People v. Waddle CA3

CourtListener 10766035Calctapp29 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/29/25 P. v. Waddle CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----

THE PEOPLE, C102224

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
CRF97-0009429)
v.

JEREMY DEAN WADDLE,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Jeremy Dean Waddle appeals the trial court’s resentencing order,
arguing prejudicial error occurred because he was not present at the resentencing hearing
and did not waive his constitutional right to be present. The People agree defendant’s
absence was error but claim it was harmless. We reverse and remand the matter with
directions to hold a new hearing with defendant present or to obtain a valid waiver.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 1, 1999, defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and admitted a
deadly weapon enhancement. Defendant was consequently sentenced to an indeterminate

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sentence of 16 years to life. On December 26, 2023, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6.2 The trial court ordered an
evidentiary hearing.
The trial court held the evidentiary hearing on October 3, 2024. The court
previously granted defendant’s request to remotely appear at the hearing, but defendant
was absent from the hearing. The minute order for the hearing states defense counsel
informed the court defendant waived appearance, but no such waiver was stated on the
record.
At the hearing, the trial court relied exclusively on the original police and forensic
reports. The court found from these reports that on the night of the homicide, defendant
went to a gas station with Troy Lyons. While defendant remained outside the gas station,
Lyons went inside to get change to use a pay phone. The clerk made a joke, offering
three quarters for a dollar to Lyons before giving him the change. Lyons then returned to
defendant, who was on the pay phone. Defendant wanted to confront the clerk about
disrespecting Lyons but Lyons talked him out of it, and they drove around for a couple of
hours.
Relying on the reports, the trial court also found that the two men eventually
returned to the gas station. They entered the store, grabbed a couple of items, and
approached the counter. When the clerk opened the register, defendant produced a knife
from under his shirt and stabbed the clerk in the right side of his neck, killing the clerk.
Defendant then jumped on the counter and took money out of the register while Lyons

1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was recodified without
substantive change to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Defendant filed his
petition under former section 1170.95, but we refer to the current section 1172.6
throughout this opinion.

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fled the store. Defendant then found Lyons and they drove to defendant’s girlfriend’s
house. In the car, defendant warned Lyons about informing anyone about what had
happened and offered to split the money.
Lyons later informed the police about what happened and directed them to the
storm drain where the murder weapon was hidden. Additionally, police questioned
defendant’s girlfriend who said defendant called her after getting arrested and told her to
tell Lyons to get rid of what was in the storm drain. Defendant’s girlfriend also said
defendant admitted to her, after he initially got out of jail, that he killed the clerk.
The trial court found that defendant, when he was questioned by law enforcement
officers, gave a statement that substantially differed from the statements Lyons and
defendant’s girlfriend had given to the police. Defendant’s account of the events heavily
implicated Lyons as the catalyst for the robbery and stated that Lyons was the actual
killer. The court then noted that defendant’s story changed during the investigation itself,
eventually admitting that he was at the scene with Lyons but still maintaining Lyons was
the actual killer.
After hearing argument from the prosecution and defendant’s counsel, in which
defense counsel highlighted conflicting evidence, such as the only palm print recovered
from the scene of the crime belonged to Lyons, the trial court found defendant to be the
actual killer beyond a reasonable doubt and denied his petition.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.6 permits resentencing for a person convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a prima facie case for relief is made,
the statute requires an evidentiary hearing where “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner” is guilty under the

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revised law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).) At this hearing, the court “may consider
evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing,” and the “prosecutor and the petitioner
may . . . offer new or additional evidence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
“ ‘ “A defendant has the constitutional right to be personally present in court
‘where necessary to protect the defendant’s opportunity for effective cross-examination,
or to allow [the defendant] to participate at a critical stage and enhance the fairness of the
proceeding.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 532 (Quan).) This “right
is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as
well as article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution.” (People v. Basler (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57 (Basler).) Because a section 1172.6 hearing allows the court to
potentially vacate a murder sentence through the admission of new evidence or by
reweighing prior evidence, it is a “critical stage” and, as such, requires either a
defendant’s presence or a valid waiver. (People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128,
150-151 (Jackson); see Quan, at pp. 532-533 [finding a § 1172.6 hearing is a critical
stage]; Basler, at p. 58 [same].)
A defendant’s right to be present serves “twin purposes,” to potentially offer
testimony and to assist counsel. (Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 536.) Indeed, “[t]he
entire purpose of the section [1172.6] resentencing hearing [is] for the court to consider
whether to vacate [a defendant’s] conviction and recall [the defendant’s] sentence,
including by reviewing the record and taking new evidence, if offered, on the issue of
[the defendant’s] actions and mens rea on the night in question. The question may well
turn on disputed issues of fact ‘about which [the defendant]—as a participant in the
events in question—may well have . . . something to say.” (Basler, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.) However, a defendant’s potential testimony is not dispositive in
and of itself, as the defendant’s presence is also critical to assist his, her, or their counsel,
because the defendant may have knowledge that is exclusive to him, her, or them.
(Quan, at p. 536; see also Basler, at p. 59.)

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Defendant contends, and the People concede, that his absence from the hearing
was error. We agree. The transcript of the hearing makes clear that defendant was not
present. The minute order asserts defendant waived his presence, but this conflicts with
the transcript of the hearing and “ ‘we presume the reporter’s transcript is . . . more
accurate.’ ” (Garner v. BNSF Railway Co. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 660, 668.) And again,
the People do not contend there was a valid waiver of defendant’s presence. As such, the
only question that we must decide is if this error was harmless.
Because a defendant’s absence from a critical stage in criminal proceedings is
constitutional error, to be harmless it must be found beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant’s absence did not affect the outcome of the proceeding. (Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; see also People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 461;
People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 902.) We conclude the error was not
harmless.
Both defendant and the People rely on three cases: Basler, Quan, and Jackson.
All three cases address felony-murder convictions at a section 1172.6 hearing, and all
three reversed and remanded because the reviewing court could not find the defendant’s
absence from the section 1172.6 hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 51, 60, 62; Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 537;
Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 136, 153-154.) The People cite no case
concluding a defendant’s absence at a section 1172.6 hearing to be harmless, and our
review of the case law likewise reveals no such case.
In Basler, the defendant was absent from his section 1172.6 hearing and had not
provided a waiver. (Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.) Remand was necessary
because the entire purpose of such hearings is to consider whether to vacate a conviction
and recall a sentence, “including by reviewing the record and taking new evidence, if
offered, on the issue of [the defendant’s] actions and mens rea on the night in question.”
(Ibid.) The court found that such an inquiry “may well turn on disputed issues of fact,

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‘about which [the defendant] . . . may well have had something to say.’ ” (Ibid.)
Consequently, it would be speculative to say that the defendant’s absence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
Quan dealt with a defendant who was convicted of three counts of first degree
murder under a felony-murder theory. (Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 526.) The
defendant was also absent from his section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. (Quan, at p. 530.)
The court found that it could not conclude the defendant’s absence was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt because the nature of felony murder requires both objective and
subjective evidence on whether the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea. (Id. at
p. 536.) Thus, “[h]ad he been present, [the defendant] could have addressed what he
knew of his confederates’ willingness to kill in furtherance of their objectives,” or to the
other components of the crime that were highly relevant to making the determination that
he possessed the requisite mens rea to support a current felony-murder standard. (Id. at
pp. 536-537.)
Finally, in Jackson, using the rationale laid out in Basler and Quan, the court
found the defendant’s absence from a section 1172.6 hearing required remand. (Jackson,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 153-154.) The defendant had also been convicted
approximately 30 years before the evidentiary hearing (id. at pp. 138-139), and the court
noted the defendant’s presence at the hearing was critical due to the difficulties of
reanalyzing “trial records that are often decades old” without the benefit of the
defendant’s presence (id. at pp. 152-154).
Defendant’s case here hinges on whether the evidence demonstrates beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was the actual killer, not necessarily his mens rea as the cases
above analyzed. (Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 59; Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 536.) But these cases still establish a defendant could provide critical support in
evaluating his, her, or their culpability in the murder, especially when the case is
determined by the credibility of the parties involved. Contrary to the People’s assertion,

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we cannot simply conclude defendant’s credibility was permanently “devastated”
because his story changed between statements. There is nothing in the record to
establish—beyond a reasonable doubt—that defendant would not have provided some
insight, either through his testimony or his ability to assist counsel, on what happened the
night of the murder.
Further, there is conflicting evidence in the police and forensic reports, which
served as the factual record below. For example, according to the forensics report, the
only palm print found on the counter belonged to Lyons. Defendant’s presence could
provide further context to this evidence if defendant was present and testified, and would
have been highly relevant to the trial court’s credibility analysis. Thus, this case, like
Basler, turns “on disputed issues of fact” about which defendant “ ‘may well have had
something to say.’ ” (Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.)
Finally, the People argue defendant’s admission to his sentence enhancement of
personally using a knife under section 12022, subdivision (b) in the commission of the
offense conclusively shows that he was the actual killer and, as such, his absence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, such a personal use finding does not
“itself prove defendant was the actual killer.” (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084,
1120.)
In short, we cannot conclude defendant’s absence from the section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3

3 Because we are reversing and remanding, we do not address defendant’s second
argument the trial court erred in relying on the police reports. Defendant may raise that
objection in the trial court on remand.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed and the matter is
remanded to conduct a new evidentiary hearing with defendant’s presence or with a valid
waiver.

/s/
ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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