People v. Rodriguez CA5

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Filed 1/8/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA5

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088045
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF434244A)
v.

FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and
Dina Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant and appellant Francisco Rodriguez was convicted by a jury of
second degree murder with a true finding he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing death. The charges arose out of a fight and shooting at a convenience
store in Visalia. Defendant’s group and the victim’s group converged at the store. The
two groups yelled and made hand gestures toward each other. The confrontation
escalated to a physical fight between the groups that spilled out of the store. The victim
and the victim’s cohort fought with defendant but then appeared to abandon the fight and
ran toward the victim’s truck in the parking lot. Defendant pursued, pulled out a
handgun, and shot the victim twice in the back. The victim died from his wounds.
Defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
prejudicial gang expert testimony; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her
closing arguments; and (3) the murder conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence
because no rational jury would conclude defendant did not act in self-defense or in the
heat of passion.
We affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On November 13, 2023, the Tulare County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of
Alfonso Barrera (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). (Undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.) The information further alleged defendant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)).1

1 The information alleged three aggravating factors that were later dismissed at the
prosecution’s request.

2.
On April 18, 2024, the jury acquitted defendant of first degree murder but
convicted him on the lesser offense of second degree murder with a true finding on the
allegation he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death.
On May 13, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life consisting
of 15 years to life for the murder conviction plus a consecutive 10-year enhancement for
personally using a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
A. The Fight and Shooting
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 7, 2022, Barrera was at an ampm
convenience store on Lovers Lane in Visalia. Barrera was accompanied by
Florencio Mejia Meraz and an unidentified man.2 Barrera was waiting outside the store
near his blue pickup truck in the parking lot while his cohort was inside buying beer.
While Barrera was waiting, Miguel Torres, defendant, and defendant’s brother,
Rene Rodriguez,3 pulled up to the ampm’s parking lot in a gray compact car.
Rene went inside the ampm passing Barrera’s cohort walking out carrying beer.
Defendant and Torres came into the ampm shortly after.
Defendant, Rene, and Torres went to the back of the store to pick out an item and
then got in line to pay. As the group was waiting, Rene exited the store and walked back
to the gray car. He opened the car’s driver’s side door, leaned inside, then backed out of
the car and closed the door. Rene walked back inside the store and waited inside the
vestibule.

2 Of the two men with Barrera, only Meraz was identified at trial. We refer to the
unidentified third man as Barrera’s “cohort.”
3 Because defendant and his brother share the same last name, we refer to Rene by
his first name for clarity. Rene was the individual in the store’s videos wearing a black
shirt and pink shorts. Defendant was wearing a shirt that said “Cookies.”

3.
From the vestibule, Rene made a hand gesture by flashing a number four with
one hand and a number one with the other hand toward Barrera’s group outside. Barrera
was sitting in the truck’s passenger seat and made hand gestures in response to Rene.
Rene motioned to defendant and defendant came over to Rene in the vestibule. Rene
took off his shoes. Barrera and Meraz rushed inside the ampm. Meraz and Rene fought
each other while Barrera fought defendant. Barrera’s cohort followed and joined the fight
with defendant which spilled out of the ampm. Defendant ended up down on the ground.
Barrera and his cohort repeatedly struck and kicked defendant while he was down.
Barrera’s shirt came off during the fight. Barrera’s cohort stopped striking defendant and
ran toward Barrera’s truck with Barrera following. Defendant got up and pursued while
pulling a handgun out of his shorts pocket. He racked the gun’s slide, held the gun with
both hands, and fired six times in Barrera’s direction as Barrera was getting into the
truck’s passenger seat. Barrera was shot twice in the back. His cohort ducked down to
the ground on the truck’s driver’s side as shots were fired.
Defendant ran away, stopped briefly in the ampm’s parking lot, and then continued
running away out of the lot. Barrera slumped in the truck’s passenger seat as his cohort
got in, started up the truck, and backed the truck out of its parking space. The cohort
stopped the truck for Meraz to get in the backseat. He then drove off.
B. Law Enforcement Investigation
Visalia Police Officer Jose Chavez was dispatched to the ampm in response to a
911 call reporting shots fired. Chavez spoke with the ampm’s cashier, Adriana Haro, and
canvassed the scene. He located six spent .40-caliber bullet casings directly in front of
the ampm.
At approximately 1:47 a.m. on the night of the shooting, Visalia Police Officer
Marcus Henry responded to a possible suspect vehicle on Westcott Avenue. Henry
discovered Barrera’s truck with Barrera inside. He pulled Barrera out of the truck and
attempted CPR but was unsuccessful. Barrera was pronounced dead at the scene and

4.
identified by the driver’s license in his pocket.
Barrera’s truck was searched by the police pursuant to a search warrant. Blood
was on the front passenger seat. There were bullet holes on the truck’s passenger side
and both the front driver’s side and passenger’s side windows were shattered. Projectiles
were recovered from the truck. Inside the truck, the police found two open beer
containers and a leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana. A 24-pack of beer was in
the truck bed. Barrera’s and Meraz’s cell phones were inside the truck, as well as
Meraz’s wallet.
Visalia Police Sargeant Andrew Saelee obtained the ampm’s surveillance videos
that had recorded various angles of the store’s exterior and interior during the altercation
and shooting. The videos did not record audio. The trial court admitted the videos as
evidence without objection. Saelee used still images from the videos to create a
be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) flyer of the suspects in the shooting. Tulare County Sheriff
Diego Ramos saw the BOLO and recognized defendant as they grew up together in the
same town, Terra Bella.
The police also obtained surveillance videos from properties in the ampm’s
vicinity. The videos showed defendant fleeing on foot after the shooting.
On August 11, 2022, Samuel Pierce, an employee of a storage facility, found a
loaded gun magazine on the canal bank. The magazine had three live .40-caliber rounds
inside. The police retrieved the magazine as evidence. The gun involved in the shooting
was never found. On the day of the shooting, Pierce saw Rene on the facility’s property.
Pierce told Rene he was on private property and must leave. He took pictures and video
of Rene. Surveillance videos from the early morning of August 7, 2022, showed Rene
appearing to search for something near the storage facility and other areas in the ampm’s
vicinity.

5.
The police obtained the records for a Snapchat4 account associated with defendant.
Screenshots of defendant’s Snapchat account from July 27, 2022, showed defendant’s
tattoos including a “TB” on his neck and palm trees on the other side of his neck. A
video posted to defendant’s account from September 7, 2022, showed he was in Cosala,
Mexico. Another video on his Snapchat account from September 6, 2022, showed
defendant in a vehicle with a handgun in the vehicle’s seat back pocket.
An arrest warrant issued for defendant. He was taken into custody at the Southern
California border on June 8, 2023.
C. Medical Evidence
Dr. Thomas Bennett, the Tulare County forensic pathologist, opined that Barrera
died from two gunshot wounds that entered through his back. One bullet went through
Barrera’s torso and exited the left side. The other bullet went up through the jaw, exited
through Barrera’s mouth, and injured his left hand. One of the bullets perforated both
lungs. Death was not instantaneous but occurred within several minutes of the wounds.
Bennett opined the wound that went through Barrera’s lungs was nonsurvivable. Barrera
also had a laceration on the bridge of his nose. He was five feet 10 inches tall and
249 pounds when he died. Barrera’s blood tested positive for alcohol, cocaine, and
inactive metabolite THC (marijuana).
D. Gang Evidence
1. Adriana Haro’s Testimony
Adriana Haro was working as a cashier at the ampm at the time of the shooting.
Haro was aware of gang violence from growing up in Farmersville. She knew the
Norteños used the color red while the Sureños used the color blue, and that there are
numbers associated with the gangs.

4 Snapchat is a multimedia messaging application that allows users to communicate
with each other.

6.
Haro testified two groups of men came into the ampm to buy alcohol while other
customers were in the store. She heard men in the groups saying, “F the 13 and F the
14.” Haro believed the first group of men who came in were “southerners” because she
heard the group yelling “f[***] the north, norte.” She “automatically knew it was gang
related” upon hearing “f[***] the north, norte.” Haro also believed this group were
southerners because they were wearing blue while the other group of men “had a little bit
of red on.” She testified the group outside the store were “[n]ortherners” because they
were saying “f[*** s]outhside and then [n]orthside, so it’s like automatically it’s gang
related.” The two groups went back and forth verbally before they started hitting each
other. Haro did not see who threw the first punch and tried to get the groups out of the
store while they fought. She saw defendant fighting with two other individuals before he
ended up outside the store.
Haro went to call 911 with her coworker and heard gunshots outside. After the
gunshots, the blue truck left first, and the gray car left right after.
Haro identified defendant to police in a photo lineup. She did not hear defendant
say anything like northerner or southerner that night though she associated him with the
red group.
While Haro testified the group outside the store (the blue group) initiated the
interaction and fight between the groups, she later said she did not know who made the
initial statement or started the fight. She confirmed the first yelling she heard was
“f[***] norte” from the outside group and that group rushed into the store.
2. Gang Expert’s Testimony
Over defendant’s objection, Lance Kirk testified as a gang expert at trial. Kirk is
an investigator with the Tulare County District Attorney’s Office and has been a peace
officer for 17 years. Before becoming an investigator, he was a police officer in
Porterville where he worked in a special unit as a gang detective for a couple years. Kirk
testified that a criminal gang is defined as a group of three or more people with an

7.
identifying name or symbol whose members commonly engage in criminal activity.
Gang members carry weapons as one of their primary objectives is committing crimes
and to protect against rival gang members.
The primary gangs in Tulare County are the Norteños and Sureños. The Norteños
originated in the 1960s in the California prison system when they formed a gang called
the Nuestra Familia. The gang was created to protect its members from and in response
to the Sureños, the main prison gang also referred to as the Mexican Mafia. The
Norteños and Sureños are rival gangs. There is a divide in territory between the gangs.
Generally, the Norteños claim territory in Northern California while the Sureños claim
territory in Southern California.
The Norteños’s identifying symbol is the number 14, which represents the letter
“N” and stands for Nuestra Familia. The gang will also commonly use four dots or X4 in
graffiti to represent 14. They use the color red. A Norteño gang member may use hand
signals to indicate the gang they represent. This could be an “N” or number four with
their fingers, or a number one with one hand and a number four with the other hand.
Norteño gang members may have tattoos identifying themselves by a 14 or the town or
barrio they are from. A “TB” tattoo could be gang related to indicate the Terra Bella
Norteño.
The Sureños’s identifying symbol is the number 13, which stands for the letter
“M” for Mexican Mafia. The gang is also referred to as “La M,” Spanish for “The M.”
They identify with the color blue.
Respect plays a big role in gang culture. One of a gang’s primary objectives is to
gain respect from the public and rival gang members. Flashing a Norteño gang sign at
somebody suspected to be a Sureño gang member would be considered offensive and a
form of disrespect. Gang members also disrespect each other by yelling out gang slurs
like derogatory terms about the rival gang. If a Sureño gang member were to yell “f[***]

8.
norte,” that would be offensive to a Norteño gang member. Likewise, yelling “f[***]
south side,” would be offensive to a Sureño.
The Norteños have certain rules their members must follow called the 14 bonds.
One rule is that a member must jump in and help another Norteño gang member in
danger. If there is a fight between a Norteño and Sureño, and a Norteño in the vicinity
did not join in, this would violate the 14 bonds. There are repercussions for failing to
abide by the bonds. The Sureños have their own set of similar rules. A Sureño would
likewise be expected to join a fight between a Norteño and Sureño and also face
repercussions for failing to do so.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of Gang Expert’s Testimony
Defendant argues the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion by allowing a
gang expert to testify. He contends the expert’s testimony was unnecessary and irrelevant
to any material issue because there were no gang charges or allegations, no evidence of
gang membership by anyone involved, and he never said or gestured any gang slogans on
the night of the shooting.
A. Additional Background
Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a motion to submit evidence defendant’s motive
for the homicide was gang related. The prosecution’s proposed gang evidence included
Haro’s testimony, a gang expert’s testimony, and a social media video showing defendant
with gang members in a rap music video. In response, defendant moved in limine to
exclude the rap music video.
During the in limine hearings, the trial court acknowledged gang evidence might
be relevant to motive but Evidence Code section 352.25 bears on evidence like the rap

5 The trial court did not specify the statutory section, but the record indicates
discussion of the rap music video was centered on Evidence Code section 352.2.

9.
music video. Based on this evidentiary statute, the court granted defendant’s request to
exclude the video. The prosecution requested the gang expert still be permitted to testify
about the reason for the fight including about the gang rivalry, as well as explanation of
the hand gestures and colors of clothes worn. The prosecution conceded no gang
allegations had been made but argued the hand gestures and gang slurs were relevant to
motive for what started the fight. The court indicated it would allow the gang expert to
testify about the history of the gangs, and background information that would
contextualize the evidence for the jury but not allow the expert to opine defendant was a
gang member. Defense counsel argued the danger in allowing the gang expert’s
testimony was that the jury could conclude defendant was a gang member and be
confused by the evidence. Counsel claimed it was prejudicial and unfair for the
prosecution to present evidence of gang animus on one side and place defendant who is
not a gang member “in the same boat as” the group being attacked. The court responded
to defense counsel: “I’m not going to allow [the prosecution] to have some expert get up
there and testify that [defendant] is a gang member, in his opinion. But I don’t think it
would be fair to the other side, to exclude what is clearly relevant evidence that you have
these two rival gangs that get into a conflict, and, therefore, there’s some motive here for
a fight to start. [¶] That doesn’t necessarily mean that [defendant], you know, is gang
motivated, as opposed to motivated to protect his brother, as maybe any brother might.
But this is relevant evidence. It’s prejudicial, in a sense that it’s harmful to the
defendant’s cause. But it’s not unduly prejudicial, in the sense that it’s going to lead this
jury or confuse them or consume an undue amount of time. It’s not unduly prejudicial, in
the context, as I understand them, which involve the homicide of a person.”
Defense counsel reiterated that allowing the gang expert to testify would paint
defendant as a gang member without evidence he is in fact one. The store’s videos did
not show defendant doing anything gang related with hand signals or words. If the expert
suggests defendant was a gang member based on his shoes or tattoo, defense counsel

10.
argued he could not ask questions about defendant’s lack of membership without opening
the door to other gang evidence like the rap music video.
The trial court clarified it had already ruled the music video inadmissible. The
court reiterated the gang expert would not be allowed to offer an opinion on whether
defendant is a gang member because that opinion relies on the excluded music video and
no gang allegations had been made. The court ruled the gang evidence was admissible as
relevant to motive, provocation, self-defense, and imperfect self-defense. The court
opined admitting the evidence would be fair to the prosecution in putting on their case to
provide context to some of the evidence that would be presented and would enlighten
rather than confuse the jury. The court would allow testimony about the gangs’
background, the history of the rivalry, and the significance of colors and numbers, but
would not allow the expert to testify defendant was a gang member. When pressed by
defense counsel on whether the expert could comment on defendant’s tattoo, the court
stated the expert would be allowed to testify the tattoo could plausibly be consistent with
gang membership or at least be perceived that way. The court likewise ruled the expert
could testify about gang-related colors. Defense counsel maintained his objection to
admission of the gang evidence while noting he would likely not object when the
evidence was presented to the jury.6
At trial, Kirk discussed the rivalry between the Norteños and Sureños, each gang’s
respective hand signals and colors, and the expectation of a gang member to respond to
an attack by a rival gang member, as detailed above.

6 The Attorney General does not argue forfeiture of the issue on appeal. The issue
was preserved for appeal given defendant’s vigorous objections to admission of the gang
evidence before the trial court. (See People v. Memory (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 835,
856–857 (Memory).)

11.
B. Applicable Law
Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Evidence is relevant if
it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) The court may
exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(Evid. Code, § 352.)
“California courts have long recognized the potential prejudicial effect of gang
evidence.” (People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167.) “Gang evidence
should not be admitted at trial where its sole relevance is to show a defendant’s criminal
disposition or bad character as a means of creating an inference the defendant committed
the charged offense.” (People v. Sanchez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449; see also
Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Gang evidence may however be admissible and “relevant
to establish the defendant’s motive, intent or some fact concerning the charged offenses
other than criminal propensity .…” (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 223
(Albarran); People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 398 (Flores).) In general, evidence of
gang affiliation and membership “including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership,
signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can
help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or
fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.” (People v. Hernandez (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049, superseded by statute on another ground as recognized in People
v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 819.) “Such evidence is admissible even when a
gang enhancement is not charged, provided the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th
997, 1095.)
Even if gang evidence is relevant, “[t]rial courts must ‘carefully scrutinize’

12.
gang-related testimony before admitting it into evidence, because the content of such
testimony ‘may have a highly inflammatory impact on the jury.’ ” (Flores, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 402.) “The decision on whether gang evidence is relevant and not unduly
prejudicial rests within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] We will not
disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion ‘ “ ‘except on a showing that the [trial] court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The appellant bears the burden to
demonstrate abuse of discretion and prejudice.” (People v. Garcia (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 1040, 1050; People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31 [a ruling on the
admissibility of gang evidence is reviewable for abuse of discretion].)
The erroneous admission of gang evidence is generally reviewed under the People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 state law standard for prejudice unless the error resulted
in a due process violation that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) Under the Watson test, “[t]he reviewing court must ask
whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to the
defendant absent the error.” (Partida, at p. 439.)
C. Analysis
Here, the gang expert’s testimony was relevant and admissible. It demonstrated
the rivalry between the Norteños and Sureños was the impetus for the fight between the
two groups that ultimately led to defendant shooting Barrera. Just before the fight,
defendant’s brother, Rene, flashed a four and one with his hands at Barrera’s group and
Barrera made hand gestures in response. Kirk explained gesturing a number four with a
number one indicates membership with the Norteños and is considered disrespectful
when flashed at a perceived Sureño gang member. Kirk also provided context for the
gang slurs exchanged between the groups. Saying “f[***] the norte,” would be offensive
to a Norteño, while saying “f[***] south side,” would be offensive to a Sureño. Kirk’s
testimony provided context as to why Barrera and his group became antagonized enough

13.
to rush defendant and his brother and start the fight that led to the shooting. (See People
v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655 [the prosecution was entitled to present gang
evidence to give context for the defendant’s statement before the killing].)
Defendant argues Kirk’s testimony had no better evidentiary or explanatory value
than Haro’s testimony that led her to “automatically” think the groups’ exchange was
gang related. He contends Haro’s lay opinion gave the jury everything it needed without
the imprimatur of irrelevant but prejudicial hearsay expert testimony, and her testimony
together with the store’s videos was superior to Kirk’s testimony. We are not persuaded.
Because the videos did not record audio, Haro gave necessary evidence about what was
said between the two groups before the fight. But Haro’s testimony and the videos lacked
context without explanation for the gang-related significance of the hand gestures and
gang slurs exchanged. And while Haro provided her lay understanding of the groups’
exchange, “[g]ang sociology and psychology are proper subjects of expert testimony
[citation] as is ‘the expectations of gang members … when confronted with a specific
action’ [citations]. Expert testimony is admissible to establish the existence, composition,
culture, habits, and activities of street gangs,” as well as gang rivalries. (People v. Hill
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1120, italics omitted.) Nothing indicates Haro was
qualified to give expert testimony explaining the history and rivalry between the
Norteños and Sureños, and the related background explaining the significance of specific
gang signs and slurs. In contrast, Kirk was a peace officer for 17 years including
two years as a gang detective, had contact with gang members “hundreds, if not
thousands” of times, and received extensive training in gangs. He had also previously
been identified as a gang expert in court. Kirk’s testimony related to a subject
“sufficiently beyond common experience” that would assist the jury’s understanding of
the source for the groups’ fight. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see also People v. Vang
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1044 [a criminal street gang’s culture and habits meets the
criterion for expert opinion testimony under Evid. Code, § 801].)

14.
Defendant suggests if the prosecution has insufficient evidence to prove a gang
enhancement or does not make a gang allegation, there can be no gang-related motive for
a crime and thus, no reason to admit gang evidence. He claims the prosecutor cannot
separate a gang “motive” from a gang “benefit” to show the motive was gang related.
Not so. A crime may still have a gang-related motive and gang evidence be relevant to
the charged offenses even where the prosecution does not allege a gang offense. (E.g.,
People v. Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 31–33 [gang evidence was relevant and
admissible despite no gang-related allegations]; Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 402 [gang
testimony was highly relevant to the defendant’s motive for the charged crimes though
the prosecution did not allege a gang enhancement].) Our Supreme Court has expressly
held evidence of a gang-related motive may be admissible regardless of whether a gang
allegation is charged. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1095.) Furthermore,
gang-related “motive” is not synonymous with gang “benefit” as that term is used in the
criminal street gang law (§ 186.22). “A ‘motive’ is defined as a ‘[c]ause or reason that
moves the will and induces the action[,]’ ‘[a]n inducement, or that which leads or tempts
the mind to indulge a criminal act.’ [Citation.] Motive is an intermediate fact which may
be probative of such ultimate issues as intent [citation], identity [citation], or commission
of the criminal act itself [citation].” (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009,
1017−1018.) Whether an offense provides a “benefit” to a criminal street gang is more
narrowly construed under section 186.22. To prove a criminal street gang engaged in a
pattern of criminal activity, the prosecution must show “the common benefit from the
[gang’s] offenses is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).)7 Bolstering one’s
reputation with the gang is a recognized gang-related motive for an offense (Memory,

7 “Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but
are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual
gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or
informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)

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supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 858−859) but would not qualify as a “benefit” to the gang
under section 186.22.
Defendant also claims Kirk’s brief explanation of a criminal street gang was
insufficient because the definition of a criminal street gang in section 186.22 was
narrowed by the Legislature effective January 1, 2022. (See Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021−2022 Reg. Sess.); People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.) This argument
misses the mark. As defendant repeatedly points out, no gang offense or enhancement
was alleged in this case. The prosecution was consequently not required to establish the
necessary elements for an active gang participation charge or enhancement under the
amended section 186.22 when neither was alleged.
Defendant relies on Albarran and Memory to argue the gang evidence presented
was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Both cases are inapposite.
In Albarran, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder and other offenses
with a true finding on a gang enhancement that the crimes were committed for the benefit
of a criminal street gang. The defendant moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
gang enhancement was not supported by sufficient evidence and the admission of gang
evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court granted the motion as to the gang
enhancement but denied it as to the other charges. On appeal, the defendant argued the
gang evidence was unduly prejudicial as to the underlying charges if there was
insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement. (Albarran, supra, 149
Cal.App.4th at p. 222.) The prosecution argued the defendant’s motive for the shooting
was to gain respect within his gang. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding “there
was insufficient evidence to support the contention that this shooting was done with the
intent to gain respect” because no evidence showed the defendant shot the victim to
enhance his reputation with his gang. (Id. at p. 227.) The court found even if evidence of
the defendant’s gang membership and some other gang evidence was relevant to motive
and intent, “certain of the gang evidence, i.e., threats against police, reference to the

16.
Mexican Mafia, and descriptions of other crimes committed by other gang members, was
irrelevant, cumulative and presented a substantial risk of undue prejudice.” (Id. at
p. 228.) This “extremely and uniquely inflammatory” gang evidence was so prejudicial it
“could only have served to cloud [the jury’s] resolution of the issues.” (Id. at p. 230.)
The court concluded the defendant’s case was “one of those rare and unusual occasions
where the admission of evidence has violated federal due process and rendered the
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” (Id. at p. 232.)
The convictions in Memory arose out of a fight between two groups at a bar. The
two defendants were members of the Jus Brothers motorcycle club. (Memory, supra, 182
Cal.App.4th at p. 837.) The trial court ruled a gang expert’s testimony was inadmissible
but admitted other evidence about the Jus Brothers that allowed the gang expert’s
testimony to come in through other witnesses. (Id. at p. 852.) Though the prosecution
couched the Jus Brothers evidence as relevant to motive and identity, the evidence was
offered to show the defendants had a criminal disposition to fight with deadly force
despite no evidence of this disposition. (Id. at p. 859.) The Court of Appeal found this
evidence inflammatory because the “prosecutor sought through its opening statement,
structure of its case-in-chief, examination of witnesses, and in closing arguments, to
continually portray [the] defendants as members of a violent” motorcycle club. (Id. at
p. 861.) The Jus Brothers evidence “served not only to destroy [the] defendants’
credibility and paint them as violent, but also to bolster the credibility of prosecution
witnesses who were otherwise suspect.” (Id. at p. 863.) Given the trial amounted to a
credibility contest, the Court of Appeal concluded there was a reasonable probability of a
different outcome if the “irrelevant, inflammatory” gang evidence had not been admitted.
(Ibid.)
The facts of this case differ materially from Albarran and Memory. In Albarran,
there was no evidence the motive for the shooting was gang related. While Memory
involved a fight between two groups like this case, there was no evidence the fight was

17.
related to a gang rivalry. Here, although defendant was not himself shown to be a gang
member, the evidence showed the animosity between defendant’s group and Barrera’s
group was fueled by the rivalry between the Norteños and Sureños. The lower courts in
Albarran and Memory also allowed the jury to hear extensive gang evidence that was
inflammatory, cumulative, and irrelevant. In this case, the trial court excluded the rap
music video from evidence and allowed the prosecution to present only Kirk’s testimony.
The court limited the scope of Kirk’s testimony to the history of the rivalry between the
two gangs and background information about the gangs’ hand gestures, colors, and
tattoos. As discussed above, this was relevant to provide context about the cause of the
fight. The court expressly precluded Kirk from opining on defendant’s gang
membership. His testimony was limited in scope, not proffered to show defendant was
criminally disposed, and was neither inflammatory nor irrelevant. It provided context for
the fight no other evidence could and was not cumulative to other evidence. Unlike
Albarran and Memory, the gang evidence in this case was relevant and admissible, and its
probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.8
Defendant briefly contends the resulting prejudice in this case rises to the level of
application of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. This contention is without
merit. The gang evidence served legitimate purposes and did not render defendant’s trial
fundamentally unfair in violation of his right to due process. Kirk’s testimony was brief,
consisting of just 13 pages of the reporter’s transcript. While the trial court did not give
the jury a limiting instruction on the use of Kirk’s testimony,9 the verdict makes clear the

8 Defendant’s reliance on People v. Huynh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 969 is similarly
misplaced. In that case, there was no evidence the group the defendant associated with
was a criminal street gang and there were no reports of gang colors, signs, shouts or
announcements during the fights that precipitated the murder the defendant committed.
(Id. at p. 982.) Here, there was evidence of gang signs and slurs before the fight.
9 In his reply brief, defendant claims the jury had no legal framework within which
to consider the gang evidence because no instruction regarding the gang evidence was
given. “Generally, ‘arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be

18.
jury was not tainted by an inference defendant was criminally disposed. The prosecution
sought a first degree murder conviction but the jury acquitted defendant of that charge
and found him guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder. This indicates the
jury reached its verdict based on the evidence, not impermissible character
considerations. (E.g., People v. Hill, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [evidence of
gang-related shootings was not prejudicial where jury rejected first degree murder charge
and found second degree murder only].) This case cannot be characterized as “the rare
and unusual” one where the admission of evidence violated the defendant’s federal due
process right and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. (Albarran, supra, 149
Cal.App.4th at p. 232.)
Applying the state law standard for error, defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice
resulted from admission of Kirk’s testimony. Overwhelming evidence supported
defendant’s guilt for second degree murder. The videos recorded the fight and resultant
shooting from multiple angles. The jury saw defendant draw his gun and repeatedly
shoot at Barrera as he fled shirtless back to his truck. The videos do not show Barrera
had a visible weapon during the fight, while running away, or when he was getting into
his truck. Because there was no evidence defendant was in imminent threat of injury or
death when he shot at Barrera, the jury was entitled to reject his self-defense argument
and convict him for murder. The jury, however, rejected the prosecution’s argument the
murder was premeditated and deliberate and found defendant guilty of only

entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.’ ” (People v. Tran, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 1208.) In any event, the trial court is only required to give a limiting
instruction on gang evidence upon request (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 1051–1052; Evid. Code, § 355), and the record reflects defendant declined a limiting
instruction. Specifically, the prosecutor proposed giving an instruction on limited
purpose evidence (CALCRIM No. 303) for the gang evidence, but the trial court
considered it unnecessary because the gang evidence came in accordance with the
in limine ruling and the court believed the instruction might confuse the jury. Defense
counsel agreed with the court and the instruction was not given.

19.
second degree murder. There is no reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict
absent the admission of the gang expert’s testimony. (People v. Davis (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 806, 813 [admission of gang evidence was harmless error where evidence of
guilt was overwhelming].)
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues the prosecutor’s use of the gang expert’s testimony during
closing argument was misconduct. He contends the prosecutor repeatedly discussed the
Norteños and Sureños during argument and made an improper guilt by association
argument.
A. Additional Background
During the prosecutor’s closing argument, she discussed the self-defense
instruction. She argued Barrera and his friend “abandon[ed] the fight,” and defendant
started shooting because he “lost the fight, and he was angry.” The prosecutor further
argued in relevant part: “the defendant had to pull the gun, because, first, he lost. And
second, we can infer that he felt disrespected, right? [¶] You heard from the gang expert
about respect, and how that is very important in any situation where gangs might be
involved. So what happens if somebody loses their respect, their reputation of being
tough? [¶] You cannot allow that to happen. You heard some testimony about how the
Norteños and Sureños are rivals, and if a Sureño attacks a Norteño, the other ones are
supposed to join. If a Norteño loses against a Sureño, what is that going to mean, you
know? That is going to bring their reputation down within the gang, and so what is there
to do; what is left to do? [¶] If you lose a fight and you have a gun, this is what you do,
you shoot, even if the people are running away and they have their backs to you.” The
prosecutor talked again about the importance of respect in gang culture and argued
defendant had a motive not to lose respect. Defense counsel made no objections during
the prosecutor’s closing argument.
In defense counsel’s closing argument, he argued defendant did not engage in a

20.
mutual fight because Barrera outweighed defendant by 85 pounds and both Barrera and
his cohort attacked him. He claimed defendant was “fighting for his life” when Barrera’s
group attacked and he had the right to defend himself. Counsel averred defendant
reasonably believed Barrera and his cohort were “going for a weapon” when they went to
Barrera’s truck, and defendant “defended himself.”
During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s
self-defense argument: “How is [defendant] going to die; the fight was over. I’ll present
you with this question, did he have to fight not to die, or did he have to fight so he does
not lose the respect of his called gang members, of his brother.” Defense counsel
objected: “Misstates the evidence regarding gang membership.” The trial court
overruled the objection stating, “It’s argument.”
B. Applicable Law
“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the federal Constitution when it ‘ “so infect[s] the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’
[Citation.] ‘Conduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair is error under state
law only when it involves “ ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to
persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] When a misconduct claim
‘focuses on the prosecutor’s comments to the jury, we determine whether there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the remarks in an
objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 156 (Nadey).)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues the prosecutor exacerbated the trial court’s error in admitting the
gang expert’s testimony by referring repeatedly to the Norteños and Sureños during her
closing argument including on issues of respect, disrespect, retaliation, punishment for
not retaliating, and gang reputation. The Attorney General responds that defendant did
not object to these instances of the prosecutor’s argument and thus forfeited this claim.
Generally, a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless

21.
the defendant made a timely objection and requested an admonition. (Nadey, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 159.) A defendant will be excused from making an objection or requesting
an admonition if either would be futile. (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1350.)
Defendant did not object to any of the prosecutor’s discussion of the Norteños and
Sureños during her closing argument. Nothing in the record indicates an objection and
request for admonition would have been futile. Defendant’s failure to object forfeits the
claim on appeal.
Defendant did object to the prosecutor’s argument during rebuttal that defendant
had to fight so he would not lose the respect of gang members. On appeal, defendant
argues this was an improper guilt by association argument. The Attorney General
concedes a guilt by association argument constitutes misconduct (see People v. Lopez
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 967) but contends defendant forfeited this claim as well because
he did not object on the same grounds he now raises on appeal. He instead objected on
the grounds the prosecutor was misstating the evidence regarding gang membership, and
the trial court overruled this objection. To preserve a prosecutorial misconduct claim for
appeal, a defendant ordinarily must object on the same grounds raised on appeal. (People
v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.) Defendant’s failure to object that the prosecutor was
making an improper guilt by association argument deprived the trial court of the
opportunity to rule on that issue and the claim is forfeited on appeal. (Nadey, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 159.)
Even if the claim was preserved, defendant has not shown it is reasonably likely
the jury construed the prosecutor’s remarks in an improper fashion. The jury was
instructed nothing the attorneys say is evidence at the beginning of trial and before
closing arguments. The jury instructions specified the attorneys discuss the case during
closing arguments, but their remarks are not evidence. The jury was told evidence
includes the witnesses’ sworn testimony, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and
anything else the court told it to consider as evidence (CALCRIM No. 222). The jury

22.
was also instructed not to let bias influence their assessment of the evidence or decisions
and base their decisions solely on the evidence presented (CALCRIM No. 209). Even if
the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, defendant has not shown they were prejudicial.
(Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 160 [the prosecutor’s allegedly improper remarks not
prejudicial where countered by jury instructions].)
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lastly, defendant contends his second degree murder conviction is not supported
by sufficient evidence. He claims no rational juror could have found proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did not act either (1) in the actual belief in the need for
self-defense whether that belief was reasonable or unreasonable, or (2) in the heat of
passion on adequate provocation. Thus, he claims his murder conviction must be
reversed or at least reduced to voluntary manslaughter.
A. Standard of Review
“To assess the evidence’s sufficiency, we review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime …
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to
support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury
could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even
testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we
look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence
‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient

23.
substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43
Cal.4th 327, 357, fourth, fifth, & sixth bracketed insertions in original; see People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 562; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317–320.)
“Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence.” (In re Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115,
126.) “Whether the evidence presented at trial is direct or circumstantial, … the relevant
inquiry on appeal remains whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105,
118.) “Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a
reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with
a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.” (People v. Zamudio, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 358.)
B. Murder, Self-Defense, and Heat of Passion
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
(People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243; § 187, subd. (a).) “The mens rea element
required for murder is a state of mind constituting either express or implied malice.”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942 (Beltran).) Malice is express when there is
a deliberate intent to kill. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) Malice is implied “when ‘the killing is
proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988; § 188, subd. (a)(2).) “Second degree murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but without the premeditation,
deliberation and willfulness necessary to elevate the offense to first degree murder.”
(People v. Bohana (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 360, 368; People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th
139, 151.)
“Criminal homicide is divided into two types: murder and manslaughter.”

24.
(Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 941.) While murder requires malice aforethought,
“manslaughter is defined as ‘the unlawful killing of a human being without malice’
(§ 192). Thus, the ‘distinguishing feature [between the two offenses] is that murder
includes, but manslaughter lacks, the element of malice.’ ” (People v. Schuller, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 252.) “Malice is presumptively absent when the defendant acts upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion on sufficient provocation (§ 192, subd. (a)), or kills in
the unreasonable, but good faith, belief that deadly force is necessary in self-defense.
[Citation.] Only these circumstances negate malice when a defendant intends to kill.”
(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583 (Manriquez).) “The resulting crime is
voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder.” (People v. Dominguez
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 174 (Dominguez).) When self-defense or heat of passion are
at issue, the prosecution must disprove those circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Schuller, at p. 254.)
Self-defense may be perfect or imperfect. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1073, 1082.) A homicide is lawful and justified where a person acts in perfect
self-defense—the actual and objectively reasonable belief in the need to defend against
imminent threat of death or great bodily injury. (Ibid.; § 197.) “Imperfect self-defense
arises when a defendant acts with a subjectively honest but objectively unreasonable
belief that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.” (People v.
Temple (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1295.) “Perfect self-defense results in a
defendant’s complete exoneration. [Citation.] Imperfect self-defense negates the mental
state of express malice. [Citation.] Imperfect self-defense, by negating malice, means a
defendant cannot be convicted of murder but can be convicted of voluntary
manslaughter.” (Ibid.) “ ‘The subjective elements of self-defense and imperfect
self-defense are identical. Under each theory, the [defendant] must actually believe in the
need to defend … against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury.’ ” (People v.
Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732, 744.) “ ‘Fear of future harm—no matter how

25.
great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm—will not suffice. The
defendant’s fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury. “ ‘[T]he peril
must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not prospective or even in the
near future. An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt
with.’ ” ’ ” (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581.)
Like self-defense, “[h]eat of passion has both objective and subjective
components. Objectively, the victim’s conduct must have been sufficiently provocative
to cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due
deliberation and reflection.” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 759.) “The
provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must
be caused by the victim or by conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been
engaged in by the victim.” (People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 105.) The “ ‘ “heat
of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an
ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances,” because “no
defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because
in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury believe that the facts and
circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable
[person].” ’ ” (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 584.) “Subjectively, ‘the accused must
be shown to have killed while under “the actual influence of a strong passion” induced by
such provocation.’ ” (Enraca, at p. 759.) “The passion aroused need not be anger or
rage, but can be any intense emotion other than revenge. [Citation.] Thus, a defendant’s
‘immediate fear and panic’ can, in an appropriate case, provide evidence from which ‘a
reasonable jury could infer that defendant was aroused to passion, and his reason was
thus obscured .…’ ” (Dominguez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)
C. Relevant Instructions
The jury was instructed on murder in both degrees (CALCRIM No. 520),
complete (or perfect) self-defense (CALCRIM No. 505), imperfect self-defense

26.
(CALCRIM No. 571), and heat of passion (CALCRIM No. 570). The jury was instructed
that to prove defendant was guilty of murder, the People must prove defendant committed
an act that caused another person’s death, acted with malice aforethought, and killed
without lawful justification (CALCRIM No. 520).
The jury instruction on complete self-defense provided in relevant part: “The
defendant acted in lawful self-defense or defense of another if: [¶] 1. The defendant
reasonably believed that he or someone else was in imminent danger of being killed or
suffering great bodily injury; [¶] 2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate
use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The
defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that
danger.” (CALCRIM No. 505.) The instructions on imperfect self-defense explained to
the jury the difference between complete and imperfect self-defense “depends on whether
the defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable.” (CALCRIM
No. 571.) The jury was also instructed the right to use force in self-defense or defense of
another “continues only as long as the danger exists or reasonably appears to exist. When
the attacker withdraws or no longer appears capable of inflicting any injury, then the right
to use force ends.” (CALCRIM No. 3474.)
The jury instruction on heat of passion provided in relevant part: “The defendant
killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if: [¶] 1. The
defendant was provoked; [¶] 2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly
and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment; [¶]
AND [¶] 3. The provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act
rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.”
(CALCRIM No. 570.) The jury was also given CALCRIM No. 522 about the effect of
provocation on murder.
We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Daveggio
and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821.) Therefore, to find defendant guilty of

27.
second degree murder, the jury necessarily concluded defendant intentionally shot and
killed Barrera with either express or implied malice, and defendant did not kill Barrera in
perfect or imperfect self-defense, or in the heat of passion.
D. Analysis
Contrary to defendant’s claim he could not be convicted of murder or could only
be convicted of voluntary manslaughter, substantial evidence supports the second degree
murder conviction. As noted, “[t]he elements of second degree murder are: (1) an
unlawful killing; (2) accomplished with malice aforethought, whether express or
implied.” (People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 735.)
Substantial evidence shows and the jury could reasonably conclude defendant
acted with either express or implied malice when he shot at Barrera. The videos showed
from more than one angle that, as Barrera was running away, defendant pursued, pulled
out his gun, racked the slide, and fired six times at Barrera in rapid succession. The jury
could reasonably infer defendant acted with an intent to kill by purposefully firing a gun
multiple times at Barrera from close range. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 742.)
Even if the jury did not believe defendant intended to kill Barrera, the jury could
reasonably infer defendant knew repeatedly firing a gun at Barrera was dangerous to
human life and acted with conscious disregard for life. That is sufficient to find
defendant guilty of second degree murder.
Defendant argues the videos established that the circumstances of the fight were
“sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person” (§ 198) to support a finding of
self-defense as a matter of law. We disagree. “ ‘ “[W]here the evidence is
uncontroverted and establishes all of the elements for a finding of self-defense it may be
held as a matter of law that the killing was justified; however, where some of the
evidence tends to show a situation in which a killing may not be justified then the issue is
a question of fact for the jury to determine.” ’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1015, 1044.) The videos did not show either Barrera or his cohort had a weapon when

28.
they rushed into the store and engaged defendant in combat. Defendant was undeniably
outnumbered, but this was a physical fight. Barrera’s cohort abandoned the fight and ran
toward Barrera’s truck with a shirtless Barrera following. Defendant ran after and shot at
Barrera as he was trying to get into his truck. At no point do the videos show Barrera or
his cohort had or displayed a weapon, nor was there any other evidence they were armed.
While Barrera was the initial attacker, the jury could reasonably infer Barrera had
abandoned the fight when he stopped striking defendant and ran toward his truck. As the
jury was instructed, defendant was no longer entitled to use force once his attackers
withdrew.
While defendant may have feared injury or death during the fight, as a reasonable
person outnumbered in a fight might, there is no evidence that danger remained after
defendant’s attackers stopped striking him and ran away. The autopsy showed Barrera
was shot twice in the back and the videos reflected Barrera was not facing defendant
when he was shot. The jury could reasonably have found a shirtless Barrera with his
back to defendant no longer posed a danger. Furthermore, “a reasonable opportunity to
retreat may defeat a claim of perfect or imperfect self-defense because ‘the opportunity to
retreat means that no use of force was reasonable.’ ” (Dominguez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th
at p. 181.) Defendant had an opportunity to retreat by running away himself once Barrera
and his cohort ran toward Barrera’s truck. Instead, defendant escalated the encounter by
introducing a gun into the exchange.
Assuming Barrera still posed an imminent danger while running away with his
back to defendant, a dubious assumption at best, defendant’s right of self-defense was
limited to the use of such force as was reasonable under the circumstances. (People v.
Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065.) Accordingly, “[e]ven when faced with imminent
fear of death, a person may only use force reasonably necessary to repel the attack, and
‘only as long as the danger exists or reasonably appears to exist.’ [Citation.] A defendant
who had an actual and reasonable belief in being in imminent danger of death, but used

29.
more force than was reasonably necessary to repel the attack, or continued to use force
after the danger no longer existed or reasonably appeared to exist, may not invoke
self-defense.” (People v. Temple, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1297; People v. Hardin
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625, 629–630.) Defendant claims he did not use excessive force
because he was responding to an overpowering assault by two men using force likely to
result in great bodily injury. But defendant did not pull out the gun during the assault; he
pulled the gun and fired at his assailants after they stopped the fight and were fleeing.
Defendant’s use of a gun constituted excessive force to repel a purely physical attack that
his victim had presumably abandoned.
Because the jury found no premeditation or deliberation, defendant claims that left
only a theory of murder premised on the supposition that neither defendant nor his
companions feared for their lives but instead defendant had an intent to kill for
gang-related purposes. The record does not support this overly narrow view of
defendant’s intent, particularly since the prosecution was precluded from presenting
evidence defendant was a gang member.
We also reject defendant’s argument no rational juror could find proof beyond a
reasonable doubt he did not act in the heat of passion on adequate provocation.
“Adequate provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated.”
(People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60.) Consequently, a defendant must “actually be
motivated by passion in committing the killing.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 951;
Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 584 [the defendant must actually, subjectively, kill
under the heat of passion].) Defendant failed to show by any evidence that he was
enraged, angered, or in fear due to Barrera’s attack. No prior statements by defendant
were admitted into evidence, and he did not testify at trial. No witnesses testified
defendant exhibited anger, rage, or fear when he pulled out a gun and shot Barrera.
Assuming the videos could indicate defendant was motivated by passion, “the
circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion are also viewed objectively.”

30.
(Manriquez, at p. 584.) The victim’s conduct must be sufficiently provocative to “arouse
feelings of homicidal rage or passion in an ordinarily reasonable person.” (People v.
Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 250.) The evidence shows Rene, not defendant, incited
Barrera’s group by flashing a gang sign in their direction, but defendant was the one
attacked by Barrera and his cohort in a two-on-one fight. While these facts could create a
basis for provocation of defendant by heat of passion, reversal is not required where the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. And a
rational trier of fact could find the provocation insufficient to arouse deadly rage. The
fight was brief and there was no evidence defendant was injured, especially given the
videos showing he quickly got up and pursued Barrera and his cohort. The circumstances
reasonably justified the jury’s finding defendant did not kill in a heat of passion.
In conclusion, defendant’s second degree murder conviction was supported by
substantial evidence, and the jury had a sufficient basis to conclude defendant did not act
in perfect or imperfect self-defense, or in the heat of passion.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

FRANSON, J.

31.

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