People v. Boyer CA4/2

CourtListener 10767620Calctapp31 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/31/25 P. v. Boyer CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E086148

v. (Super.Ct.No. PARS2500381)

WILLIAM BRIAN BOYER, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Laurie Burns, Judge.

Affirmed.

Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A court found that defendant and appellant William Brian Boyer violated the terms

and conditions of his parole and sentenced him to 180 days in jail.

1
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d

436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738,1 setting forth a statement of the facts,

a statement of the case, and identifying two potentially arguable issues: (1) whether the

court erred in denying defendant’s motion that the People had not established that his

parole violations occurred within Riverside County; and (2) whether the court adequately

considered and rejected intermediate or remedial sanctions for appropriate reasons and

sufficiently explained those reasons on the record.

We offered defendant the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which

he has not done. We affirm.

1 In People v. Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126, the court held that Wende and
Anders procedures do not apply to “an order revoking and reinstating [post release
community supervision.]” (Id. at p. 133.) In People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), the California Supreme Court subsequently held that Wende and Anders
procedures do not apply in appeals from the denial of a Penal Code section 1172.6
postjudgment petition. (Delgadillo, at pp. 224-226.)
Regardless of whether Wende and Anders procedures apply to orders revoking a
defendant’s parole, we exercise our discretion to independently review the record here for
error. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 230 [“if the appellate court wishes, it may also
exercise its discretion to conduct its own independent review of the record in the interest
of justice”]; People v. Pittman (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1254, fn. 1 [exercising
discretion to independently review postconviction order]; People v. Griffin (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 329, 335-336 [“we find the interests of justice call for an independent review
of the record as an additional layer of protection from the risk of a defendant remaining
unlawfully incarcerated because of a failure to discover a meritorious issue in his or her
appeal”].) Here, appellate counsel’s filing of a Wende brief may have misled defendant
into believing that regardless of whether he filed a supplemental brief, this court would
independently review the case.

2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 6, 2016, defendant was convicted of indecent exposure. (Pen. Code,

§ 314, subd. (1).)2 On February 2, 2017, defendant was again convicted of indecent

exposure. (§ 314, subd. (1)). As a result of his convictions, defendant was required to

register as a sex offender. (§ 290, subd. (c).) Defendant is considered a high-risk sex

offender.

On July 31, 2023, defendant was convicted of battery by gassing a peace officer.

(§ 243.9, subd. (a).) The court sentenced defendant to two years in prison.

On October 5, 2024, defendant was released to parole supervision; however, due

to mental health issues, defendant was remanded to the Department of State Hospitals

(DSH). On December 12, 2025, defendant was conditionally released from DSH and

picked up by parole agents at the Chino Institute for Men.

On February 12, 2025, defendant signed special conditions for parole, which

included a requirement that he “participate in continuous electronic monitoring.”

Another condition required that he “report to your parole agent on the first working day

following your release.”

On March 12, 2025, defendant was arrested for absconding parole supervision.

The court revoked his parole and sentenced him to 180 days in jail.3 Defendant was

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 One declaration reflects that the court sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail,
while another reflects the court sentenced him to 180 days in jail.

3
released on March 24, 2025, after serving 12 days. Defendant was instructed to report to

parole on the first working day following his release. He failed to do so.

On March 26, 2025, a parole agent requested, and the court issued, a no bail

warrant for defendant’s arrest. Officers arrested defendant on the warrant on April 11,

2025.

On April 16, 2025, personnel from the Riverside parole unit filed a petition for

revocation of defendant’s parole. The parole agent reported that, “All remedial sanctions

. . . have been considered however, they are not appropriate at this time. . . .” Defendant

denied he violated his parole.

At the hearing on May 16, 2025, a parole agent testified that defendant was

assigned to his caseload. On February 12, 2025, the parole agent went over the

conditions of parole with defendant. One of defendant’s parole terms required that he

wear a GPS monitor. They affixed a GPS monitor to defendant.

Another term required that defendant report to his parole agent the first working

day following his release. Yet another required that he not violate any law. Defendant

was required by law to register as a sex offender. Defendant indicated he understood the

terms both verbally and by signing the terms and conditions.

Defendant failed to report to his parole agent as required when he was released in

March. When officers arrested defendant, he was not wearing his GPS device.

Defendant failed to register as a sex offender.

4
The parole agent considered intermediate sanctions; however, because defendant

failed to register as a sex offender, there was a mandatory referral for revocation of

parole.4 He had previously offered defendant an intermediate sanctions program;

however, defendant left the program.

Defendant’s counsel argued in part that the parole agent did not “appropriately

review[] or seriously consider[] intermediate sanctions, and preferred instead to sanction

[defendant] with the maximum penalty.” The People responded that the parole agent “did

testify that intermediate sanctions were not appropriate in this case due to the fact that

under Penal Code 3010.10, that does require mandatory revocation.”

Defense counsel added, “I don’t think it was ever established that this happened in

the county of Riverside.” The People responded, “there was testimony that the defendant

was booked in a facility that was about four to five miles from the parole agent’s location.

I would just ask the Court to take notice that that is within the county of Riverside.”

The court noted, “I don’t believe territorial jurisdiction applies to parole

revocations. It would have to be that way, for example, if there’s a term that the parolee

is to violate no other laws, he wouldn’t be able to go outside of the county and violate the

law and then escape the allegation of revocation.” “I do think, even if it were required,

4 “Unless the parole authority finds that in the interests of justice it is not
appropriate in a particular case,” upon a violation of the requirement that a parolee have a
GPS device affixed to his person, “the parole authority shall revoke the person’s parole
and require that he or she be incarcerated in a county jail for 180 days.” (§ 3010.10,
subds. (a) & (d).) Upon a violation of the requirement that a sex offender not remove a
GPS device, “the parole authority shall revoke the person’s parole and require that he or
she be incarcerated in a county jail for 180 days.” (§ 3010.10, subds. (b) & (e).)

5
that would be satisfied. Because, for example, he’s required to report to the county, to the

agent’s office, and he failed to do that. So that omission did occur within the county.”

The court ruled that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his parole by

failing to report, by engaging in criminal conduct by failing to register as a sex offender,

by not having a GPS monitor, and by failing to register as a sex offender. The court

sentenced defendant to 180 days in jail.

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have

independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no arguable issues.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS
J.

MENETREZ
J.

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