-568.) “Considering
them together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect does not
warrant reversal of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 568.)
III.
We affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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