In re G.K. CA2/2

CourtListener 10776968Calctapp20 janv. 2026

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Filed 1/20/26 In re G.K. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re G.K., a Person Coming B343611
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP01169)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Linda L. Sun, Judge. Affirmed.
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellant C.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s
orders made at a hearing held under Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 366.3.2 Mother contends the juvenile court
impermissibly delegated its authority over visitation and conjoint
therapy to her daughter G.K. (born March 2009) and G.K.’s
therapists. Mother further contends the court erred in denying
mother’s request for a continuance under section 352.3 We affirm
the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Background
The family is comprised of G.K. and mother; the two were
originally from Australia and moved to the United States in 2019.

1
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
The hearing was styled as both a “post permanent plan
review” pursuant to section 366.3, as well as a “permanency
planning review hearing” pursuant to section 366.26. The
January 22, 2025 proceeding functioned as a section 366.26
hearing following the second termination of mother’s
reunification services.
3
Section 352 allows the court to continue any hearing
beyond the time limit if the hearing is otherwise meant to be held
provided the continuance is not contrary to the interest of the
minor.

2
G.K. and mother had no contact with presumed father, and he
was believed to have died of COVID-19 in Cameroon in 2020.4
Referral and section 300 petition
On February 17, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (the Department) received a
referral after G.K. was hospitalized on an “involuntary hold . . .
for choking mother.” During the hospitalization, G.K. alleged
physical and emotional abuse by mother and bore marks from
self-harm.
On March 12, 2021, the Department filed a section 300
petition alleging G.K. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court based on subdivisions (a), (b)(1) and (c) of section 300.
Specifically, it was alleged G.K. (1) suffered physical abuse when
mother hit G.K.’s “thigh with a mineral crystal”; (2) was “at risk
of serious physical harm, damage, danger and medical neglect” as
the result of mother’s “limited ability to provide care and
supervision of the child due to the child’s specific mental health
needs”; and (3) was emotionally abused by mother and the abuse
“resulted in the child experiencing depression, anxiety, paranoia,
suicidal ideations, self-harming behaviors and aggressive and
assaultive behaviors towards others.” The petition recommended
G.K. be detained pending further hearing.
Detention hearing
At the March 17, 2021 detention hearing, the court found a
prima facie case existed and the facts demonstrated G.K. was a
person described in section 300 and “[r]easonable efforts ha[d]
been provided to prevent removal.” The court also found there

4
On June 10, 2021, the court found due diligence in the
attempt to locate father. During a hearing on April 6, 2023,
mother indicated father died on April 1, 2021.

3
was “substantial danger to the physical and emotional health of
the child and there [we]re no reasonable means by which the
child’s physical or emotional health may be protected without
removing the child from the home” and “that it would be
detrimental to the child to be placed in the home” or in the care of
mother. Therefore, the court “order[ed] the child removed from
the home” and “placed in the care, custody and control of the
Department.” The court ordered the Department to provide the
parties with reunification services and monitored visitation
between mother and G.K. two times per week with discretion by
the Department to liberalize.
Adjudication and disposition hearing
On June 10, 2021, the court sustained the petition and G.K.
was “declared a dependent of the court” under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(2) and (c)(1); the court dismissed the allegations
pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(1). The court found it
“reasonable and necessary to remove the child from the mother”
because “it would be detrimental to [G.K.’s] safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being.” The Department was ordered
to provide reunification services to G.K. and mother. Mother’s
case plan included, inter alia, conjoint counseling with G.K.,
parenting classes, individual counseling, a National Alliance on
Mental Health parent support group and “psychoeducation
regarding [G.K.’s] diagnoses.” The court ordered two monitored
visits per week with discretion to liberalize.
Six-month review hearing
On December 9, 2021, the court held a six-month review
hearing. The court found “by clear and convincing evidence that
return of [G.K. to mother] would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the child” and “that continued jurisdiction is

4
necessary.” The court found mother’s “progress made toward
alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement”
“ha[d] not been substantial.” The court further found the
Department had “complied with the case plan” by providing or
offering “reasonable services to enable the child’s safe return
home,” and ordered reunification services continued.
During the hearing, G.K.’s counsel shared “that [G.K.]
would prefer to not have any visits with mother,” but she was
“willing to follow her therapist’s recommendation to reduce the
visits to once a week.” Mother objected to the reduction but also
agreed to submit on the Department’s recommendation and
“whatever is in [G.K.’s] best interest.” After reviewing the status
reports, the court noted “there ha[d] been triggering events when
[G.K.] ha[d] been ordered to visit with the mother” and, because
“it is important to . . . maintain stability of the child’s mental
health,” the court reduced the monitored visitation to a minimum
of once per week with discretion to liberalize.
Twelve-month review hearing
On May 10, 2022, the court held a 12-month review
hearing. The court found by clear and convincing evidence return
of G.K. to mother “would create a substantial risk of detriment to
the child” and, therefore, found continued jurisdiction necessary.
The court found mother had been cooperative and involved in
G.K.’s care and was in compliance with her case plan. However,
because mother had not completed any of the programming,
mother’s case plan progress was not substantial. The court
ordered the Department to continue reunification services and
continue monitored visitation.

5
Eighteen-month review hearing
On September 9, 2022, the court held an 18-month review
hearing. The Department and G.K.’s counsel asked the court to
terminate services. G.K.’s counsel noted the issues which
brought them into the jurisdiction of the court had not been
resolved, “communication between mother and [G.K.] ha[d] not
improved,” and G.K. felt overwhelmed “about the quantity of
visits,” that had “not been liberalized because [G.K.] continue[d]
to experience anxiety during the visit[s].” In regard to conjoint
counseling, G.K.’s counsel noted mother continued to push for
conjoint counseling against the recommendation of the mental
health professionals who advised against the sessions because of
G.K.’s mental health and “current suicidal ideation.” Mother’s
counsel asked the court to “extend family reunification services
pursuant to section 350.”
The court found mother had “work[ed] very hard to address
her own issues” and had completed the bulk of her services with
the exception of the conjoint counseling in large part because
G.K. “[wa]s not ready” to participate. Therefore, the court found
that continuing mother’s services was in G.K.’s best interests,
and extraordinary circumstances necessitated a continuance of
the hearing for three months “to see how the conjoint
counseling . . . and . . . monitored visitation goes.”
The Department was ordered to provide “very detailed
reports” on the status of conjoint therapy visits and set a progress
hearing for October 2022.
Progress hearing
On October 14, 2022, the court held a “progress hearing
regarding conjoint counseling visits for mother and [G.K.].” The
court noted the “fragile” state of G.K.’s mental health at that time

6
and ordered the visits to continue but ordered conjoint counseling
to be suspended to allow the therapist to “observe the child’s
behavior and make sure that her mental health [wa]s stabilized
before [resuming].” The court ordered continued monitored
visitation between mother and G.K. and held “after four
successful monitored visits conjoint counseling may proceed.”
Mother’s walk-on request for conjoint counseling
On November 23, 2022, mother filed a walk-on request
because in October the “court ordered conjoint therapy . . . to
begin after completing [four] visits without incident” and despite
four uneventful visits being completed on November 13, 2022,
conjoint counseling had not begun. Mother was seeking a “new
therapist to be appointed to commence conjoint counseling
forthwith” or, in the alternative, the current therapist be
questioned as to her refusal to provide conjoint counseling.
On December 1, 2022, the court held a hearing on mother’s
walk-on request regarding the progress toward conjoint
counseling. Mother explained she would like G.K.’s former
therapist, Dr. Lynn Steinberg, to take over conjoint therapy and
for sessions to begin within the week. Dr. Steinberg had been
G.K. and mother’s therapist in 2020 before the court had
jurisdiction.
Minor’s counsel objected to changing therapists to
Dr. Steinberg and explained the current therapist had not simply
disregarded the court’s previous orders regarding when conjoint
counseling should begin but instead was “fulfilling their
professional obligation” to ensure the stability of G.K.’s mental
health before conjoint counseling could recommence. Minor’s
counsel noted G.K.’s current therapist would be leaving the
agency soon and posited the new therapist assigned to the case

7
might have a different approach that could be helpful. The
Department agreed with minor’s counsel and reiterated that,
although there had been four uneventful visits, stability of G.K.’s
mental health, which was part of the court’s orders, had not been
reached. The Department argued it was not “appropriate to force
the issue at [that] point.”
The court clarified its prior order had been that “conjoint
counseling . . . may resume after four uneventful monitored
visit[s].” (Italics added.) Thus, the court’s order was not
mandatory; instead, it hinged on G.K.’s mental health, which was
the “paramount concern.” The court noted G.K. was “extremely
mentally fragile” and different from other children. As a result,
the court found the therapist’s findings to be “very weighty.”
Moreover, the court found the past four visits had not been
entirely uneventful because G.K. had become “irritated” and
“annoyed” by mother. The court noted G.K. did not want to do
conjoint therapy with mother but explained, “I need the therapist
to provide information . . . as to why the child has such strong
feelings against having therapy sessions with the mother” and
ordered the Department to provide this information in their next
report. Accordingly, the court ordered the Department and
minor’s counsel to “ensure the [c]ourt receives information
regarding why [G.K.] does not want to continue conjoint
counseling” and to determine whether Dr. Steinberg was a
suitable option for conjoint counseling.
Continued 18-month review hearing: termination of
services
In preparation for the December 8, 2022 hearing, G.K. was
interviewed by then-therapist Maria Ponce and children’s social
worker Veronica Oviedo. G.K. told Ponce and Oviedo she did not

8
want therapy switched to Dr. Steinberg because Dr. Steinberg
did not believe her regarding prior allegations of sexual abuse
against father; G.K. also indicated that mother preferred
Dr. Steinberg because she always agreed with mother “as long as
she was paying her.” G.K. submitted a letter to the court to
explain why she did not want to participate in conjoint therapy
with mother. In it, G.K. emphatically stated, “[u]ntil my mother
is able to take accountability, it is way beyond me to have
therapy with her. I repeat, I DO NOT want therapy sessions
with her.”
On December 8, 2022, the court held the previously
continued 18-month review hearing. The Department and
minor’s counsel recommended services be terminated; they noted
the issue was not with mother’s compliance with the case plan,
but was instead “whether the mother ha[d] sufficiently addressed
the issues that led to th[e] court taking jurisdiction” in the first
place and whether mother was able to “care for [G.K.’s] specific
mental health needs.” Mother’s counsel pointed to mother’s
progress and asked the court to extend reunification services.
The court found mother had substantially complied with
her case plan and the Department had made reasonable efforts to
return G.K. to a safe home; however, mother’s “efforts [we]re not
sufficient to meet the level of the child’s mental health needs.”
Specifically, the “first conjoint counseling that occurred . . . did
not go well” and “actually triggered self-harm for [G.K.].” The
court pointed to the letter written by G.K. wherein she “very
articulately and eloquently wrote . . . that [mother] ha[d] not
taken any responsibility and accountability for her actions” and
“implore[d]” the court not to allow conjoint counseling with
mother to continue. This, the court found, was “more than

9
enough for [it] to make a decision conjoint counseling [wa]s not in
the best interest of the child.” The court noted “mother
continue[d] to blame everything around her . . . besides . . .
herself.” Ultimately, the court terminated reunification services
and set the matter for a permanency hearing for June 12, 2023.
Visitation was ordered to continue.
Permanency planning hearings
On April 6, 2023, the court held a permanency planning
review hearing. The court continued the hearing due to untimely
notice to mother. Relevant here, G.K. indicated she “would like
to have weekly visits” with mother and the court ordered the
Department to “[f]acilitate weekly monitored visits between
mother and [G.K.].”
On June 12, 2023, the court held the permanency planning
review hearing. The court noted the parties agreed legal
guardianship was the permanent plan.
On July 13, 2023, the court held a permanency planning
hearing. G.K. was hospitalized; as a result, the hearing was
continued.
On July 26, 2023, the court was made aware of a “fallout”
in the relationship between G.K. and her foster parent and, as a
result, G.K. was placed at Five Acres, a short term residential
therapeutic program (STRTP) on July 18, 2023. On September 1,
2023, the court held a STRTP review hearing and found G.K.’s
needs could not be met in a “family-based setting” and placement
in the STRTP would provide “the most effective and appropriate
care” for her. The court noted G.K. reported her goal was “to
return to [mother] eventually under certain conditions.”
On October 12, 2023, the court held the permanency
planning hearing. Minor’s counsel requested unmonitored visits

10
with mother right away with the goal of moving toward overnight
visits. Mother agreed and asked for conjoint counseling despite
reunification services having been terminated. The Department
sought a “step-up plan” to ensure this attempt at reunification
went “smoothly.” The court ordered unmonitored day visits
between mother and G.K. and ordered the Department to
“establish a step-up plan to help [m]other transition to
overnights.”
Mother’s section 388 petition
On December 8, 2023, mother filed a section 388 petition
requesting the court take the permanency planning hearing off
calendar, reinstate reunification services, and order overnight
visits and conjoint counseling. On December 11, 2023, the court
ordered the Department to file a response to mother’s section 388
petition, assess overnight and extended visits between mother
and G.K. and refer the pair to conjoint counseling.
On January 26, 2024, after a hearing on the request, the
court granted mother’s section 388 petition. The court reinstated
reunification services, granted mother’s request for overnight
visits, and ordered the pair to begin conjoint counseling “without
the requirement of the clinician or mental health team
authorization.” The court found G.K.’s current placement
continued to be necessary and appropriate, but allowed the
Department discretion to begin extended visits with mother and
noted the Department “may walk the matter on for home of
parent . . . if deemed appropriate.”
Progress after reunification services were restarted
On February 29, 2024, the court received a report that
revealed G.K. and mother had an argument during a recent visit
and, as a result, G.K. engaged in self-harm and called her STRTP

11
placement. During the call, mother could be heard in the
background yelling at G.K., “you are [a] ward of the state, and
that someone needs to come pick you up.” Mother was angry and
“struggling to deal with [G.K.’s] self-harm.”
On March 1, 2024, the court held a progress hearing. G.K.
read a statement to the court and requested a “cooling-off period”
between herself and mother. Mother accepted the cooling-off
period. The court ordered visits and contact between mother and
G.K. to be suspended until further notice.
On March 7, 2024, the court received a letter from G.K.
wherein she explained her feelings toward mother and that she
no longer wanted to have contact, visits, or conjoint therapy with
her. On May 1, 2024, the court received a report from the
Department. In pertinent part, the report noted G.K. had been
“placed on three separate psychiatric hospitalizations” on
March 20, April 3, and April 11, 2024. She was last discharged
on April 19, 2024. Mother indicated she would like visits and
“stressed the importance of conjoint therapy to be able to work on
her relationship with [G.K.].” G.K. noted she “has never felt
supported by mother and d[id] not want to reunify with [her].”
On May 10, 2024, the court held a progress hearing.
Minor’s counsel indicated G.K. was “open to visits with her
mother.” The court ordered the Department to “[f]acilitate . . .
visitation in a therapeutic setting or other appropriate setting.”
On May 27, 2024, G.K. and mother “resumed in-person
visitation[]” and the Department continued to facilitate the visits.
The visits were two hours every Saturday morning.
A status review report was filed by the Department on
July 12, 2024. At that time, G.K. was refusing to allow mother to
participate in child and family team “meetings or to participate in

12
family therapy.” She reported “feeling triggered” when the
Department or her team inquired about conjoint therapy. While
mother was being “very attentive and cooperative,” G.K.
“fluctuate[d] on wanting to reunify with mother and w[ould] not
participate in conjoint therapy.” The report indicated G.K. was
attending visitation with mother.
On July 26, 2024, the court held a permanency planning
review hearing. The Department noted continued reunification
services would be helpful, but recommended mother’s services be
terminated “only because of the time.” G.K. expressed continued
interest in reunifying with mother. Mother asked for the court to
extend services and emphasized her belief that conjoint
counseling was “critically important to ensure a successful
transition.”
The court found G.K.’s current placement was necessary
and appropriate, and the Department had “complied with the
case plan.” The court ordered conjoint counseling to begin
immediately and unmonitored visitation to begin that weekend.
After two successful unmonitored visits, the court indicated
mother and G.K. could begin overnight visits “if they wish[ed].”
On August 6, 2024, the Department filed a report with the
court which indicated G.K. no longer wanted to reunify with
mother and wanted visits to stop. The report noted there had
been successful unmonitored visits on July 28 and August 1,
2024. On August 3, 2024, however, an unmonitored visit
occurred and “went downhill” after mother asked G.K. about
school. G.K. “appeared to be upset [and] walked away from
mother.” After finding G.K. in the restroom, mother called the
Department and asked that G.K. be picked up from the visit
location, which upset G.K. Mother agreed she could have

13
handled the situation better, but she became “scared when [G.K.]
ran off.” After the visit, G.K. reported wanting no further visits
with mother. In the end, G.K. felt “she ha[d] given mother many
chances and she [kept] abusing those chances” and G.K. believed,
despite meaning well, mother would never change.
On August 9, 2024, a progress hearing was held. G.K.
expressed she did not want contact with mother and was seeking
a “time-out period.” Mother did not object and only asked “the
Department [to] have counseling at the ready.” The court
ordered further visitation and conjoint counseling suspended
until mother and G.K. were both ready.
A report filed by the Department on August 30, 2024,
indicated G.K. was not speaking to mother and still did not want
mother involved in her therapy.
On October 17, 2024, the Department filed a report in
preparation for a hearing the next day. The report indicated
mother was insisting family therapy be scheduled; however, the
therapist noted G.K. was not ready and had “declined to
participate.” The therapist offered to schedule virtual sessions
and invite G.K. to participate, but “[m]other declined and
requested a schedule be created for in-person sessions.” The
therapist remained “available to continue the in-person sessions
with [mother] and [would] include [G.K.] once she [wa]s ready to
participate in family sessions.” On October 18, 2024, the court
held a progress hearing at which the court ordered visitation and
conjoint therapy to begin when G.K. “[wa]s ready for it,” and, in
the meantime, mother and G.K. could write to one another as
they wished. Mother’s counsel expressed concern “that mother’s
due process rights [were] being implicated” because G.K. was

14
“refus[ing] to engage in visitation” and reiterated mother’s belief
that conjoint therapy was “critical to reunification.”
On October 29, 2024, G.K. was placed in a psychiatric
hospital after she took scissors from her teacher’s desk and
engaged in self-harm. While hospitalized, G.K. requested to see
mother. She was discharged on November 6, 2024, and a visit
was arranged for November 9, 2024. The visit went well;
however, when asked on November 12, 2024, if she would like
another visit with mother, G.K. declined. As a result, the
Department reported it would “facilitate visit[s] when [G.K.]
informs . . . she is ready to resume visits.”
On November 20, 2024, the court held a hearing. Mother
requested “scheduled weekly calls” between herself and G.K. The
court was pleased to see improvement in mother’s communication
but declined to order a “fixed schedule” for calls or visits. The
court did not want to “forc[e]” G.K. because, after getting to know
G.K. “all these years,” the court believed it would “only drive her
away.” As a result, the court ordered no change to visitation and
instead found a “fluid visitation” schedule would be more
beneficial and would yield better results.
Second termination of services
On December 30, 2024, the Department filed a status
review report to update the court on G.K.’s progress and
reunification efforts. G.K.’s current placement was in a “small
family home.” G.K. had been hospitalized on November 21, 2024,
after she “used a piece of . . . glass to self-harm,” and was
discharged on December 5, 2024. G.K. was still “not ready to
participate [in] . . . family therapy”; as a result, mother was
attending weekly on her own. On December 6, 2024, mother
again requested the Department speak to and consider

15
Dr. Steinberg as G.K.’s therapist; however, the Department noted
given the number of years (five) since Steinberg last worked with
G.K., it “was concerned about the relevance of her opinion to
[G.K.’s] current course of treatment.” The Department also noted
G.K.’s documented negative feelings toward Dr. Steinberg.
The Department reiterated “[m]other received
approximately 21 months of reunification services” prior to
termination of services and another 12 months of services after
the court reinstated services; in between, G.K. “received
approximately 13 months of permanent placement services.”
Mother had been involved in G.K.’s “life as much as possibly
permitted by [G.K.]” and had “completed the services and
programs from the initial case plan.” Despite these efforts by the
Department and mother, G.K. was “able to advocate for her own
needs” and “[u]nfortunately, [G.K.] d[id] not want to participate
in conjoint counseling with her mother.” Ultimately, the
Department recommended the court terminate services as they
had been exhausted.
During a “team” meeting on January 16, 2025, G.K.
indicated she did not want to reunify with mother and instead
wanted “to age out of foster care.” G.K. read a poem which closed
with, “Mum, I do not want to reunify. I can write 10 more pages
as to why, yet time is so sparse in our lives.”
On January 22, 2025, a permanency plan review hearing
took place.5 Minor’s counsel argued it was too risky for G.K. to be
returned to mother, noted the case had been open for four years
and asked that reunification services be terminated. Mother’s

5
This hearing was also referred to as a post permanent plan
review hearing, which took place pursuant to section 366.3.

16
counsel objected to the termination of services, asked the court to
extend services for six months pursuant to section 352, and
asserted mother’s due process rights were violated by G.K.’s “veto
power to visits and conjoint counseling.” The Department argued
the court did not delegate its authority to G.K. or therapists to
decide if visitation or counseling would take place. Instead, the
court “set clear guidelines as to . . . what needed to occur and
really tried to assist the family with setting up the visitation . . .
and for several reasons they did not occur. . . . [I]t wasn’t because
the court delegated that responsibility to another person[, but]
that this case has been a real challenge.”
The court denied mother’s request to continue the
permanency planning hearing and terminated mother’s
reunification services. The court noted, at the time it granted
mother’s section 388 request, mother had six months to reunite;
in this case, however, at the six-month mark everyone agreed
that another six months would be beneficial. As a result, services
were continued for an additional six months. The court noted
mother’s “unwavering commitment to be in [G.K.’s] life.”
However, the court emphasized it must also “consider what is in
[G.K.’s] best interest.” In that regard, the court found it “really
clear” that G.K.’s “vacillation” with regard to reunifying with
mother “was just to provide the mother with an opportunity to
prove herself,” and one year later “there ha[d] been no
improvement. [G.K.] continue[d] to self-harm” and G.K.’s safety
is the court’s “paramount concern.”
The court found mother’s due process rights had not been
violated because the Department went “above and beyond to help
mother and [G.K.] reunify” and worked to “ensure that they ha[d]
visits and conjoint counseling.” The court noted the pair had

17
“five or six conjoint counseling” sessions that “did not go well
because the sessions triggered [G.K.] because of the mother’s lack
of empathy, lack of accountability, and lack of effective
communication.” The court further noted G.K. was making “a lot
of progress in school” and during that time she was not having
visits with mother, and G.K.’s therapists were recommending
“that conjoint counseling should not start because [G.K.] [wa]s
not ready.” Additionally, G.K. had episodes of self-harm
apparently triggered by the post-traumatic stress of “her
experience [of] living with her mother and the abuse that she
suffered.” The court reiterated G.K. was not granted “unfettered
decision making” in terms of visiting mother, but instead the
court needed “to make sure that her mental health [wa]s stable
before [having] any visits with [mother].”
The court found G.K. was “in a safe place” with her current
caregiver and would “remain[] a dependent of the [c]ourt” and
that “placement in foster care with a permanent plan of another
planned permanent living arrangement . . . [wa]s ordered as the
permanent plan” for G.K. The court found because G.K. was
turning 16 in less than two months, “there [wa]s no compelling
reason to conduct a [p]ermanency [p]lanning [h]earing pursuant
to [section] 366.26.”
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The juvenile court did not abdicate its authority or
violate mother’s due process rights when making

18
and enforcing conjoint counseling and visitation
orders
Mother contends the court violated her constitutional due
process rights by “delegating its authority over conjoint therapy
and visitation” to G.K. and/or G.K.’s therapists.6
A. Conjoint counseling
Mother argues “the court failed to assert its authority to
make sure that conjoint therapy actually occurred” and, because
conjoint therapy was the pair’s best shot at reunification, without
it, “G.K.’s attitude toward [m]other would continue to oscillate.”
Mother’s argument suggests the court and the parties did not
understand the important role conjoint counseling would serve.
Her argument also suggests, however, the court had the burden
of forcing G.K. to participate in conjoint therapy. It did not.
In juvenile dependency cases, the court has the authority to
issue “all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody,
conduct, maintenance, and support of [a dependent] child” and to
“direct any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of [that]
child.” (§ 362, subds. (a) & (d).) “‘“The juvenile court has broad
discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the
child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly.
On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.”’” (In re F.P. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 966, 975.)
“Unlike visitation, there is no statutory right to counseling.
Counseling is merely a service the court may order if the court
thinks it would benefit the parent and the child. [Citation.] A

6
We note, throughout mother’s opening brief, she
interchanges her contentions regarding visitation and conjoint
counseling. Because they are two separate orders and the rights
to each are different, we have separated them.

19
court may properly decline to order conjoint counseling if the
child’s therapist believes the child is not ready for it.” (In re F.P.,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.)
Here, the juvenile court did not leave it up to the therapists
or G.K. to decide whether conjoint therapy would take place, only
when the sessions should begin, consistent with the therapeutic
goals of counseling and G.K.’s well-being. (Cf. In re C.S. (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 631, 640–641 [“the visitation order granting
[mother] visitation rights and expressly stating the frequency
and duration of visits, while [also] requiring [the child’s]
therapist to approve the start of those visits, did not constitute an
unlawful delegation of judicial authority”]; In re S.H. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 310, 319 [“the [child protective agency] and mental
health professionals working with it and with the dependent
child may determine when visitation should first occur”].) This
was not an improper delegation of authority.
Relying on In re S.H., mother argues the court allowed
“G.K. veto power over visits and family therapy” despite her lack
of mental stability or demonstrated maturity to make “adult
decisions” about “what was in her best interests.” In re S.H. does
not offer mother support. There is no question mother
consistently argued conjoint counseling was an integral
component to reunification. To this end, conjoint counseling
orders were in place to varying degrees throughout the case.
By our count, throughout the course of this case, G.K. was
hospitalized for self-harm nearly 20 times, oftentimes with
occurrences increasing when she was pushed to visit or attend
counseling sessions with mother. For example, in January 2024,
upon reinstatement of services, the court ordered conjoint
counseling to begin regardless of the therapist’s

20
recommendations; however, during an overnight visit in
February 2024, G.K. self-harmed, which resulted in G.K. seeking
no contact with mother. (See In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th
at p. 317 [“the child’s input and refusal and the possible adverse
consequences if a visit is forced against the child’s will are factors
to be considered in administering visitation”].)
Due to the fragility of G.K.’s mental health, the court’s
orders for conjoint therapy were often conditioned on the
recommendations of G.K.’s therapists or G.K.’s readiness. These
orders did not improperly delegate decision making to the
therapists or “allow G.K. to run the show.” Instead, the court
was in a position where it needed to balance the potential
benefits of forcing conjoint counseling with the importance of
G.K.’s mental health and well-being. We find substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s findings and it did not abuse
its discretion in conditioning counseling on G.K.’s readiness
and/or therapist’s recommendations. (See In re F.P., supra, 61
Cal.App.5th at p. 975 [juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering conjoint counseling when deemed appropriate by the
child’s therapist because the child “repeatedly stated he was
afraid of [the] mother and said he wanted no contact with her,”
became “stressed and anxious when [the] mother made harassing
phone calls to his caregiver,” and “engaged in self-harming
behaviors and was twice hospitalized for suicidal ideation”]; In re
Andrea G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 556 [where a 12-year-old
child “insisted . . . she did not want conjoint therapy with her
mother” because the mother did not “understand the
consequences of her own actions,” the court did not abuse its
discretion in not ordering it].)

21
B. Visitation
“[M]other essentially argue[s] her [due process] rights had
been violated because the minor continuously refused visits and
the court failed to do anything about it.” Because she asserts her
constitutional rights have been violated, mother urges us to use a
de novo standard of review. (See In re J.H. (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 174, 183 [issues involving constitutional questions
are subject to de novo review].) However, an appellate court
reviews orders setting the terms of visitation for an abuse of
discretion (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356)
and we review the juvenile court’s finding that visitation would
be detrimental under the substantial evidence standard (In re
Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580–581, disapproved on
another ground by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1010, fn. 7). Under either standard, the court did not err.
Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides: “In order to
maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to
provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a
child to the custody of his or her parent . . . , any order placing a
child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, shall
provide . . . [¶] . . . for visitation between the parent or guardian
and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible,
consistent with the well-being of the child.” (See In re Sofia M.
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1044 (Sofia M.).) Importantly,
section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B), also states: “No visitation
order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (See In re S.H.,
supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317, fn. 9 [“The court may deny a
parent visitation only if visitation would be harmful to the
child.”].)

22
Preliminarily, we note mother did not object to the court’s
suspension of visitation orders and, instead, continued to push for
conjoint counseling. A “reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been
but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293, superseded by statute on unrelated grounds as stated
in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) In any event, we
find substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that forcing
visits would be detrimental to G.K.’s well-being and, therefore,
the court did not abuse its discretion in making and enforcing its
visitation orders.
Despite mother’s contention that the case is not relevant
here, we find Sofia M., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, instructive.
There, a 12-month review hearing occurred three months after
the dependent teenager had begun refusing to visit with her
mother, and the mother’s counsel asked the court for “‘the visits
outlined in’” a previous order. (Id. at p. 1043.) The court granted
the request but visits still did not occur. (Ibid.) On appeal, the
mother contended the court erred by failing to “enforce its
visitation order.” (Id. at p. 1044.) The appellate court rejected
the contention, holding the juvenile court had properly ordered
visitation; if the mother had wanted a different order that would
encourage the child to agree to visitation, it was “the parent’s
burden to request a specific type of enforcement, or a specific
change to the visitation order.” (Id. at p. 1046.) “Absent a
request, it is not the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a
solution to the intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to
visit a parent. Trial judges are not mental health experts, nor
child behavior experts.” (Ibid.) In other words, “[t]he court does

23
not err by failing to do that which it is not requested to do.”
(Ibid.)
Mother argues Sofia M., is inapt because there were
significant periods from March to May 2024, and August 2024,
through termination of services in January 2025, when there
were no visitation orders of which to seek enforcement. It is true
there were no mandatory visitation orders in place between
March and May 2024, and after August 2024. Beginning in
October 2024, however, the court ordered G.K. “may start
visitation, conjoint therapy, or any other form of contact with the
mother when [G.K.] [wa]s ready for it.” In November 2024,
mother asked the court for specific visitation orders—to order
scheduled phone calls between the pair—but the court declined to
“order . . . a fixed schedule,” and instead found it would suffice
that G.K. knows how to reach her mother and will reach out if
she would like to; the court found “forcing [G.K.] to have a
relationship o[r] forcing her to have a visitation schedule [would
not] actually improve the mother and daughter relationship.”
It is clear as G.K. got older—approaching 16 years old—and
the court became more familiar with G.K. and her mental health
and crisis patterns, the court found it was not appropriate to
force visits with mother and instead found a “fluid visitation”
schedule would be more beneficial and would yield better results.
The court noted each time G.K. was forced to visit or the topic of
conjoint counseling was pushed, it “just dr[o]ve her away.”
Instead, when the “fluid visitation” schedule was in place, “good
results” were yielded.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that
G.K.’s mental health was fragile and needed to be top of mind
when determining appropriate visitation orders. There is no

24
evidence G.K. was allowed to “r[u]n the show” or that the court’s
orders unconstitutionally delegated its authority to G.K.
Therefore, In re S.H., on which mother relies, is inapposite.
II. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
denying mother’s request to continue services
pursuant to section 352
Mother contends, though this case had gone “on for far
longer than the normal maximum, there was nothing to be
gained in terminating efforts to reunify [G.K.] with [m]other.”
Therefore, “this case presents extraordinary circumstances
where, regardless of the statutory timelines, continuation of
reunification efforts was in the minor’s best interests—precisely
the type of scenario that section 352 was designed to facilitate.”
Respondent argues, “Nothing in the record indicates mother was
moving toward changing her behaviors . . . or altering her
approach to [G.K.] as she continued to deny her fault or
shortcomings regarding [G.K.].”
“By its terms, the statutory discretion to continue ‘any
hearing’ under section 352 extends to the section 366.26
permanency planning hearing.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632.) “In the past, California courts have
found good cause in a number of cases where ‘“extraordinary
circumstances”’ justified an extension and doing so was
consistent with the child’s best interests.” (Ibid.) “‘Extraordinary
circumstances exist when “inadequate services” are offered by the
child welfare agency or “an external force over which [the parent
has] no control” prevented the parent from completing a case
plan.’” (Ibid.) “In determining whether to grant relief, the
juvenile court must consider whether there are exceptional
circumstances constituting good cause for the continuance and

25
whether the continuance would be contrary to the child’s
interests.” (Id. at p. 635.)
Here, there were no “exceptional circumstances
constituting good cause for [a] continuance.” (Michael G. v.
Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 635.) In denying mother’s
motion to continue, the court noted it granted mother’s section
388 request to reinstate services in January 2024, and after six
months, the court extended services for an additional six months.
The court found “no reason for [it] to grant additional time for the
mother to continue with her reunification . . . and [further efforts
to do so are not] in [G.K.’s] best interest.” Mother and G.K. were
provided nearly two years of reunification services, from March
2021 through December 2022, and another year of services, from
January 2024 through January 2025. The court found the
Department provided reasonable services to mother and further
found mother was compliant with her case plan. Despite the
efforts of all the parties involved, however, reunification
remained a challenge given the instability of G.K.’s mental health
and safety. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding it
was in G.K.’s best interest to terminate services and move toward
permanency.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional orders concerning conjoint counseling and
visitation are affirmed. The court’s order terminating mother’s

26
reunification services and denying mother’s motion under section
352 are affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J. RICHARDSON, J.

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