CourtListener 10775558•Sherry H. v. Cho CA2/7
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Filed 1/16/26 Sherry H. v. Cho CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SHERRY H., B337685
Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23PDRO01890)
v.
CHRISTINA CHO,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.
Gordon C. Strange for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
__________________________
Christina Cho, a former home care aide for an elderly and
incapacitated woman, Sherry H.,1 appeals from a one-year
restraining order protecting Sherry under the Elder Abuse and
Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15600 et seq.).2 Cho makes one argument on appeal: The trial
court violated her due process rights by refusing to allow her to
present a second witness at the restraining order hearing.
While this appeal was pending, the restraining order
expired. Although typically the expiration of a restraining order
renders the appeal from the order moot, we conclude Cho’s appeal
is not moot because of the potential that even an expired
restraining order could affect Cho’s ability to obtain work as a
home care aide. However, we determine the court did not violate
Cho’s due process rights and thus affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Petition
On December 22, 2023 Sherry’s power of attorney and
appointed healthcare agent, Jenna S., filed for an elder abuse
1 We refer to the adult protected party, as well as her power
of attorney and medical agent and her trustee, by their names
and last initials. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(8)
[permitting abbreviation of names of “[p]rotected persons in elder
or dependent adult abuse-prevention proceedings” to protect their
privacy interests].)
2 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.
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restraining order against Cho on Sherry’s behalf.3 Jenna alleged
she had hired Cho as Sherry’s home care aide approximately
three years earlier and had recently terminated her in writing on
December 11, 2023.
Cho had recently started displaying “unstable” and “manic”
behavior and was increasingly “erratic, aggressive, hostile and
belligerent.” Cho had suggested she could assist in accelerating
Sherry’s death. Jenna also asserted on one occasion Cho had
abandoned her work shift without notice until 30 hours
afterwards.
After being terminated, Cho responded that Jenna lacked
authority to fire her, then dismissed the home care aide
scheduled to be on duty at Sherry’s home and indicated she
would return to work the next day. Although Jenna instructed
her not to return, Cho showed up at Sherry’s home and told the
aide who was present to leave. Jenna called the local sheriff’s
department and a deputy arrived; Cho falsely claimed to have
power of attorney before being escorted from the premises.
Jenna further alleged that Cho had called a detective at the
sheriff’s department “numerous times, becoming increasingly
3 Cho’s record on appeal—consisting only of the restraining
order, the hearing transcript, and the notice of appeal—is
inadequate. An appellant must provide an adequate record to
support any claims of error. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an
issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the
appellant].’ ”].) We requested Sherry’s petition for a restraining
order from the superior court and on our own motion augment
the record to include it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
In addition, we augment the record to include the minute orders
showing the restraining order was not renewed.
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agitated with each call.” In these calls, Cho made accusations of
elder abuse by Jenna and falsely claimed that Jenna had
transferred title of Sherry’s home to herself. The calls triggered
multiple visits from law enforcement and Adult Protective
Services, including late at night, causing Sherry confusion and
distress. The sheriff’s detective believed Cho intended to
continue to go to Sherry’s home and recommended Jenna request
a restraining order. He described Cho to Jenna as “unhinged.”
Jenna also asserted Cho attempted to fraudulently revoke
Jenna’s existing power of attorney to gain control of Sherry’s
finances. Jenna received a revocation document mailed from
Redondo Beach—near where Cho lives—purportedly signed by
Sherry, who lacked capacity to revoke Jenna’s power of attorney
due to a major neurocognitive disorder. Jenna alleged Cho or
someone acting with her took Sherry to a notary to execute the
revocation, of which Sherry had no memory or understanding.
Jenna also asserted Cho took a blank signed check from Sherry’s
bank account and made it payable to Cho’s husband in the
amount of $5,000.
Jenna alleged Sherry suffered psychological harm from the
numerous home visits from sheriff’s deputies and Adult
Protective Services caused by Cho’s false reports, harm from
Cho’s attempt to fraudulently revoke Jenna’s power of attorney
so that Cho could take over Sherry’s finances, and financial harm
from Cho writing her husband a check for $5,000 from Sherry’s
account.
B. The Hearing
In February 2024 the court held a hearing on the request
for a restraining order. The court denied Jenna’s request for a
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continuance so that the sheriff’s deputy who had interacted with
Cho could be present to testify.
Jenna testified that Cho returned to Sherry’s home after
being told not to, dismissed the caretakers who were there, and
installed herself in the home. After the sheriffs escorted her
away, Cho told them she was planning to return to the home.
The sheriffs told Jenna they believed Cho would continue to
return to Sherry’s residence. They had received dozens of calls
from Cho. Jenna testified that her concern Cho would return to
Sherry’s home was the only reason Jenna was pursuing a
restraining order. Jenna was concerned for Sherry’s safety, given
the recent personality changes in Cho.
During Jenna’s testimony, the court indicated, “I don’t
usually restrain people from calling the police . . . . I don’t do
that,” and indicated instead it was focused on Cho returning to
Sherry’s home and the sheriff having to remove her. The court
indicated it needed to decide if Cho would return to the home if
there was no restraining order in place. The court excluded
Jenna’s second witness, her husband, because his planned
testimony (about Cho’s remarks about accelerating Sherry’s
demise) would be cumulative.
The court then asked Cho’s attorney if he wished to call a
witness, and Cho’s counsel said, “Two witnesses. Ms. Cho.” He
did not identify the second intended witness.
Cho testified that Jenna told her to stop feeding and giving
water to Sherry, and that Jenna said she “needed Sherry to die
soon but preferably after Christmas.” Cho said she reported the
conversation to Adult Protective Services because, as Sherry’s
caregiver, she felt obligated to report potential abuse. Cho
admitted she called the sheriff’s department “probably 15 times”
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because she was worried about Sherry’s safety. She said she
would like to work with Sherry again but would not return to the
home unless invited. Cho testified the restraining order had
barred her from continuing to work as a home care aide, and that
a permanent order would make her unemployable in that field.
During Cho’s testimony, the court indicated it was not
interested in testimony about the revocation of Jenna’s power of
attorney. The court stated, “I’m not interested in the estate
documents,” and said, “I’m not going to restrain her because she
had that document.” In addition, when Cho addressed the
allegation in the petition that Cho had written a $5,000 check to
her husband from Sherry’s bank account, testifying that Sherry’s
bookkeeper had issued the check to reimburse her for an injury at
work, the court noted it had not “heard any evidence that there
was money stolen,” and Jenna’s counsel indicated the issue was
not relevant to the proceedings. In addition, the court cut off
Cho’s counsel’s attempt to question Cho about the purported
allegation in the petition that Cho had left Sherry alone for 30
hours; the court indicated it did not believe there was any
evidence that had happened.
After Cho’s testimony, the court asked Cho’s counsel why
the restraining order should not issue. Cho’s counsel argued that
the request for restraining order was based on three grounds:
“the wrongful appropriation of trust,” “the stealing of the $5,000,”
and “the abandonment of Sherry for 30 hours. That never
happened.” Counsel was then in the middle of stating “I’ve also
got a witness to testify that –” when the court said, “I’m not
interested in those –.” Cho’s counsel then continued his
argument, ending with, “And that’s it.”
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The court pronounced its ruling orally, finding Jenna had
demonstrated that Cho harassed Sherry and would continue to go
to her home absent a restraining order. Cho’s counsel did not
object that Cho had another witness to present or make an offer
of proof, but instead stated, “I would ask the court to not issue
the order because she’s made representations to the court under
oath that she would not go back nor contact her unless invited.”
The court responded, “I heard that, but I wasn’t convinced,” and
concluded the hearing.
The court issued a one-year restraining order, set to expire
in February 2025. Cho timely appealed.
In January 2025 Jenna requested a renewal of the order,
and the court issued a temporary restraining order. However, in
July, Jenna withdrew the request, and the court dissolved the
temporary restraining order.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards and Standard of Review
Under section 15657.03, an elder (defined as a California
resident 65 years of age or older) who has suffered abuse may
seek a protective order “enjoining a party from abusing,
intimidating, . . . harassing, telephoning, . . . contacting, either
directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a
specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of, the petitioner.”
(§§ 15657.03, subds. (a)(1), (b)(5)(A), 15610.27.) An elder’s
attorney-in-fact acting within the authority of a power of attorney
is authorized to seek a restraining order on behalf of the elder.
(§ 15657.03, subd. (a)(1).)
“ ‘Abuse of an elder’ ” includes “[p]hysical abuse, neglect,
abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with
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resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering.”
(§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(1).) “[U]nder section 15610.07,
subdivision (a)(1), ‘treatment’ that is neither physical abuse,
neglect, abandonment, isolation nor abduction, can constitute
elder abuse if the treatment results in ‘physical harm or pain or
mental suffering.’ ” (Darrin v. Miller (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 450,
456.) “Mental suffering” is defined as “fear, agitation, confusion,
severe depression, or other forms of serious emotional distress
that is brought about by forms of intimidating behavior, threats,
[or] harassment.” (§ 15610.53.) Abuse of an elder also includes
financial abuse. (§§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(3), 15610.30,
subd. (a)(1).)
“Elder abuse protective orders are reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and the factual findings necessary to support such
orders are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Herren v. George
S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 410, 427-28; accord, Bookout v. Nielsen
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137.) The trial court’s evidentiary
rulings are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Meeks v.
Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 861.) “The trial court’s
‘discretion is only abused where there is a clear showing [it]
exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being
considered.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Mootness
The restraining order against Cho expired in February
2025. Although Jenna initially sought to renew the order, she
later withdrew the request, and the court dissolved the
temporary order. Thus, the restraining order is no longer in
effect.
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“ ‘It is well settled that an appellate court will decide only
actual controversies and that a live appeal may be rendered moot
by events occurring after the notice of appeal was filed.’ ”
(Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 852, 866.) “ ‘If relief granted by the trial court is
temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can
be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.’ ” (City of
Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079; see
San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550,
564 [“Ordinarily, an appeal from an expired restraining order is
moot because the appellate court cannot grant any effective relief
from an expired order.”]; see Newman v. Casey (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 359, 376.)
However, given the particular circumstances here, we
conclude Cho’s appeal is not moot despite the expiration of the
restraining order. “The information ‘on a protective order
relating to elder or dependent adult abuse . . .’ must be
transmitted to law enforcement, either the Department of Justice
or a local law enforcement agency authorized by the Department
of Justice to enter orders into the California Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (CLETS). (§ 15657.03, subd. (p)(1),
(3)(A)-(B).)” (Newman v. Casey, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 381.)
Cho testified that if the court issued a permanent restraining
order, she “will never be able to be a caregiver ever again.” On
appeal, she argues that as long as this restraining order remains
on her record, “she will continue to suffer from the loss of her
entire profession . . . as a caregiver, thus unendingly
perpetuating the infliction of unending damages upon her.” Due
to the potential collateral implications for Cho’s livelihood in the
healthcare field in which she works, we conclude her appeal is
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not moot. (See San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S., supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 564 [appeal from expired restraining order
not moot where appellant “asserts that as a result of the
restraining order, he faces an investigation by the Ohio State Bar
where he is currently licensed and in good standing” and because
“he will now be listed in a database alerting law enforcement he
is a potential threat”]; see also In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042
[parent’s challenge to dependency court’s jurisdiction findings is
not moot when the parent shows that the challenged allegation is
one that an agency must report for inclusion in the Child Abuse
Central Index].)
C. Merits
Cho contends that in granting the elder abuse restraining
order protecting Sherry, the trial court “dismisse[d] cavalierly
and ignore[d]” Cho’s counsel’s statement that he had another
witness to call, “thus preventing [Cho] from presenting her full
defense as is her constitutional right re due process under the
l4th Amendment.” She contends this “key witness” was needed
to corroborate that Cho is a person who tells the truth and to
refute the three allegations on which the petition for a
restraining order were based.
“[A] party’s opportunity to call witnesses to testify and to
proffer admissible evidence is central to having his or her day in
court.” (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357.)
At the same time, however, “ ‘[i]t is . . . well established that
courts have . . . inherent power to control litigation before
them. . . . “. . . That inherent power entitles trial courts to
exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with
pending litigation . . . in order to insure the orderly
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administration of justice.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1351; see Rutherford v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [“Courts have
inherent power to control litigation before them.”].) Application
of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly
infringe on a party’s constitutional rights. (See People v. Cudjo
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
961, 969.)
Even if a witness’s testimony was erroneously excluded,
reversal is warranted only if the error resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. (Evid. Code, § 354; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Cho
must demonstrate it is reasonably probable that, but for the
error, she would have obtained a more favorable result. (See
Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800; 640
Octavia LLC v. Walston (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 861, 869.) “ ‘[A]
“probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not,
but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract
possibility.’ ” (Cassim, at p. 800.)
Further, in order for an appellate court to reverse a
decision for the erroneous exclusion of evidence, “[t]he substance,
purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence” must have been
“made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of
proof, or by any other means,” unless the court’s rulings made
this impossible. (Evid. Code, § 354, subds. (a), (b); see Shaw v.
County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 282 [failure to
make adequate offer of proof generally precludes appellate review
of ruling on excluded evidence].)
Cho has not met her burden to show that the superior court
committed reversible error in failing to allow Cho to present her
second witness. First, while Cho now contends she intended to
call Judy D., the co-trustee for Sherry along with Jenna, Cho has
11
not demonstrated that she ever identified Judy as the second
witness she wished to call.4 Second, and more importantly, Cho
failed to make an offer of proof of the proposed testimony by this
witness. Although Cho’s counsel was in the middle of stating he
had a witness to testify when the court interrupted him, it is
unclear from the record if the court even heard or understood
Cho’s counsel to be requesting to call another witness. Cho’s
counsel did not follow up and request that the court permit him
to call another witness, and did not put on the record the subject
of the witness’s proposed testimony. Rather, Cho’s counsel
suggested he was done with the presentation of evidence on
behalf of Cho, stating, “And that’s it.” Thus, Cho failed to make a
proper record that would justify reversal of the restraining order.
(See Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a); Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz,
supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 282.)
In any event, the subjects of Judy’s intended testimony
were not germane to the narrow ground on which the court
issued the restraining order: Cho’s return to Sherry’s home after
being terminated and likelihood that she would do so again. Cho
contends her witness would have refuted the allegations in
Jenna’s petition about Cho’s reports to the sheriff and Adult
Protective Services, the allegedly fraudulent revocation of
Jenna’s power of attorney, and the alleged theft of funds from
Sherry’s checking account. But the court made plain it would not
and did not issue the restraining order based on any of that
alleged conduct. As such, the witness’s testimony would have
added nothing material to the court’s analysis, and it was not an
4 Although the opening brief refers to a declaration from
Judy corroborating that she was present at the restraining order
hearing, no such declaration is in the record.
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abuse of discretion to exclude it. Moreover, Cho has not
demonstrated she suffered prejudice from the exclusion of the
witness. (See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 800 [reversible error for exclusion of witness requires showing
of miscarriage of justice, which occurs “ ‘ “only when the court,
‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’
is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error” ’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Sherry shall recover her costs (if
any) on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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