CourtListener 10774022•People v. Mitchell CA2/7
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Filed 1/13/26 P. v. Mitchell CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B340950
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA049816)
v.
CORREY MITCHELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher W. Dybwad, Judge. Dismissed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Correy Mitchell appeals after the trial court did not
respond to a letter from a correctional case records manager at
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) advising the court that the amended abstract of
judgment for Mitchell’s sentence may be in error or incomplete.
We appointed counsel to represent Mitchell on appeal. After
reviewing the record on appeal, counsel for Mitchell filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 that did
not identify any arguable issues. After independently reviewing
the record and the contentions in the two supplemental briefs
filed by Mitchell, we have not identified any either. We now
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. If Mitchell wishes to
file a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the increase
of his sentence upon his August 17, 2004 resentencing as
violating Penal Code former section 1170, subdivision (d)’s
prohibition on resentencing a defendant to a sentence that is
“greater than the initial sentence,” he should file that petition in
superior court and make that specific argument.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Robbery1
On August 21, 2003, Mitchell entered a restaurant in
Beverly Hills, pointed a gun at the manager, and declared he was
robbing the restaurant. Mitchell herded the manager and five
other employees into the restaurant’s office at gunpoint. The
manager triggered the silent alarm as he entered the office.
1 The factual background of this case is taken from the
published opinion on Mitchell’s direct appeal. (See People v.
Mitchell (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1210.)
2
Once everyone was in the office, Mitchell blocked the
room’s only entrance with his body while holding his gun.
Mitchell ordered the manager to open the safe and to empty its
contents into a takeout bag bearing the restaurant’s name. When
the manager did not move quickly enough, Mitchell struck him
on the back of the head with his gun.
After the manager placed the cash from the safe into the
takeout bag, Mitchell told the employees, “Please don’t follow me
or I’ll kill you. Stay in the office.” Mitchell then left the
restaurant with the takeout bag containing approximately $1,400
from the safe.
B. The Carjacking
A few minutes later, Benjamin Fish was in his red Honda
Civic when Mitchell, wearing a baby-blue plaid button-down
shirt, approached and motioned to Fish to roll down the window.
Fish complied, and Mitchell then pointed a gun at his head and
ordered him to get out of the car. When Fish struggled to do so,
Mitchell threatened to kill him. Once Fish exited the car,
Mitchell got in and drove away.
C. The Police Pursuit
A few minutes later, a police officer spotted Fish’s car and
notified police dispatch he had found the stolen vehicle. A police
pursuit ensued, during which Mitchell drove on the wrong side of
the street, ran red lights and stop signs, and drove through a
fence. While driving, Mitchell also fired his gun toward an
officer’s vehicle. The police eventually apprehended Mitchell and
took him into custody.
3
Inside the car, the police found a nine-millimeter
semiautomatic handgun, a loaded magazine for the gun, and an
expended shell casing. Nearby the police found a takeout bag
(bearing the restaurant’s name) that contained cash totaling
$1,442 and a bundled up plaid shirt.
D. Mitchell Is Sentenced to 191 Years to Life
Mitchell was charged by information with one count of
carjacking (Pen. Code,2 § 215, subd. (a); count 1); one count of
robbery (§ 211; count 2); five counts of assault with a
semiautomatic weapon (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 3, 5, 7, 9 & 11);
five counts of false imprisonment by violence (§ 236; counts 4, 6,
8, 10 & 12); one count of assault upon a peace officer with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (d)(2); count 13); and one
count of driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety of
persons or property while fleeing from pursuing police officer
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 14). It was alleged as to all
counts that Mitchell had previously been convicted of two serious
or violent felonies (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d))
and had two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning
of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), as to counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11,
and 13.
On March 24, 2004, the jury found Mitchell guilty on all
counts and found true the allegations that he had used a firearm
in the commission of the offenses. In a bifurcated proceeding, the
court found true the allegations that Mitchell had two prior
strike convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law.
2 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
4
On June 21, 2004, Mitchell was sentenced as a third strike
offender to a total of 191 years to life in state prison.
E. Mitchell Is Resentenced to 207 Years to Life
While Mitchell’s appeal from his conviction and sentence
was pending, on August 17, 2004, the trial court recalled his
sentence pursuant to former section 1170, subdivision (d).3
Former section 1170, subdivision (d), provided that “[w]hen a
defendant . . . has been sentenced to be imprisoned in the state
prison . . . , the court may, within 120 days of the date of
commitment on its own motion . . . recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in
the same manner as if he or she had not previously been
sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than
the initial sentence.” (Italics added.)
According to the trial court, new case law “changed the
calculus on a couple of counts wherein [Mitchell was] previously
sentenced. [¶] I was unclear that that was the course that was
going to be taken in the analysis by the Courts of Appeal in
interpreting the Supreme Court’s dicta, but it’s now readily
apparent to me that the sentencing that I imposed on three of the
counts have to be modified. All the original sentences will
remain the same except for three of the counts: counts 13, counts
1 and count 3. All will be sentenced pursuant to [section]
1170.12[, subdivision] (c)(2)(A)(III). [¶] . . . [¶] In accordance
3 “[A] trial court is not divested of its limited jurisdiction
under [former] section 1170, subdivision (d) to recall a sentence
for modification within 120 days of the defendant’s commitment
by the filing of an appeal notice.” (Portillo v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1829, 1836.)
5
with those, the court sentences the defendant as follows: On
count 13, pursuant to [section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A)(III)],
the [upper] term of nine years plus 20 years for the [section
12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancement], plus the ten years
pursuant to [the section 667, subdivision (a)] allegations equal 39
years as the base term. Plus the enhancement pursuant to
[section 12022.53, subdivision (c),] which is an additional 20
years, plus the two priors pursuant to [section 667, subdivision
(a),] at ten years for a total of 69 years on count 13 instead of the
previously imposed . . . sentence of 57 years. [¶] On count 1,
pursuant to the same code sections . . . the sentence is nine years
as the [upper] term, plus ten years pursuant to [section 12022.53,
subdivision (b)], plus the ten years for the two [section 667,
subdivision (a)] five-year prior enhancements for a total of 29
years. . . . [P]lus the [section 12022.53, subdivision (b)]
enhancement for a total of 39 years . . . instead of the 37
years . . . . [¶] On count 3 . . . [s]ame sentencing, nine years, plus
ten for the [section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement] plus
the [section 667, subdivision (a)] priors for another ten for a total
of 29 years . . . plus the [section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1)]
allegation for 39 years . . . instead of the 37 years.” The
sentences on the remaining counts were not changed (except the
court clarified that the sentences on counts 4, 7, 9, and 11 were
not stayed, as the minute order from the original sentencing
stated, but instead were to run concurrently).
As a result of the resentencing, Mitchell’s sentence
increased 16 years from 191 years to life to 207 years to life.
6
F. We Affirm on Appeal
On direct appeal from the judgment, we affirmed. (See
People v. Mitchell (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1210.) We rejected
Mitchell’s contention that admission at trial of a police dispatch
tape violated his right to confrontation under Crawford v.
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, as well as his claim that the trial
court’s imposition of upper terms and consecutive sentences
deprived him of the right to a jury trial as mandated by Blakely v.
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296. (Mitchell, at p. 1214.) We noted
that “[t]he court sentenced [Mitchell] to 191 years in state prison
as a ‘third strike’ offender,” and it does not appear that this court
or defense counsel on appeal were aware of the August 17, 2004
recall and resentencing pursuant to former section 1170,
subdivision (d), that increased Mitchell’s prison sentence from
191 to 207 years to life.
G. Letter from the CDCR and the Trial Court’s Denial of
Mitchell’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
On December 18, 2023, a correctional case records manager
for the CDCR sent a letter to the trial court indicating the
amended abstract of judgment “may be in error, or incomplete.”
The letter explained, “The amended Abstract of Judgment
reflects in Section 6 a total of 207 years to life, with the
possibility of parole on Counts 13, 1, 2, 3 and 14. However,
section 11 (other orders) breaks down the full 207 years but [it is]
unclear if the enhancements are included in the totals. Section 6
should reflect the individual term for each count without any
applicable enhancements. [¶] Also, the amended Abstract of
Judgment reflects in Section 2 Enhancements. We are unclear if
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these counts are part of a Determinate or Indeterminate
sentence.”
On May 13, 2024, Mitchell requested the trial court set a
hearing on the CDCR letter and requested the appointment of
counsel. Upon receiving no response, Mitchell filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus on August 26, 2024, contending
irregularities with the amended abstract of judgment prevented
him from obtaining relief based on the erroneous resentencing on
August 17, 2004. In part, he complained the amended abstract
bore an incorrect hearing date of June 21, 2004 (the date of the
original sentencing), instead of the correct date of August 17,
2004. He also complained that in resentencing him the court
failed “to include in the minute order that the judge used Penal
Code [former section 1170, subdivision (d),] to recall [Mitchell’s]
sentence.” Mitchell also claimed the trial court created a false
document “by altering the date of the resentencing” and then not
serving the amended abstract of judgment on the Court of
Appeal, which was unaware of the resentencing when it issued
its opinion.
On September 4, 2024, the trial court denied Mitchell’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court explained that this
issue could have been raised on direct appeal and that Mitchell
“is barred from raising an issue in a subsequent petition for
habeas corpus that could have been raised in an earlier petition.”
Mitchell appealed on September 6, 2024, “from the failure
of the Superior Court . . . to act on the request for recall of
sentence submitted on December 18, 2023,” by the CDCR.4
4 Mitchell’s notice of appeal does not purport to appeal from
the order denying his habeas petition, which is not appealable.
(See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; accord, People v.
8
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Mitchell in this appeal.
After reviewing the record, counsel did not identify any arguable
issues. On September 19, 2025, counsel advised Mitchell that he
was filing a brief stating he was unable to find any arguable
issues and that Mitchell could personally submit a supplemental
brief or letter brief stating any contentions he wanted the court to
consider. Thereafter, we directed appointed counsel to “send the
record of this appeal and a copy of [the Delgadillo] brief to
[Mitchell] immediately.”
A. Mitchell’s First Supplemental Brief
On October 3, 2025, Mitchell filed an 18-page supplemental
brief and attached a 2022 minute order from the Monterey
County Superior Court denying his petition for writ of habeas
corpus (filed while he was incarcerated in Monterey County)
wherein he claimed that the Salinas Valley State Prison
“improperly added 44 years to his sentence” and that his “proper
sentence should be 207 years to life, but staff changed his
sentence to 251 years to life.”5
In his supplemental brief, Mitchell contends the CDCR
letter “brought to light . . . the culmination of a 20-year
systematic cover-up involving document fraud, concealment of
constitutional violations, and denial of adequate appellate review
across multiple proceedings.” Specifically, Mitchell contends that
Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 979.)
5 The Monterey County Superior Court noted that the
petition for habeas corpus was moot because “[Mitchell] received
the relief he requested when staff corrected his sentence.”
9
when he was originally sentenced on June 21, 2004, he was given
a 191-year sentence and that the court illegally increased his
sentence to 207 years when it recalled his original sentence and
resentenced him on August 17, 2004. Mitchell contends the
increased sentence was systemically concealed by the trial court
from the appellate court and that he is now serving both
sentences in violation of his constitutional protection from double
jeopardy. According to Mitchell, both his original recalled
sentence and subsequent resentencing are void as a matter of law
and the trial court abused its discretion in failing to correct the
illegal sentence upon receiving the letter from the CDCR.
B. Mitchells’s Second Supplemental Brief
On October 9, 2025, Mitchell filed a nine-page “follow-up
supplemental brief” in order “to address critical threshold issues.”
Specifically, Mitchell argues that because his 207-year sentence
has never been reviewed by this court, this court should consider
this post-judgment appeal as a direct appeal under People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. As Mitchell argues, “[t]he 191-year
sentence was recalled under . . . section 1170[, subdivision] (d) on
August 17, 2004, making it legally void. Yet the Court of
Appeal’s 2005 opinion affirmed that recalled, void 191-year
sentence. . . . By the time the Court of Appeal issued its opinion,
the 191-year sentence no longer legally existed—it had been
recalled and replaced five months before appellant even filed his
notice of appeal.” Mitchell also claims he received multiple
duplicative enhancements under section 12022.53.
10
C. We Must Dismiss the Appeal Because There Is No
Appealable Order
The sole issue raised in the notice of appeal filed by
Mitchell is the trial court’s alleged “failure . . . to act on the
request for recall of sentence [pursuant to section 1172.1]
submitted on December 18, 2023” by the CDCR. However, if a
trial court, acting consistently with section 1172.1, never issues
an order on a request for resentencing under that statute, there
is no appealable order. (See People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696.) As we will discuss, the trial court was
not obligated to respond to the CDCR letter or to Mitchell’s
follow-up request for a hearing to address the letter, because
neither of those requests conferred jurisdiction on the court to
recall Mitchell’s sentence. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) Accordingly,
there is no appealable order, and Mitchell’s appeal must be
dismissed.
A court may modify a sentence only if the court “has
jurisdiction under section 1172.1 or another authorizing statute,
or by the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (People
v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 787 (Singleton).) As
pertinent here, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), provides:
“When a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been
committed to the custody of the Secretary of the [CDCR], the
court may, on its own motion, within 120 days of the date of
commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at
the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new
statutory authority or case law, [or] at any time upon the
recommendation of the secretary [of the CDCR] or the Board of
Parole Hearings[,][or] the district attorney of the county in which
the defendant was sentenced, . . . recall the sentence and
11
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in
the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced,
. . . provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the
initial sentence.”
As we recently explained in Singleton, a letter from a
CDCR case records manager informing the court that the
abstract of judgment for a defendant “ ‘ “may be in error” ’ ” is not
a “recommendation of the secretary” of the CDCR that the court
recall the sentence. (Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 788, 791-792 [“A correctional case records manager is not the
secretary,” and an invitation to determine whether a correction is
required is not a recommendation for recall and resentencing].)
Under section 1172.1, subdivision (a), such a letter from a CDCR
case records manager does not confer jurisdiction to recall the
sentence, even if a sentence was unauthorized. (Singleton, at
pp. 787, 790, 792-793.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
correct the judgment based on the letter from the case records
manager of the CDCR advising the court the abstract of
judgment “may be in error or incomplete.” And because the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to act on the letter from the CDCR case
records manager, it was not required to take any action in
response to the letter.
Nor did Mitchell’s request that the court set a hearing on
the CDCR’s letter confer jurisdiction on the court. Effective
January 1, 2024, the Legislature “added subdivision (c) to section
1172.1, which provides that ‘[a] defendant is not entitled to file a
petition seeking relief from the court under this section.’ (See
Stats. 2023, ch. 131, § 157.)” (Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 790, fn. 9.) Section 1172.1, subdivision (c), further provides
12
that “[i]f a defendant requests consideration for relief under this
section, the court is not required to respond.” Mitchell’s request
for relief under section 1172.1 thus did not trigger jurisdiction or
any obligation on the court’s part to respond. (See People v.
Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 697; People v. Hodge
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 996 [“a defendant who chooses to file
an unauthorized request for resentencing has no right to a
ruling. . . . If the defendant has no right to a decision, the trial
court’s choice not to make one does not deprive the defendant of
any right, much less a substantial one”].)
A trial court’s refusal to consider an unauthorized request
for recall and resentencing is not an appealable order. (See
People v. Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 998 [“The lack of
any statutory constraints on a trial court’s decision to decline
action on a defendant’s request for resentencing under section
1172.1 also means that there would be nothing for this court to
review on appeal.”]; People v. Magana (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
1120, 1128 [where “the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant
defendant’s motion for a resentencing hearing . . . the order
denying that motion did not affect defendant’s substantial rights
and was not an appealable order”].) Because there was no
appealable order by the trial court, we lack jurisdiction and must
dismiss the appeal. (See Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 797-798; People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135
[“Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction[,] the appeal must be
dismissed.”].) We also must decline Mitchell’s invitation to treat
this postjudgment appeal as a direct appeal under People v.
Wende, supra, as the only issue raised in the notice of appeal, as
framed by Mitchell, is the trial court’s “failure . . . to act on the
request for recall of sentence.” (See Faunce v. Cate (2013)
13
222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“We have no jurisdiction over an order
not mentioned in the notice of appeal.”].)
However, “ ‘[a] “defendant who is serving a longer sentence
than the law allows may challenge the sentence in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.” ’ ” (Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 799; see In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 839, disapproved on
another ground by Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th
842, 855, fn. 5.) Although Mitchell has filed multiple habeas
petitions (see, e.g., B298598, B323789, and B345611), none of
these petitions has directly dealt with the increase in sentence
from 191 years to 207 years to life. Other petitions were denied
because Mitchell failed to file his petition in the superior court.
(See People v. Superior Court (Jimenez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798,
806, fn. 3 [Court of Appeal “has discretion to deny a petition that
was not filed first in a proper lower court”]; In re Ramirez (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1320.) If Mitchell wishes to pursue a
habeas petition challenging the increase of his sentence from 191
to 207 years to life as violating former section 1170, subdivision
(d)’s prohibition on resentencing defendants to a sentence that is
“greater than the initial sentence,” he should file that petition in
superior court and make that specific argument.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J.
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