CourtListener 10768975•People v. Reese CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 1/5/26 P. v. Reese CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102051
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 17FE009151)
v.
JOHNNY JAY REESE,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2020, defendant Johnny Ray Reese was found guilty of four counts of lewd and
lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1), statutory
section citations that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated) and one count
of sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)). The trial court
imposed an aggregate prison term of 40 years plus 165 years to life, which included
upper term sentences for each of the lewd and lascivious convictions. Defendant
successfully appealed his sentence in light of the changes made to section 1170,
subdivision (b) by Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1) (Senate Bill 567). On
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remand, defendant asked the trial court to reduce his sentence; the trial court refused,
citing to several aggravating circumstances in support of its sentencing decision.
Defendant again appeals. He contends the trial court erred by reimposing the
upper term sentences based on aggravating factors that were not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury as required under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). Defendant
claims this error violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also argues the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under
Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess. ch. 441, § 1) (Assembly Bill 518) at the
resentencing hearing, and his attorney was ineffective for failing to raise this issue below.
Finally, defendant asks that the abstract of judgment be corrected to reflect the correct
sentencing date and number of custody credits.
The People concede the trial court prejudicially erred when it reimposed the upper
term sentences based upon aggravating factors that were not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury. We accept the People’s concession. We also agree with defendant that
the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under Assembly Bill 518 at the resentencing
hearing. We will remand for a full resentencing hearing.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In 2020, a jury found defendant guilty on four counts of lewd and lascivious acts
with a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 1, 3, 4, and 5) and one count
of sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a); count 2). In a
bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that defendant suffered two
prior serious strike convictions (§§ 667, subds (a), (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s Romero (People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) motion to strike his prior strike as well
as his request for dismissal or reduction of the five-year prior serious felony
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enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court also found defendant took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)) and engaged in
violent conduct making him a serious danger to society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 40 years plus
165 years to life including 75 years to life for count 2 (25 years to life tripled to 75 years
to life for the two prior strikes (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)); 30 years to life each on counts
1, 4, and 5 (upper term of 10 years tripled to 30 years to life for the two prior strikes
(§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)); and 40 years for the two serious priors (five years for each
serious prior per sentenced count (§ 667, subd. (a)). Under former section 654, the court
imposed but stayed a term of 30 years to life on count 3 (upper term of 10 years tripled
for two prior strikes).
Defendant appealed his conviction and, as relevant here, requested remand for
resentencing under Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 518. (People v. Reese (Sept. 21,
2022), C093095 [nonpub. opn.].) We previously had granted defendant’s motion to
incorporate by reference case No. C093095, People v. Reese.
In deciding Senate Bill 567 applied retroactively to defendant, we concluded the
aggravating factors the trial court relied upon—that defendant took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence, and he engaged in violent conduct making him a serious
danger to society—were not found true by a jury or stipulated by defendant as required
under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). (People v. Reese, supra, C093095.)
We concluded it was not reasonably probable the jury would have found not true a
finding that defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence. (People v.
Reese, supra, C093095.) However, we were unable to determine whether it was
reasonably probable the jury would have found not true the allegation that defendant
engaged in violent conduct making him a serious danger to society. (Ibid.) We therefore
decided there was a reasonable probability the trial court would have imposed a more
lenient sentence under Senate Bill 567, and we remanded for resentencing. (Ibid.)
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Because the matter was being remanded for resentencing under Senate Bill 567,
we did not reach the merits of defendant’s request for remand under Assembly Bill 518.
(People v. Reese, supra, C093095.)
At the resentencing hearing, defendant again asked the trial court to strike his prior
strike and dismiss or reduce the five year prior serious felony enhancements. Defendant
also argued that the single aggravating factor this court determined the jury would have
found true under the reasonable doubt standard—that he took advantage of a position of
trust or confidence—was not, by itself, enough to justify an upper term sentence.
The People asked the trial court to consider defendant’s criminal history as an
aggravating factor weighing in favor of reimposing the upper term sentences. Defendant
disagreed and argued that the trial court could not “make decisions about whether or not a
person is themselves in violation of probation or parole as well as whether or not their
criminal history is increasing in seriousness.”
The trial court reimposed the original sentence. In doing so, the court chronicled
defendant’s criminal history and found “defendant has prior convictions” that “are
numerous and of increasing seriousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) The
court also found several other aggravating factors including that defendant had prior
prison terms (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)); was on parole at the time of the incident (id., rule
4.421(b)(4)); performed poorly on probation or parole (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)); posed a
serious danger to the community “based on the criminality that [defendant] has engaged
in” (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)); and the victim was particularly vulnerable (id., rule
4.421(a)(3)). The trial court said, “[a]ll of those collectively justify the exact sentence I
previously imposed, and I’ll simply indicate I’m not going to modify it in any way.”
The trial court did not address the changes in law under Assembly Bill 518. The
court believed it was “not necessary” to “deal with” Assembly Bill 518 at the
resentencing hearing.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
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DISCUSSION
Senate Bill 567
Defendant contends the trial court erred in reimposing the upper term sentences by
relying on aggravating factors that had not been found true by a jury. Defendant argues
this sentencing error violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and resulted in
prejudice. The People concede the error. Having reviewed the record and relevant legal
authority, we accept their concession.
“Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, ‘any
fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a
judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the
evidence.’ ” (People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078.) “Section 1170(b)(2)
similarly provides that the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term
sentence, and ‘the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt’ at a jury or court trial.”
(Ibid.) “[T]his jury trial right is not merely a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally
required for all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an
upper term sentence.” (Ibid.)
“When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify
imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman
standard of review.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087; see Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) “Under that standard, ‘a sentence imposed under . . .
section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found
true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term
was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the
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current statute.’ ” (Wiley, at p. 1087.) “Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under
Chapman if ‘the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’
with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.” (Ibid.)
The trial court erred by finding a variety of aggravating factors and relying on
them to reimpose the upper term. Aside from the trial court’s finding that defendant had
prior convictions, each of the other aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court were
required to have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2). (People v. Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086 [“a defendant is entitled
to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its
elements”].) Since they were not, the trial court could not use them to support its
reimposition of the upper term.
Remand is required here because we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury, applying the same standard, would have found true all aggravating
circumstances upon which the court relied to impose the upper term. (People v. Wiley,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) Indeed, one of the aggravating circumstances the trial court
relied on at resentencing was that defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a
serious danger to society. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1).) However, as we
previously recognized, the record here does not establish “whether it is reasonably
probable the jury would have found not true that defendant engaged in violent conduct
making him a serious danger to society.” (People v. Reese, supra, C093095.) Nothing
has changed that would warrant a departure from our previous determination on this
point. Consequently, remand for resentencing remains appropriate and we accept the
People’s concession accordingly.
Assembly Bill 518
Section 654 prohibits a court from punishing a defendant more than once for the
same act or course of conduct. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) Prior to
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2022, the statute required that an act or omission punishable in different ways by different
statutes be punished under the provision that provided the longest potential term of
imprisonment. (Former § 654, subd. (a).) Assembly Bill 518 amended section 654
effective January 1, 2022, to grant a court discretion to punish such an act under either of
such provisions. (§ 654, subd. (a).)
Here, the trial court stayed count 3, which carries a sentence of 30 years to life. In
the original appeal, defendant asked for a remand for resentencing so the trial court could
exercise its discretion to stay the 75 years to life sentence for count 2 under amended
section 654. (People v. Reese, supra, C093095.) We determined that remand under
Assembly Bill 518 was unnecessary since remand under Senate Bill 567 was required.
(Ibid.) The trial court did not address the changes made to section 654 under Assembly
Bill 518 at the resentencing hearing.
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously failed to exercise its discretion
under Assembly Bill 518 at the resentencing hearing. We agree. Since we are again
remanding this matter for resentencing under Senate Bill 567, the trial court should
conduct a full resentencing as to all counts based on the law and circumstances that apply
when resentencing occurs, including the amendments to section 654 under Assembly Bill
518. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
Since we agree with defendant that the trial court failed to exercise its sentencing
discretion under Assembly Bill 518 at the resentencing hearing, we need not address
whether his attorney was ineffective for failing to raise this issue at the trial court.
Correction to Abstract of Judgment
Defendant asks that the abstract of judgment be corrected to reflect the correct
sentencing date and number of custody credits. The trial court will have the opportunity
to make these corrections on remand.
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DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
_____/s/____________________
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
_____/s/____________________
ROBIE, J.
_____/s/____________________
FEINBERG, J.
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