CourtListener 10765593•In re A.L. CA2/5
Texte intégral
Filed 12/26/25 In re A.L. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re A.L., A Person Coming Under B345748, B347072
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24LJJP00029)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.L. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Donald A. Buddle, Judge. Affirmed.
Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.L.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant A.G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2
This consolidated appeal is taken from a parental rights
termination order. The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over
15-month-old A.L. (Minor) after sustaining allegations that C.L.
(Mother) endangered the child by leaving her home alone. The
juvenile court bypassed reunification services for Mother and
A.G. (Father), the latter of whom was incarcerated during the
proceedings, and ultimately terminated parental rights. Mother,
joined by Father, asks us to decide whether the juvenile court
erred in denying the change of circumstances petition she filed
before termination of parental rights and whether the parental
benefit exception should have forestalled that termination.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings Leading to Dependency Jurisdiction
In January 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) received a
referral alleging Mother was abusing drugs, smoking marijuana,
and had mental health issues.1 According to Minor’s maternal
1
Mother had previously been involved in a prior dependency
case. Minor has one older maternal half-sibling, Au.L., and in
2017, the juvenile court sustained allegations that Mother and
Au.L.’s father were involved in a robbery and subsequent police
vehicle pursuit while Au.L. was in the vehicle. When the vehicle
stopped, Mother dangled Au.L. out of the vehicle so law
enforcement would not use force when taking her and Au.L.’s
father into custody. Au.L. was removed from Mother and
eventually placed under the legal guardianship of maternal
grandmother. Mother was incarcerated as a result of the incident
and was released in October 2020.
3
aunt, Mother said she wanted to commit suicide three weeks
earlier.
Later in January 2024, the Department received another
referral alleging Mother left Minor home alone while she went to
another location to engage in a violent altercation. Mother was
arrested at the other location for stabbing someone and for
breaking and entering. The incident report prepared by the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department represented Mother did not
have the keys to her apartment when arrested, nor did she know
where they were. Law enforcement responded to the family
home, forced entry into the home, and found Minor lying on a
mattress in the living room, asleep. Minor, who was evaluated by
an EMT, appeared to be fine.
When a Department social worker interviewed Mother, she
said she picked up her friend Jaime the day before she (Mother)
was arrested. Jaime’s boyfriend called Mother numerous times
while she was with Jaime, but Mother did not answer the calls.
When she took Jaime home around 10 p.m. that night, Jaime’s
boyfriend was waiting outside their residence. The boyfriend
began yelling and threatening them, and he slammed and kicked
Mother’s car. Minor, who was in the car, was crying. Mother
managed to leave and took Minor home. After about 15 minutes
at home, Minor fell asleep. Mother then left their home and went
back to Jaime’s apartment to seek an apology from Jaime’s
boyfriend. According to Mother, Jaime and her boyfriend were
waiting outside for Mother when she arrived. The boyfriend had
a bat, and Jaime had a knife. Jaime’s boyfriend hit Mother with
a bat and Jaime tried slashing at Mother. Mother denied having
a knife, bringing a knife, or stabbing anyone. Mother said she
was about to leave, but someone called law enforcement and she
4
was arrested. Mother claimed she accompanied law enforcement
to her home and provided the key to open the door.
According to the Department’s reporting, Mother was
charged with assault with a deadly weapon and child
endangerment. (She was later released from custody on bond.)
Minor was taken into protective custody.
The Department thereafter filed a two-count petition
alleging dependency jurisdiction was proper under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).2 Count b-1 alleged
Mother placed Minor in a detrimental and endangering situation
by leaving her at home and unattended without adult supervision
for an extended period. Count b-2 alleged Mother failed to make
a plan for Minor’s safety because she was incarcerated with an
unknown release date. Father was not named in the petition;
when dependency proceedings commenced, he was incarcerated
and not parole-eligible until March 2027. The juvenile court
sustained both counts of the petition at an adjudication hearing
in March 2024.
The disposition hearing was held later, in July 2024, and
Mother testified. She asserted the criminal charges against her
had been dismissed on the condition that Mother attend mental
health and parenting programs.3 Mother testified about lessons
she claimed to have learned in anger management and parenting
classes, though she acknowledged she previously participated in
similar classes in connection with Au.L.’s dependency
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
3
The record elsewhere indicates Mother was placed on a 12-
month diversion program.
5
proceedings. When asked why allegations had been found true
against her in this case, Mother said, “For leaving my daughter
at home, but that does[ not] make me a monster. I know I could
have went around to do other things to protect her.” When asked
if she would have handled the situation differently based on what
she learned in parenting classes she had taken in the interim,
she said yes and explained she would have called the police.
When asked how she failed to protect Minor during the incident,
she said by not calling the police when she should have. When
asked if calling the police would have been the only necessary
step to help Minor, Mother said yes. When asked if there was
anything else she could have done to protect Minor, other than
call the police, Mother said no.
The juvenile court bypassed reunification services for
Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (12).
The court also bypassed reunification services for Father
pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (e).
B. Minor’s Interactions with Mother and Others
Mother began having monitored visits with Minor in
February 2024. The frequency of the visits increased over time,
with visits initially occurring a few times per month, and later
occurring two to three times per week.
The reports of the visits were generally positive. Mother
brought food and toys to each visit, including a swing set to visits
at the Department’s office. When the visits occurred at the
Department, Mother cleaned the visitation room for Minor.
Mother showed affection to Minor, and Minor appeared to enjoy
the visits. Minor’s caregiver reported Minor appeared happy to
see Mother during the first visits, but she clung to caregiver at
6
the beginning. The caregiver also reported Minor would run to
the caregiver at pickup time and did not cry when saying goodbye
to Mother. There were no reports indicating Minor had difficulty
separating from Mother at the end of visits.
Shortly after Minor was placed with her caregiver, the
caregiver stated she believed Minor needed therapy because she
was tripping when she walked. The social worker similarly
observed Minor was unable to keep a stable stance. Minor was
eventually deemed eligible for regional center services due to
developmental delays and also received special services through
her local school district. The caregiver took her to her
therapeutic appointments.
In both February and May 2024, Minor’s caregiver reported
Mother visited with Minor via calls, was kind to Minor, and was
respectful to the caregiver. A Multidisciplinary Assessment
Team Report from May 2024 advised Minor was bonded to her
caregivers and foster family and had adjusted quickly to her new
living arrangement. By November 2024, her caregivers reported
they were interested in adopting Minor.
Paternal grandparents visited repeatedly with Minor over
the course of the proceedings and they also expressed a desire to
adopt Minor. The Department, however, had concerns about that
potential placement. Father participated in some phone and
video calls with Minor. Maternal grandmother and Minor’s half-
sibling participated in one visit with Minor on her birthday.
Maternal aunt stated she had seen Minor approximately two
times.
7
C. Mother’s Change of Circumstance Petition
In February 2025, Mother filed a section 388 change of
circumstance petition, seeking to change the court’s orders
bypassing reunification services and ordering her visits with
Minor be monitored. Mother asked the court to return Minor to
her care and order six months of reunification services. If the
court declined to return Minor to Mother, Mother asked for
reunification services and unmonitored visits.
Mother argued she worked hard to improve herself and
show the court her commitment to Minor. She completed seven
parenting programs, an anger management program, an
outpatient drug program, attended Narcotics Anonymous
meetings, and had a sponsor. Mother asserted the changes she
requested would benefit Minor because Minor had a strong bond
with Mother, maternal relatives, and her half-sibling.
During an interview the following month, a Department
social worker asked Mother why Minor was detained. Mother
responded by saying she was helping her friend out, her friend’s
partner got violent, Mother put Minor in her home, and Mother
wanted an apology from the male partner. Mother said the male
partner got physical and attacked her. She explained she pled no
contest in criminal court, was participating in a diversion
program, and was required to do a 52-week parenting course and
one year of mental health counseling.
When asked if she had a therapist and a psychiatrist,
Mother replied she had a new therapist but she was not seeing a
psychiatrist at the time of interview. When asked for the contact
information for her therapist, Mother said a different social
worker had the information but also agreed to send the
information to the person interviewing her. Mother, however,
8
had not provided the contact information by the time the social
worker completed the report. Mother said she had not been in
any further altercations or disputes and said she moved to a
different environment.
D. The Change of Circumstance Petition and
Permanency Planning Rulings
The juvenile court held a hearing to decide Mother’s section
388 petition and permanency planning in April 2025. Regarding
the section 388 petition, Mother argued there was a change in
circumstances because Mother had participated in many
programs. She asserted it would be in Minor’s best interest to
grant the petition because Minor loves Mother and enjoys visits.4
Mother argued she had been doing a lot of work on herself,
including learning new ways to handle stress and how best to
talk to Minor.
The Department argued Mother completed many of the
programs she identified prior to the court’s issuance of the order
bypassing family reunification services—meaning they were not
necessarily new circumstances—and she was ordered to
participate in some of the programs by the criminal court. The
Department also argued some of the programs (e.g., the
substance abuse program) were not part of the court’s concerns
regarding Mother’s parenting. The Department stated individual
therapy was one of the court’s concerns, the reports indicated
Mother changed therapists during the proceedings, it was unclear
whether she was consistently participating in therapy, and she
4
Prior to the hearing, Mother was visiting Minor two to
three times per week, for two to three hours each time.
9
was not taking any medication. The Department also argued
Mother seemed to lack insight into why Minor originally came
before the court. The Department contended it was in Minor’s
best interests to stay in her placement, where her caretakers
were consistently caring for her and taking her to services.
Minor’s counsel acknowledged Mother was working hard to
improve herself and had been consistently having good visits
with Minor. However, Minor’s counsel argued that it was not in
her best interests to grant the petition given Mother’s history.
The court acknowledged Mother participated in many
programs and seemed to be trying to work on herself. But the
court stated it did not believe Mother had shown a substantial
change in circumstances considering the length of her criminal
history and the fact that the dependency proceedings were
precipitated by a crime. The court explained that given the
amount of time Minor had been out of Mother’s home and the
stage of the proceedings, it was not in Minor’s best interests to
grant the petition.
The court also heard argument on permanency planning.
Mother asked the court not to terminate her parental rights
because the parental benefit exception applied. Mother asserted
she had regular visitation with Minor, Minor is affectionate
toward Mother, and there is a strong bond between Mother and
Minor. Mother noted Minor looks forward to visits, is engaged
with Mother during visits, and shows affection to her without
prompting. Mother argued it would be destabilizing to Minor to
lose her relationship with Mother. She also argued it would be in
Minor’s best interests to have a continuing relationship with
Mother.
10
Father requested Minor be placed with paternal
grandparents. He also objected to the termination of parental
rights, asserting his lack of visits with Minor was due to his
incarceration.
Minor’s counsel acknowledged visits with Mother were
positive but maintained the benefit of permanency with her
loving foster home outweighed any detriment that would occur by
termination of parental rights.
The Department conceded Mother was visiting with Minor
on a regular basis, but it argued the preference was for the most
permanent plan for Minor, which was adoption. The Department
argued that even though Mother was visiting regularly, Minor’s
caregivers were still providing most of the parental support and
were the ones facilitating Minor’s extensive therapy. The
Department also emphasized Minor had been in the care of her
caregivers for around half her life and contended the benefits of a
permanent plan with those caregivers outweighed any sort of
bond between Minor and Mother.
The court stated that after reviewing the file and hearing
arguments, it would find Mother had not met her burden to
demonstrate the parental benefit exception applied. The court
acknowledged Mother regularly visited Minor, but it found
neither she nor Father had a beneficial relationship with Minor
and, further, that terminating the parent-child relationships
would not be detrimental to Minor.
Mother and Father filed separate appeals. Mother’s
briefing was completed first. In his opening brief, Father joined
in Mother’s opening and reply briefs and did not raise any
additional arguments. We subsequently consolidated the appeals
for purposes of oral argument and decision.
11
II. DISCUSSION
The juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s change of
circumstances petition was not an abuse of discretion. Even
assuming for argument’s sake that Mother showed changed
circumstances, she did not establish commencing reunification
services late in the proceedings was in Minor’s best interests
given the permanency and stability offered by her caregivers.
Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s finding that the
parental benefit exception does not apply, which is premised on
the contention that the court’s ruling was too cursory, also fails.
The juvenile court was not required to explain its reasons for
finding the exception does not apply and the record does not
affirmatively demonstrate the juvenile court failed to apply
settled law.
A. Section 388 Petition
“Section 388 allows a parent or other person with an
interest in a dependent child to petition the juvenile court to
change, modify, or set aside any previous order. . . . The
petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of
circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in
the best interests of the child.” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) Where reunification services are
terminated, “the parents’ interest in the care, custody[,] and
companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at
this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability’ [citation] . . . .” (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) A court considering a child’s best
12
interests in the context of a section 388 petition “must recognize
this shift of focus . . . .” (Ibid.)
“[B]est interests is a complex idea” that requires
consideration of a variety of factors. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 519, 530.) In determining whether a section 388
petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court may
consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case
including “factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to
the child’s removal, the reason the problem was not resolved, the
passage of time since the child’s removal, the relative strength of
the bonds with the child, the nature of the change of
circumstance, and the reason the change was not made sooner.”
(Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at 616.) We review a juvenile
court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 398, 415 [the decision on a section 388 petition “is
addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its
decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion”].)
Here, the juvenile court bypassed reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (12), meaning
it previously determined by clear and convincing evidence that
Mother failed to reunify with Minor’s half-sibling and had been
convicted of a violent felony. We will assume for the sake of
argument that Mother’s participation in parenting and other
classes, and the absence of additional criminal or violent conduct
after dependency proceedings began, reflect a change in
circumstances. We still conclude, however, that the the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in denying her change of
circumstance petition because she did not establish ordering
family reunification services would be in Minor’s best interests.
13
Minor had been in Mother’s care for the first fifteen months
of her life, but by the time of the section 388 hearing, Minor had
been in a stable placement for over a year and her caregivers
were intent on adopting her. Mother’s contact with Minor during
the entirety of the dependency proceedings was limited to
monitored visitation. There was evidence that Minor enjoyed her
visits with Mother, but there was no evidence Minor was notably
eager at the start of visits, upset at the end of visits, or otherwise
manifested a desire for more contact with Mother. There was
also evidence that Minor was happy, healthy, and well-bonded
with her caregivers, with whom she had spent almost as much of
her life with as she spent with Mother. She was doing well in
their stable home and referred to one of her caregivers as
“mommy.” Given the late stage of the proceedings, Minor’s need
for permanency and stability was the juvenile court’s “foremost
concern.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 594.) It
was not unreasonable for the juvenile court to conclude Minor’s
best interests would not be served by attempts at reunification
and the resulting delay in implementing the permanent plan.5
In addition to the evidence-focused challenge to the court’s
exercise of discretion that we have rejected, Mother also
5
Additionally, Mother’s petition, which generally asserts
Minor would benefit emotionally and mentally from being in
Mother’s care, did not specifically explain how granting the
petition would be in Minor’s best interests. Though the petition
did assert Minor had a strong bond with maternal relatives and
her brother, the record indicates she only had one visit with her
brother or any other maternal relatives during the dependency
proceedings. Father’s parents visited with Minor numerous
times, but Mother’s did not.
14
complains the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard in
determining the requested change would not be in Minor’s best
interests because the court did not expressly discuss the factors
identified in Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 519. Kimberly F.
enumerated the following non-exhaustive list of factors to be
considered in evaluating the “best interests” prong of a section
388 petition: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the
dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem;
(2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children
to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the
problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to
which it actually has been.” (Id. at 532.)
Mother’s argument fails for several reasons. The law does
not require a juvenile court to expressly consider the Kimberly F.
factors. Additionally, though the only factor the court mentioned
on the record at the hearing was the length of time Minor had
been out of Mother’s home, nothing in the record suggests the
court was not aware of or did not consider other relevant factors.
Mother’s complaint that the length of time Minor was out of her
home is not a factor identified by Kimberly F. is meritless because
Kimberly F. did not purport to identify every possible relevant
factor and because, at the stage of dependency proceedings
involved here, “the court’s focus shifts from family reunification
toward promoting the child’s needs for permanency and
stability.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.)
Moreover, the juvenile court’s ruling was within its
discretion even if analyzed solely within the confines of the
Kimberly F. framework. The problem that led to the dependency
proceedings was Mother’s decision to leave then 15-month-old
Minor home alone for hours in order to reengage in a conflict with
15
a third party. Though Mother told the dependency court she
would make different choices after participating in parenting
courses, her focus was on calling the police—presumably to
address the conflict between her and the third party. There is no
indication in the record that Mother addressed the core of the
problem as it related to Minor: that Mother endangered her by
leaving her alone on a mattress in an apartment with items that
could have caused Minor harm had she woken and moved about
without supervision. Mother did not acknowledge she had
endangered Minor in this manner during the proceedings, and
thus did not actually ameliorate the problem. As for the strength
of the relative bonds, Mother focuses on the bond between herself
and Minor. While the record supports her assertion that Minor
enjoyed her visits with Mother, it goes no further than that, and
that is not far enough to countermand the court’s discretionary
determination in light of the other considerations we have
already discussed.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
If a juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence at
the section 366.26 hearing that a child is likely to be adopted,
“the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child
placed for adoption” unless, as relevant here, it “finds a
compelling reason for determining that termination would be
detrimental to the child due to one or more” enumerated
exceptions. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B); see also In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631.) “The statutory
exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances
[citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which
remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
16
The exception at issue here, the parental benefit exception,
applies if “termination would be detrimental to the child” because
the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with
the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A parent invoking the
exception in an effort to forestall termination of parental rights
bears the burden to demonstrate three things by a preponderance
of the evidence. First, the parent must show he or she had
“regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account
the extent of visitation permitted.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at 636.) Second, the parent must show “the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.) This element is affected by
“‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id.
at 632 [in conducting this assessment, “courts often consider how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their
parents”].) Third, the parent must show that “terminating that
[parental] attachment would be detrimental to the child even
when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new,
adoptive home.” (Id. at 636.) Ordinarily, our review of the
juvenile court’s ruling on the parental benefit exception is for
substantial evidence on the first two of these elements and for
abuse of discretion on the third. (Id. at 639-640.)
Mother’s sole argument on appeal, however, is that the
court’s order terminating parental rights must be reversed
because the court did not expressly consider the elements of the
second and third prong of the parental benefit test outlined in
17
Caden C. This is unpersuasive. The record does not indicate the
statements the juvenile court made during the hearing were
“intended to be a comprehensive recitation of the grounds for its
decision” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156) and, as
precedent holds, we “infer from section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(D)—under which the juvenile court is required to ‘state its
reasons in writing or on the record’ when it makes a finding that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the
child—that the court is not required to make findings when it
concludes that parental rights termination would not be
detrimental” (Ibid.).
Though Mother cites several cases where courts have found
it appropriate to remand a parental benefit determination for
further proceedings, none support her contention that the
juvenile court was required to make express findings to support
its ruling here. In most of the cited cases, the juvenile court
found the parental benefit exception did not apply prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Caden C. The courts of appeal,
reviewing the cases after Caden C. was decided, reversed the
juvenile court orders either because the record affirmatively
disclosed the juvenile court based its ruling on improper factors
under Caden C. (In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 264) or
because the appellate court could not assess whether the juvenile
court had done so (In re D.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153, 168-169;
In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 854). Here, by contrast,
where Caden C. is well-established law, “[w]e presume the trial
court followed applicable law” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956), and the court expressly
stated that Mother did not meet the requirements of Caden C.
18
Mother’s reliance on In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
197 to support the proposition that remand is required where a
court’s ruling is “terse” is similarly unavailing. The court in L.A.-
O. remanded not simply due to a paucity of express analysis but
because the juvenile court’s ruling found parents had not acted in
a “parental role” and its use of the term created doubt about
whether the court analyzed legally correct factors. (Id. at 211-
212.) Similarly, the appellate court in In re M.V. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1155, remanded for multiple reasons, including
because the juvenile court based its decision to terminate
parental rights on improper factors. (Id. at 1185-1186.) Mother
does not identify any improper factors the juvenile court
considered here.6
6
At most, Mother contends some of the arguments made by
counsel urged the court to base its ruling on improper factors.
But there is no indication in the record the court did so.
19
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
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