Project 7 Security Group v. Johnson CA2/5

CourtListener 10775015Calctapp15 janv. 2026

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Filed 1/15/26 Project 7 Security Group v. Johnson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

PROJECT 7 SECURITY GROUP B341446
et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No.
23STCV24878)
v.

MICHAEL JOHNSON,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
The Fullman Firm, Adam C. Fullman, Christopher J.
Peters, and Sam Dehbozorgi for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Michael Johnson, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Respondent.
We know defendant and respondent Michael Johnson
(Johnson) sued his former employer, plaintiff and appellant
Project 7 Security Group, and its principal, plaintiff and
appellant Brandon Gatewood (collectively, plaintiffs). We know
Johnson obtained a default judgment. We do not know many of
the details of this earlier action, however, because of the sparse
record plaintiffs has provided on appeal.
Nearly four years after Johnson obtained the default
judgment, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the judgment
claiming improper service. (That motion is not included in the
appellate record we have been given.) The trial court appears to
have heard that motion and denied it, but the appellate record
includes no record of what transpired at that hearing—not even a
minute order.
Notwithstanding the denial of their motion to vacate the
judgment, plaintiffs persisted: they filed an independent lawsuit
to vacate the same judgment. Johnson moved to dismiss that
lawsuit, arguing it was frivolous and attempted to “re-litigate”
the very same issue the court had earlier decided in denying
plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the default judgment. Accompanying
Johnson’s motion was a declaration that stated, without
elaboration, that he “provided evidence” when successfully
opposing plaintiffs’ motion to vacate.
The trial court granted Johnson’s motion to dismiss. Once
again, we have no transcript of the hearing on Johnson’s motion
because plaintiffs have not provided one (nor have they provided
a settled statement or other adequate substitute). So, we do not
know what was argued, what may have been conceded, and what
testimony may have been presented. We do have, however, a
subsequently issued minute order that does not detail what

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happened at the hearing on Johnson’s motion to dismiss but does
present the court’s written ruling on the motion after having
taken the matter under submission.
The minute order states that the court previously denied
plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the default judgment (with a different
judge presiding) and expressly found that service was proper.
With that background, the trial court found plaintiffs’ lawsuit
barred by issue preclusion principles. In so finding, the court
rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on a Court of Appeal decision, Groves
v. Peterson (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 659, that holds a denial of a
motion to vacate a judgment generally has no preclusive effect on
a later lawsuit in equity—but does have that preclusive effect
when “the record of the prior proceedings shows the moving party
was in fact given a hearing on the motion that was the equivalent
of a trial with oral testimony.” (Id. at 668 [citing Darlington v.
Basalt Rock Co. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 706, a case Groves
characterizes as holding that preclusion applies where a “judge
held hearing, made clear the court did not restrict the party to
affidavits, interrogated a witness, and gave [the] party [the] full
opportunity to develop the issues by oral testimony”].) The trial
court found Groves was no bar to dismissal in this case,
reasoning: “[T]he record discloses that [plaintiffs] had the
opportunity in the underlying case to fully brief the issues
relevant to the motion to set aside, to submit evidence in the form
of declarations and documentary evidence, [and to] provide oral
argument in [a] hearing before the trial court. As such, the
record discloses that [p]laintiff[s] had the opportunity to develop
[their] case, and, thus, the issue of the validity of the service of
process was fully litigated and decided. [¶] In sum, applying
[issue preclusion] promotes judicial economy in these

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circumstances where [p]laintiff[s] presented all the evidence
[they] wanted to present and provides repose and finality to
[Johnson], who first obtained [the] default judgment in October
2019. Moreover, it avoids an unjust result which would result
from application of the general rule set forth in Groves.”
The appellate record plaintiffs have given us is inadequate
to countermand the trial court’s finding. (See, e.g.,
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“‘A judgment or order of
the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This
is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an
ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error’”].)
We have no record of what happened in connection with
plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the default judgment. We even have
no record of what transpired during the hearing held on
Johnson’s motion to dismiss. We have only the trial court’s
finding that issue preclusion applies because plaintiffs “presented
all the evidence [they] wanted to present” at the earlier motion to
vacate hearing.1 Thus, while there may be a future case that

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Justice Hoffstadt opines “Johnson did not show that
[plaintiffs] actually presented oral testimony at the motion to
vacate hearing or that it had the ‘full opportunity’ to present oral
testimony . . . .” To support that assertion, he cites Johnson’s
declaration and—oddly (when it is plaintiffs who have the burden
of providing a record warranting reversal)—the absence of other
evidence in the record. Evidence, however, can be presented and
considered at a hearing (and points can be conceded) even if not
in a written declaration, and we have no idea what happened at
either of the key hearings in this case. Recognizing this, Justice

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compels a closer examination of Groves’s summary of precedent,
this case is not it given the deficits in the record. Even under the
principles as articulated in Groves, a finding of issue preclusion is
unassailable on this record. (Groves, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at
667-668 [“As explained in the Supreme Court’s early case and
reiterated in the recent case in this line, the reason for [the rule
that a decision on a prior motion to vacate a default judgment is
generally not preclusive in a later suit in equity] is: in the motion
procedure the moving party is limited to presenting ex parte
affidavits of voluntary witnesses, unless the trial court in its
discretion permits a greater latitude”], italics added].)

Hoffstadt is forced to assert the trial court “‘departed from the
Groves decision’” and applied an “incorrect legal
standard . . . other than Groves.” That is not a fair
characterization of trial court’s ruling. The court discusses
Groves in detail and identifies what everyone agrees is the key
issue, writing: “[A]ccording to Groves, whether or not
[p]laintiff[s’] claim here is barred by [issue preclusion] turns on
additional factors concerning the degree to which [p]laintiff[s]
w[ere] able to adjudicate the motion to vacate in the underlying
judgment.” As we know, the ruling then finds “that this case falls
into the category of cases which are exceptions from the general
rule” as articulated in Groves.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Defendant is awarded
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

I concur:

KIM (D.), J.

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Project 7 Security Group et al. v. Johnson, B341446

HOFFSTADT, P. J., Dissenting.

The record presented in this appeal is undeniably “sparse”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2), but it still establishes that the trial
court erred in granting Michael Johnson’s (Johnson) motion to
dismiss the independent, equitable action brought by Project 7
Security Group and Brandon Gatewood (collectively, Project 7) to
vacate the default judgment Johnson previously obtained.
Although the doctrine of issue preclusion generally
“prevents relitigation of previously decided issues” between the
same parties (e.g., DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61
Cal.4th 813, 824-825), a “long line” of California cases originating
with our Supreme Court holds that the “denial of an earlier
motion to vacate a default judgment does not collaterally estop
[that is, does not trigger the doctrine of issue preclusion as to] a
subsequent independent equitable action seeking the same relief”
(California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, 224
(Hoehn)) unless “the record of the prior [motion to vacate]
proceedings shows the moving party was in fact given a hearing
on the motion [to vacate] equivalent of a trial with oral
testimony” (Groves v. Peterson (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 659, 668
(Groves)). A motion to vacate hearing is the equivalent of a trial
with oral testimony only if (1) the person “attacking the [default]
judgment” actually presented oral testimony at the hearing
(Groves, at p. 668) or (2) the record “ma[kes] clear” that the
person attacking the default judgment “was not restrict[ed],” at
the hearing, to presenting only documentary evidence and had a
“full opportunity at [that] hearing to develop the issues by oral
testimony” (Darlington v. Basalt Rock Co. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d
706, 709-710; Sarten v. Pomatto (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 288, 300-
301 [looking to “proof as to the manner in which th[e] motion [to
vacate] was considered]; Rohrbasser v. Lederer (1986) 179
Cal.App.3d 290, 298).
The record on appeal here shows that Johnson did not
carry his burden of showing the trial court that Project 7—as the
party attacking the default judgment—either presented oral
testimony at the motion to vacate hearing or was given the full
opportunity to do so during those proceedings. (Pacific Lumber
Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921,
943 [party asserting issue preclusion has the burden of showing
its application].) The only evidence Johnson provided in support
of his motion to dismiss was his own declaration, stating that he
“provided evidence” in opposing Project 7’s motion to vacate;
neither his declaration nor any other evidence in the record
speaks to what Project 7 presented or was permitted to present at
the hearing. While Johnson’s evidence in support of his motion to
dismiss sufficiently supports the finding in the trial court’s
dismissal order that “Project 7 had the opportunity [] to fully
brief the issues relevant to the motion to [vacate], to submit
evidence in the form of declarations and documentary evidence,
[and to] provide oral argument in hearing before the trial court,”
Johnson did not show that Project 7 actually presented oral
testimony at the motion to vacate hearing or that it had the “full
opportunity” to present oral testimony—and that is what matters
for purposes of barring Project 7’s independent action.

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To be sure, the trial court went on to say that “the record
discloses that [Project 7] had the opportunity to develop its case,”
but this finding—even if construed as an implicit finding that
Project 7 had the opportunity to present oral testimony at the
motion to vacate hearing—is not supported by any evidence in
the record. While appellate courts must construe the record in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773) and “presume[]” a trial court’s order
is “correct” when “the record is silent” (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564), this standard of review is not so
malleable as to justify affirmance from a partially silent record
when the trial court is applying the incorrect legal standard, such
that the evidence presumed to exist in the record does not
support affirmance under the correct standard. In my view, that
is the case here. Groves supplies the correct legal standard, but
the trial court was refreshingly up front in admitting that its
analysis “departed from the Groves decision,” and in explaining
that it was willing to depart because Groves, in its view,
“seriously undermine[d] several other vital public policy
interests” and led to what the court viewed as an “unjust result.”
However valid those views of Groves’ wisdom may be, it is not the
place of this court to entertain them because Groves is grounded
in a 1906 Supreme Court case (see Estudillo v. Security Loan &
Trust Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 556, 564-565) and because Groves was
reaffirmed by our Supreme Court as recently as 2024 (Hoehn,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 224). More to the point, the presumption
that the silent record contains all the evidence necessary to
support a ruling under a standard other than Groves does not

3
mean that the record contains all the evidence necessary to
support a ruling under Groves.
I accordingly dissent.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

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