CourtListener 10775020•People v. Ambriz CA2/4
Texte intégral
Filed 9/25/25 P. v. Ambriz CA2/4
Review denied 1/14/26; reposted with Supreme Court order and statement
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B336232
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA376570)
v.
FREDDY AMBRIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Renee Korn Judge. Remanded with
instructions, affirmed in all other respects.
John Patrick Dwyer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Freddy Ambriz was convicted of murder in 2011.
He was resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.751 in
2023, and he appealed. He asserts that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a continuance of the resentencing
hearing, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel,
and that the court incorrectly calculated his custody credits. The
People assert no error as to Ambriz’s first two contentions, but
concede that the court’s award of custody credits was erroneous.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with
respect to defense counsel’s request for a continuance, and that
Ambriz was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. We
agree with the parties that the calculation of custody credits was
erroneous. We therefore remand the matter for recalculation of
Ambriz’s custody credits, and otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and previous sentence
Ambriz and his brother were convicted of the July 2010
murder of Shaquana Watson. (People v. Ambriz (Sept. 6, 2013,
B238305 [nonpub. opn.] (Ambriz I).) In 2011, a jury found both
defendants guilty of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and
found true the special allegation that the crime was committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
As to Ambriz, the jury found true the allegation that a principal
personally used a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). (Ambriz I, supra.) Ambriz
admitted three prior serious or violent felony convictions and
prison terms.
1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
The trial court sentenced Ambriz to 82 years to life,
consisting of 25 years to life, doubled, for the murder; a 25-year
firearm use enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivisions (d) and (e)(1); and seven years for the prior
convictions and prison terms. The court also imposed and stayed
a section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) 10-year enhancement.
(Ibid.) This court affirmed the conviction, but struck the section
186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) enhancement. (Ibid.)
In March 2017, the trial court granted Ambriz’s petition for
habeas corpus under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155. The
People elected to not re-try Ambriz, and instead accepted a
judgment of second degree murder. The trial court modified
Ambriz’s sentence to 62 years to life, calculated as 15 years to life
on the murder count, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law;
25 years for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (d) and (e)(1); five years pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a)(1); and two years pursuant to section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
In February 2019, Ambriz sought resentencing under
former section 1170.95. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied his petition. This court affirmed that order.
(People v. Ambriz (Nov. 7, 2022, B317778) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Resentencing under section 1172.75
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the court that Ambriz may be
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. As relevant here,
section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that sentence
enhancements imposed prior to January 1, 2020 under section
667.5, subdivision (b) are invalid. Section 1172.75, subdivision
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(c)(2) states that review and resentencing under the statute
“shall be completed” “[b]y December 31, 2023.”
On June 28, 2023, the court appointed counsel, Daniel A.
Nardoni, for Ambriz. On August 31, 2023, the court granted
defense counsel’s oral motion for a continuance; according to the
minute order, “The court states no further continuances.” The
court set the resentencing hearing for October 3, 2023. At the
October 3 hearing, the court continued the matter to December 1
“for further status on petition.” On December 1, the court set the
resentencing hearing for December 12, 2023.
At the December 12 hearing, the court noted that Ambriz
had not submitted a sentencing memorandum, and Nardoni
confirmed he had not filed one. When the court asked if he would
like to be heard, Nardoni stated that it was a “waste of everyone’s
time to seek resentencing in a situation like this unless the court
and [the People have] the C-file,” referring to Ambriz’s central file
from CDCR. Nardoni said he “just received the C-file in early
November,” while he was in trial, and he had “not had the time . .
. to file any pleading papers” due to the trial. Nardoni noted that
the court believed resentencing must be completed by December
31, 2023 based on the language of the statute. Nardoni said he
disagreed with that interpretation, and that resentencing could
be completed in 2024. He further stated that he had learned only
that day that Ambriz’s first-degree murder conviction had been
reduced to second degree. He continued,
“So we’re talking 15 to life times two is 30 to
life with the allegations. Stiff sentence but for a
horrible crime. I suppose, based on what I said
moments ago, I would like to file a brief. I can’t have
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it done by December 31st because I’ll be in [trial] for
about six weeks.
“And if the court is of the opinion, as you’ve
stated in the past, that the case must go forward,
then so be it. If I must go forward today, I can offer to
the court that in my review of the lengthy C-file, Mr.
Ambriz -- Freddy Ambriz has no history in the penal
institution of violence, no record of any possession of
any weapons, things of this sort. I think that’s an
important consideration, particularly on a crime of
violation [sic]. It’s an important consideration for the
court to be aware of before the court passes judgment
on the resentencing.”
Nardoni asked that a prior strike be stricken, “and the
other allegations fall by the wayside as well.” He continued, “The
bottom line, your honor, based upon his fine record, I’m asking
that Freddy Ambriz be sentenced or remain with the sentence of
15 to life, and that would be it.”
The court stated, “You’ve had that C-file since November. I
am more than happy to put this on December 29th if you’d like or
December 28th. You can appear via Webex video so you can
highlight what he’s done in state prison.” The court also noted
that the “C-file is only part of the picture,” and that the most
compelling cases are the ones in which “defendants have actually
gotten degrees, have really made the best of their world while
they’re in state prison.”
Nardoni responded, “I have the C-file. I have gone through
it, and I don’t think I can offer any more, December 28th or 29th,
than what I’m offering you today.” He noted that Ambriz has
“done well in prison,” and said, “And so I don’t feel I can offer
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anything more than what I’m stating to you today in asking for a
second chance, and 15 to life is still a harsh sentence, but, of
course, the court has the discretion. I’ll submit and defer to your
honor.” The People asked the court to strike only the sentences
for the priors invalidated by section 1172.75.
The court resentenced Ambriz to a total term of 60 years to
life. It declined to strike Ambriz’s prior convictions, noting that
the court also had declined to do so in earlier sentencings. The
court noted its discretion to strike the enhancement under section
12022.53, and declined to exercise that discretion. The court
awarded Ambriz 461 days of custody credit.
Ambriz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ambriz asserts three arguments on appeal. First, he
contends the court erred by denying defense counsel’s request for
a continuance to submit briefing based on Ambriz’s C-file.
Second, he contends his federal due process right to effective
assistance of counsel was violated. Finally, Ambriz argues that
the court was required to calculate custody credits up to the date
of the resentencing hearing, and the court erred by failing to do
so. The People assert there was no error with respect to the first
two contentions, but concede the matter should be remanded for
correction of Ambriz’s custody credits. We consider each of these
issues in turn.
A. Continuance
Ambriz contends the trial court erred by treating the
December 31 deadline in section 1172.75, subdivision (c)(2) as
mandatory rather than directory, and by denying defense
counsel’s request for a continuance based on that mistaken belief.
The People assert that the court did offer a continuance to
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December 28 or 29 but defense counsel refused it, and defense
counsel offered no good cause for a further continuance. The
People also argue that any error was harmless.
“A continuance in a criminal case may be granted only for
good cause. (§ 1050, subd. (e).) Whether good cause exists is a
question for the trial court’s discretion.” (People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 450; see also People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th
907, 920 (Beames) [“the decision whether or not to grant a
continuance of a matter rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court”].) “[A] trial court may not exercise its discretion over
continuances so as to deprive the defendant or his attorneys of a
reasonable opportunity to prepare.” (People v. Snow (2003) 30
Cal.4th 43, 70.)
We review a trial court’s denial of a continuance request for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th
442, 508.) “The party challenging a ruling on a continuance
bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion, and an
order denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked.”
(Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 920.) “Under this state law
standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the
bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (Ibid.)
Ambriz argues that the court could not have properly
exercised its discretion regarding granting defense counsel’s
request for a continuance because it mistakenly believed that
resentencing was required to be completed by December 31, 2023.
He asserts that contrary to the trial court’s belief, the deadline in
section 1172.75, subdivision (c)(2) was directory rather than
mandatory. (See, e.g., People v. Cota (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
1118, 1131; Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 858-859.)
Ambriz argues that a court that is unaware of the scope of its
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discretion cannot exercise informed discretion. (See, e.g., People
v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 774.)
The People assert that no such error occurred, because the
trial court did not deny Ambriz’s request for a continuance.
Rather, the trial court offered defense counsel a shorter
continuance than counsel requested, which counsel declined. We
agree with the People.
At the December 12 hearing, Nardoni said he received
Ambriz’s C-file in early November and had looked through it. He
said he would like to file a brief, but if the court believed “the
case must go forward, then so be it.” Nardoni stated that based
on the C-file, “Freddy Ambriz has no history in the penal
institution of violence, no record of any possession of any
weapons, things of this sort.” When the court offered a
continuance to December 28 or 29 so Nardoni could “highlight
what [Ambriz has] done in state prison,” Nardoni declined,
stating, “I have the C-file. I have gone through it, and I don’t
think I can offer any more, December 28th or 29th, than what I’m
offering you today.”
Thus, the court did not decline counsel’s request for a
continuance; rather, it offered a shorter continuance than defense
counsel would have preferred. The denial of a continuance
cannot be error where there was no denial.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the court’s ruling
could be construed as a denial of counsel’s request for a
continuance, we find no abuse of discretion. The offer of a
continuance to December 28 or 29 did not “deprive the defendant
or his attorneys of a reasonable opportunity to prepare.” (People
v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 70.) Nardoni did not provide
good cause for a further continuance; rather, he said that with
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additional time he could offer no new information to the court.
He stated that he would prefer to file a written brief, but he also
made clear that he had reviewed the C-file and was aware of its
contents, and he did not state that a written brief would provide
any additional information to the court that he was unable to
convey orally. Notably, Ambriz does not suggest on appeal that
any relevant information was excluded from the hearing or that a
written brief would have provided the trial court with
information unavailable at the December 12 hearing. “[A]ll
circumstances being considered” (Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p.
920), Ambriz has not established that the court’s ruling exceeded
the bounds of reason.
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Ambriz further asserts that he had a federal due process
right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing
hearing. He argues that he was “denied effective representation
as a result of the court’s decision not to continue the hearing past
December 31.” We are not persuaded.
“‘[O]nly an unreasoning and arbitrary “insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay”
violates the right to the assistance of counsel.’” (People v.
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 934.) Thus, when a trial court
“acted reasonably and within its broad discretion in denying the
continuance,” the ruling does not violate the federal
constitutional right to competent representation. (Id. at pp. 935-
936.)
Here, there was neither a “justifiable request for delay” nor
“an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness.”
Because we find no abuse of discretion, Ambriz’s right to the
effective assistance of counsel was not violated.
9
C. Custody credit
The parties agree the trial court erred in its calculation of
Ambriz’s custody credits. The court awarded custody credit of
461 days, the amount of custody credit listed on Ambriz’s original
abstract of judgment from January 11, 2012. We agree this was
error.
“[W]hen a prison term already in progress is modified . . . ,
the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the
modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already
served.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29; see also
People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 396 [“resentencing
courts must recalculate actual time served”], § 2900.5, subd. (d)
[“It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine
the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody
prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited
pursuant to this section. The total number of days to be credited
shall be contained in the abstract of judgment provided for in
Section 1213.”].)
Ambriz and the People assert that the matter should be
remanded for the trial court to recalculate Ambriz’s custody
credits and amend the abstract of judgment accordingly. We
agree this is the appropriate remedy.
10
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court to recalculate
Ambriz’s custody credits; the court shall amend the abstract of
judgment accordingly. The clerk shall forward a copy of the
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
11
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four - No. B336232
S293792
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
____________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FREDDY AMBRIZ, Defendant and Appellant.
____________________________________________________________
The petition for review is denied.
(See Concurring Statement by Justice Liu)
_______________/s/_______________
Chief Justice
THE PEOPLE v. AMBRIZ
S293792
Concurring Statement by Justice Liu
Petitioner Freddy Ambriz was convicted in 2011 of murder
and sentenced with a variety of enhancements, including two
prior prison term enhancements. The Legislature subsequently
restricted the use of these prior prison term enhancements. (See
Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, p. 5235; Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3,
pp. 9077–9078.) In what is now Penal Code section 1172.75, the
Legislature provided a process for recalling and resentencing
defendants whose original sentences included prior prison term
enhancements that are now unlawful. The Legislature
instructed the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to
identify defendants eligible for recall and resentencing by
certain dates (March 1, 2022 for some individuals, then July 1,
2022 for others). (Pen. Code, § 1172.75, subd. (b).) In turn,
courts in receipt of this information are ordered to resentence
eligible defendants on a specified timetable — by October 1,
2022 for specific individuals, then by December 31, 2023 for the
remaining eligible defendants. (Id., subd. (c).)
Ambriz’s resentencing hearing took place December 12,
2023. His counsel sought a continuance until after the new year
because counsel had been and would continue to be in trials,
preventing him from preparing a sentencing memorandum. The
trial court offered a continuance until December 29, but it
apparently thought it could not resentence Ambriz after the
December 31 deadline. Deciding that the two-and-a-half-week
continuance would not allow him to write the memorandum,
1
PEOPLE v. AMBRIZ
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review
Ambriz’s counsel submitted the issue after brief oral comments.
The court ultimately sentenced Ambriz to 60 years to life after
striking his now-unlawful prior prison term enhancements.
Ambriz appealed, arguing, among other points, that the
trial court abused its discretion because it proceeded on the
erroneous belief that it could not resentence Ambriz after the
December 31, 2023 deadline. (People v. Ambriz (B336232, Sept.
25, 2025) [nonpub. opn.].) The Court of Appeal declined to
address that argument. Instead, it concluded that the trial court
never denied Ambriz a continuance and that Ambriz lacked good
cause for a longer continuance because his attorney did not have
additional material to raise beyond what he said in court. (Ibid.)
On this record, I concur with today’s decision to deny Ambriz’s
petition for review, however nothing appears to preclude him
from developing the factual record through a writ of habeas
corpus and then seeking relief for ineffective assistance of
counsel. (See People v. Guevara (2025) 338 Cal.Rptr.3d 625,
631–632; People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 829, 837–
839.)
In addition, I note that Ambriz has raised an important
legal question: whether trial courts may resentence defendants
after the December 31, 2023 deadline. We have long observed
that failure to follow statutory procedures does not necessarily
invalidate a subsequent governmental action. (See, e.g., People
v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 958.) Where failing to follow the
statutory process has that “invalidating effect,” then the statute
is “mandatory”; otherwise, it is merely “directory.” (Ibid.) “In
California, it is not uncommon for obligatory statutory
provisions to be accorded only directory effect.” (City of Santa
Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 924.) Indeed, the
statute does not appear to penalize noncompliance and instead
2
PEOPLE v. AMBRIZ
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review
offers an entitlement to defined individuals; it is hard to imagine
why the Legislature would have wanted the deadline to bar
relief to defendants affected by sentencing enhancements that
are now “legally invalid.” (Pen. Code, § 1172.75, subd. (a); see
People v. Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 909–910.) Notably, the
Court of Appeal in People v. Cota (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1118,
1129–1131, review granted October 1, 2025, S292637, relied on
analogous reasons to conclude that the deadlines in section
1172.75, subdivision (b) — about the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation’s obligation to timely notify courts of eligible
defendants — were directory rather than mandatory. Whether
the deadlines in section 1172.75, subdivision (c) are similarly
directory rather than mandatory is an important question that
may call for our attention in a future case.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
3
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