CourtListener 10776962•People v. Binns CA2/7
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Filed 1/20/26 P. v. Binns CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337619
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA028021)
v.
KEYRON LAMONT BINNS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Dismissed.
Keyron Lamont Binns, in pro. per.; S.R. Balash, Jr., under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Keyron Lamont Binns appeals from a superior court order
declining to take action on his request for recall and resentencing
under Penal Code1 section 1172.1. We appointed counsel to
represent Binns on appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel
for Binns filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record and the contentions in
Binns’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any either.
We now dismiss the appeal as having been taken from a
nonappealable order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Attempted Murder and Binns’s Convictions
The evidence at trial established that Nichelle Shaw was
sitting in her car in the drive-through line at a restaurant at
2:45 a.m. on January 27, 1997, when Binns, pointing a nine-
millimeter handgun, and a confederate (who was never
identified) approached, forced their way into the car, and drove
off with Shaw inside. As they drove, Binns demanded all of
Shaw’s money and then insisted that Shaw take the men
somewhere to get more money. She complied and took them to
her uncle’s home.
The men entered the uncle’s home with Shaw and held the
occupants—Shaw’s uncle, Malcolm Hardaway (Hardaway), her
aunt, Odessa Hardaway, and her three cousins—at gunpoint.
The men took jewelry and other property from the family
members. During the several hours the assailants remained in
the residence, Binns struck Hardaway at least twice and sexually
assaulted Shaw.
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
When Binns attempted to tie the victims with an extension
cord, Hardaway, fearing he would be killed, attempted to escape
through the front door. Both of the perpetrators followed
Hardaway to the porch. A scuffle ensued. Odessa Hardaway was
able to lock the men outside and called the police. During the
altercation outside the doorway, Hardaway kicked Binns’s gun to
the curb and ran down the street. Binns yelled, “Smoke that
fool,” and Binns’s confederate fired several shots at Hardaway
but missed.
As the police officers approached with their patrol car’s
sirens sounding, Binns and his companion fled to another street,
where they approached Francisco Franco at gunpoint, took
Franco’s car and wallet, and fled the area.
At the Hardaway residence, the police recovered Binns’s
jacket, which contained his driver’s license. The victims
identified Binns as one of the assailants based on the driver’s
license photograph.
In December 1997 a jury convicted Binns of two counts of
carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), one count of kidnapping to commit
robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), four counts of first degree home
invasion robbery (§ 211), one count of second degree robbery
(§ 211), one count of sexual battery of a person who was
unlawfully restrained (§ 243.4, subd. (a)), and one count of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664). The jury found true the allegations that Binns
personally used a firearm in the commission of the carjacking
and four of the robberies but not the attempted murder.
(§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1).)
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found Binns had
suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions within
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the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12). We affirmed Binns’s convictions but remanded for
resentencing. (People v. Binns (Jan. 26, 1999, B119375) [nonpub.
opn.].) On remand the trial court sentenced Binns to an
aggregate indeterminate state prison term of 195 years to life.
The sentence included a five-year enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), for a prior serious felony
conviction. We affirmed the judgment. (People v Binns (Apr. 17,
2000, B130456) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. 2020 Resentencing Hearing
On January 24, 2020 the Secretary of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation wrote the superior
court “to provide the court with authority to resentence” Binns
pursuant to former section 1170, subdivision (d) (now codified as
section 1172.1). The Secretary recommended that Binns’s
sentence be recalled and he be resentenced “[i]n light of the
court’s newfound authority to not impose a consecutive
enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1).”
The Secretary’s recommendation was placed on calendar
for consideration on July 31, 2020. The People were represented;
Binns was not present and had not been appointed counsel. The
superior court denied the request, explaining, “It remains in the
discretion of the court whether or not to resentence, and I decline
to do so. The crimes in this case were horrendous and the
damage done to people as the court, not me, but the court who
sentenced the defendant, noted it deserved the lengthy sentence
that it received. And for that reason, I decline to order a
resentence.”
4
We affirmed the order. (People v. Binns (July 12, 2021,
B309838) [nonpub. opn.].) We rejected Binns’s argument that he
“was deprived of his right to present additional materials in the
superior court in support of the Secretary’s resentencing
recommendation” because, as we explained, “[n]othing in the
record on appeal or in Binns’s supplemental brief and attached
materials indicates Binns made any such request.”
C. Binns’s 2024 Resentencing Request
On March 18, 2024 Binns, representing himself, filed a
“‘Motion to Resentence’ for the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County to Grant Petitioner a hearing pursuant to
recommendation by Secretary Ralph Diaz on January 24, 2020
(P.C. 1170.03 & 1172.1).” (Capitalization omitted.) At a hearing
on April 18, 2024, appointed counsel for Binns represented to the
superior court that Binns “refuses to go to the Webex. And I
talked to him yesterday, he demanded he be personally ordered
out to appear, but I don’t believe he has standing or the right to
do that at this stage of the proceedings. So we’re ready to
proceed without him.” The court proceeded without Binns
present and advised the parties that pursuant to section 1172.1,
subdivision (c), the court did “not intend to respond” to the
petition, and “my response is no response.” The court issued a
minute order stating, “The court does not respond to Petitioner’s
motion/petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1(c).”
Binns again appealed.
5
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Binns in this appeal.
After reviewing the record, counsel did not identify any arguable
issues and indicated that “[t]his [c]ourt should determine
appealability.” On August 6, 2025 counsel advised Binns that he
was filing a brief stating he was unable to find any arguable
issues and that Binns could personally submit a letter brief
stating any contentions he wanted this court to consider.
Counsel also sent Binns a copy of the record on appeal. On
August 6, 2025 we also advised counsel “to send the record of this
appeal and a copy of appellant’s brief to appellant immediately.”
On November 7, 2025 we received an 18-page supplemental
brief from Binns. In his supplemental brief, Binns argued that
he was entitled to a resentencing hearing “according to the 2020
recommendation of the secretary, the right to be personally
present at the resentencing, and the [right] to place before the
court his record of rehabilitation while incarcerated.” (Boldface
and capitalization omitted.) Binns asserted he had a right to be
present at the April 18, 2024 hearing to address the Secretary’s
recommendation, and the superior court’s failure to address the
recommendation and correct the prior errors of the court denied
him due process.
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) The superior court’s decision not to take
any action on Binns’s motion for resentencing under
Section 1172.1 is not appealable. Section 1172.1, subdivision (c),
provides, “A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking
6
relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests
consideration for relief under this section, the court is not
required to respond.”2 As the court explained in People v.
Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696 with respect to
subdivision (c), a “defendant is not entitled to file a section 1172.1
petition [or] to receive a ruling if he nevertheless files one. It
follows that an appeal from an order acting on his petition
(whether couched as a denial, dismissal, or any other statement
that the court is not acting) does not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights. We lack the authority to rule on the merits of
appeals from orders filed in response to a defendant’s attempt to
seek resentencing under section 1172.1.” (Accord, People v.
Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047 [“a trial court’s
decision not to act on a defendant’s section 1172.1 request for
recall and resentencing does not affect his or her substantial
rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237,
subdivision (b)”].)
In the absence of an appealable order, we lack jurisdiction
over the appeal. (Axitron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments, Inc. (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 360, 384; Canandaigua Wine Co., Inc. v. County of
2 Binns was therefore not entitled to a resentencing hearing
at which he could personally attend and present evidence. (See
People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 996 [“It follows that
a defendant who chooses to file an unauthorized request for
resentencing has no right to a ruling. The defendants may have
a liberty interest at stake in any decision as to whether they
should remain incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to
demand that the trial court actually make such a decision. If the
defendant has no right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to
make one does not deprive the defendant of any right, much less
a substantial one”].)
7
Madera (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.) We therefore dismiss
Binns’s appeal. (See People v. Baltazar (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
334, 342; People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135.).
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
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